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THE
ANCIENT HISTORY

OF THE
EGYPTIANS, CARTHAGINIANS,
ASSYRIANS, BABYLONIANS, MEDES AND PERSIANS,
MACEDONIANS AND GRECIANS.

BY
CHARLES ROLLIN,

*Late Principal of the University of Paris, Professor of Eloquence in the Royal
College, and Member of the Royal Academy of Inscriptions
and Belles Lettres.*

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOLUME II.

FROM THE LATEST LONDON EDITION,
Carefully Revised and Corrected.

NEW YORK:
JOHN WURTELE LOVELL
24 BOND STREET.

A NEW HISTORY

OF THE

ANTIENT GREEK HISTORY

FROM THE FIRST TO THE LAST OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

AND GREEK HISTORY

BY

JOHN WURTELL JOVELL

This History of the Antient Greek History, Professor of Eloquence in the Royal Academy, and Member of the Royal Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres.

—*—

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CONTENTS.

BOOK VI.

THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

	PAGE.
CHAP. I. The History of Darius, connected with that of the Greeks,	13
Sect. I. Darius's Marriage, &c.	13
—II. Revolt and Reduction of Babylon,	24
—III. Darius prepares for an Expedition against the Scythians. A Digression upon the Manners and Customs of that Nation,	27
A Digression concerning the Scythians,	28
Sect. IV. Darius's Expedition against the Scythians,	34
—V. Darius's Conquest of India,	44
—VI. The Revolt of the Ionians,	45
—VII. The Expedition of Darius's Army against Greece,	53
1. The State of Athens. The characters of Miltiades, Themistocles and Aristides,	54
2. Darius sends Heralds into Greece, in order to sound the People, and to require them to submit,	60
3. The Persians Defeated at Marathon by Miltiades,	62
Sect. VIII. Darius resolves to make War in person against Egypt and against Greece, &c.	71
Chap. II. The History of Xerxes, connected with that of the Greeks,	75
Sect. I. Xerxes reduces Egypt, &c.	75
—II. Xerxes begins his March, and passes from Asia into Europe, by crossing the Strait of the Hellespont upon a Bridge of Boats,	82
Sect. III. The Number of Xerxes's Forces, &c., &c.	89
—IV. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians send to their Allies in vain to require succors from them. The Command of the Fleet given to the Lacedæmonians,	93
Sect. V. The Battle of Thermopylæ. The Death of Leonidas,	98
—VI. Naval Battle near Artemisium,	104
—VII. The Athenians abandon their City, which is taken and burnt by Xerxes,	106
Sect. VIII. The Battle of Salamin, &c.	110
—IX. The Battle of Platææ,	119
—X. The Battle near Mycale. The defeat of the Persians,	132
—XI. The Barbarous and Inhuman Revenge of Amestris, the Wife of Xerxes,	134
Sect. XII. The Athenians rebuild the Walls of their City, notwithstanding the opposition of the Lacedæmonians,	137
Sect. XIII. The black design of Themistocles rejected unanimously by the People of Athens,	140
Sect. XIV. The Lacedæmonians lose the Chief Command through the Pride and Arrogance of Pausanias,	143
Sect. XV. The Secret Conspiracy of Pausanias with the Persians. His Death,	145
Sect. XVI. Themistocles flies for Shelter to King Admetus,	147
—XVII. Disinterested Administration of the Public Treasure by Aristides. His Death and Eulogium,	150
Sect. XVIII. Xerxes killed by Artabanus. His Character,	156

BOOK VII.

THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

	PAGE.
CHAP. I. The History of the Persians and Grecians from the Beginning of the Reign of Artaxerxes to the Peloponnesian War,	159
Sect. I. Artaxerxes Ruins the Faction of Artabanes, &c. - - -	159
—II. Themistocles Flies to Artaxerxes, - - -	161
—III. Cimon begins to make a Figure at Athens, - - -	165
—IV. The Egyptians, supported by the Athenians, rise against Persia, - - -	174
Sect. V. Inarus is Delivered up to the King's Mother. The Affliction and Revolt of Megabyzus, - - -	176
Sect. VI. Artaxerxes sends Esdras and afterwards Nehemiah to Jerusalem, - - -	178
Sect. VII. Character of Pericles, &c. - - -	181
—VIII. An Earthquake in Sparta, &c. - - -	187
—IX. Cimon is Recalled, &c. His Death, - - -	190
—X. Thucydides is Opposed to Pericles, &c. - - -	193
—XI. Pericles Changes his Conduct with Regard to the People, -	197
—XII. Jealousy and Contests arise between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, - - -	201
Sect. XIII. New Subjects of Contention between the two Nations, -	204
—XIV. Troubles excited against Pericles, &c. - - -	211
Chap. II. Transactions of the Greeks in Sicily and Italy, - - -	217
Sect. I. The Carthaginians defeated in Sicily. Of Gelon and his two Brothers, - - -	217
Sect. II. Famous Persons and Cities in Græcia Major, &c. - - -	229
Chap. III. The War of Peloponnesus, - - -	238
Sect. I. The Siege of Platææ by the Thebans, &c., &c. The First year of the War, - - -	238
Sect. II. The Plague makes dreadful havoc in Attica, &c. Second and Third years of the War, - - -	246
Sect. III. The Lacedæmonians besiege Platææ. Fourth and Fifth years of the War, - - -	255
Sect. IV. The Athenians possess themselves of Pylus, &c. Sixth and seventh years of the War, - - -	270

BOOK VIII.

THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIANS AND GRECIANS,

Continued during the Reigns of

XERXES II. OF SOGDIANUS, AND OF DARIUS NOTHUS.

CHAP. I. Contains thirteen years of the Peloponnesian War, - -	277
Sect. I. The very short Reigns of Xerxes II. and Sogdianus, &c. -	277
—II. The Athenians make themselves masters of the Island of Cythera, &c. Eighth year of the War, - - -	282
Sect. III. A twelvemonth's truce is agreed upon between the two states, &c., &c. Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh years of the War, - - -	285
Sect. IV. Character of Alcibiades. Banishment of Hyperbolus, &c. Twelfth year of the War, - - -	290
—V. Alcibiades engages the Athenians in the War of Sicily. Sixteenth and Seventeenth years of the War, - - -	298
—VI. Account of the several people who inhabited Sicily, - -	300
—VII. The People of Eggesta implore Aid of the Athenians, &c. -	302

	PAGE.
Sect. VIII. The Athenians prepare to set Sail, &c., &c.	307
IX. Syracuse is alarmed. The Athenian fleet arrives in Sicily,	310
X. Alcibiades recalled, &c., &c.	313
XI. Description of Syracuse,	316
XII. Nicias, after some Engagements, besieges Syracuse, &c. Eighteenth year of the War,	319
Sect. XIII. The Syracusans resolve to capitulate, but the arrival of Gylippus changes the face of Affairs, &c. Nineteenth year of the War,	327
Sect. XIV. The Athenians again hazard a Sea-fight, and are defeated. Nicias and Demosthenes sentenced to Die, and Executed,	340
Chap. II. Contains the last Eight years of the Peloponnesian War,	353
Sect. I. Consequences of the Defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, &c.	353
II. Alcibiades returns to Athens. Tissaphernes concludes a new Treaty with the Lacedæmonians,	357
Sect. III. Alteration in the Government of Athens. Alcibiades re- called, and afterwards appointed Generalissimo,	360
Sect. IV. The Lacedæmonians appoint Lysander Admiral. He beats the Athenian fleet near Ephesus. Lysander is succeeded in the command by Callicratidas,	370
Sect. V. Callicratidas is defeated by the Athenians. Sentence of death passed on some Athenian Generals. Socrates alone opposes this sentence,	377
Sect. VI. Lysander commands the Lacedæmonian fleet. His cele- brated victory over the Athenians,	384
Sect. VII. Lysander besieges Athens. Form of Government changed. Death of Darius Nothus,	389

BOOK IX.

THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIANS AND GRECIANS,

Continued during the

FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE REIGN OF ARTAXERXES MNEMON.

CHAP. I Domestic troubles of the Court of Persia	395
Sect. I. Coronation of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Cyrus attempts to as- sassinate his brother. Revenge of Statira. Death and character of Alcibiades,	395
Sect. II. The Thirty exercise horrid cruelties at Athens; they put Theramenes to Death. Thrasybulus attacks the Tyrants, is master of Athens, and restores its Liberties,	402
Sect. III. Lysander abuses his Power in an extraordinary manner. He is recalled to Sparta,	408
Chap. II. Young Cyrus, with the aid of the Grecian troops, endeav- ors to dethrone his brother Artaxerxes. He is killed. Famous retreat of Ten Thousand,	411
Sect. I. Cyrus raises troops against his brother Artaxerxes,	412
II. The Battle of Cunaxa. Cyrus is killed,	418
III. Eulogy of Cyrus,	424
IV. The King is for Compelling the Greeks to Deliver up their Arms,	427
Sect. V. Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks from the Province of Babylon to Trebisond,	434
Sect. VI. The Greeks arrive upon the Sea-coast, opposite to Byzan- tium. Xenophon joins Thimbron,	440
Sect. VII. Consequences of the Death of Cyrus. Cruelty of Pary- satis. Statira Poisoned,	446

CHAP. III. The famous Peace of Antalcides prescribed to the Greeks by Artaxerxes Mnemon,	449
Sect. I. Grecian Cities of Ionia implore aid of Lacedæmon. Agesilaus elected king. His character,	450
Sect. II. Agesilaus goes to Asia. Lysander falls out with him,	458
—III. Expedition of Agesilaus to Asia,	464
—IV. Agesilaus recalled by the Ephori to defend his Country,	470
—V. Agesilaus returns victorious to Sparta. Peace shameful to the Greeks concluded,	479
Sect. VI. War of Artaxerxes against Evagoras,	486
Eulogy and Character of Evagoras,	491
Trial of Tiribasis,	494
Sect. VII. The Expedition of Artaxerxes against the Cadusians. History of Detames the Carian,	495
CHAP. IV. History of Socrates abridged,	503
Sect. I. Birth and Education of Socrates,	504
—II. Of the Dæmon, or familiar Spirit of Socrates,	509
—III. Socrates declared the Wisest of Mankind by the Oracle,	511
—IV. Socrates devotes himself entirely to the Instruction of the Youth of Athens,	513
Sect. V. Socrates applies himself to discredit the Sophists in the opinion of the young Athenians,	520
Sect. VI. Socrates is accused of holding bad Opinions in regard to the gods. He is condemned to die,	522
Sect. VII. Socrates refuses to escape out of Prison. He drinks the Poison,	534
Sect. VIII. Reflections upon Socrates, and the Sentence passed upon him by the Athenians,	545

BOOK X.

THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIANS AND GRECIANS,

Containing the

MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE GREEKS.

CHAP. I. Of Political Government,	551
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ARTICLE I.

Of the Government of Sparta,	552
Sect. I. Idea of the Spartan Government,	553
—II. Love of Poverty instituted at Sparta,	556
—III. Laws established by Minos in Crete,	560

ARTICLE II.

Of the Government of Athens,	567
Sect. I. Foundation of the Government of Athens,	568
—II. Of the Inhabitants of Athens,	570
I. Of the Citizens,	571
II. Of the Strangers,	572
III. Of the Servants,	572
Sect. III. Of the Council, or Senate of Five Hundred,	574
—IV. Of the Areopagus,	575
—V. Of the Magistrates,	577

	PAGE.
Sect. VI. Of the Assemblies of the People, - - - - -	577
-----VII. Of Trials, - - - - -	580
-----VIII. Of the Amphictyons, - - - - -	582
-----IX. Of the Revenues of Athens, - - - - -	584
-----X. Of the Education of the Youth, - - - - -	585
I. Dancing, Music, - - - - -	586
II. Of the other Exercises of the Body, - - - - -	588
III. Of the Exercises of the Mind, - - - - -	589
CHAP. II. Of War, - - - - -	591
Sect. I. People of Greece in all times very warlike, - - - - -	591
-----II. Origin and Cause of the Valor and Military Virtue of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, - - - - -	592
Sect. III. Of the different kinds of Troops which composed the Armies of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, - - - - -	595
Sect. IV. Of Maritime Affairs, Fleets, and Naval Forces, - - - - -	598
-----V. Peculiar Character of the Athenians, - - - - -	603
-----VI. Common Character of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, - - - - -	608

BOOK XI.

THE HISTORIES OF DIONYSIUS AND HIS SON, TYRANTS OF SYRACUSE.

CHAP. I. The History of Dionysius the Elder, - - - - -	611
Sect. I. Means made use of by Dionysius the Elder to possess himself of the Tyranny, - - - - -	613
Sect. II. Commotions in Sicily and at Syracuse against Dionysius. He finds Means to dispel them, - - - - -	620
Sect. III. Dionysius declares War against the Carthaginians. Various success of it, - - - - -	630
Sect. IV. Violent Passion of Dionysius for Poetry. His Death and bad qualities, - - - - -	610
CHAP. II. The History of Dionysius the Younger, - - - - -	652
Sect. I. Dionysius the Younger succeeds his Father. He invites Plato to his Court, - - - - -	652
Sect. II. Banishment of Dion, - - - - -	661
-----III. Dion sets out to deliver Syracuse. His Death, - - - - -	666
-----IV. Character of Dion, - - - - -	687
-----V. Dionysius the Younger re-ascends the Throne, - - - - -	689
-----VI. Timoleon restores Liberty to Syracuse, and institutes wise Laws. His Death. - - - - -	697

BOOK XII.

THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CHAP. I. The History of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, two illustrious Theban Generals, - - - - -	705
Sect. I. State of Greece from the Treaty of Antalcides, - - - - -	705
-----II. Sparta's prosperity. Character of two illustrious Thebans, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, - - - - -	709
Sect. III. Sphodrias forms a design against the Piræus, - - - - -	718
-----IV. New Troubles in Greece. The Lacedæmonians declare War against Thebes, - - - - -	723
Sect. V. The two Theban Generals, at their return, are accused and absolved. Sparta implores aid of Athens, - - - - -	735
Sect. VI. Pelopidas marches against Alexander, Tyrant of Phæræ; is killed in Battle. Tragical end of Alexander, - - - - -	740

	PAGE.
Sect. VII Epaminondas chosen General of the Thebans. His Death and Character,	750
Sect. VIII. Death of Evagoras King of Salamin. Admirable Character of that Prince,	761
Sect. IX. Artaxerxes Mnemon undertakes the reduction of Egypt,	763
Sect. X. The Lacedæmonians send Agesilaus to the aid of Tachos. His death,	766
Sect. XI. Trouble of the Court of Artaxerxes concerning his successor. Death of that Prince,	771
Sect. XII. Causes of the frequent Insurrections and Revolts in the Persian Empire,	773

BOOK SIXTH.

THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

PLAN.

This Book contains the History of the Persians and Grecians, in the reigns of Darius I. and Xerxes I. during the space of forty-eight years, from the year of the world 3483, to the year 3531.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY OF DARIUS, CONNECTED WITH THAT OF THE GREEKS.

BEFORE Darius came to the throne he was called Ochus. At his accession he took the name of Darius, which, according to Herodotus, in the Persian language, signifies an avenger, or a man that defeats the schemes of another; probably because he had punished and put an end to the insolence of the Magian impostor. He reigned thirty years.*

SECTION I.—DARIUS'S MARRIAGES. THE IMPOSITION OF TRIBUTES. THE INSOLENCE AND PUNISHMENT OF INTAPHERNES. THE DEATH OF ORETES. THE STORY OF DEMOCEDUS, A PHYSICIAN. THE JEWS PERMITTED TO CARRY ON THE BUILDING OF THEIR TEMPLE. THE GENEROSITY OF SYLOSON REWARDED.

Before Darius was elected king, he had married the daughter of Gobryas, whose name is not known. Artabazanes, his eldest son by her, afterwards disputed the empire with Xerxes.

When Darius was seated on the throne, the better to secure himself therein, he married two of Cyrus's daughters,

* Herod. l. vi. c. 38. Val. Max. l. ix. c. 2.

Atossa and Aristona. The former had been wife to Cambyzes, her own brother, and afterwards to Smerdis the Magian, during the time he possessed the throne. Aristona was still a virgin, when Darius married her; and, of all his wives, was the person he most loved. He likewise married Parmys, daughter of the true Smerdis, the brother of Cambyzes; as also Phedyma, daughter of Otanes, by whose management the imposture of the Magian was discovered. By these wives he had a great number of children of both sexes.*

We have already seen that the seven conspirators, who put the Magian to death, had agreed among themselves, that he whose horse, on a day appointed, first neighed at the rising of the sun, should be declared king; and that Darius's horse, by an artifice of his groom, procured his master that honor. The king, desiring to transmit to future ages his gratitude for this signal and extraordinary service, caused an equestrian statue to be set up with this inscription, "Darius, the son of Hystaspes, acquired the kingdom of Persia by means of his horse (whose name was inserted), and of his groom, Œbares."† There is in this inscription, in which we see the king is not ashamed to own himself indebted to his horse and his groom for so transcendent a benefaction as the regal diadem, when it was his interest, one would think, to have it considered as the fruits of a superior merit, a simplicity and sincerity peculiar to the genius of those ancient times, and extremely remote from the pride and vanity of ours.

One of the first cares of Darius, when he was settled on the throne, was to regulate the state of the provinces, and to put his finances in good order. Before his time, Cyrus and Cambyzes had contented themselves with receiving from the conquered nations such free gifts only as they voluntarily offered, and with requiring a certain number of troops, when they had occasion for them. But Darius conceived, that it was impossible for him to preserve all the nations subject to him, in peace and security, without keeping up regular forces, and without assigning them a certain pay; or to be able punctually to give them that pay, without laying taxes and impositions upon the people.‡

In order, therefore, to regulate the administration of his finances, he divided the whole empire into twenty districts, or governments, each of which was annually to pay a certain

* A. M. 3483. Ant. J. C. 521. Herod. l. iii. c. 88. † Ibid. ‡ Herod. c. 89-97.

sum to the satrap, or governor appointed for that purpose. The natural subjects, that is, the Persians, were exempt from all imposts. Herodotus has an exact enumeration of these provinces, which may very much contribute to give us a just idea of the extent of the Persian empire.

In Asia it comprehended all that now belongs to the Persians and Turks; in Africa, it included Egypt and part of Nubia, as also the coasts of the Mediterranean, as far as the kingdom of Barca; in Europe, part of Thrace and Macedonia. But it must be observed, that in this vast extent of country, there were several nations, which were only tributary, and not properly subjects to Persia; as is the case at this day, with respect to the Turkish empire.

History observes, that Darius, in imposing these tributes, showed great wisdom and moderation. He sent for the principal inhabitants of every province; such as were best acquainted with the condition and ability of their country, and were obliged by interest to give him a true and impartial account. He then asked them, if such and such sums, which he proposed to each of them for their respective provinces, were not too great, or did not exceed what they were able to pay? his intention being, as he told them, not to oppress his subjects, but only to require such aids from them as were proportioned to their incomes, and absolutely necessary for the defence of the state. They all answered that the sums he proposed were very reasonable, and such as would not be burdensome to the people. The king, however, was pleased to abate one-half, choosing rather to keep a great deal within bounds, than to risk a possibility of exceeding them.*

But notwithstanding this extraordinary moderation on the king's part, as there is something odious in all imposts, the Persians, who gave the surname of mother to Cyrus, and of master to Cambyzes, thought fit to characterize Darius with that of merchant.†

The several sums levied by the imposition of these tributes, or taxes, as far as we can infer from the calculation of Herodotus, which is attended with great difficulties, amounted in the whole to about forty-four millions *per annum* French, or something less than two millions English money. ‡

* Plut. in Apophthegm. p. 172. *οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τῷ βασιλεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑποκόμοις*

† *Κάπηλος* signifies something more mean and contemptible; but I do not know how to express it in our language. It may signify a broker, or a retailer, any one that buys to sell again.

‡ Nearly nine millions of dollars.

After the death of the Magian impostor, it was agreed that the Persian noblemen who had conspired against him, should, besides several other marks of distinction, have the liberty of free access to the king's presence at all times, except when he was alone with the queen. Intaphernes, one of these noblemen, being refused admittance into the king's apartment, at a time when the king and queen were in private together, in a violent rage attacked the officers of the palace, abused them outrageously, cutting their faces with his scimitar. Darius highly resented so heinous an insult; and at first apprehended it might be a conspiracy among the noblemen. But when he was well assured of the contrary, he caused Intaphernes, with his children, and all that were of his family, to be taken up, and had them all condemned to be put to death, confounding, through a blind excess of severity, the innocent with the guilty. In these unhappy circumstances, the criminal's lady went every day to the gates of the palace, crying and weeping in the most lamentable manner, and never ceasing to implore the king's clemency with all the pathetic eloquence of sorrow and distress. The king could not resist so moving a spectacle, and besides her own, granted her the pardon of any one of her family whom she should choose. This gave the unhappy lady great perplexity, who desired, no doubt, to save them all. At last, after a long deliberation, she determined in favor of her brother.

The choice, wherein she seemed not to have followed the sentiments which nature should dictate to a mother and a wife, surprised the king, who desired her to be asked the reason of it, to which she made answer, that by a second marriage, the loss of a husband and children might be retrieved; but that, her father and mother being dead, there was no possibility of recovering a brother. Darius, besides the life of her brother, granted her the same favor for the eldest of her children.*

I have already related in Vol. I. by what an instance of perfidy Oretes, one of the king's governors in Asia Minor, brought about the death of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos. So black and detestable a crime did not go unpunished. Darius found out that Oretes strangely abused his power, making no account of the blood of those persons who had the misfortune to displease him. This satrap carried his insolence so far as to put to death a messenger sent him by

* Herod. 1. iii. c. 118, 119.

the king, because the orders he had brought him were disagreeable. Darius, who did not yet think himself well settled on the throne, would not venture to attack him openly; for the satrap had no less than a thousand soldiers for his guard, not to mention the forces he was able to raise from his government which included Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia. The king therefore thought fit to proceed in a secret manner to rid himself of so dangerous a servant. With this commission he intrusted one of his officers, of approved fidelity and attachment to his person. The officer, under pretence of other business, went to Sardis, where, with great dexterity, he sounded the dispositions of the people. To open the way to his design, he first gave the principal officers of the governor's guard letters from the king, which contained nothing but general orders. A little while after he delivered them other letters, in which their orders were more express and particular. And as soon as he found himself perfectly sure of the disposition of the troops, he then read them a third letter, wherein the king, in plain terms, commanded them to kill the governor; which order was executed without delay. All his effects were confiscated to the king, and all the persons belonging to his family and household were removed to Susa. Among the rest, there was a celebrated physician of Crotona, whose name was Democedes. This physician's story is very singular, and happened to be the occasion of some considerable events.*

Not long after the above mentioned transactions, Darius chanced to have a fall from his horse in hunting, by which he sprained one of his feet in a violent manner, and put his heel out of joint. The Egyptians were then considered the most skilful in physic; for which reason Darius had several physicians of that nation about him. These undertook to cure the king,† and exerted all their skill on so important an occasion: but they were so awkward in the operation, and in handling and managing the king's foot, that they put him to incredible pain; so that he passed seven days and seven nights without sleeping. Democedes was mentioned on this occasion by some person, who had heard him extolled at Sardis as a very able physician. He was sent for immediately, and brought to the king in the condition he was in, with his irons on, and in very poor apparel; for he was at that time actually a prisoner. The king asked him whether

* Idem, c. 120-128.

† Anciently the same persons practised both as physicians and surgeons.

he had any knowledge of physic? At first he denied he had, fearing that if he should give proofs of his skill, he should be detained in Persia, and by that means be forever debarred from returning to his own country, for which he had an exceeding affection. Darius, displeased with his answer, ordered him to be put to the torture. Democedes found it was necessary to own the truth, and therefore offered his service to the king. The first thing he did, was to apply gentle fomentations to the parts affected. This remedy had a speedy effect; the king recovered his sleep, and in few days was perfectly cured, both of the sprain and dislocation. To recompense the physician, the king made him a present of two pair of gold chains. Upon which Democedes asked him whether he meant to reward the happy success of his endeavors, by doubling his misfortune. The king was pleased with that saying, and ordered his eunuchs to conduct Democedes to his wives, that they might see the person to whom he was indebted for his recovery. They all made him very magnificent presents; so that in one day's time he became extremely rich.*

Democedes was a native of Crotona, a city of Græcia Major, in the Low Calabria in Italy, from whence he had been obliged to fly, on account of the ill treatment he received from his father.† He first went to Egina,‡ where by several successful cures he acquired great reputation: the inhabitants of this place settled on him a yearly pension of a talent. The talent contained sixty minas, and was worth about three thousand livres French money. Some time after, he was invited to Athens, where they augmented his pension to five thousand livres § per annum. After this, he was received into the family of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, who gave him a pension of two thousand crowns.|| It is very much for the honor of cities, or princes, by handsome pensions and salaries, to engage such persons in their service, as are of public benefit to mankind; and even to induce foreigners of worth and merit to come and settle among them. The Crotonians from this time had the reputation of having the ablest physicians; and next after them, the people of Cyrene in Africa. The Argives were at the same time reputed to excel in music.

Democedes, after performing this cure upon the king, was admitted to the honor of eating at his table, and was

* Herod. l. iii. c. 129, 130.

† An island between Attica and Peloponnesus.

|| Two talents.

† Herod. l. iii. c. 131.

§ A hundred minæ.

highly respected at Susa. At his intercession, the Egyptian physicians were pardoned, who had been condemned to be hanged for having been less skilful than the Grecian physician; as if they were obliged to answer for the success of their remedies, or that it was a crime not to be able to cure a king. This is a strange abuse, though too common an effect of unlimited power, which is seldom guided by reason or equity, and which being accustomed to see everything give way implicitly to its authority, expects that its commands, of whatever nature, should be infallibly performed! We have seen something of this kind in the history of Nebuchadnezzar, who pronounced a general sentence of death upon all his magicians, because they could not divine what it was he had dreamed in the night, which he himself had forgot. Democedes procured also the enlargement of several of those persons who had been imprisoned with him. He lived in the greatest affluence, and was in the highest esteem and favor with the king. But he was at a great distance from his own country, upon which his thoughts and desires were continually bent.*

He had the good fortune to perform another cure, which contributed to raise his credit and reputation still higher. Atossa, one of the king's wives, and daughter to Cyrus, was attacked with a cancer in her breast. As long as the pain of it was tolerable, she bore it with patience, not being able to prevail on herself, out of modesty, to discover her disorder. But at last she was constrained to it, and sent for Democedes, who promised to cure her, and at the same time requested, that she would be pleased to grant him a certain favor he should beg of her, entirely consistent with her honor. The queen engaged her word, and was cured. The favor promised the physician, was to procure him a journey into his own country; and the queen was not unmindful of her promise.† It is worth while to take notice of such events, which, though not very considerable in themselves, often give occasion to the greatest enterprises of princes, and are even the secret springs and distant causes of them.‡

As Atossa was conversing one day with Darius, she took occasion to represent to him, that, being in the flower of his age, and of a vigorous constitution, capable of enduring the fatigues of war, and having great and numerous armies at

* Herod. l. iii. c. 132. † Herod. l. iii. c. 135, 137.

‡ Non sine usu fuerit introspicere illa, primo aspectu levia, ex quibus magnarum sæpè rerum motus oriuntur.—Tacit. l. iv. c. 32.

command, it would be for his honor to form some great enterprise, and let the Persians see that they had a man of courage for their king. "Your thoughts coincide with mine," replied Darius, "which were upon invading the Scythians." "I had much rather," said Atossa, "you would first turn your arms against Greece. I have heard great things said in praise of the women of Lacedæmon, of Argos, Athens, and Corinth, and should be very glad to have some of them in my service. Besides, you have a person here, that might be very useful to you in such an enterprise, and could give you a perfect knowledge of the country; the person I mean, is Democedes, who has cured both you and me." This was enough for the king, and the affair was resolved on immediately. Fifteen Persian noblemen were appointed to accompany Democedes into Greece, and to examine with him all the maritime places, as thoroughly as possible. The king farther charged those persons, above all things, to keep a strict eye upon the physician, that he did not escape from them, and to bring him back with them to the Persian court.

Darius, in giving such an order, plainly showed he did not understand the proper methods for engaging men of wit and merit to reside in his dominions, and for attaching them to his person. To pretend to do this by authority and compulsion, is the sure way of suppressing all knowledge and industry, and of driving away the liberal arts and sciences, which must be free and unconfined, like the genius from whence they spring. For one man of genius that will be kept in a country by force, thousands will be driven away, who would probably have chosen to reside in it, if they could enjoy their liberty, and meet with kind treatment.

When Darius had formed his design of sending into Greece, he acquainted Democedes with it, laid open his views to him, and told him the occasion he had for his services to conduct the Persian noblemen thither, particularly to the maritime towns, in order to observe their situation and strength; at the same time earnestly desiring him, that, when that was done, he would return with them to Persia. The king permitted him to carry all his moveables with him, and to give them, if he pleased, to his father and brothers, promising, at his return, to give him as many of greater value; and signified to him farther, that he would order the galley in which he was to sail to be laden with very rich presents, for him to bestow as he thought fit on the rest of

his family. The king's intention appeared, by his manner of speaking, to be undisguised and without artifice : but Democedes was afraid it might be a snare laid for him, to discover whether he intended to return to Persia, or not ; and therefore, to remove all suspicion, he left his own goods behind him at Susa, and only took with him the presents designed for his family.

The first place they landed at was Sidon in Phœnicia, where they equipped two large vessels for themselves, and put all they had brought along with them on board another vessel of burden. After having passed through, and carefully examined the chief cities of Greece, they went to Tarentum in Italy. Here the Persian noblemen were taken up as spies ; and Democedes taking advantage of this arrest, made his escape from them, and fled to Crotona. When the Persian lords had recovered their liberty, they pursued him thither, but could not prevail upon the Crotonians to deliver up their fellow-citizen. The city moreover seized the loaded vessel ; and the Persians having lost their guide, laid aside the thoughts of going over to the other parts of Greece, and set out for their own country. Democedes informed them, at their departure, that he was going to marry the daughter of Milo, a famous wrestler of Crotona, whose name was very well known to the king, and of whom we shall have occasion to speak hereafter. This voyage of the Persian noblemen into Greece, was attended with no immediate consequence ; because, on their return home, they found the king engaged in other affairs.

In the third year of this king's reign, which was but the second according to the Jewish computations, the Samaritans excited new troubles against the Jews.* In the preceding reigns, they had procured an order to prohibit the Jews from proceeding any farther in building the temple of Jerusalem. But upon the lively exhortation of the prophets, and the express order of God, the Israelites had lately resumed the work, which had been interrupted for several years, and carried it on with great vigor. The Samaritans had recourse to their ancient practices to prevent them. To this end they applied to Tatnai, whom Darius had made governor of the provinces of Syria and Palestine. They complained to him of the audacious proceeding of the Jews, who, of their own authority, and in defiance of the prohibitions to the contrary, presumed to rebuild their temple ;

* Ezra, chap. 5.

which must necessarily be prejudicial to the king's interest. Upon this representation of theirs the governor thought fit to go himself to Jerusalem. And being a person of great equity and moderation, when he had inspected the work, he did not think proper to proceed violently, and to put a stop to it without any farther deliberation; but inquired of the Jewish elders, what license they had for entering upon a work of that nature. The Jews hereupon producing the edict of Cyrus made in their behalf, he would not of himself ordain any thing in contradiction of it, but sent an account of the matter to the king, and desired to know his pleasure. He gave the king a true representation, acquainting him with the edict of Cyrus, which the Jews alleged in their justification, and desiring him to order the registers to be consulted, to know whether Cyrus had really published such an edict in their favor, and thereupon to send him instructions of what he thought fit to order in the affair. Darius having commanded the registers to be examined, the edict was found at Ecbatana in Media, the place where Cyrus was at the time of its being granted.* Now Darius, having a great respect for the memory of that prince, confirmed his edict, and caused another to be drawn up, wherein the former was referred to, and ratified. This motive of regard to the memory of Cyrus, had there been nothing else to influence the king, would be very laudable; but the Scripture informs us, that it was God himself who influenced the mind and heart of the king, and inspired him with a favorable disposition to the Jews. The truth of this appears pretty plain from the edict itself. In the first place, it ordains, that all the victims, oblations, and other expenses of the temple, be abundantly furnished the Jews, as the priests require: in the second place, it enjoins the priests of Jerusalem, where they offered their sacrifices to the God of heaven, to pray for the preservation of the life of the king and of the princes his children: and, lastly, it goes so far as to denounce imprecations against all princes and people, that should hinder the carrying on of the building of the temple, or that should attempt to destroy it: by all which, Darius evidently acknowledges, that the God of Israel is able to overturn the kingdom of the world, and to dethrone the most mighty and powerful princes.

By the virtue of this edict, the Jews were not only authorized to proceed in the building of their temple, but all the expenses thereof were also to be furnished to them out

of the taxes and imposts of the province. What must have become of the Jews, when the crimes of disobedience and rebellion were laid to their charge, if at such a juncture their superiors had only hearkened to their enemies, and not given them leave to justify themselves!

The same prince, some time after, gave a still more signal proof of his love for justice, and of his abhorrence for accusers and informers, a detestable race of men, who are, by their very nature and condition, enemies to all merit and all virtues. It is pretty obvious that I mean the famous edict published by this prince against Haman, in favor of the Jews, at the request of Esther, whom the king had taken to his bed in the room of Vashti, one of his wives. According to Archbishop Usher, this Vashti is the same person as is called by profane writers Atossa; and the Ahasuerus of the Holy Scriptures the same as Darius; but according to others it is Artaxerxes. The fact is well known, being related in the sacred history; I have given, however, a brief account of it in this work.

Such actions of justice do great honor to a prince's memory; as do also those of gratitude, of which Darius on a certain occasion gave a very laudable instance. Syloson, brother to Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, had once made Darius a present of a suit of clothes, of a curious red color, which extremely pleased Darius's fancy, and would never suffer him to make any return for it. Darius at that time was but a private gentleman, an officer in the guards of Cambyses, whom he accompanied to Memphis in his Egyptian expedition. When Darius was on the throne of Persia, Syloson went to Susa, presented himself at the gate of his palace, and sent up word to the king, that there was a Grecian below, to whom his majesty was under some obligation. Darius, surprised at such a message, and curious to know the truth of it, ordered him to be brought in. When he saw him, he remembered him, and acknowledged him to have been his benefactor; and was so far from being ashamed of an adventure which might seem derogatory to his honor, that he ingenuously applauded the gentleman's generosity, which proceeded from no other motive than that of doing a pleasure to a person from whom he could have no expectations; and then proposed to make him a considerable present of gold and silver. But money was not the thing Syloson desired; the love of his country was his predominant passion. The favor he required of the king was, that he would

settle him at Samos, without shedding the blood of the citizens, by driving out the person that had usurped the government since the death of his brother. Darius consented, and committed the conduct of the expedition to Otanes, one of the principal lords of his court, who undertook it with joy, and performed it with success.*

SECTION II.—REVOLT AND REDUCTION OF BABYLON.

In the beginning of the fifth year of Darius, Babylon revolted, and could not be reduced till after a siege of twenty months.† This city, formerly mistress of the East, grew impatient of the Persian yoke, especially after the removal of the imperial seat to Susa, which very much diminished Babylon's wealth and grandeur. The Babylonians taking advantage of the revolution that happened in Persia, first on the death of Cambyzes, and afterwards on the massacre of the Magians, made secretly, for four years together, all kinds of preparation for war. When they thought the city sufficiently stored with provisions, for many years, they set up the standard of rebellion, which obliged Darius to besiege them with all his forces. Now, God continued to accomplish those terrible threatenings he had denounced against Babylon, that he would not only humble and bring down that proud and impious city, but depopulate and lay it waste with fire and blood, utterly exterminate it, and reduce it to an eternal solitude. In order to fulfil these predictions, God permitted the Babylonians to rebel against Darius, and by that means to draw upon themselves the whole force of the Persian empire; and they themselves were the first in putting these prophecies in execution, by destroying a great number of their own people, as will be seen presently. It is probable that the Jews, of whom a considerable number remained at Babylon, went out of the city before the siege was formed, as the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah had exhorted them long before, and afterwards Zechariah, in the following terms: "Thou, Zion, that dwellest with the daughter of Babylon, flee from the country, and save thyself."‡

The Babylonians, to make their provisions last the longer, and to enable them to hold out with the greater vigor, took the most desperate and barbarous resolution that was ever heard of, which was, to destroy all such of their own people

* Herod. l. iii. c. 138-149.

† A. M. 3438. Ant. J. C. 516. Herod. l. iii. c. 150, 160.

‡ Isa. xlviii. 20. Jer. i. 8, li. 6, 9, 45. Zech. ii. 6, 7.

as were unserviceable on this occasion. For this purpose they assembled together all their wives and children, and strangled them. Only every man was allowed to keep his best beloved wife, and one servant-maid to do the business of the family.

After this cruel execution, the unhappy remainder of the inhabitants, thinking themselves out of all danger, both on account of their fortifications, which they looked upon as impregnable, and the vast quantity of provisions they had laid up, began to insult the besiegers from the top of their walls, and to provoke them with opprobrious-language. The Persians, for the space of eighteen months, did all that force or stratagem were capable of, to make themselves masters of the city; nor did they forget to make use of the same means as had succeeded so happily with Cyrus some years before; I mean that of turning the course of the river. But all their efforts were fruitless; and Darius began almost to despair of taking the place, when a stratagem, till then unheard of, opened the gates of the city to him. He was strangely surprised one morning to see Zopyrus, one of the chief noblemen of his court, and son of Megabyzus, who was one of the seven lords that formed the conspiracy against the Magians, appear before him all over blood, with his nose and ears cut off, and his whole body covered with wounds. Starting up from his throne, he cried out, Who is it, Zopyrus, that has dared to treat you thus? You yourself, O king! replied Zopyrus. The desire I had of rendering you service has put me in this condition. As I was fully persuaded that you never would have consented to this method, I have consulted none but the zeal I have for your service. He then opened to him his design of going over to the enemy; and they settled every thing that was proper to be done. The king could not see him set out upon this extraordinary project without the utmost affliction and concern. Zopyrus approached the walls of the city, and having told them who he was, was soon admitted. They then carried him before the governor, to whom he laid open his misfortune, and the cruel treatment he had met with from Darius, for having dissuaded him from continuing any longer before a city which it was impossible for him to take. He offered the Babylonians his service, which could not fail of being highly useful to them, since he was acquainted with all the designs of the Persians, and since the desire of revenge would inspire him with fresh courage and resolution. His name and

person were both well known at Babylon ; the condition in which he appeared, his blood and his wounds, testified for him, and, by proofs not to be suspected, confirmed the truth of all he advanced. They therefore entirely believed whatever he told them, and gave him, moreover, the command of as many troops as he desired. In the first sally he made, he cut off a thousand of the besiegers ; a few days after he killed double the number ; and on the third time, four thousand of their men lay dead upon the spot. All this had been before agreed upon between him and Darius. Nothing was now talked of in Babylon but Zopyrus ; the whole city strove who should extol him most, and they had not words sufficient to express their high value for him, and how happy they esteemed themselves in having gained so great a man. He was now declared generalissimo of their forces, and entrusted with the care of guarding the walls of the city. Darius approaching with his army at the time agreed on between them, Zopyrus opened the gates to him, and by that means made him master of the city, which he could never have taken either by force or stratagem.

Powerful as this prince was, he found himself incapable of making a sufficient recompense for so great a service ; and he used often to say, that he would with pleasure sacrifice a hundred Babylons, if he had them, to restore Zopyrus to the condition he was in before he inflicted that cruel treatment upon himself. He settled upon him during life, the whole revenue of this opulent city, of which he alone had procured him the possession, and heaped all the honors upon him that a king could possibly confer upon a subject. Megabyzus, who commanded the Persian army in Egypt against the Athenians, was son to this Zopyrus : and that Zopyrus who went over to the Athenians as a deserter, was his grandson.

No sooner was Darius in possession of Babylon, than he ordered the gates to be pulled down, and all the walls of that proud city to be entirely demolished, that she might never more be in a condition to rebel against him. If he had pleased to make use of all the rights of a conqueror, he might upon this occasion have exterminated all the inhabitants. But he contented himself with causing three thousand of those who were principally concerned in the revolt to be impaled, and granted a pardon to all the rest. And in order to prevent the depopulation of the city, he caused fifty thousand women to be brought from the several prov-

inces of his empire, to supply the place of those whom the inhabitants had so cruelly destroyed at the beginning of the siege. Such was the fate of Babylon; and thus did God execute his vengeance on that impious city, for the cruelty she had exercised towards the Jews, in falling upon a free people without any reason or provocation; in destroying their government, laws, and worship; in forcing them from their country, and transporting them to a strange land, imposing upon them a most grievous yoke of servitude, and making use of all its power to crush and afflict an unhappy nation, favored however by God, and having the honor of being styled his peculiar people.

SECTION III.—DARIUS PREPARES FOR AN EXPEDITION AGAINST THE SCYTHIANS. A DIGRESSION UPON THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THAT NATION.

After the reduction of Babylon, Darius made great preparations for the war against the Scythians, who inhabited that large tract of land which lies between the Danube and the Tanais.* His pretence for undertaking this war was, to be revenged of that nation for the invasion of Asia by their ancestors; a very frivolous and sorry pretext, and a very ridiculous ground for reviving an old quarrel, which had ceased a hundred and twenty years before. While the Scythians were employed in that eruption, which lasted twenty-eight years, their wives married their slaves. When the husbands were on their return home, these slaves went out to meet them with a numerous army, and disputed their entrance into the country. After some battles fought with nearly equal loss on both sides, the masters, considering that it was doing too much honor to their slaves to put them on the footing of soldiers, marched against them in the next encounter with whips in their hands, to make them remember their proper condition. This stratagem had the intended effect: for not being able to bear the sight of their masters thus armed, they all ran away.

I design in this place to follow Herodotus, who, in writing of this war, takes occasion to give an ample account of all that relates to the customs and manners of the Scythians. But I shall be much more brief in my account of the matter than he is.

* Herod. l. iv. c. 1. Justin. l. ii. c. 5

A DIGRESSION CONCERNING THE SCYTHIANS.

Formerly there were Scythians both in Europe and Asia, most of them inhabiting those parts that lie towards the north. I design at present to treat chiefly of the first, namely, of the European Scythians.

The historians, in the accounts they have left us of the manners and characters of the Scythians, relate things of them that are entirely opposite and contradictory to one another. At one time they represent them as the most just and moderate people in the world : at another, they describe them as a fierce and barbarous nation, which carried its cruelty to such horrible excesses as are shocking to human nature. This contrariety is a manifest proof, that those different characters are to be applied to different nations of Scythians, all comprised in that vast and extensive tract of country ; and that, though they were all comprehended under one and the same general denomination of Scythians, we ought not to confound them or their characters together.

Strabo has quoted authors, who mention Scythians dwelling upon the coast of the Euxine sea, that cut the throats of all strangers who came among them, fed upon their flesh, and made pots and drinking-vessels of their skulls, when they had dried them.* Herodotus, in describing the sacrifices which the Scythians offered to the god Mars, says they used to offer human sacrifices.† Their manner of making treaties, according to this author's account, was very strange and particular.‡ They first poured wine into a large wooden vessel, and then the contracting parties, cutting their arms with a knife, let some of their blood run into the wine, and stained likewise their armor therein ; after which they, themselves, and all that were present, drank of that liquor, making the strongest imprecations against the person that should violate the treaty.§

But what the same historian relates, concerning the ceremonies observed at the funeral of their kings, is still more extraordinary. I shall only mention such of those ceremonies as may serve to give us an idea of the cruel barbarity of this people. When the king died, they embalmed his body, and wrapped it up in wax ; this done, they put it into an open chariot, and carried it from city to city, exposing it to the view of all the people under his dominion.

* Strabo. l. vii. p. 298.

† Herod. l. iv. c. 62.

‡ This custom was still practised by the Iberians, who were originally Scythians in the time of Tacitus, who makes mention of it.—Ann. l. iiii. c. 47.

§ Herod. l. iv. c. 70.

When this circuit was finished, they laid the body down in the place appointed for the burial of it, and there they made a large grave, in which they interred the king, and with him one of his wives, his chief cup-bearer, his great chamberlain, his master of horse, his chancellor, his secretary of state, all of whom were put to death for that purpose. To these they added several horses, a great number of drinking-vessels, and a certain part of every kind of household goods, and furniture belonging to their deceased monarch : after which they filled up the grave, and covered it with earth. This was not all : when the anniversary of his interment came, they cut the throats of fifty more of the dead king's officers, and of the same number of horses, and placed the officers on horseback round the king's tomb, having first prepared and embalmed their bodies for the purpose ; this they did probably to serve him as guards. These ceremonies possibly took their rise from a notion they might have of their king being still alive : and upon this supposition they judged it necessary that he should have his court and ordinary officers still about him. Whether employments, which terminated in this manner, were much coveted, I will not determine.*

It is now time to pass to the consideration of such of their manners and customs, as had more of humanity in them ; though possibly in another sense they may appear to be equally savage. The account I am going to give of them is chiefly taken from Justin.† According to this author, the Scythians lived in great innocence and simplicity. They were ignorant indeed of all arts and sciences, but then they were equally unacquainted with vice. They did not make any division of their lands among themselves, says Justin : it would have been in vain for them to do it, since they did not apply themselves to cultivate them. Horace, in one of his odes, of which I shall insert a part by and by, tell us, that some of them did cultivate a certain portion of land allotted to them for one year only ; at the expiration of which they were relieved by others, who succeeded them on the same conditions. They had no houses nor settled habitations, but wandered continually with their cattle and their flocks from country to country. Their wives and children they carried along with them in wagons, covered with the skins of beasts, which were the only houses they had to dwell in. Justice was observed and maintained

* Herod. i. iv. c. 71, 72. † Lib. ii. c. 2.

among them, through the natural temper and disposition of the people, without any compulsion of laws, with which they were wholly unacquainted.* No crime was more severely punished among them than theft and robbery; and that with good reason. For their herds and their flocks, in which all their riches consisted, being never shut up, how could they possibly subsist, if theft had not been most rigorously punished? They coveted neither silver nor gold, like the rest of mankind; and made milk and honey their principal diet. They were strangers to the use of linen or woollen manufactures; and to defend themselves from the violent and continual cold weather of their climate, they made use of nothing but the skins of beasts.

I said before, that these manners of the Scythians would appear to some people very wild and savage. And indeed, what can be said for a nation that has lands, and yet does not cultivate them; that has herds of cattle, whose milk alone satisfies them, while they neglect the flesh? The wool of their sheep might supply them with warm and comfortable clothes, and yet they use no other raiment than the skins of animals. But that which is the greatest demonstration of their ignorance and savageness, according to the general opinion of mankind, is their utter neglect of gold and silver, which have always been had in such great request in all civilized nations.

But, oh! how happy was this ignorance, how vastly preferable this savage state to our pretended politeness. This contempt of the conveniences of life, says Justin, was attended with such an honesty and uprightness of manners, as hindered them from ever coveting their neighbor's goods. For the desire of riches can only take place, where riches can be made use of. And would to God, says the same author, we could see the same moderation prevail among the rest of mankind, and the like indifference to the goods of other people! If this was the case, the world would not have seen so many wars perpetually succeeding one another in all ages, and in all countries: nor would the number of those that are cut off by the sword, exceed that of those that fall by the irreversible decree and law of nature. †

Justin finishes his character of the Scythians with a very

* *Justitia gentis ingenio culta, non legibus.*

† *Hæc continentia illis morum quoque justitiam indidit, nihil alienum concupiscentibus. Quippe ibidem divitiarum cupido est, ubi et usus. Atque utinam reliquis mortalibus similis moderatio et abstinentia alieni foret! profecto non tantum bellorum per omnia secula terris omnibus continuaretur: neque plus hominum ferrum et arma, quam naturalis factorum conditio raperet.*

judicious reflection. It is a surprising thing, says he, that a happy natural disposition, without the assistance of education, should carry the Scythians to such a degree of wisdom and moderation, as the Grecians could not attain, either by the institutions of their legislators, nor the rules and precepts of all their philosophers; and that the manners of a barbarous nation should be preferable to those of a people so much improved and refined by the polite arts and sciences. So much more effectual and advantageous was the ignorance of vice in the one, than the knowledge of virtue in the other.*

The Scythian fathers thought, with good reason, that they left their children a valuable inheritance, when they left them in peace and union with one another.† One of their kings, whose name was Scylurus, finding himself drawing near his end, sent for all his children, and giving to each of them, one after another a bundle of arrows tied fast together, desired them to break them. Each used his endeavors, but was not able to do it. Then untying the bundle, and giving them the arrows one by one, they were very easily broken. Let this emblem, said the father, be a lesson to you, of the mighty advantage that results from union and concord. In order to strengthen and enlarge these domestic advantages, the Scythians used to admit their friends into the same terms of union with them as their relations. Friendship was considered by them as a sacred and inviolable alliance, which differed but little from the alliance nature has put between brethren, and which they could not infringe without being guilty of a heinous crime. ‡

Ancient authors seem to have contended who should most extol the innocence of manners that reigned among the Scythians, by magnificent encomiums. I shall transcribe that of Horace at large. The poet does not confine it entirely to the Scythians, but joins the Getæ with them, their near neighbors. It is in that beautiful ode, where he inveighs against the luxury and irregularities of the age he lived in. After telling us, that peace and tranquillity of mind is not to be procured either by immense riches or sumptuous buildings, he adds, “a hundred times happier are the Scythians, who roam about in their itinerant houses, their wagons; and happier even are the frozen Getæ. With them

* Prorsus ut admirabile videatur, hoc illis naturam dare, quod Græci longa sapientium doctrina præceptusque philosophorum consequi nequeunt, cultosque mores incultæ barbariæ collatione superari. Tanto plus in illis proficit vitiorum ignoratio, quam in his cognitio virtutis!

† Plut. de Garrul. p. 511.

‡ Lucian, in Tex. p. 51.

the earth, without being divided by land-marks, produceth her fruits, which are gathered in common. There each man's tillage is but of one year's continuance; and when that term of his labor is expired, he is relieved by a successor, who takes his place, and manures the ground on the same conditions. There the innocent step-mothers form no cruel designs against the lives of their husband's children by a former wife. The wives do not pretend to domineer over their husbands on account of their fortunes, nor are to be corrupted by the insinuating language of spruce adulterers. The greatest portion of the maiden is the virtue of her father and mother, her inviolable attachment to her husband and her perfect disregard to all other men. They dare not be unfaithful because they are convinced that infidelity is a crime, and its reward is death.*

When we consider the manners and character of the Scythians without prejudice, can we possibly forbear to look upon them with esteem and admiration? Does not their manner of living, as to the exterior part of it at least, bear a great resemblance to that of the patriarchs, who had no fixed habitation; who did not till the ground; who had no other occupation than that of feeding their flocks and herds; and who dwelt in tents? Can we believe this people were much to be pitied, for not understanding, or rather, for despising the use of gold and silver? Is it not to be wished, that those metals had for ever lain buried in the bowels of the earth, and that they had never been dug from thence, to become the causes and instruments of all vices and iniquity? † What advantage could gold or silver be of to the

*
Campestres melius Scythæ.
Quorum plaustra vagas rite trahunt domos.
Vivunt, et rigidi Getæ;
Immetata quibus jugera liberas
Fruges et Cererem ferunt:
Nec cultura placet longior annus,
Defunctumque laboribus
Æquali recreat sorte vicarius
Illic mære carentibus
Privignis mulier temperat innocens;
Nec dotata regit virum
Conjux, nec nitido fudit adultero:
Dos est magna parentium
Virtus, et metuens alterius viri
Certo fœdere castitas:
Et peccare nefas, aut pretium est mori.

—Hor. lib. ii. Od. 26.

Aurum irrepertum, et sic melius situm
Cum terra celat, spernere fortior,
Quam cogere humanos in usus
Omne sacrum rapiente dextra.

—Hor. lib. iii. Od. 3.

Scythians, who valued nothing but what the necessities of man actually require, and who took care to set narrow bounds to those necessities. It is no wonder that, living as they did, without houses, they should make no account of those arts that were so highly valued in other places, as architecture, sculpture, and painting; or that they should despise fine clothes and costly furniture, since they found the skins of beasts sufficient to defend them against the inclemency of the seasons. After all, can we truly say, that these pretended advantages contribute to the real happiness of life? Were those nations that had them in the greatest plenty, more healthful or robust than the Scythians? Did they live to a greater age than they? or did they spend their lives in greater freedom and tranquillity, or in a greater exemption from cares and troubles? Let us acknowledge, to the shame of ancient philosophy, that the Scythians, who did not particularly apply themselves to the study of wisdom, carried it, however, to a greater height in their practice, than either the Egyptians, Grecians, or any other civilized nation. They did not give the name of goods or riches to any thing, but what, humanly speaking, truly deserved that title; as health, strength, courage, the love of exercise and liberty, innocence of life, sincerity, an abhorrence of all fraud and dissimulation, and, in a word, all such qualities as render a man more virtuous and more valuable. If to these happy dispositions we add the knowledge and love of God and of our Redeemer, without which the most exalted virtues are of no value and ineffectual, they would have been a perfect people.

When we compare the manners of the Scythians with those of the present age, we are tempted to believe, that the pencils which drew so beautiful a picture were not free from partiality and flattery; and that both Justin and Horace have decked them with virtues that did not belong to them. But all antiquity agrees in giving the same testimony of them; and Homer in particular, whose opinion ought to be of great weight, calls them "the most just and upright of men."

But at length, who could believe it? luxury, that might be thought to thrive only in an agreeable and delightful soil, penetrated into this rough and uncultivated region; and breaking down the barriers, which the constant practice of several ages, founded in the nature of the climate and the genius of the people, had set against it, did at last effectually corrupt the manners of the Scythians, and bring them, in

that respect, upon a level with other nations, where it had long been predominant. It is Strabo that acquaints us with this particular, which is very worthy of our notice: he lived in the time of Augustus and Tiberius.* After he has greatly commended the simplicity, frugality, and innocence of the ancient Scythians, and their extreme aversion to all dissimulation and deceit, he owns that their intercourse, in later times, with other nations, had extirpated those virtues, and planted the contrary vices in their stead. "One would think," says he, "that the natural effect of such an intercourse with civilized and polite nations should have consisted only in rendering them more humanized and courteous, by softening that air of savageness and ferocity which they had before: but instead of that, it introduced a total dissoluteness of manners among them, and quite transformed them into different creatures." It is undoubtedly with reference to this change that Athenæus says, the Scythians abandoned themselves to voluptuousness and luxury; at the same time that they suffered self-interest and avarice to prevail among them.†

Strabo, in making the remark I have been mentioning, does not deny that this fatal change of manners was owing to the Romans and Grecians. "Our example," says he, "has perverted almost all the nations of the world: by carrying the refinements of luxury and pleasure among them, we have taught them insincerity and fraud, and a thousand kinds of shameful and infamous arts to get money." It is a miserable talent, and a very unhappy distinction for a nation, through its ingenuity in inventing modes, and refining upon every thing that tends to nourish and promote luxury, to become the corruptor of all its neighbors, and the author, as it were, of their vices and debauchery.

It was against these Scythians, but at a time when they were yet uncorrupted, and in their utmost vigor, that Darius undertook an unsuccessful expedition; which I will make the subject of the next article.

SECTION IV.—DARIUS'S EXPEDITION AGAINST THE SCYTHIANS.

I have already observed, that the pretence used by Darius for undertaking the war against the Scythians, was the irruption formerly made by that people into Asia; but in reality he had no other purpose, than to satisfy his own ambition, and to extend his conquests.

* Strab. l. vii. p. 301.

† Athen. l. xii. p. 524

His brother Artabanes, for whom he had a great regard, and who, on his side, had no less zeal for the true interests of the king his brother, thought it his duty on this occasion to speak his sentiments with all the freedom that an affair of such importance required. "Great prince," said he to him,* "they who form any great enterprise, ought carefully to consider, whether it will be beneficial or prejudicial to the state; whether the execution of it will be easy or difficult, whether it be likely to augment or diminish their glory; and lastly, whether the thing designed be consistent with, or contrary to, the rules of justice. For my own part, I cannot perceive, sir, even though you were sure of success, what advantage you can propose to yourself in undertaking a war against the Scythians. Consider the vast distance between them and you, and the prodigious space of land and sea that separates them from your dominions; besides, they are a people that dwell in wild and uncultivated deserts; that have neither towns nor houses; that have no fixed settlement, or place of habitation; and that are destitute of all manner of riches. What spoil or benefit can accrue to your troops from such an expedition; or, to speak more properly, what loss have you not reason to apprehend?

"As they are accustomed to remove from country to country, if they should think proper to fly before you; not out of cowardice or fear, for they are a very courageous and warlike people, but only with a design to harass and ruin your army, by continual and fatiguing marches; what would become of us, in such an uncultivated, barren, and naked country, where we should neither find forage for our horses, nor provision for our men? I am afraid, sir, that through a false notion of glory, and the influence of flatterers, you may be hurried into a war, which may turn to the dishonor of the nation. You now enjoy the sweets of peace and tranquillity in the midst of your people, where you are the object of their admiration, and the author of their happiness. You are sensible the gods have placed you upon the throne to be their coadjutor, or, to speak more properly, to be the dispenser of their bounty, rather than the minister of their power. It is your pleasure to be the protector, the guardian, and the father of your subjects: and you often declare to us, because you really believe so, that you look upon yourself as invested with sovereign power, only to make your people happy.

* Omnes qui magnarum rerum consilia suscipiunt, æstimare debent, an, quod inchoatur, reipublicæ utile, ipsis gloriosum, aut promptum effectum, aut certe non arduum sit.—Tacit. Hist. l. ii. c. 76.

What exquisite joy must it be to so great a prince as you are, to be the source of so many blessings; and under the shadow of your name to preserve such infinite numbers of people in so desirable a tranquility! Is it not the glory of a king, who loves his subjects, and is beloved by them, who instead of making war against the neighboring or distant nations, makes use of his power to keep them in peace and amity with each other; is not such a glory vastly preferable to that of ravaging and spoiling nations, of filling the earth with slaughter and desolation, with horror, consternation and despair? But there is one motive more, which ought to have a greater influence upon you than all others, I mean that of justice. Thanks to the gods, you are not of the number of those princes, who acknowledged no other law than that of force, and who imagine that they have a peculiar privilege annexed to their dignity, which private persons have not, of invading other men's properties.* You do not make your greatness consist in being able to do whatever you will, but in willing only what may be done, without infringing the laws, or violating justice.† To speak plain, shall one man be considered unjust, and a robber, for seizing on a few acres of his neighbor's estate; and shall another be accounted just and great, and have the title of hero, only because he seizes upon and usurps whole provinces? Permit me, sir, to ask you, what title have you to Scythia? What injury have the Scythians done you? what reason can you allege for declaring war against them? The war, indeed, in which you have been engaged against the Babylonians, was at the same time both just and necessary: the gods have accordingly crowned your arms with success. It belongs to you, sir, to judge whether that which you are now going to undertake is of the same nature."

Nothing, on the one hand, but the generous zeal of a brother, truly concerned for the glory of his prince, and the good of his country, could inspire such a freedom: as on the other, nothing but a perfect moderation in the prince could make him capable of bearing with it. Darius, as Tacitus observes of another great emperor, had the art of reconciling two things which are generally incompatible, the sovereignty and liberty. ‡ Far from being offended at the

* *Id in summa fortune æquius, quod validius; et sua retinere, privatæ domus; de alienis certare, regiam laudem esse.*—Tacit. *Annal* 1. xxv. c. 1.

† *Ut felicitatis est quantum velis posse, sic magnitudinis velle quantum possis.*—Plin. in *Paneg. Traj.*

‡ *Nerva Cæsar res olim dissociabiles miscuit, principatum et libertatem.*—Tacit. in *Vit. Agric. cap. iii.*

freedom used by his brother, he thanked him for his good advice, though he did not follow it; for he had taken his resolution. He departed from Susa at the head of an army of seven hundred thousand men; and his fleet, consisting of six hundred sail of ships, was chiefly manned with Ionians, and other Grecian nations, that dwelt upon the sea-coast of Asia Minor and the Hellespont. He marched his army towards the Thracian Bosphorus, which he passed upon a bridge of boats: after which, having made himself master of all Thrace, he came to the banks of the Danube, otherwise called the Ister, where he had ordered his fleet to join him. In several places on his march he caused pillars to be erected, with magnificent inscriptions, in one of which he suffered himself to be called, "the best and handsomest man living." What a littleness of soul and vanity was this!

And yet, if all this prince's faults had terminated only in sentiments of pride and vanity, perhaps they would appear more excusable than they do, at least they would not have been so pernicious to his subjects. But how shall we reconcile Darius's disposition, which seemed to be so exceedingly humane and gentle, with a barbarous and cruel action of his towards Cebasus, a venerable old man, whose merit, as well as quality, entitled him to respect! This noble man had three sons who were all preparing themselves to attend the king in this expedition against the Scythians. Upon Darius's departure from Susa, the good old father begged as a favor of him, that he would please to leave him one of his sons at home, to be a comfort to him in his old age. "One," replied Darius, "will not be sufficient for you; I will leave you all the three;" and immediately he caused the whole to be put to death.*

When the army had passed the Danube upon a bridge of boats, the king was for having the bridge broken down, that his army might not be weakened by leaving so considerable a detachment of his troops, as was necessary to guard it. But one of his officers represented to him that it might be proper to keep that as a necessary recourse, in case the war with the Scythians should prove unfortunate. The king assented to this opinion, and committed the guarding of the bridge to the care of the Ionians, who built it, giving them leave at the same time to go back to their own country, if he did not return in the space of two months: he then proceeded on his march to Scythia.†

* Herod. l. v. c. 84. Senec. de Ira, c. xvi.

† Herod. l. iv. c. 99, 101.

As soon as the Scythians were informed that Darius was marching against them, they immediately entered into consultation upon the measures necessary to be taken. They were very sensible that they were not in a condition to resist so formidable an enemy alone. They applied therefore to all the neighboring people, and desired their assistance, alleging that the danger was general, and concerned them all; and that it was their common interest to oppose an enemy, whose views of conquest were not confined to one nation. Some returned favorable answers to their demand; others absolutely refused to enter into a war, which they said did not regard them; but they soon had reason to repent their refusal.*

One wise precaution taken by the Scythians, was to secure their wives and children by sending them in carriages to the most northern parts of the country; with them, likewise, they sent all their herds and flocks, reserving nothing to themselves but what was necessary for the support of their army. Another precaution of theirs was to fill up all their wells, and stop up their springs, and to consume all the forage in those parts through which the Persian army was to pass. This done, they marched in conjunction with their allies against the enemy, not with the view of giving him battle, for they were determined to avoid that, but to draw him into such places as best suited their interest. Whenever the Persians seemed disposed to attack them, they still retired farther up into the country; and thereby drew them on from place to place, into the territories of those nations that had refused to enter into alliance with them, by which means their lands became a prey to the two armies of the Persians and Scythians.†

Darius, weary of those tedious and fatiguing pursuits, sent a herald to the king of the Scythians, whose name was Indathysus, with this message, in his name: "Prince of the Scythians, wherefore dost thou continually fly before me? Why dost thou not stop somewhere or other, either to give me battle, if thou believest thyself able to encounter me, or if thou thinkest thyself too weak, to acknowledge thy master, by presenting him with earth and water?" The Scythians were a high-spirited people, extremely jealous of their liberty, and professed enemies to all slavery. Indathysus sent Darius the following answer: "If I fly before thee, prince of the Persians, it is not because I fear thee:

* Herod. l. iv. c. 102, 118, 119.

† Idem. c. 120, 125.

what I do now, is no more than what I am used to do in time of peace. We Scythians have neither cities nor lands to defend: if thou hast a mind to force us to come to an engagement, come and attack the tombs of our fathers, and thou shalt find what manner of men we are. As to the title of master, which thou assumest, keep it for other nations than the Scythians. For my part, I acknowledge no other master than the great Jupiter, one of my own ancestors, and the goddess Vesta." *

The farther Darius advanced into the country, the greater hardships his army was exposed to. Just when it was reduced to the last extremity, there came a herald to Darius from the Scythian prince, with a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows as a present. The king desired to know the meaning of these gifts. The messenger answered, that his orders were only to deliver them, and nothing more; and that it was left to the Persian king to find out the meaning. Darius concluded at first, that the Scythians thereby consented to deliver up the earth and water to him, which were represented by a mouse and a frog; as also their cavalry, whose swiftness was represented by the bird; together with their own persons and arms, signified by the arrows. But Gobryas, one of the seven lords that had deposed the Magian impostor, expounded the enigma in the following manner: "Know," said he to the Persians, "that unless you can fly away in the air like birds, or hide yourselves in the earth like mice, or swim the water like frogs, you shall in no wise be able to avoid the arrows of the Scythians." †

And indeed, the whole Persian army, marching in a vast uncultivated and barren country, in which there was no water, was reduced to so deplorable a condition, that they had nothing before their eyes but inevitable ruin; nor was Darius himself exempted from the common danger. He owed his preservation to a camel, which was loaded with water, and followed him with great difficulty through that wild and desert country. The king did not afterwards forget this benefactor. To reward him for the service he had done him, and the fatigues he had undergone, on his return into Asia, he settled a certain district of his own upon him for his peculiar use and subsistence; for which reason the place was called Gaugamele, that is, in the Persian tongue, "the Camel's Habitation." ‡ It was near this same place

* Herod. l. iv. c. 126, 127.

† Strab. l. vii. p. 305, et l. xvi. p. 737.

‡ Idem. c. 128, 130.

that Darius Codomanus received a second overthrow by Alexander the Great.

Darius deliberated no longer, finding himself under an absolute necessity of quitting his imprudent enterprise. He began then to think in earnest upon returning home; and saw but too plainly that there was no time to be lost. Therefore, as soon as night came, the Persians, to deceive the enemy, lighted a great number of fires as usual; and leaving the old men and the sick behind them in the camp, together with all their asses, which made a sufficient noise, they marched with all possible haste, in order to reach the Danube. The Scythians did not perceive they were gone till the next morning; whereupon they immediately sent a considerable detachment, as quick as possible, to the Danube: this detachment, being perfectly well acquainted with the roads of the country, arrived at the bridge a considerable time before the Persians. The Scythians had sent expresses beforehand to persuade the Ionians to break the bridge, and to return to their own country; and the latter had promised to do it, but without intending to execute their promise. The Scythians now pressed them to it the more earnestly, and represented to them, that the time prescribed by Darius for staying there was elapsed; that they were at liberty to return home, without either violating their word or duty; that they now had it in their power to throw off for ever the yoke of their subjection, and make themselves happy and free people; and that the Scythians would render Darius incapable of forming any more enterprises against his neighbors.*

The Ionians entered into consultation upon the affair. Miltiades, an Athenian, who was prince, or, as the Greeks call it, tyrant, of Chersonesus of Thrace, at the mouth of the Hellespont, was one of those that had accompanied Darius, and furnished him with ships for his enterprise. Having the public interest more at heart than his own private advantage,† he was of opinion that they should comply with the request of the Scythians, and embrace so favorable an opportunity of recovering the liberty of Ionia. All the other commanders yielded to his sentiments, except Hystiæus, the tyrant of Miletus. When it came to his turn to speak, he represented to the Ionian generals, that their fortune was linked with that of Darius; that it was under that prince's

* Herod. l. iv. c. 134, 140.

† *Amicior omnium libertati quam suæ dominationi fuit.*—Corn. Nep.

protection each of them was master in his own city ; and if the power of the Persians should sink or decline, the cities of Ionia would not fail to depose their tyrants, and recover their freedom. All the other chiefs embraced his opinion ; and, as is usual in most cases, the consideration of private interests prevailed over the public good. They, therefore, came to the resolution of waiting for Darius : but, in order to deceive the Scythians, and hinder them from undertaking any thing, they declared that they had resolved to retire, pursuant to their request, and the better to carry on the fraud, they actually began to break one end of the bridge, exhorting the Scythians at the same time to do their part, to return speedily back to meet the common enemy, to attack and defeat them. The Scythians, being too credulous, retired, and were deceived a second time.

They missed Darius, who had taken a different route from that in which they expected to come up with him. He arrived by night at the bridge over the Danube, and finding it broken down, he no longer doubted but the Ionians were gone, and consequently he should be ruined. He made his people call out with a loud voice for Hystiæus, the Milesian, who at last answered and relieved the king from his anxiety. They entirely repaired the bridge ; so that Darius repassed the Danube, and came back into Thrace. There he left Megabyzus, one of his chief generals, with part of his army, to complete the conquest of that country, and entirely reduce it to his obedience. After which he repassed the Bosphorus with the rest of his troops, and went to Sardis, where he spent the winter and the greatest part of the following year, in order to refresh his army, which had suffered extremely in that ill-concerted and unfortunate expedition.*

Megabyzus continued some time in Thrace, whose inhabitants, according to Herodotus, would have been invincible, had they used the discretion to unite their forces, and to choose one chief commander.† Some of them had very particular customs. In one of their districts, when a child came into the world all the relations expressed great sorrow and affliction, bitterly weeping at the prospect of misery the new-born infant had to experience : and, when any person died, all their kindred rejoiced, because they looked upon the deceased person as happy only from that moment, wherein he was delivered for ever from the troubles and calamities of this life. In another district, where polyg-

* Herod. l. iv. c. 141, 144.

† Herod. l. v. c. 1.

any was in fashion, when a husband died, it was a great dispute among his wives, which of them was the best beloved. She in whose favor the contest was decided, had the privilege of being sacrificed by her nearest relation upon the tomb of her husband, and of being buried with him; while all the other wives envied her happiness, and thought themselves in some sort dishonored.

Darius, on his return to Sardis after his unhappy expedition against the Scythians, having learned to a certainty that he owned both his own safety and that of his whole army to Hystiæus, who had persuaded the Ionians not to destroy the bridge on the Danube, sent for that prince to his court, and desired him freely to ask any favor, in recompense of his service. Hystiæus hereupon desired the king to give him Marcina of Edonia, a territory upon the river Strymon in Thrace, together with the liberty of building a city there. His request was readily granted: whereupon he returned to Miletus, where he caused a fleet of ships to be equipped, and then set out for Thrace. Having taken possession of the territory granted him, he immediately set about the execution of his project for building a city.*

Megabyzus,† who was then governor of Thrace for Darius, immediately perceived how prejudicial that undertaking would be to the king's affairs in those quarters. He considered, that this new city stood upon a navigable river: that the country round it abounded in timber fit for the building of ships; that it was inhabited by different nations, both Greeks and barbarians, that might furnish great numbers of men for land and sea service; that if once those people were under the management of a prince so skilful and enterprising as Hystiæus, they might become so powerful both by sea and land, that it would be no longer possible for the king to keep them in subjection; especially considering, that they had a great many gold and silver mines in that country, which would enable them to carry on any projects or enterprises. At his return to Sardis, he represented all these things to the king, who was convinced by his reasons, and therefore sent for Hystiæus to come to him at Sardis, pretending to have some great designs in view, wherein he wanted the assistance of his counsel. When he had brought him to his court by his means, he carried him to Susa, making him believe, that he set an extraordinary value upon a friend of his fidelity and understanding: two qualifications

* Herod. c. 11, 23.

† Idem, c. 23, 25.

that rendered him so very dear to him, and of which he had given such memorable proofs in the Scythian expedition; and giving him to understand at the same time, that he should be able to find something for him in Persia, which would make him ample amends for all that he could leave behind him. Hystiæus, pleased with so honorable a distinction, and finding himself likewise under a necessity of complying, accompanied Darius to Susa, and left Aristagoras to govern at Miletus in his stead.

While Megabyzus was still in Thrace, he sent several Persian noblemen to Amyntas, king of Macedonia, to require him to give earth and water to Darius his master: this was the usual form of one prince's submitting to another: Amyntas readily complied with that request, and paid all imaginable honor to the envoys. Towards the conclusion of an entertainment which he made for them, they desired that the ladies might be brought in, which was a thing contrary to the custom of the country: the king, however, would not venture to refuse them. The Persian noblemen being heated with wine, and thinking they might use the same freedom as in their own country, did not observe a due decorum towards those princesses. The king's son, whose name was Alexander, could not see his mother and sister treated in such a manner, without great resentment and indignation. Wherefore, upon some pretence or other, he contrived to send the ladies out of the room, as if they were to return again presently: and had the precaution to get the king, his father, also out of the company. In this interval he caused some young men to be dressed like women, and to be armed with poignards under their garments. These pretended ladies came into the room instead of the others; and when the Persians began to treat them as they had before treated the princesses, they drew out their poignards, fell violently upon them, and killed, not only the noblemen, but every one of their attendants. The news of this slaughter soon reached Susa; and the king appointed commissioners to take cognizance of the matter; but Alexander, by the power of bribes and presents, stifled the affair, so that it came to nothing.*

The Scythians, to be revenged of Darius for invading their country, passed the Danube, and ravaged all that part of Thrace that had submitted to the Persians, as far as the Hellespont. Miltiades, to avoid their fury, abandoned the Chersonesus: but after the enemy retired, he returned

* Herod. l. v. c. 17, 21.

thither, and was restored to the same power he had before over the inhabitants of the country. *

SECTION V.—DARIUS'S CONQUEST OF INDIA.

About the same time, † which was in the thirteenth year of Darius's reign, this prince, ambitious of extending his dominion eastwards, first resolved, in order to facilitate his conquests, to get a proper knowledge of the country. To this end, he caused a fleet to be built and fitted out at Caspatyra, a city upon the Indus, and did the same at several other places on the same river, as far as the frontiers of Asiatic Scythia. ‡ The command of this fleet was given to Scylax, § a Grecian of Caryandia, a town of Caria, who was perfectly well versed in maritime affairs. His orders were, to sail down that river, and get all the knowledge he possibly could of the country on both sides, quite down to the mouth of the river; to pass from thence into the southern ocean, and to steer his course afterwards to the west, and return that way to Persia. Scylax, having exactly observed his instructions, and sailed quite down the river Indus, entered the Red Sea by the strait of Babelmandel; and after a voyage of thirty months from the time of his setting out from Caspatyra, he arrived in Egypt at the same port from whence Nechao, king of Egypt, had formerly sent to the Phœnicians, who were in his service, with orders to sail round the coast of Africa. || Very probably this was the same port where now stands the town of Suez, at the farther end of the Red Sea. From thence Scylax returned to Susa, where he gave Darius an account of all his discoveries. Darius afterwards entered India with an army and subjected all that vast country. The reader will naturally expect to be informed of the particulars of so important a war. But Herodotus ¶ does not say one word about it: he only tells us that India made the twentieth province, or government, of the Persian empire, and that the annual revenue of it was worth three hundred and sixty talents of gold to Darius, which amount to near eleven millions of livres of French money, something less than five hundred thousand pounds sterling, or more than two millions of dollars.

* Herod. l. vi. c. 40. † A. M. 3496. Ant. J. C. 508. ‡ Herod. l. iv. c. 44.

§ There is a treatise of geography entitled *Περὶ πλοῦς*, and composed by one Scylax of Caryandia, who is thought to be the same person spoken of in this place. But that opinion is attended with some difficulties, which have given occasion to many learned dissertations.

|| Herod. l. iv. c. 42.

¶ Lib. iii. c. 94.

SECTION VI.—THE REVOLT OF THE IONIANS.

Darius, after his return to Susa from the Scythian expedition had given his brother Artaphernes the government of Sardis, and made Otanes commander in Thrace, and the adjacent countries along the sea-coast, in the room of Megabyzus.*

From a small spark, kindled by a sedition at Naxos, arose a great flame, which gave occasion to a considerable war. Naxos was the most important island of the Cyclades in the *Ægean* Sea, now called the Archipelago. In this sedition the principal inhabitants having been overpowered by the populace, who were the greater number, many of the richest families were banished out of the island. Hereupon they fled to Miletus, and addressed themselves to Aristagoras, imploring him to reinstate them in their own city. He was at that time governor of that city, as lieutenant to Hystiaeus, to whom he was both nephew and son-in-law, and whom Darius had carried along with him to Susa. Aristagoras promised to give these exiles the assistance they desired.†

But not being powerful enough himself to execute what he had promised, he went to Sardis, and communicated the affair to Artaphernes. He represented to him, that this was a very favorable opportunity for reducing Naxos under the power of Darius; that if he was once master of that island, all the rest of the Cyclades would fall of themselves into his hands, one after another; that in consequence, the isle of Eubœa, now Negropont, which was as large as Cyprus, and lay very near it, would be easily conquered, which would give the king a free passage into Greece, and the means of subjecting all that country; and, in short, that a hundred ships would be sufficient for the effectual execution of this enterprise. Artaphernes was so pleased with the project, that, instead of one hundred vessels, which Aristagoras required, he promised him two hundred, in case he obtained the king's consent to the expedition.

The king, charmed with the mighty hopes with which he was flattered, very readily approved the enterprise, though it was founded only on injustice, and a boundless ambition; as also in perfidiousness on the part of Aristagoras and Artaphernes. No consideration gave him a moment's pause. The most injurious project is formed and accepted without the least reluctance or scruple: motives of advantage and

* A. M. 3500. Ant. J. C. 504. Herod. l. v. c. 25

† Idem, c. 28, 34.

convenience solely determine. The isle lay convenient for the Persians : this was conceived a sufficient title, and a warrantable ground to reduce it by force of arms. And, indeed, most of the other expeditions of this prince had no better principle.

As soon as Artaphernes had obtained the king's consent to this project, he made the necessary preparations for executing it. The better to conceal his design, and to surprise the people of Naxus, he spread a report that his fleet was going towards the Hellespont ; and the spring following he sent the number of ships he had promised to Miletus, under the command of Megabates, a Persian nobleman of the royal family of Achæmenes. But being directed in his commission to obey the orders of Aristagoras, that haughty Persian could not bear to be under the command of an Ionian, especially one who treated him in a lofty and imperious manner. This pique occasioned a breach between the two generals, which rose so high, that Megabates, to be revenged of Aristagoras, gave the Naxians secret intelligence of the design formed against them. Upon which intelligence they made such preparations for their defence, that the Persians, after having spent four months in besieging the capital of the island, and consumed all their provisions, were obliged to retire.

This project having thus miscarried, Megabates threw all the blame upon Aristagoras, and entirely ruined his credit with Artaphernes. The Ionians foresaw that this accident would be attended, not only with the loss of his government, but with his utter ruin. The desperate situation he was in made him think of revolting from the king, as the only expedient whereby he could possibly save himself. No sooner had he formed this design, than a messenger came to him from Hystiæus, who gave him the same counsel. Hystiæus, who had now been some years at the Persian court, being disgusted with the manners of that nation, and having an ardent desire to return to his own country, thought this the most likely means of bringing it about, and therefore gave Aristagoras that counsel. He flattered himself that in case any troubles arose in Ionia, he could prevail with Darius to send him thither to appease them ; and, in fact, the thing happened according to his expectation. As soon as Aristagoras found his design seconded by the orders of Hystiæus, he imparted them to the principal persons of Ionia, whom he found extremely well disposed to enter into

his views. He therefore deliberated no longer, but being determined to revolt, applied himself wholly to making preparations for it.*

The people of Tyre, having been reduced to slavery when their city was taken by Nebuchadnezzar, had groaned under that oppression for the space of seventy years. But after the expiration of that term, they were restored, according to Isaiah's prophecy, † to the possession of their ancient privileges, with the liberty of having a king of their own; which liberty they enjoyed till the time of Alexander the Great. It seems probable, that this favor was granted them by Darius, in consideration of the service he expected to receive from that city (which was so powerful by sea), in reducing the Ionians to their ancient subjection. This was in the nineteenth year of Darius's reign. ‡

The next year, Aristagoras, in order to engage the Ionians to adhere the more closely to him, reinstated them in their liberty, and in all their former privileges. He began with Miletus, where he divested himself of his power, and resigned it into the hands of the people. He then made a journey through all Ionia, where, by his example, his influence, and perhaps by the fear that they would be forced to it whether they would or not, he prevailed upon all the other tyrants to do the same in every city. They complied the more readily with it, as the Persian power, since the check it received in Scythia, was the less able to protect them against the Ionians, who were naturally fond of liberty and a state of independence, and professed enemies to all tyranny. Having united them all in this manner in one common league, of which he himself was declared the head, he set up the standard of rebellion against the king, and made great preparations by sea and land for supporting a war against him. §

To enable himself to carry on the war with more vigor, Aristagoras went, in the beginning of the year following, to Lacedæmon, in order to bring that city into his interests, and engage it to furnish him with succors. Cleomenes was at this time king of Sparta. He was the son of Anaxandrides by a second wife, whom the Ephori had obliged him to marry, because he had no issue by the first. He had by her three sons besides Cleomenes, namely, Doræus, Le-

* Herod. l. v. c. 35, 36.

† "And it shall come to pass after the end of seventy years, that the Lord will visit Tyre, and she shall turn to her hire."—Isa. xlviii. 17.

‡ A. M. 3502. Ant. J. C. 502.

§ Herod. l. v. c. 37, 38.

onidas, and Cleombrotus, the two last of whom ascended the throne of Lacedæmon in their turns. Aristagoras then addressed himself to Cleomenes; and the time and place for an interview between them being agreed to, he waited upon him, and represented to him, that the Ionians and Lacedæmonians were countrymen; that Sparta being the most powerful city of Greece, it would be for her honor to concur with him in the design he had formed of restoring the Ionians to their liberty: that the Persians, their common enemy, were not a warlike people, but exceeding rich and wealthy, and consequently would become an easy prey to the Lacedæmonians; that, considering the present spirit and disposition of the Ionians, it would not be difficult for them to carry their victorious arms even to Susa, the metropolis of the Persian empire, and the place of the king's residence: he showed him, at the same time, a description of all the nations and towns through which they were to pass, engraven upon a little plate of brass which he had brought along with him. Cleomenes desired three days to consider of his proposals. That term being expired, he asked the Ionian how far it was from the Ionian sea to Susa, and how much time it required to go from the one place to the other. Aristagoras, without considering the effect his answer was likely to have with Cleomenes, told him, that from Ionia to Susa was about three months' journey.* Cleomenes was so amazed at this proposal, that he immediately ordered him to depart from Sparta before sun-set. Aristagoras, nevertheless, followed him home to his house, and endeavored to win him by arguments of another sort, that is, by presents. The first sum he offered him was only ten talents, which were equivalent to thirty thousand livres French money: that being refused, he still rose in his offers, till at last he proposed to give him fifty talents. Gorgo, a daughter of Cleomenes, about eight or nine years of age, whom her father had not ordered to quit the room, apprehending nothing from so young a child, hearing the proposals that were made to her father, "Fly, father, fly, this stranger will corrupt you." Cleomenes laughed, yet observed the child's admonition, and actually retired. Aristagoras left Sparta.†

* According to Herodotus, who reckons the parasanga, a Persian measure, to contain 30 stadia, the distance from Sardis to Susa is 450 parasangas, or 13,500 stadia, which makes 675 of our leagues; for we generally reckon 20 stadia to one of our common leagues. So that by travelling 150 stadia per day, which makes seven leagues and a half of our measure, it is ninety days' journey from Sardis to Susa. If they set out from Ephesus, it would require about four days more, for Ephesus is 540 stadia from Sardis.

† Herod. l. v. c. 38, 41, 48, 51.

From hence he proceeded to Athens, where he found a more favorable reception. He had the good fortune to arrive there at a time when the Athenians were extremely well disposed to hearken to any proposals that could be made to them against the Persians, with whom they were highly offended on the following occasion. Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens, about ten years before the time we are speaking of, having been banished, after having in vain tried numerous methods for his re-establishment, at last went to Sardis, and made application to Artaphernes. He insinuated himself so far into the good opinion of that governor, that he listened favorably to all he said to the disadvantage of the Athenians, and became extremely prejudiced against them.* The Athenians, having intelligence of this, sent an ambassador to Sardis, and desired of Artaphernes not to give ear to what any of their outlaws should insinuate to their disadvantage. The answer of Artaphernes to this message was, that if they desired to live in peace, they must recall Hippias. When this haughty answer was brought back to the Athenians, the whole city was violently enraged against the Persians. Aristagoras, coming thither just at this juncture, easily obtained all he desired. Herodotus remarks on this occasion, how much easier it is to impose upon a multitude than upon a single person; and so Aristagoras found it; for he prevailed with thirty thousand Athenians to come to a resolution, into which he could not persuade Cleomenes alone. They engaged immediately to furnish twenty ships to assist him in his design; and it may be truly said, that this little fleet was the original source of all the calamities in which both the Persians and Grecians were afterwards involved.†

In the third year of this war, the Ionians, having collected all their forces, together with the twenty vessels furnished by the city of Athens, and five more from Eretria, in the island of Eubœa, set sail for Ephesus, where, leaving their ships, they marched by land to the city of Sardis: and finding the place in a defenceless condition, soon made themselves masters of it: but were not able to force the citadel, into which Artaphernes retired. As most of the houses of the city were built with reeds, and consequently were very combustible, an Ionian soldier set fire to one house, the flame of which spreading and communicating itself to the

* This fact has been before treated at large in the preceding volume.

† Herod. l. v. c. 55, 96, 97.

rest, reduced the whole city to ashes. Upon this accident, the Persians and Lydians assembling their forces together for their defence, the Ionians judged it was time for them to think of retreating; and accordingly they marched back with all possible diligence, in order to re-embark at Ephesus: but the Persians, arriving there almost as soon as they, attacked them vigorously, and destroyed a great number of their men. The Athenians, after the return of their ships, would never again engage in this war, notwithstanding all the entreaties and solicitations of Aristagoras.*

Darius being informed of the burning of Sardis, and of the part the Athenians took in that affair, resolved from that very time to make war upon Greece; and that he might never forget his resolution, he commanded one of his officers to cry out to him with a loud voice every night, when he was at supper, "Sir, remember the Athenians." In the burning of Sardis it happened that the temple of Cybele, the goddess of that country, was consumed with the rest of the city. This accident served afterwards as a pretence to the Persians to burn all the temples they found in Greece; to which they were likewise induced by a motive of religion, which I have before explained.†

As Aristagoras, the head and manager of this revolt, was Hystiæus's lieutenant at Miletus, Darius suspected that the latter might probably be the instigator of the whole conspiracy; for which reason he entered into a free conference with him upon the subject, and acquainted him with his thoughts, and the just grounds he had for his suspicions. Hystiæus, who was a crafty courtier, and an expert master in the art of dissembling, appeared extremely surprised and afflicted; and speaking in a tone that at once expressed both sorrow and indignation, thus endeavored to exculpate himself to the king: "is it possible, then, for your majesty to have entertained so injurious a suspicion of the most faithful and most affectionate of your servants? I concerned in a rebellion against you! Alas! what is there in the world that could tempt me to it? Do I want any thing here? Am I not already raised to one of the highest stations in your court? And besides the honor I have of assisting at your councils, do I not daily receive new proofs of your bounty, by the numberless favors you heap upon me?" After this he insinuated, that the revolt in Ionia proceeded from his absence and distance from the country; that they

* Herod. l. v. c. 99, 103.

Idem. c. 105.

had waited for that opportunity to rebel; that if he had staid at Miletus, the conspiracy would never have been formed: that the surest way to restore the king's affairs in that province, would be to send him thither; that he promised him on the forfeiture of his head, to deliver Aristagoras into his hands; and engaged, besides all this, to make the large island of Sardinia tributary to him.* The best princes are often too credulous; and when they have once taken a subject into their confidence, it is with difficulty they withdraw from him; nor do they easily undeceive themselves. Darius, imposed upon by the air of sincerity with which Hystiæus spoke on this occasion, believed him on his own word, and gave him leave to return to Ionia, on condition he would return to the Persian court as soon as he had executed what he promised.†

The revolters in the mean time, though deserted by the Athenians, and notwithstanding the considerable check they had received in Ionia, did not lose courage but still pushed on their point with resolution. Their fleet set sail towards the Hellespont and the Propontis, and reduced Byzantium, with the major part of the other Grecian cities in that quarter; after which, as they were returning, they obliged the Carians and the people of Cyprus to join with them in this war. The Persian generals, having divided their forces among themselves, marched three different ways against the rebels, and defeated them in several encounters, in one of which Aristagoras was slain. ‡

When Hystiæus came to Sardis, his intriguing spirit formed a plot against the government, into which he drew a great number of Persians. But, perceiving by some discourse he had with Artaphernes, that the part he had in the revolt of Ionia was not unknown to that governor, he thought it not safe for him to stay any longer at Sardis, and retired secretly, the night following, to the isle of Chios: from thence he sent a trusty messenger to Sardis, with letters for such of the Persians as he had gained to his party. This messenger betrayed him, and delivered his letters to Artaphernes, by which means the plot was discovered, all his accomplices put to death, and his project utterly defeated. But still imagining that he could bring about some enterprise of importance, if he was once at the head of the

* This island is very remote from Ionia, and could have no relation to it. I am therefore inclined to believe it must be an error that has crept into the text of Herodotus.

† Herod. l. v. c. 105, 107.

‡ Idem. c. 103, 104, 108, and 122.

Ionian league, he made several attempts to get into Miletus, and to be admitted into the confederacy by the citizens: but none of his endeavors succeeded, and he was obliged to return to Chios.*

Being there asked why he had so strongly urged Aristagoras to revolt, and by that means involved Ionia in such calamities, he made answer, that it was because the king had resolved to transport the Ionians into Phœnicia, and to plant the Phœnicians in Ionia. But all this was a mere story and fiction of his own inventing, Darius having never conceived any such design. The artifice, however, served his purpose extremely well, not only for justifying him to the Ionians, but also for engaging them to prosecute the war with vigor. For being alarmed at the thoughts of this transmigration, they came to a firm resolution to defend themselves against the Persians to the last extremity.†

Artaphernes and Otanes, with the rest of the Persian generals, finding that Miletus was the centre of the Ionian confederacy, resolved to march thither with all their forces; concluding, that if they could carry that city, all the rest would submit of course. The Ionians, having intelligence of their design, determined in a general assembly to send no army into the field, but to fortify Miletus, to furnish it as well as possible with provisions, and all things necessary for enduring a siege; and to unite all their forces to engage the Persians at sea, their skill in maritime affairs inducing them to believe that they should have the advantage in a naval battle. The place of their rendezvous was Lade, a small isle opposite to Miletus, where they assembled a fleet of three hundred and fifty-three vessels. At the sight of this fleet, the Persians, though stronger by one-half with respect to the number of their ships, were afraid to hazard a battle, till by their emissaries they had secretly corrupted the greatest part of the confederates, and engaged them to desert; so that when the two fleets came to action, the ships of Samos, of Lesbos, and several other places, sailed off, and returned to their own country, and the remaining fleet of the confederates, consisting of not more than a hundred vessels, were all quickly overpowered by numbers, and almost entirely destroyed. After this, the city of Miletus was besieged, and became a prey to the conquerors, who utterly destroyed it. This happened six years after the revolt of Aristagoras. All the other cities, as well on the continent

* Herod. l. vi. c. 1-5.

† Idem. c. 3.

as on the sea-coast and in the isles, returned to their duty soon after, either voluntarily, or by force. Those persons who stood out were treated as they had been threatened beforehand. The handsomest of the young men were chosen to serve in the king's palace, and the young women were all sent to Persia; the cities and temples were reduced to ashes. These were the effects of the revolt into which the people were drawn by the ambitious views of Aristagoras and Hystiæus.*

Hystiæus suffered in the general calamity: for that same year he was taken by the Persians, and carried to Sardis, where Artaphernes caused him to be immediately hanged, without consulting Darius, lest that prince's affection for Hystiæus should incline him to pardon him, and by that means a dangerous enemy should be left alive, who might create the Persians new troubles. It appeared by the sequel, that the conjecture of Artaphernes was well grounded: for when Hystiæus's head was brought to Darius, he expressed great dissatisfaction at the authors of his death, and caused the head to be honorably interred, as being the remains of a person to whom he owed infinite obligations, the remembrance of which was too deeply engraven on his mind, ever to be effaced by the greatness of any crimes he had afterwards committed. Hystiæus was one of those restless, bold, and enterprising spirits, in whom many good qualities are joined with still greater vices; with whom all means are lawful and good, that seem to promote the end they may have in view; who look upon justice, probity, and sincerity, as mere empty names; who make no scruple to employ lying or fraud, treachery, or even perjury, when it is to serve their turn; and who account it nothing to ruin nations, or even their own country, if necessary to their own elevation. His end was worthy his sentiments, and what is common enough to these irreligious politicians, who sacrifice everything to their ambition, and acknowledge no other rule of their actions, and hardly any other God than their interest and fortune.†

SECTION VII.—THE EXPEDITION OF DARIUS'S ARMY AGAINST GREECE.

Darius, in the twenty-eighth year of his reign, having recalled all his other generals, sent Mardonius, the son of Go-

* Herod. l. vi. c. 6, 20, 31, and 39.

† Idem. c. 29, 30.

bryas, a young lord of an illustrious Persian family, who had lately married one of the king's daughters, to command in chief throughout all the maritime parts of Asia, with a particular order to invade Greece, and to revenge the burning of Sardis upon the Athenians and Eretrians.* The king did not show much wisdom in this choice, by which he preferred a young man, because he was a favorite, to all his oldest and most experienced generals: especially as it was in so difficult a war, the success of which he had very much at heart, and wherein the glory of his reign was intimately concerned. His being son-in-law to the king was a quality indeed that might augment his influence, but added nothing to his real merit, or his capacity as a general.

Upon his arrival in Macedonia, into which he had marched with his land forces, after having passed through Thrace, the whole country, terrified by his power, submitted. But this fleet, attempting to double Mount Athos, now called Capo Santo, in order to gain the coasts of Macedonia, was attacked with so violent a storm of wind, that upwards of three hundred ships, with above twenty thousand men, perished in the sea. His land army at the same time met with an equally fatal overthrow. For, being encamped in a place of no security, the Thracians attacked the Persian camp by night, made a great slaughter of the men, and wounded Mardonius himself. All this ill success obliged him shortly after to return into Asia, with grief and confusion at his having miscarried both by sea and land in this expedition.

Darius, perceiving too late that the youth and inexperience of Mardonius had occasioned the defeat of his troops, recalled him and gave the command to two generals, Datis, a Mede, and Artaphernes, son of his brother Artaphernes, who had been governor of Sardis. The king was earnestly bent upon putting in execution the great design he had long had in mind, which was to attack Greece with all his forces, and particularly to take a signal vengeance on the people of Athens and Eretria, whose enterprise against Sardis was perpetually in his thoughts.

1. THE STATE OF ATHENS. THE CHARACTERS OF MILTIADES, THEMISTOCLES, AND ARISTIDES.

Before we enter upon this war, it will be proper to refresh our memories with a view of the state of Athens at

* A. M. 3510. Ant. J. C. 494. Herod. l. vi. c. 43, 45.

this time, which alone sustained the first shock of the Persians at Marathon, to form some idea beforehand of the great men who shared in that celebrated victory.

Athens, just delivered from that yoke of servitude which she had been forced to bear for above thirty years, under the tyranny of Pisistratus and his children, now peaceably enjoyed the advantages of liberty, the sweetness and value of which were only heightened and improved by that short privation. Lacedæmon, which was at this time the mistress of Greece, and had contributed at first to this happy change in Athens, seemed afterwards to repent of her good offices, and growing jealous of the tranquillity she herself had procured for her neighbors, she attempted to disturb it, by endeavoring to reinstate Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, in the government of Athens. But all her attempts were fruitless, and served only to manifest her ill-will, and her grief, to see Athens determined to maintain its independence even of Sparta itself. Hippias hereupon had recourse to the Persians. Artaphernes, governor of Sardis, sent the Athenians word, as we have already mentioned, that they must re-establish Hippias in his authority, unless they chose rather to draw the whole power of Darius upon them. This second attempt succeeded no better than the first; Hippias was obliged to wait for a more favorable juncture. We shall see presently that he served as a conductor or guide to the Persian generals sent by Darius against Greece.

Athens, from the recovery of her liberty, was quite another city than under her tyrants, and displayed a very different kind of spirit. Among the citizens, Miltiades distinguished himself most in the war with the Persians, which we are going to relate. He was the son of Cimon, an illustrious Athenian. This Cimon had a half brother by the mother's side, whose name was likewise Miltiades, of a very ancient and noble family in Ægina, who had lately been received into the number of Athenian citizens. He was a person of great reputation even in the time of Pisistratus; but being unwilling to bear the yoke of a despotic government, he joyfully embraced the offer made him, of going to settle with a colony in the Thracian Chersonesus, where he was invited by the Dolonci, the inhabitants of that country, to be their king, or according to the language of those times, their tyrant. He, dying without children, left the sovereignty to Stesagoras, who was his nephew, and eldest son of his brother Cimon; and Stesagoras also dying without issue,

the sons of Pisistratus, who then ruled the city of Athens, sent his brother Miltiades, the person we are now speaking of, into that country to be his successor. He arrived there, and established himself in the government, the same year that Darius undertook his expedition against the Scythians. He attended that prince with some ships as far as the Danube: and was the person who advised the Ionians to destroy the bridge, and return home without waiting for Darius. During his residence in the Chersonesus, he married Hegesipyla,* daughter of Olorus, a Thracian king in the neighborhood, by whom he had Cimon, the famous Athenian general, of whom a great deal will be said in the sequel. Miltiades, having for several reasons abdicated his government in Thrace, embarked with all his effects on board five ships, and set sail for Athens. There he settled a second time, and acquired great reputation.†

At the same time two other citizens, younger than Miltiades, began to distinguish themselves at Athens, namely, Aristides and Themistocles. Plutarch observes, that the former of these two had endeavored to form himself upon the model of Clisthenes, one of the greatest men of his time, and a zealous defender of liberty, who had greatly contributed to the restoring of it at Athens, by expelling the Pisistratidæ out of that city. It was an excellent custom among the ancients, and it is to be wished that the same might prevail among us, that the young men, ambitious of public employments, particularly attached themselves to such aged and experienced persons as had distinguished themselves most eminently in business, and who, both by their conversation and example, could teach them the art of conducting themselves, and governing others with wisdom and discretion.‡ Thus, says Plutarch, did Aristides attach himself to Clisthenes, and Cimon to Aristides; and he mentions several others, among the rest Polybius, whom we have mentioned so often, and who in his youth was the constant disciple and faithful imitator of the celebrated Philopæmen.§

Themistocles and Aristides were of very different dispositions; but they both rendered great services to the commonwealth. Themistocles, who naturally inclined to popu-

* After the death of Miltiades, this princess had, by a second husband, a son who was called Olorus, after the name of his grandfather, and who was the father of Thucydides the historian.—Herod.

† Herod. l. vi. c. 34, 40. Corn. Nep. in Mil. cap. i-iii.

‡ Discere a peritis, sequi optimos. Tacit. in Agric.

§ Plut. in Arist. pp. 319, 320, et in Them. 112, 113. An seni sit in ger. Resp. pp. 790, 791.

lar government, omitted nothing that could contribute to render him agreeable to the people, and to gain friends; behaving himself with great affability and complaisance to every body; always ready to do service to the citizens, every one of whom he knew by name; nor was he very scrupulous about the means he used to oblige them. Somebody talking with him once on the subject, told him he would make an excellent magistrate, if his behavior towards the citizens was more equal, and if he was not biassed in favor of one more than another. "God forbid," replied Themistocles, "I should ever sit upon a tribunal, where my friends should find no more credit or favor than strangers."* Cleon, who appeared some time after at Athens, observed a quite different conduct, but yet such as was not wholly exempted from blame. When he came into the administration of public affairs, he assembled all his friends, and declared to them, that from that moment he renounced their friendship, lest it should prove an obstacle to him in the discharge of his duty, and cause him to act with partiality and injustice. This was doing them very little honor, and judging harshly of their integrity. But, as Plutarch says, it was not his friends, but his passions that he ought to have renounced.

Aristides had the discretion to observe a just medium between these two vicious extremes. Being a favorer of aristocracy, in imitation of Lysurgus, whom he greatly admired, he in a manner struck out a new path of his own; not endeavoring to oblige his friends at the expense of justice, and yet always ready to do them service when consistent with it. He carefully avoided making use of his friends' recommendations for obtaining employments, lest it should prove a dangerous obligation upon him, as well as a plausible pretext for them, to expect the same favor on the like occasion. He used to say that the true citizen, or the honest man, ought to make no other use of his credit and power, than upon all occasions to practice what was honest and just, and engage others to do the same.

Considering this contrariety of principles and humors among these great men, we are not to wonder, if, during their administration, there was a continual opposition between them. Themistocles, who was bold and enterprising, was still sure almost always to find Aristides against him, who thought himself obliged to thwart the other's designs, even sometimes when they were just and beneficial to the public, lest he should get too great an ascendant and au-

* Cic. de Senect. Plat. An Seni sit ger. Resp. pp. 806, 807.

thority, which might become pernicious to the commonwealth. One day, having got the better of Themistocles, who had made some proposal really advantageous to the state, he could not contain himself, but cried out aloud, as he went out of the assembly, "That the Athenians would never prosper till they threw them both into the Barathrum." The Barathrum was a pit into which malefactors, condemned to die, were thrown. But notwithstanding this mutual opposition, when the common interest was at stake, they were no longer enemies, and whenever they were to take the field, or engage in any expedition, they mutually agreed to lay aside all differences on leaving the city, and to be at liberty to resume them on their return, if they thought fit.*

The predominant passion of Themistocles was ambition and the love of glory, which discovered itself from his childhood. After the battle of Marathon, which we shall speak of presently, when the people were every where extolling the valor and conduct of Miltiades, who had won it, Themistocles never appeared but in a thoughtful and melancholy humor; he spent whole nights without sleep, and was never seen at public feasts and entertainments as usual. When his friends, astonished at this change, asked him the reason of it, he made answer, "that the trophies of Miltiades would not let him sleep." These were a kind of incentive, which never ceased to prompt and animate his ambition. From this time Themistocles addicted himself wholly to arms; and the love of martial glory wholly engrossed him.

As for Aristides, the love of the public good was the great spring of all his actions. What he was most particularly admired for, was his constancy and steadiness under the unforeseen changes, to which those who have the administration of affairs are exposed; for he was neither elevated with the honor conferred upon him, nor cast down at the contempt and disappointments he sometimes experienced. On all occasions, he preserved his usual calmness and temper, being persuaded that a man ought to give himself up entirely to his country, and to serve it with a perfect disinterestedness, as well with regard to glory as to riches. The general esteem he had gained for the uprightness of his intentions, the purity of his zeal for the interests of the state, and the sincerity of his virtue, appeared one day in the theatre, when one of Æschylus's plays was acting. For when the actor repeated that verse which describes the

* Plut. Apophthegm. p. 186.

character of Amphiaraus, "He does not desire to seem an honest and virtuous man, but really to be so," the whole audience cast their eyes on Aristides, and applied the eulogy to him.

Another thing related of him with respect to public employment, is very remarkable. He was no sooner made treasurer-general of the republic, than he made it appear that his predecessors in office had defrauded the state of vast sums of money, and among the rest Themistocles, in particular; for this great man, with all his merit, was not irreproachable on that head. For which reason, when Aristides came to pass his accounts, Themistocles raised a mighty faction against him, accused him of having embezzled the public treasure, and prevailed so far as to have him condemned and fined. But the principal inhabitants, and the most virtuous part of the citizens, rising up against so unjust a sentence, not only the judgment was reversed, and the fine remitted, but he was elected treasurer for the ensuing year. He then seemed to repent of his former administration; and by showing himself tractable and indulgent towards others, he found out the secret of pleasing all that plundered the commonwealth. For as he neither reproved them, nor narrowly inspected their accounts, all these plunderers, grown fat with spoil and repine, now extolled Aristides to the skies. It would have been easy for him, as we perceive, to enrich himself in a post of that nature, which seems, as it were, to invite a man to do so by the many favorable opportunities presented to him; especially as he had to deal with officers, who, for their part, were intent upon nothing but robbing the public, and would have been ready to conceal the frauds of the treasurer their master, on condition he did them the same favor.

These very officers now made interest with the people to have him continued a third year in the same employment. But when the time of election arrived, just as they were upon the point of electing Aristides unanimously, he rose up, and warmly reproved the Athenian people; "what," said he, "when I managed your treasure with all the fidelity and diligence an honest man is capable of, I met with the most cruel treatment, and the most mortifying returns; and now that I have abandoned it to the mercy of all these robbers of the public, am I an admirable man, and the best of citizens? I cannot help declaring to you, that I am more ashamed of the honor you do me this day, than I was of the

condemnation you passed against me this time twelvemonth ; and with grief I find, that it is more glorious with us to be complaisant to knaves, than to save the treasures of the republic." By this declaration he silenced the public plunderers, and gained the esteem of all good men.

Such were the characters of these two illustrious Athenians, who began to display their extraordinary merit, when Darius turned his arms against Greece.

2. DARIUS SENDS HERALDS INTO GREECE, IN ORDER TO SOUND THE PEOPLE, AND TO REQUIRE THEM TO SUBMIT.

Before this prince would directly engage in this enterprise, he judged it expedient, first of all, to sound the Grecians, and know in what manner the different states stood affected towards him. With this view he sent heralds into all parts of Greece to require earth and water in his name. This was the form used by the Persians when they demanded submission from those they were desirous of bringing under subjection. On the arrival of these heralds, many of the Grecian cities, dreading the power of the Persians, complied with their demands ; as did also the inhabitants of Ægina, a small island opposite to, and not far from Athens. This proceeding of the people of Ægina, was looked upon as a public treason. The Athenians represented the matter to the Spartans, who immediately sent Cleomenes, one of their kings, to apprehend the authors of it. The people of Ægina refused to deliver them up, under pretence that he came without his colleague.*

This colleague was Demaratus, who had himself suggested that excuse. As soon as Cleomenes was returned to Sparta, in order to be revenged on Demaratus for that affront, he endeavored to get him deposed, as not being of the royal family, and succeeded in his attempt by the assistance of the priestess of Delphos, whom he had suborned to give an answer favorable to his designs. Demaratus, not being able to endure so gross an injury, banished himself from his country, and retired to Darius, who received him with open arms, and gave him a considerable settlement in Persia. He was succeeded in the throne by Leontychides, who joined his colleague, and went with him to Ægina, from whence they brought away ten of the principal inhabitants, and committed them to the custody of the Athenians, their declared ene-

* Herod. l. vi. c. 49 et 86.

mies. Cleomenes dying not long after, and the fraud he had committed at Delphos being discovered, the Lacedæmonians endeavored to oblige the people of Athens to set those prisoners at liberty, but they refused.

The Persian heralds, who went to Sparta and Athens, were not so favorably received as those that had been sent to the other cities. One of them was thrown into a well, and the other into a deep ditch, and were bid to take earth and water from thence.* I should be less surprised at this unworthy treatment, if Athens alone had been concerned in it. It was a proceeding suitable enough to a popular government, rash, impetuous, and violent, where reason is seldom heard, and every thing determined by passion. But I do not find any thing in this agreeable to the Spartan equity and gravity. They were at liberty to refuse what was demanded: but to treat public officers in such a manner, was an open violation of the law of nations. If what historians say on this head be true, the crime did not remain unpunished. Talthybius, one of Agamemnon's heralds, was honored at Sparta as a god, and had a temple there. He revenged the indignities done to the heralds of the king of Persia, and made the Spartans feel the effects of his wrath, by bringing many terrible accidents upon them. In order to appease him, and to expiate their offence, they sent afterwards several of their chief citizens into Persia, who voluntarily offered themselves as victims for their country. They were delivered into the hands of Xerxes, who would not let them suffer, but sent them back to their own country. As for the Athenians, Talthybius executed his vengeance on the family of Miltiades, who was principally concerned in the outrage committed upon Darius's heralds.†

3. THE PERSIANS DEFEATED AT MARATHON BY MILTIADES.

Darius immediately sent away Datis and Artaphernes, whom he had appointed generals in the room of Mardonius. ‡ Their instructions were to give up Eretria and Athens to be plundered, to burn the houses and temples, to make all the inhabitants of both places prisoners, and to send them to Darius; for which purpose they went provided with a great number of chains and fetters. They set sail with a fleet of five or six hundred ships, and an army of five hundred thousand men. After having made themselves masters of the

* Herod. l. vii. c. 133, 136. † Herod. l. vii. c. 135, 136. Paus. in Lacon. pp. 182, 183. ‡ A. M. 3514. Ant. J. C. 490.

isles in the Ægean sea, which they did without difficulty, they steered their course towards Eretria, a city of Eubœa, which they took after a siege of seven days, by the treachery of some of the principal inhabitants; they reduced it entirely to ashes, put all the inhabitants in chains, and sent them to Persia.* Darius, contrary to their expectation, treated them kindly, and gave them a village in the country of Cissia † for their habitation, which was but a day's journey from Susa, where Apollonius Tyanæus found some of their descendants six hundred years afterwards. ‡

After this success at Eretria, the Persians advanced towards Attica. Hippias conducted them to Marathon, a little town by the seaside. They took care to acquaint the Athenians with the fate of Eretria, and to let them know that not an inhabitant of that place had escaped their vengeance, in hopes that this news would induce them to surrender immediately. § The Athenians had sent to Lacedæmon, to desire succors against the common enemy, which the Spartans granted them instantly; but which could not set out till some days after, on account of an ancient custom and superstitious maxim among them, that did not allow them to begin a march before the full of the moon. Not one of their other allies prepared to succor them, such terror had the formidable army of the Persians spread on every side. The inhabitants of Plataeæ alone furnished them with a thousand soldiers. In this extremity the Athenians were obliged to arm their slaves, which they had never done before this occasion.

The Persian army commanded by Datis, consisted of a hundred thousand foot, and ten thousand horse. That of the Athenians amounted only to ten thousand men. It was headed by ten generals, of whom Miltiades was the chief; and these ten were to have the alternate command of the whole army each for a day. There was a great dispute among these officers, whether they should hazard a battle, or await the enemy within the walls. The latter opinion had a great majority, and appeared very reasonable. For, what prospect of success could there be in facing, with a handful of soldiers, so numerous and formidable an army as that of the Persians? Miltiades, however, declared for the contrary opinion, and showed that the only means to rouse the courage of their own troops, and to strike terror into

* Plut. in Moral. p. 829.

† Herod. l. vi. c. 119.

‡ Philostr. l. i. c. 17.

§ Herod. l. vi. c. 102, 120. Corn. Nep. in Milt. c. iv.-vi. Justin. l. ii. c. 3. Plut. in Aristid. p. 321.

those of the enemy, was to advance boldly towards them with an air of confidence and intrepidity. Aristides strenuously defended this opinion, and brought some of the other commanders into it, so that when the suffrages came to be taken, they were equal on both sides of the question. Hereupon Miltiades addressed himself to Callimachus, who was then polemarch,* and had a right of voting as well as the ten commanders. He very warmly represented to him that the fate of their country was then in his hands: that his single vote was to determine whether Athens should preserve her liberty, or be enslaved; and that he had it in his power by one word to become as famous as Harmodious and Aristogiton, the authors of that liberty the Athenians enjoyed. Callimachus pronounced the word in favor of Miltiades's opinion. And accordingly a battle was resolved upon.

Aristides, reflecting that a command which changes every day must necessarily be feeble, unequal, often contradictory, and incapable either of projecting or executing any uniform design, was of opinion, that their danger was both too great and too pressing for them to expose their affairs to such inconveniences. In order to obviate these, he judged it necessary to vest the whole power in a single person; and, to induce his colleagues to act conformably, he himself set the first example of resignation. When the day came on which it was his turn to take upon him the command, he resigned it to Miltiades, as the more able and experienced general. The other commanders did the same, all sentiments of jealousy giving way to the love of the public good; and, by this day's behavior we may learn, that it is almost as glorious to acknowledge merit in other persons, as to have it one's self. Miltiades, however, thought fit to wait till his own day came. Then, like an able captain, he endeavored, by the advantage of the ground, to gain what he wanted in strength and number. He drew up his army at the foot of a mountain, that the enemy should not be able either to surround him, or charge him in the rear. On the two sides of his army he caused large trees to be thrown, which were cut down on purpose, in order to cover his flanks, and render the Persian cavalry useless. Datis, their commander, was very sensible that the place was not very advantageous for him: but relying upon the number of his troops, which was infinitely superior to that of the

* The polemarch at Athens was both a military and judicial officer, equally employed to command in the army, and to administer justice. I shall give a more particular account of this office in another place.

Athenians, and on the other hand unwilling to delay till the reinforcement of the Spartans arrived, he determined to engage. The Athenians did not wait for the enemy to charge them. As soon as the signal for battle was given, they ran against the enemy with all the fury imaginable. The Persians looked upon this first step of the Athenians as a piece of madness, considering their army was so small and utterly destitute both of cavalry and archers: but they were quickly undeceived. Herodotus observes, that this was the first time the Grecians began an engagement by running in this manner; which may seem somewhat astonishing. And, indeed, was there not reason to apprehend that their running would in some measure weaken the troops, and blunt the edge of their first impetuosity; and that the soldiers having quitted their ranks, might be out of breath, spent, and in disorder, when they came to the enemy, who, waiting to receive them in good order, and without stirring, ought, one would think, to be in a condition to sustain the charge advantageously? This consideration engaged Pompey, at the battle of Pharsalia, to keep his troops in a steady posture, and to forbid their making any motion, till the enemy made the first attack.* But Cæsar † blames Pompey's conduct in this respect, and gives this reason for it, that the impetuosity of an army's motion in running to engage, inspires the soldiers with a certain enthusiasm and martial fury, gives an additional force to their blows, and increases and inflames their courage, which, by the rapid movement of so many thousand men together, is blown up and animated, to use the expression, like flames, by the wind. ‡ I leave it to military gentlemen to decide the point between these two great captains, and return to my subject.

The battle was very fierce and obstinate. Miltiades had made the wings of his army exceeding strong, but had left the main body weaker, and not so deep; the reason of which is sufficiently obvious. Having but ten thousand men to oppose to such a numerous and vast army, it was impossible for him either to make a large front, or to give an equal depth to his battalions. He was obliged therefore to take

* Cæs. in Bell. Civil. l. iil.

† Quod nobis quidem nulla ratione factum a Pompeio videtur: propterea quod est quedam incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, quæ studio pugnæ incenditur. Hanc non reprimere, sed augere imperatores debent. —Cæs.

Καίσαρ περὶ τοῦτο δε ἀπορτεῖν φησὶ τὸν Πομπήιον ἀγνοήσαντα, τὴν μετὰ δρόμον καὶ φοβερὰν ἐν ἀρχῇ γινομένην σύρραξιν, ὡς ἔντε ταῖς, πληναῖς, βίαν προστιζήσι, καὶ συνεκκρίει τὸν θυμὸν ἐκ παντὶ ἀναρριζόμενον.—Plut. in Cæs.

‡ Plut. in Pomp. p. 656, et in Cæs. p. 719.

his choice ; and he imagined that he could gain the victory in no other way than by the efforts he should make with his two wings, in order to break and disperse those of the Persians ; not doubting that when once his wings were victorious they would be able to attack the enemy's main body in flank, and complete the victory without much difficulty. This was the plan followed by Hannibal afterwards at the battle of Cannæ, which succeeded so well with him, and which indeed can scarce ever fail of succeeding. The Persians then attacked the main body of the Grecian army, and made their greatest effort, particularly upon their front. This was led by Aristides and Themistocles, who supported it a long time with intrepid courage and bravery, but were at length obliged to give ground. At that very instant came up their two victorious wings, which had defeated those of the enemy, and put them to flight. Nothing could be more seasonable for the main body of the Grecian army, which began to be broken, being quite borne down by the number of the Persians. The scale was quickly turned, and the barbarians were entirely routed. They all betook themselves to flight, not towards their camp, but to their ships, that they might make their escape. The Athenians pursued them thither and set many of their vessels on fire. It was on this occasion that Cynægirus, the brother of the poet Æschylus, who laid hold of one of the ships, in order to get into it with those that fled, had his right hand cut off, and fell into the sea and was drowned.* The Athenians took seven of their ships. They lost not more than two hundred men on their side in this engagement ; whereas, on the side of the Persians, above six thousand were slain, besides those who fell into the sea as they endeavored to escape, or those that were consumed with the ships on fire.

Hippias was killed in the battle. That ungrateful and perfidious citizen, in order to recover the unjust dominion usurped by his father Pisistratus over the Athenians, had the baseness to become a servile courtier to a barbarian prince, and to implore his aid against his native country. Urged on by hatred and revenge, he suggested all the means he could invent to load his country with chains ; and even put himself at the head of its enemies, for the purpose of reducing that city to ashes to which he owed his birth, and

* Justin adds, that Cynægirus, having first had his right, and then his left hand cut off with an axe, laid hold of the vessel with his teeth, and would not let go, so violent was his rage against the enemy. This account is utterly fabulous, and has not the least appearance of truth.

against which he had no other ground of complaint, than that she would not acknowledge him for her tyrant. An ignominious death, together with everlasting infamy, entailed upon his name, was the just reward of so black a treachery.

Immediately after the battle, an Athenian soldier, still reeking with the blood of the enemy, quitted the army, and ran to Athens, to carry his fellow-citizens the happy news of the victory. When he arrived at the magistrate's house, he only uttered two words, "rejoice, rejoice,* the victory is ours," and fell down dead at their feet.†

The Persians thought themselves so sure of the victory, that they had brought marble to Marathon, to erect a trophy there. The Grecians took this marble, and caused a statue to be made of it by Phidias in honor of the goddess Nemesis,‡ who had a temple near the place where the battle was fought.§

The Persian fleet, instead of sailing by the islands, in order to re-enter Asia, doubled the cape of Sunium, with the design of surprising Athens, before the Athenian forces should arrive there to defend the city. But the latter had the precaution to march thither with nine tribes to secure their country; and performed their march with so much expedition, that they arrived there the same day. The distance from Marathon to Athens is about forty miles, or fifteen French leagues. This was a great exertion for an army that had just undergone the fatigue of a long and severe battle. By this means the design of their enemies miscarried.

Aristides, the only general that remained at Marathon with his tribe, to take care of the spoil and prisoners, acted suitably to the good opinion that was entertained of him. For, though gold and silver were scattered about in abundance in the enemy's camp, and though all the tents, as well as galleys that were taken, were full of rich clothes and costly furniture, and treasure of all kinds to an immense value, he not only was not tempted to touch any of it himself, but hindered every body else from touching it.

As soon as the day of the full moon was over, the Lacedæmonians began their march with two thousand men; and, having travelled with all imaginable expedition, arrived in Attica after three days' forced march, the distance from Sparta to Attica being no less than twelve hundred stadia,

* *Χαίrete, Χαίρουμεν*. I could not render the liveliness of the Greek expression in our language. † Plut. de Glor. Athen. p. 347.

‡ This was the goddess whose business it was to punish injustice and oppression. § Paus. l. i. p. 62.

or one hundred and fifty English miles. The battle was fought the day before they arrived: they however proceeded to Marathon, where they found the fields covered with dead bodies and riches. After having congratulated the Athenians on the happy success of the battle, they returned to their own country.*

They were prevented by a foolish and ridiculous superstition, from having a share in the most glorious action recorded in history. For it is almost without example, that such a handful of men as the Athenians were, should not only make head against so numerous an army as that of the Persians, but should entirely rout and defeat them. One is astonished to see so formidable a power miscarry in an attack on so small a city; and we are almost tempted to question the truth of an event that appears so improbable, but which is, however, well authenticated. This battle alone shows what wonderful things may be performed by an able general, who knows how to take his advantages; by the intrepidity of soldiers, who are not afraid of death; by a zeal for one's country; the love of liberty; a hatred and detestation of slavery and tyranny; which were sentiments natural to the Athenians, but undoubtedly very much augmented and inflamed in them by the very presence of Hippias, whom they dreaded to have again for their master, after all that had passed between them.

Plato in more places than one, makes it his business to extol the battle of Marathon, and is for having that action considered as the source and original cause of all the victories that were gained afterwards.† It was undoubtedly this victory that deprived the Persians of that power and terror which had rendered them so formidable, and made every thing yield before them: it was this victory that taught the Grecians to know their own strength, and not to tremble before an enemy terrible only in name; that made them find by experience, that victory does not depend so much upon the number, as the courage of troops; that set before their eyes in a most conspicuous light the glory there is in sacrificing one's life in the defence of our country, and for the preservation of liberty; and, lastly, that inspired them, through the whole course of succeeding ages, with a noble emulation and warm desire to imitate their ancestors, and not to degenerate from their virtue. For,

* Suicer. in Paneg. p. 113.

† In Menex. pp. 239, 240. Et lib. iii. de Leg. pp. 698, 699.

on all important occasions, it was customary among them to put the people in mind of Miltiades and his invincible troop, that is, of a little army of heroes, whose intrepidity and bravery had done so much honor to Athens.

Those who were slain in the battle had all the honor immediately paid to them that was due to their merit. Illustrious monuments were erected to them all, in the very place where the battle was fought; upon which their own names and that of their tribes were recorded. There were three distinct sets of monuments separately set up; one for the Athenians, another for the Platæans, and a third for the slaves, whom they had admitted among their soldiers on that occasion. A tomb for Miltiades was afterwards erected in the same place.*

The reflection Cornelius Nepos makes upon what the Athenians did to honor the memory of their generals, deserves to be taken notice of. Formerly, says he, speaking of the Romans, our ancestors rewarded virtue by marks of distinction that were not stately or magnificent, but such as were rarely granted, and for that very reason highly esteemed; whereas now they are so profusely bestowed, that little or no value is set upon them. The same thing happened, adds he, among the Athenians. All the honor that was paid to Miltiades, the great deliverer of Athens and of all Greece, was, that in a picture of the battle of Marathon, drawn by order of the Athenians, he was represented at the head of the ten commanders, exhorting the soldiers, and setting them an example of their duty. But this same people in later ages, grown more powerful and corrupted by the flatteries of their orators, decreed three hundred statues to Demetrius Phalereus.†

Plutarch makes the same reflection, and wisely observes that ‡ the honor which is paid to great men ought not to be looked upon as the reward of their illustrious actions, but only as a mark of esteem of which such monuments are intended to perpetuate the remembrance. § It is not, then, the stateliness or magnificence of public monuments, which gives them their value, or makes them durable, but the sincere gratitude of those who erect them. The three hundred statues of Demetrius Phalereus were all thrown down even in his own lifetime, but the picture representing the courage of Miltiades was preserved many ages after him.

* Paus. in Attic. pp. 60, 61.

† Corn. Nep. in Milt. c. vi.

‡ Οὐ γὰρ μισθὸν εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πράξεως, ἀλλὰ συμβῆλόν τινι τιμῇ, ἵνα καὶ διομένη πολλὸς χρόνόν.

§ In Præde Rep. Ger. p. 820.

This picture was kept at Athens in a gallery, adorned and enriched with different paintings, all excellent in their kind, and done by the greatest masters; which for that reason was called ποικίλη, signifying varied and diversified. The celebrated Polygnotus, a native of the isle of Thasos, and one of the finest painters of his time, painted this picture, or at least the greatest part of it; and, as he valued himself upon his reputation, and was more attached to glory than interest, he did it *gratuitously*, and would not receive any recompense for it. The city of Athens therefore rewarded him in a manner that was more congenial to his feelings, by procuring an order from the Amphictyons to appoint him a public lodging in the city, where he might live during his own pleasure.*

The gratitude of the Athenians towards Miltiades was of no very long duration. After the battle of Marathon, he desired and obtained the command of a fleet of seventy ships, in order to punish and subdue the islands that had favored the barbarians. Accordingly he reduced several of them: but having been unsuccessful in the isle of Paros, and upon a false report of the arrival of the enemy's fleet, having raised the siege which he had laid to the capital city, wherein he had received a very dangerous wound, he returned to Athens with his fleet, and was there impeached by a citizen, called Xanthippus, who accused him of having raised the siege through treachery, and in consideration of a great sum of money given him by the king of Persia.† Little probability as there was in this accusation, it nevertheless prevailed over the merit and innocence of Miltiades. He was condemned to lose his life, and to be thrown into the barathrum; a sentence passed only upon the greatest criminals and malefactors. The magistrate opposed the execution of so unjust a condemnation. All the favor shown to this preserver of his country, was to have the sentence of death commuted into a penalty of fifty talents, or fifty thousand crowns French money, being the sum to which the expenses of the fleet, that had been equipped upon his solicitation and advice, amounted. Not being able to pay this sum, he was sent to prison, where he died of the wound he had received at Paros. Cimon, his son, who was at this time very young, signalized himself for his piety on this occasion, as we shall find in the sequel he afterwards did for his courage. He purchased the permission of burying his

* Plin. l. xxxv. c. 9. † Herod. l. vi. c. 122, 136. Corn. Nep. in Milt. c. vii. viii.

father's body, by paying the fine of fifty thousand crowns, in which he had been condemned; which sum the young man raised as well as he could, by the assistance of his friends and relations.*

Cornelius Nepos observes, that what chiefly induced the Athenians to act in this manner, with regard to Miltiades, was only his great merit and reputation, which made the people, who were but lately delivered from the yoke of slavery under Pisistratus, apprehend that Miltiades, who had been tyrant before in the Chersonesus, might affect the same at Athens. They therefore chose rather to punish an innocent person, than to be under perpetual apprehensions of him.† To this same principle was to be attributed the institution of the ostracism at Athens. I have elsewhere given an account of the most plausible reasons upon which the ostracism could be founded: but I do not see how we can fully justify so strange a policy, to which all merit becomes suspected, and virtue itself appears criminal.‡

This appears plainly in the banishment of Aristides. His inviolable attachment to justice obliged him on many occasions to oppose Themistocles, who did not pride himself upon his delicacy in that respect, and who spared no intrigues and cables to engage the suffrages of the people, for removing a rival who always opposed his ambitious designs. This is a strong instance, that a person may be superior in merit and virtue, without being so in influence. The impetuous eloquence of Themistocles bore down the justice of Aristides, and occasioned his banishment.§ In this kind of trial, the citizens gave their suffrages by writing the name of the accused person upon a shell, called in Greek, *ὄστρακον*, from whence came the term ostracism. On this occasion a peasant, who could not write, and did not know Aristides, applied to himself, and desired him to put the name of Aristides upon his shell. "Has he done you any wrong," said Aristides, "that you are for condemning him in this manner?" "No," replied the other, "I do not so much as know him; but I am quite tired and angry with hearing every body call him the Just." Aristides, without saying a word more, calmly took the shell, wrote his own

* Plat. in Gorg. p. 519.

† Hæc populus respiciens maluit eum innocentem plecti, quam se diutius esse in timore.

‡ Man. d'Etud. Vol. iii. p. 407.

§ In his cognitum est, quanto antistaret eloquentia innocentie. Quanquam enim adeo excelebat Aristides abstinentia, ut unus post hominum memoriam, quod quidem nos audierimus, cognomine Justus sit appellatus; tamen a Themistocle collabefactus testula illa exilio decem annorum mulctatus est.—Corn. Nep. in Arist.

name on it, and returned it. He set out for his banishment, imploring the gods that no accident might befall his country to make it regret him.* The great Camillus, in a like case, did not imitate his generosity, but prayed to a quite different effect, desiring the gods to force his ungrateful country, by some misfortune to have occasion for his aid, and recall him as soon as possible.†

O fortunate republic! exclaims Valerius Maximus, speaking of the banishment of Aristides, which, after having so basely treated the most virtuous man it ever produced, has still been able to find citizens zealously and faithfully attached to her service! *Felices Athenas, quæ post illius exilium, invenire aliquem aut virum bonum, aut amantem sui civem potuerunt; cum quo tunc ipsa sanctitas migravit.* ‡

SECTION VIII.—DARIUS RESOLVES TO MAKE WAR IN PERSON AGAINST EGYPT AND AGAINST GREECE, ETC.

When Darius received the news of the defeat of his army at Marathon, he was violently enraged; but that misfortune was so far from discouraging or diverting him from carrying on the war against Greece, that it only served to animate him to pursue it with the greater vigor, in order to be revenged at the same time for the burning of Sardis, and for the disgrace suffered at Marathon. Being thus determined to march in person with all his forces, he despatched orders to all his subjects in the several provinces of his empire, to arm themselves for this expedition. §

After having spent three years in making the necessary preparations, he had another war to carry on, occasioned by the revolt of Egypt. It seems from what we read in Diodorus Siculus, that Darius went thither himself to quell it, and that he succeeded. || The historian relates, that upon his prince's desiring to have his statue placed before that of Sesostriis, the chief priest of the Egyptians told him, "he had not yet equalled the glory of that conqueror;" and that the king, without being offended at the Egyptian priest's freedom, made answer, that he would endeavor to surpass it. Diodorus adds farther, that Darius, detesting the impious cruelty which his predecessor Cambyses had exercised in that country, expressed great reverence for

* Plut. in Arist. pp. 322, 323.

† In exilium abiit, precatus ab diis immortalibus, si innoxio sibi ea injuria fieret, primo quoque tempore desiderium sui civitati ingratae facerent.—Liv. l. v. n. 32.

‡ Val. Max. l. v. c. 3.

§ Herod. l. vii. c. 1.

|| Lib. i. pp. 54, 85.

their gods and temples ; that he had several conversations with the Egyptian priests upon matters of religion and government ; and that having learned of them, with what great gentleness their ancient kings used to treat their subjects, he endeavored, after his return into Persia, to form himself upon their model. But Herodotus, more worthy of belief in this particular than Diodorus, only observes, that this prince, resolving at once to chastise his revolted subjects, and to be avenged of his ancient enemies, determined to make war against both at the same time, and to attack Greece in person with the main body of his army, while the rest of it was employed in the reduction of Egypt.*

According to an ancient custom among the Persians, their king was not allowed to go to war, without having first named the person that should succeed him on the throne ; a custom wisely established to prevent the state's being exposed to the troubles which generally attend the uncertainty of a successor, to the inconvenience of anarchy, and to the cabals of various pretenders.† Darius, before he undertook his expedition against Greece, thought himself the more obliged to observe this rule, as he was already advanced in years, and as there was a difference between two of his sons, upon the question of succeeding to the empire ; which difference might occasion a civil war after his death, if he left it undetermined. Darius had three sons by his first wife, the daughter of Gobryas, all three born before their father came to the crown ; and four by Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, who were all born after their father's succession to the throne. Artabazanes, called by Justin Artemenes, was the eldest of the former, and Xerxes of the latter. Artabazanes alleged in his own behalf, that as he was the eldest of all the brothers, the right of succession, according to the custom and practice of all nations, belonged to him, in preference to all the rest. Xerxes's argument was, that, as son of Darius by Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, who founded the Persian empire, it was more just that the crown of Cyrus should devolve upon one of his descendants, than upon one who was not. Demaratus, a Spartan king, unjustly deposed by his subjects, and at that time in exile at the court of Persia, secretly suggested to Xerxes another argument to support his pretensions : that Artabazanes was indeed the eldest son of Darius, but he, Xerxes, was the eldest son of the king ; and

* Herod. l. vi. c. 2.

† Idem. c. 2, 3.

therefore, Artabazanes being born when his father was but a private man, all he could pretend to, on account of his seniority, was only to inherit his private estate; but that he, Xerxes, being the first-born son of the king, had the best right to succeed to the crown. He farther supported this argument by the example of the Lacedæmonians, who admitted none to inherit the kingdom but those children who were born after their father's accession. The right of succeeding was accordingly determined in favor of Xerxes.

Justin* and Plutarch place this dispute after Darius's decease.† They both take notice of the prudent conduct of these two brothers on so nice an occasion. According to their manner of relating this fact, Artabazanes was absent when the king died; and Xerxes immediately assumed all the marks, and exercised all the functions of the sovereignty. But, upon his brother's returning home, he quitted the diadem and the tiara, which he wore in such a manner as only suited the king, went out to meet him, and showed him all imaginable respect. They agreed to make their uncle Artabanes the arbitrator of their difference, and without any farther appeal, to acquiesce in his decision. All the while this dispute lasted, the two brothers showed one another every demonstration of a truly fraternal friendship, by keeping up a continual intercourse of presents and entertainments, from whence their mutual esteem and confidence for each other banished all their fears and suspicions on both sides, and introduced an unconstrained cheerfulness and a perfect security. This is a spectacle, says Justin, highly worthy of our admiration; to see, while most brothers are at deadly variance with one another about a small patrimony, with what moderation and temper both waited for a decision, which was to dispose of the greatest empire then in the universe. When Artabanes gave judgment in favor of Xerxes, Artabazanes the same instant prostrated himself before him, acknowledging him for his master, and placed him upon the throne with his own hand; by which proceeding he showed a greatness of soul truly royal, and infinitely superior to all human dignities. This ready acquiescence in a sentence so contrary to his interests, was not the effect of an artful policy, that knows how to dissemble upon occa-

* Adeo fraterna contentio fuit, ut nec victor insultaverit, nec victus doluerit; ipsoque litis tempore invitum munera miserint; jucunda quoque inter se non solum, sed credula convivia habuerint; judicium quoque ipsum sine arbitris, sine convitio fuerit. Tanto moderatius tum fratres inter se regna maxima dividebant, quam nunc exigua patrimonialia partiantur.—Justin.

† Justin, l. ii. c. 10. Plut. de Frat. Amore, p. 448.

sion, and to derive honor to itself from what it could not prevent. No; it proceeded from a real respect for the laws, a sincere affection for his brother, and an indifference for that which so warmly inflames the ambition of mankind, and so frequently arms the nearest relations against each other. For his part, during his whole life, he continued firmly attached to the interests of Xerxes, and prosecuted them with so much ardor and zeal, that he lost his life in his service at the battle of Salamis.

At whatever time this dispute is to be dated, it is evident Darius could not execute the double expedition he was meditating against Egypt and Greece; and that he was prevented by death from pursuing that project.* He had reigned thirty-six years. The epitaph † of this prince, which contains a boast, that he could drink much without disordering his reason, proves that the Persians actually thought that circumstance added to their glory. We shall see in the sequel, that Cyrus the younger ascribes this quality to himself, as a perfection that rendered him more worthy of the throne than his elder brother. Who at the present day would think of annexing this merit to the qualifications of an excellent prince?

Darius had many excellent qualities, but they were attended with great failings, and the kingdom felt the effects both of the one and the other. For such is the condition of princes, they never act nor live for themselves alone. Whatever they are, either as to good or evil, they are for their people; and the interests of the one and the other, are inseparable. ‡ Darius had a great fund of gentleness, equity, clemency, and kindness for his people; he loved justice and respected the laws; he esteemed merit, and was careful to reward it; he was not jealous of his rank or authority, so as to exact a forced homage, or to render himself inaccessible; and notwithstanding his own great experience and abilities in public affairs, he would hearken to the advice of others, and reap the benefit of their counsels. It is of him the Holy Scripture speaks, where it says, that he did nothing without consulting the wise men of his court. § He was not afraid of exposing his person in battle, and was always cool even in the heat of action; he said of himself, that the most imminent and pressing danger served only to increase his

* Herod. l. vi. c. 4.

† Ἡδυνάμην καὶ οἶνον πίνειν πολὺν, καὶ τοῦτον φέρειν καλῶς.—Athen. l. x. p. 434.

‡ Ita nati estis, ut bona malaque vestra ad remp. pertineant.—Tacit. l. iv. c. 8.

§ Esth. i. 13.

courage and his prudence : * in a word, there have been few princes more expert than he in the art of governing, or more experienced in the business of war. Nor was the glory of being a conqueror, if that may be called a glory, wanting to his character. For he not only restored and entirely confirmed the empire of Cyrus, which had been very much shaken by the ill conduct of Cambyses and the Magian impostor ; but he likewise added many great and rich provinces to it, and particularly India, Thrace, Macedonia and the isles contiguous to the coasts of Ionia.

But sometimes these good qualities of his gave way to failings of a quite opposite nature. Do we see any thing like Darius's usual gentleness and good nature in his treatment of that unfortunate father, who desired the favor of him to leave him one of his three sons at home, while the other two followed the king in his expedition ? Was there ever an occasion wherein he had more need of counsel, than when he formed the design of making war upon the Scythians ? And could any one give more prudent advice than his brother gave him on that occasion ? But he would not follow it. Does there appear in that whole expedition any mark of wisdom or prudence ? What do we see in all that affair, but a prince intoxicated with his greatness, who fancies there is nothing in the world that can resist him ; and whose weak ambition to signalize himself by an extraordinary conquest, has stifled all the good sense, judgment and even military knowledge, he possessed before ?

What constitutes the solid glory of Darius's reign is his being chosen by God himself, as Cyrus had been before, to be the instrument of his mercies towards his people, the declared protector of the Israelites, and the restorer of the temple at Jerusalem. The reader may see this part of his history in the book of Ezra, and in the writings of the prophets Haggai and Zechariah.

CHAPTER II.

THE HISTORY OF XERXES CONNECTED WITH THAT OF THE GREEKS.

The reign of Xerxes lasted but twelve years, but abounds with great events.

SECTION I.—XERXES REDUCES EGYPT, ETC. ETC.

XERXES having ascended the throne, employed the first year of his reign in carrying on the preparations begun by

* Plut. in Apoph. p. 172.

his father, for the reduction of Egypt. He also confirmed to the Jews at Jerusalem all the privileges granted them by his father, and particularly that which assigned them the tribute of Samaria, for supplying them with victims for the temple of God.*

In the second year of his reign he marched against the Egyptians, and having reduced and subdued these rebels, he made the yoke of their subjection more heavy; then giving the government of that province to his brother Achæmenes, he returned about the latter end of the year to Susa.†

Herodotus, the famous historian, was born this same year at Halicarnassus in Caria. For he was fifty-three years old, when the Peloponnesian war began.‡

Xerxes, elated with his success against the Egyptians, determined to make war against the Grecians. § He did not intend, he said, any longer to buy the figs of Attica, which were very excellent, because he would eat no more of them till he was master of the country. || But before he engaged in an enterprise of that importance, he thought proper to assemble his council, and take the advice of all the greatest and most illustrious persons of his court. He laid before them the design he had of making war against Greece, and acquainted them with his motives; which were, the desire of imitating the example of his predecessors, who had all of them distinguished their names and reigns by noble enterprises; the obligation he was under to revenge the insolence of the Athenians, who had presumed to fall upon Sardis, and reduce it to ashes; the necessity he was under to avenge the disgrace his country had received at the battle of Marathon: and the prospect of the great advantages that might be reaped from this war, which would be attended with the conquest of Europe, the richest and most fertile country in the universe. He added farther, that this war had been resolved on by his father Darius, and he meant only to follow and execute his intentions: he concluded with promising ample rewards to those who should distinguish themselves by their valor in the expedition.

Mardonius, the same person that had been so unsuccessful in Darius's reign, grown neither wiser or less ambitious by his ill success, and being anxious for the command of the army, was the first who gave his opinion. He began by extolling Xerxes above all the kings that had gone before

* A. M. 3510. Ant. J. C. 485. Her. l. vii. c. 5. Joseph. Antiq. l. xi. c. 5.

† A. M. 3520. Ant. J. C. 484. Her. l. vii. c. 7. ‡ Aul. Gel. l. xv. c. 23.

§ Mer. l. vii. c. 8-18.

|| Plut. in Apoph. p. 173.

or should succeed him. He endeavored to show the indispensable necessity of avenging the dishonor done to the Persian name; he disparaged the Grecians, and represented them as a cowardly, timorous people, without courage, without forces, or experience in war. For a proof of what he said, he mentioned his own conquest in Macedonia, which he exaggerated in a very vain and ostentatious manner, as if that people had submitted to him without any resistance. He presumed even to affirm, that not any of the Grecian nations would venture to come out against Xerxes, who would march with all the forces of Asia; and if they had the temerity to present themselves before him, they would learn to their cost, that the Persians were the bravest and most warlike nation in the world.

The rest of the council, perceiving that this flattering discourse extremely pleased the king, were afraid to contradict it, and all kept silence. This was almost an unavoidable consequence of Xerxes's manner of proceeding. A wise prince, when he proposes an affair in council, and really desires that every one should speak his true sentiments, is extremely careful to conceal his own opinion, that he may put no constraint upon that of others, but leave them entirely at liberty. Xerxes, on the contrary, had openly discovered his own inclination, or rather resolution to undertake the war. When a prince acts in this manner, he will always find artful flatterers, who, being eager to insinuate themselves and to please, and ever ready to comply with his passions, will not fail to second his opinion with specious and plausible reasons, while those that might be capable of giving good counsels are restrained by fear; there being very few courtiers who love their prince well enough, and have sufficient courage, to venture to displease him, by disputing what they know to be his taste or opinion.

The excessive praises given by Mardonius to Xerxes, which is the usual language of flatterers, ought to have rendered him suspected by the king, and made him apprehend, that under an appearance of zeal for his glory, that nobleman endeavored to cloak his own ambition, and the violent desire he had to command the army. But these grateful and flattering words, which glide like a serpent under flowers, are so far from displeasing princes, that they captivate and charm them. They do not consider, that men flatter and praise them, because they believe them weak and vain enough to suffer themselves to be deceived by commendations that bear no proportion to their merits and actions.

This behavior of the king made the whole counsel mute. In this general silence Artabanus, the king's uncle, a prince venerable for his age and prudence, made the following speech, "Permit me, great prince," said he, addressing himself to Xerxes, "to deliver my sentiments to you on this occasion, with a liberty suitable to my age and to your interest. When Darius, your father and my brother, first thought of making war against the Scythians, I used all my endeavors to divert him from it. I need not tell you what that enterprise cost, or what was the success of it. The people you are going to attack are infinitely more formidable than the Scythians. The Grecians are esteemed the best troops in the world, either by land or sea. If the Athenians alone could defeat the numerous army commanded by Datis and Artaphernes, what ought we to expect from all the states of Greece united together? You design to pass from Asia into Europe, by laying a bridge over the sea. What will become of us, if the Athenians, proving victorious, should advance to the bridge with their fleet and break it down? I still tremble when I consider, that in the Scythian expedition, the life of the king your father, and the safety of all his army, were reduced to depend upon the fidelity of a single man; and that, if Hystæus the Milesian had, in compliance with the strong entreaties made to him, consented to break down the bridge, which had been laid over the Danube, the Persian empire had been entirely ruined. Do not expose yourself, sir, to the like danger, especially since you are not obliged to do so. Take time at least to reflect upon it. When we have maturely deliberated upon an affair, whatever happens to be the success of it, we have nothing to impute to ourselves. Precipitation, besides its being imprudent, is almost always unfortunate, and attended with fatal consequences. Above all, do not suffer yourself, great prince, to be dazzled with the vain splendor of imaginary glory, or with the pompous appearance of your troops. The highest and most lofty trees have the most reason to dread the thunder. As God alone is truly great, he is an enemy to pride, and takes pleasure in humbling every thing that exalteth itself; and very often the most numerous armies fly before a handful of men, because he inspires these with courage, and scatters terror among the others." *

* Φιλει ὁ Θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολώνει—ὃν γὰρ εἰς φρονέειν ἄλλονμέγα ὁ Θεὸς ἢ ἑωυτόν.

Artabanus, after having spoken thus to the king, turned himself towards Mardonius, and reproached him with his want of sincerity or judgment, in giving the king an idea of the Grecians so directly contrary to truth; and showed how extremely he was to blame for desiring rashly to engage the nation in a war, which nothing but his own views of interest and ambition could tempt him to advise. "If a war be resolved upon," added he, "let the king, whose life is dear to us all, remain in Persia: and do you, since you so ardently desire it, march at the head of the most numerous army that can be assembled. In the mean time, let your children and mine be given up as a pledge, to answer for the success of the war. If the issue of it be favorable, I consent that mine be put to death: * but if it prove otherwise, as I well foresee it will, then I desire that your children, and you yourself, on your return, may be treated in such a manner as you deserve, for the rash counsel you have given your master."

Xerxes, who was not accustomed to have his sentiments contradicted in this manner, fell into a rage; "Thank the gods," said he to Artabanus, "that you are my father's brother; were it not for that, you should this moment suffer the just reward of your audacious behavior. But I will punish you for it in another manner, by leaving you here among the women, whom you too much resemble in your cowardice and fear, while I march at the head of my troops, where my duty and glory call me."

Artabanus had expressed his sentiments in very respectful and inoffensive terms: Xerxes nevertheless was extremely offended. It is the misfortune of princes, spoiled by flattery, to look upon every thing as dry and austere, that is sincere and ingenuous, and to regard all counsel, delivered with a generous and disinterested freedom, as a seditious presumption.† They do not consider, that even a good man never dares to tell them all he thinks or discover the whole truth, especially in things that may be disagreeable to them; and that what they most stand in need of, is a sincere and faithful friend, that will conceal nothing from them. A prince ought to think himself very happy, if in his whole reign he finds but one man, born with that degree of generosity, who certainly ought to be considered as the most valuable treasure of the state; as he is, if the expres-

* Why should the children be punished for their fathers' faults?

† Ita formatis principum auribus, uti aspera quæ utilia, nec quicquam nisi jucundum et lætum accipiant.—Tacit. Hist. l. iii. c. 50.

sion may be allowed, both the most necessary, and at the same time the most rare instrument of government.*

Xerxes himself acknowledged this upon the occasion we are speaking of. When the first emotions of his anger were over, and he had time to reflect on his pillow upon the different counsels that were given him, he confessed he had been to blame in giving his uncle such harsh language, and was not ashamed to confess his fault the next day in open council, ingenuously owning, that the heat of his youth, and his want of experience, had made him negligent in paying the regard due to a prince so worthy of respect as Artabanus, both for his age and his wisdom: and declaring, at the same time, that he was inclined to his opinion, notwithstanding a dream he had in the night, wherein a vision had appeared to him, and warmly exhorted him to undertake that war. All the lords that composed the council were delighted to hear the king speak in this manner; and to testify their joy, they fell prostrate before him, striving who should most extol the glory of such a proceeding; nor could their praises on such an occasion be at all suspected. For it is not difficult to discern, whether the praises given to princes proceed from the heart, and are founded upon truth, or whether they drop from the lips only, as an effect of mere flattery and deceit.† That sincere and humble declaration made by the king, far from appearing as a weakness in him, was looked upon by them as the effort of a great soul, which rises above its faults, in bravely confessing them, by way of reparation and atonement. They admired the nobleness of this procedure the more, as they knew that princes educated like Xerxes, in a vain haughtiness and false glory, are never disposed to own themselves in the wrong, and generally make use of their authority to justify, with pride and obstinacy, whatever faults they have committed through ignorance or imprudence. We may venture, I think, to say, that it is more glorious to rise in this manner, than it would be never to have fallen. Certainly there is nothing greater, and at the same time more rare and uncommon, than to see a mighty and powerful prince, and that in the time of his greatest prosperity, acknowledge his faults, when he happens to commit any, without seeking pretexts or excuses to cover them; pay homage to truth,

* *Nullam majus boni imperii instrumentum quam bonus amicus.*—Tacit. Hist. l. v. c. 7.

† *Nec occultum est quando ex veritate, quando adumbrata lætitia, facta imperatorum celebrantur.*—Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 31.

even when it is against him, and condemns him ; and leave other princes, who have a false delicacy concerning their grandeur the shame of always abounding with errors and defects, and of never owning that they have any.

The night following, the same phantom, if we may believe Herodotus, appeared again to the king, and repeated the same solicitations with new menaces and threatenings. Xerxes communicated what passed to his uncle, and in order to find out whether this vision was divine or not, entreated him earnestly to put on the royal robes, to ascend the throne, and afterwards to take his place in his bed for the night. Artabanes hereupon discoursed very sensibly and rationally with the king upon the vanity of dreams ; and then coming to what personally regarded him ; “ I look upon it,” said he, “ almost equally commendable, to think well of one’s self, or to hearken with docility to the good counsels of others.* You have both these qualities, great prince ; and if you followed the natural bent of your own temper, it would lead you entirely to sentiments of wisdom and moderation. You never take any violent measures or resolutions, but when the arts of evil counsellors draw you into them, or the poison of flattery misleads you ; in the same manner as the ocean, which of itself is calm and serene, nor ever disturbed but by the extraneous impulse of other bodies. What afflicted me in the answer you made me the other day, when I delivered my sentiments freely in council, was not the personal affront to me, but the injury you did yourself by making so wrong a choice between the different counsels that were offered ; rejecting that which led you to sentiments of moderation and equity, and embracing the other, which, on the contrary, tended only to cherish pride, and to inflame ambition.

Artabanes, through complaisance, passed the night in the king’s bed, and had a vision similar to that which Xerxes had seen ; that is, in his sleep he saw a man, who reproached him severely and threatened him with the greatest misfortunes, if he continued to oppose the king’s intentions. This so much affected him, that he yielded to the king’s opinion, believing that there was something divine in these repeated visions ; and the war against the Grecians was

* This thought is in Hesiod, *Opera et Dies*, v. 293. Cic. *pro Cluent.* n. 84, et *Tit. Liv.* l. xxii. n. 18. *Sæpe ego audivi, milites, eum primum esse virum, qui ipse consulat quid in rem sit ; secundum eum, qui bene momenti obediatur ; qui nec ipse consulere, nec alteri parere sciat, eum extremi ingenii esse.*

resolved upon. These circumstances I relate as I find them in Herodotus.

Xerxes, in the sequel, did but ill support this character of moderation. We shall find, that he had but very short intervals of wisdom and reason, which shone out only for a moment, and then gave way to the most culpable and extravagant excesses. We may judge, however, even from thence, that he had very good natural parts and inclinations. But the most excellent qualities are soon spoiled and corrupted by the poison of flattery, and the possession of absolute and unlimited power. *Vi dominationis convulsus.**

It is a fine sentiment in a minister of state, to be less affected with an affront to himself, than with the wrong done his master by giving him evil and pernicious counsel.

The counsel of Mardonius was pernicious, because, as Artabanus observes, it tended only to cherish and increase that spirit of haughtiness and violence in the prince, which was but too prevalent in him already, ὄρεν ἀνξυροσύης; and to dispose and accustom his mind still to carry his views and desires beyond his present fortune, still to be aiming at something farther, and to set no bounds to his ambition.† This is the predominant passion of those men whom we usually call conquerors, and whom, according to the language of the Holy Scripture, we might call, with greater propriety, “robbers of nations.”‡ “If you consider and examine the whole succession of Persian kings,” says Seneca, “will you find any one of them that ever stopped his career of his own accord; that ever was satisfied with his past conquests; or that was not forming some new project or enterprise, when death surprised him? Nor ought we to be astonished at such a disposition,” adds the same author: “for ambition is a gulf and a bottomless abyss, wherein every thing is lost that is thrown in, and where, though you were to heap province upon province, and kingdom upon kingdom, you would never be able to fill up the mighty void.”§

SECTION II.—XERXES BEGINS HIS MARCH, AND PASSES FROM ASIA INTO EUROPE, BY CROSSING THE STRAIT OF THE HELLESPOINT UPON A BRIDGE OF BOATS.

The war being resolved upon, Xerxes, that he might

* Tacitus.

† Ὡς κακὸν εἶη διδάσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν πλέον τι διζέσθαι αἰε ἐχειντοῦ

παρίοντος

† Jer. iv. 7.

§ Nec hoc Alexandri tantum vitium fuit, quem per Liberi Herculisque vestigia felix temeritas egit; sed omnium, quos fortuna irritavit implendo. Totum regni Persici stemma percense, quem invenies, cui modum imperii satietas fecerit? qui non vitam in aliqua ulterius procedendi cogitatione finierit? Nec id

omit nothing which could contribute to the success of his undertaking, entered into a confederacy with the Carthaginians, who were at that time the most powerful people of the west, and made an agreement with them, that while the Persian forces should attack Greece, the Carthaginians should fall upon the Grecian colonies that were settled in Sicily and Italy, in order to hinder them from coming to the aid of the other Grecians. The Carthaginians made Amilcar their general, who did not content himself with raising as many troops as he could in Africa, but with the money that Xerxes had sent him, engaged a great number of soldiers out of Spain, Gaul, and Italy, in his service; so that he collected an army of three hundred thousand men, and a proportionate number of ships in order to execute the projects and stipulations of the league.

Thus Xerxes, agreeably to the prophet Daniel's prediction, "having, through his great power and his great riches, stirred up all the nations of the then known world against the realm of Greece,"* that is to say, of all the west under the command of Amilcar, and of all the east, that was under his own banner, set out from Susa, in order to enter upon this war, in the fifth year of his reign, which was the tenth after the battle of Marathon, and marched towards Sardis, the place of rendezvous for the whole land army, while the fleet advanced along the coasts of Asia Minor towards the Hellespont.†

Xerxes had given orders to have a passage cut through mount Athos. This is a mountain in Macedonia, now a province of Turkey in Europe, which extends a great way into the Archipelago, in the form of a peninsula. It is joined to the land by an isthmus only of about half a league over. We have already taken notice, that the sea in this place was very tempestuous, and occasioned frequent shipwrecks. Xerxes made this pretext for the orders he gave for cutting through the mountain; but the true reason was, the vanity of signalizing himself by an extraordinary enterprise, and by doing a thing that was extremely difficult; as Tacitus says of Nero: *Erat incredibilium cupitor*. Accordingly, Herodotus observes, that this undertaking was more vain-glorious than useful, since he might with less trouble and expense have had his vessels carried over the isthmus,

mirum est. Quicquid cupiditati contigit, penitus hauritur et conditur: nec interest quantum eo, quod inexplebile est, congeras.—Senec. l. vii. de Benef. c. 3.

* Dan. xi. 2.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 26. A. M. 3524. Ant. J. C. 480.

as was the practice in those days. The passage he caused to be cut through the mountain was broad enough to let two gallies, with three benches of oars each, pass through it abreast.* This prince, who was extravagant enough to believe that all nature and the very elements were under his command, in consequence of that opinion, wrote a letter to mount Athos in the following terms: "Athos, thou proud and aspiring mountain, that lifteth up thy head into the heavens, I advise thee not to be so audacious, as to put rocks and stones, which cannot be cut, in the way of my workmen. If thou givest them that opposition, I shall cut thee entirely down, and throw thee headlong into the sea."† At the same time he ordered his laborers to be whipt in order to make them carry on the work the faster.‡

A traveller, who lived in the time of Francis the First, and who wrote a book in Latin concerning the singular and remarkable things he had seen in his travels, doubts the truth of this fact; and remarks, that as he passed near mount Athos, he could perceive no traces or footsteps of the work we have been speaking of.§

Xerxes, as we have already related, advanced towards Sardis. Having left Cappadocia, and passed the river Halys, he came to Cylene, a city in Phrygia, near which is the source of the Mæander. Pythius, a Lydian, had his residence in this city, and, next to Xerxes, was the most opulent prince of those times. He entertained Xerxes and his whole army with incredible magnificence, and made him an offer of all his wealth towards defraying the expenses of his expedition. Xerxes, surprised and charmed at so generous an offer, had the curiosity to inquire to what sum his riches amounted. Pythius answered, that having designed to offer them to his service, he had taken an exact account of them, and that the silver he had by him amounted to two thousand talents, or six millions French money, || and the gold to three millions, nine hundred and ninety-three thousand darics, or thirty-nine millions, nine hundred and thirty thousand livres.¶ All this money he offered him, telling him, that his revenues were sufficient for the support of his household. Xerxes made him very hearty acknowledgments, entered into a particular friendship with him; and, that he might not be outdone in generosity, instead of accepting his offers, obliged him to accept of a present of the seven thou-

* Herod. l. vii. c. 21, 24.

† Plut. de Anim. Tranq. p. 470.

‡ About \$1,133,333.

§ Plut. de Ira Cohib. p. 455.

|| Bellon. singul. rer. Observ. p. 78.

¶ About \$7,555,555.

sand daries, which were wanting to make up his gold to a round sum of four millions.*

After such conduct as this, who would not think that Pythius's peculiar character and particular virtue had been generosity, and a noble contempt of riches! And yet he was one of the most penurious princes in the world, and who, besides his sordid avarice with regard to himself, was extremely cruel and inhuman to his subjects, whom he kept continually employed in hard and fruitless labor, always digging in gold and silver mines, which he had in his territories. When he was absent from home, all his subjects went with tears in their eyes to the princess his wife, laid their complaints before her, and implored her assistance. Commiserating their condition, she made use of a very extraordinary method to work upon her husband, and to give him a clear sense and a kind of palpable demonstration of the folly and injustice of his conduct. On his return home, she ordered an entertainment to be prepared for him, very magnificent in appearance, but which in reality was no entertainment. All the courses and services were of gold and silver; and the prince, in the midst of all these rich dishes and splendid rarities, could not satisfy his hunger. He conjectured the meaning of this enigma, and began to consider, that the end of gold and silver was not merely to be looked upon, but to be employed and made use of; and that to neglect, as he had done, the business of husbandry and the tillage of lands, by employing all his people in the digging and working of mines, was the direct way to bring a famine both upon himself and his country. For the future, therefore, he only reserved a fifth part of his people for the business of mining. Plutarch has preserved this fact in a treatise, wherein he has collected a great many others to prove the ability and industry of women.† We have the same disposition of mind detailed in fabulous story, in the example of a prince, who reigned in that very country, for whom every thing that he touched was immediately turned into gold, according to the request which he himself had made to the gods, and who by that means was in danger of perishing with hunger. ‡

The same prince, who had made such obliging offers to Xerxes, having desired as a favor of him some time afterwards, that out of his five sons who served in his army, he would be

* Her. l. vii. c. 26, 27.

† Plutarch calls him Pythis.—Plut. de Virt. Mulier. 252.

‡ Midas, king of Phrygia.

pleased to leave him the eldest, in order to be a support and comfort to him in his old age; the king was so enraged at the proposal, though so reasonable in itself, that he caused the eldest son to be killed before the eyes of his father, giving the latter to understand, it was a favor that he spared him and the rest of his children; and then causing the dead body to be cut in two, and one part to be placed on the right, and the other on the left, he made the whole army pass between them, as if he meant to purge and purify it by such a sacrifice.* What a monster in nature is a prince of this kind? How is it possible to have any dependence upon the friendship of the great, or to rely upon their warmest professions and protestations of gratitude and service?

From Phrygia, Xerxes marched and arrived at Sardis, where he spent the winter. From hence he sent heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Athens and Lacedæmon, to require them to give him earth and wate, which, as we have remarked before, was the way of exacting and acknowledging submission.†

As soon as the spring of the year came on he left Sardis, and directed his march towards the Hellespont. Being arrived there, he was desirous of seeing a naval engagement for his curiosity and diversion. A throne was therefore erected for him upon an eminence; and in that situation, seeing all the sea crowded with his vessels, and the land covered with his troops, he at first felt a secret joy diffuse itself through his soul, in surveying with his own eyes the vast extent of his power, and considering himself as the most happy of mortals: but reflecting soon afterwards, that of so many thousands, in a hundred years' time there would not be one living soul remaining, his joy was turned into grief, and he could not forbear weeping at the uncertainty and instability of human affairs.‡ He might have found another subject of reflection, which would have more justly merited his tears and affliction, had he turned his thoughts upon himself, and considered the reproaches he deserved for being the instrument of shortening that fatal term to millions of people, whom his cruel ambition was about to sacrifice in an unjust and unnecessary war.

Artabanes, who neglected no opportunity of making himself useful to the young prince, and of instilling into him sentiments of goodness to his people, laid hold of this mo-

* Herod. l. viii. c. 38, 39. Sen. de Ira, l. iii. c. 17.

† Idem. vii. c. 30-32.

‡ Idem. c. 41 and 46.

ment, in which he found him touched with a sense of tenderness and humanity, and led him into farther reflections upon the miseries with which the lives of most men are attended, and which render them so painful and unhappy; endeavoring at the same time to make him sensible of the duty and obligation of princes, who, not being able to prolong the natural life of their subjects, ought at least to do all that lies in their power to alleviate the pains and allay the bitterness of it.

In the same conversation Xerxes asked his uncle if he still persisted in his first opinion, and if he would still advise him not to make war against Greece, supposing he had not seen the vision, which occasioned him to change his sentiments. Artabanus owned he still had his fears; and that he was very uneasy concerning two things. "What are those two things?" demanded Xerxes. "The land and the sea," replied Artabanus: "the land, because there is no country that can feed and maintain so numerous an army; the sea, because there are no ports capable of receiving such a multitude of vessels." The king was very sensible of the strength of this reasoning; but, as it was now too late to go back, he made answer, that in great undertakings, men ought not so narrowly to examine all the inconveniences that may attend them; that if they did, no signal enterprises would ever be attempted; and that, if his predecessors had observed so scrupulous and timorous a rule of policy, the Persian empire would never have attained its present height of greatness and glory.

Artabanus gave the king another piece of very prudent advice, which he did not think fit to follow any more than he had done the former. This advice was, not to employ the Ionians in his service against the Grecians, from whom they were originally descended, and on which account he ought to suspect their fidelity. Xerxes, however, after these conversations with his uncle, treated him with great friendship, paid him the highest marks of honor and respect, sent him back to Susa to take the care and administration of the empire upon him during his own absence, and, to that end, invested him with his whole authority.

Xerxes, at a vast expense had caused a bridge of boats to be built across the sea for the passage of his forces from Asia into Europe. The space that separates the two continents, formerly called the Hellespont and now called the Strait of the Dardanelles, or of Gallipoli, is seven stadia or

nearly an English mile in breadth. A violent storm rising on a sudden, soon after, broke down the bridge. Xerxes hearing this news on his arrival, fell into a transport of anger; and in order to avenge himself of so cruel an affront, commanded two pair of chains to be thrown into the sea, as if he meant to shackle and confine it, and that his men should give it three hundred strokes of a whip and speak to it in this manner: "thou troublesome and unhappy element, thus does thy master chastise thee for having affronted him without reason. Know, that Xerxes will easily find means to pass over thy waters in spite of all thy billows and resistance." The extravagance of this prince did not stop here; but making the undertakers of the work answerable for events, which do not in the least depend upon the power of man, he ordered all the persons to have their heads struck off, that had been charged with the direction and management of that undertaking.*

Xerxes commanded two other bridges to be built, one for the army to pass over, and the other for the baggage and beasts of burden. He appointed workmen more able and expert than the former, who constructed it in the following manner: they placed three hundred and sixty vessels across the strait, some of them having three benches of oars, and others fifty oars a piece, with their sides turned towards the Euxine sea; and on the side that faced the *Ægean* sea they put three hundred and fourteen. They then cast large anchors into the water on both sides, in order to fix and secure all these vessels against the violence of the winds, and against the current of the water.† On the east side they left three passages or vacant spaces between the vessels, that there might be room for small boats to pass easily, as there was occasion, to and from the Euxine sea. After this, upon the land on both sides they drove large piles into the earth, with huge rings fastened to them, to which were tied six vast cables, which went over each of the two bridges; two of which cables were made of hemp, and four of a sort of reeds, called *βελος*, which were used in those times in the manufacture of cordage. Those that were made of hemp must have been of an extraordinary strength and thickness, since every cubit of those cables

* Herod. l. vii. c. 33, 35.

† Polybius remarks, that there is a current of water from the lake Mæotis and the Euxine Sea, into the *Ægean* Sea, occasioned by the rivers which empty themselves into those two seas.—Polyb. l. iv. pp. 307, 308.

weighed a talent.* The cables, laid over the whole extent of the vessels lengthwise, reached from one side of the sea to the other. When this part of the work was finished, quite over the vessels lengthwise, and over the cables we have been speaking of, they laid the trunks of trees, cut purposely for that use, and flat boats again over them, fastened and joined together, to serve as a kind of floor or solid bottom; all which they covered over with earth, and added rails or battlements on each side, that the horses and cattle might not be frightened with seeing the sea in their passage. Such was the construction of those famous bridges built by Xerxes.†

When the whole work was completed, a day was appointed for their passing over; and as soon as the first rays of the sun began to appear, sweet odors of all kinds were abundantly spread over both the bridges, and the way was strewed with myrtle. At the same time Xerxes poured out libations into the sea, and turning his face towards the sun, the principal object of the Persian worship, he implored the assistance of that god in the enterprise he had undertaken, and desired the continuance of his protection till he had the entire conquest of Europe, and had brought it into subjection to his power. This done, he threw the vessel which he used in making his libations, together with a golden cup, and a Persian scimitar, into the sea. The army was seven days and seven nights in passing over the strait; those who were appointed to conduct the march lashing the poor soldiers all the while with whips in order to quicken their speed, according to the custom of that nation, which, properly speaking, was only a vast assemblage of slaves.

SECTION III.—THE NUMBER OF XERXES' FORCES, ETC., ETC.

Xerxes, directing his march across the Thracian Chersonesus, arrived at Dor, a city standing at the mouth of the Hebrus in Thrace; where, having encamped his army, and given orders to his fleet to follow him along the shore, he reviewed them both.

He found that the land army, which he had brought out of Asia, consisted of seventeen hundred thousand foot, and of eighty thousand horse, which, with at least twenty thousand men that were absolutely necessary for conducting and taking care of the carriages and the camels, amounted in all

* A talent in weight consisted of 80 minæ, or 42 pounds of our weight; and the minæ consisted of 100 drachmas.

† Herod. i. vii. c. 36.

to eighteen hundred thousand men. When he had passed the Hellespont, the other nations that submitted to him made an addition to his army of three hundred thousand men, which made all his land forces together amount to two millions one hundred thousand men.

His fleet, when it set out from Asia, consisted of twelve hundred and seven vessels, or galleys, all of three benches of oars, and intended for fighting. Each vessel carried two hundred men, natives of the country that fitted them out, besides thirty more, that were either Persians or Medes, or of the Sacæ; which formed a total of two hundred and seventy-seven thousand six hundred and ten men. The European nations augmented his fleet with a hundred and twenty vessels, each of which carried two hundred men, in all four and twenty thousand: these added to the other, amounted together to three hundred and one thousand six hundred and ten men.

Besides this fleet, which consisted all of large vessels, the small galleys of thirty and fifty oars, the transport-ships, the vessels that carried the provisions, and that were employed in other uses, amounted to three thousand. If we reckon but eighty men in each of these vessels, one with another, the whole number would be two hundred and forty thousand men.

Thus, when Xerxes arrived at Thermopylæ, his land and sea forces, together, made up the number of two millions six hundred and forty-one thousand six hundred and ten men, exclusive of servants, eunuchs, women, sutlers, and other people of that sort, who usually follow an army, and whose number at this time was equal to that of the forces: so that the whole number of souls that followed Xerxes in this expedition amounted to five millions two hundred and eighty-three thousand two hundred and twenty.* This is the computation made of them by Herodotus, and in which Plutarch and Isocrates agree with him. Diodorus Siculus, Pliny, Ælian, and others, fall very short of this number in their calculation; but their accounts of the matter appear to be less authentic than that of Herodotus, who lived in the same age in which this expedition was undertaken, and who repeats the inscription engraved, by order of the Amphictyons, upon the monument of those Grecians who were killed at Thermopylæ, which expressed that they fought against three millions of men.†

* Herod. l. vii. c. 56-99, and 184-187.

† Diod. l. xi. p. 3. Plin. l. xxxiii. c. 10. Ælian, xiii. c. 3.

For the sustenance of all these persons, there must have been daily consumed, according to Herodotus's computation, above a hundred and ten thousand three hundred and forty medimni of flour (the medimnus was a measure, which, according to Budæus, was equivalent to six of our bushels), allowing for every head the quantity of a chœnix, which was the daily portion or allowance that masters gave their slaves among the Grecians. We have no account in history of any other army so numerous as this. And among these millions of men, there was not one that could vie with Xerxes in point of beauty, either for the comeliness of his face, or the tallness of his person.* But this is a poor merit or pre-eminence for a prince, when attended with no other. Accordingly Justin, after he has mentioned the number of these troops, adds that this vast body of forces wanted a chief: *Huic tanto agmini dux defuit.*

We should hardly be able to conceive how it was possible to find a sufficient quantity of provisions for such an immense number of persons, if the historian had not informed us that Xerxes had employed four whole years in making preparations for this expedition.† We have already seen how many vessels of burden there were that coasted along continually to attend upon and supply the land army; and doubtless there were fresh ones arriving every day, that furnished the camp with a sufficiency of all things necessary.

Herodotus acquaints us with the method they made use of to calculate their forces, which were almost innumerable. They assembled ten thousand men in a particular place, and ranked them as close together as was possible; after which they described a circle quite round them, and erected a little wall upon that circle about half the height of a man's body; when this was done, they made the whole army successively pass through this space, and thereby knew to what number it amounted.‡

Herodotus gives us, also, a particular account of the different armor of all the nations which composed this army. Besides the generals of every nation, who each of them commanded the troops of their respective country, the land army was under the command of six Persian generals; viz.: Mardonius, the son of Gobryas; Tirintatechmus, the son of Artabanes, and Smerdonus, son of Otanes, both near relations to the king; Masistus, son of Darius and Atossa;

* Herod. l. viii. c. 137. † Idem. c. 20. ‡ Idem. c. 60.

Gergis, son of Ariazes; and Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus. The ten thousand Persians, who were called the Immortal Band, were commanded by Hydarnes. The cavalry had its particular commanders.

There were likewise four Persian generals who commanded the fleet. In Herodotus we have a particular account of all the nations by which it was fitted out. Artemisa, queen of Halicarnassus, who from the death of her husband governed the kingdom for her son, who was still a minor, brought but five vessels along with her; but they were the best equipped, and the lightest ships in the whole fleet, next to those of the Sidonians. The princess distinguished herself in this war by her singular courage, and still more by her prudence and conduct. Herodotus observes, that among all the commanders in the army, there was not one who gave Xerxes so good advice and such wise counsel as this queen; but he was not prudent enough to apply it to his advantage.*

When Xerxes had numbered his whole forces by land and sea, he asked Demaratus, if he thought the Grecians would dare to withstand him. I have already taken notice, that this Demaratus was one of the two kings of Sparta, who, being exiled by the faction of his enemies, had taken refuge at the Persian court, where he was entertained with the greatest marks of honor and beneficence. As the courtiers were one day expressing their surprise that a king should suffer himself to be banished, and desired him to acquaint them with the reason of it: "It is," said he, "because the law is more powerful than the kings at Sparta." † This prince was very highly esteemed in Persia: but neither the injustice of the Spartan citizens, nor the kind treatment of the Persian king, could make him forget his country. ‡ As soon as he knew that Xerxes was making preparations for the war, he found means to give the Grecians secret intelligence of it. And now, being obliged on this occasion to speak his sentiments to the king, he did it with such a noble freedom and dignity, as became a Spartan and a king of Sparta.

Demaratus, before he answered the king's question, desired to know whether it was his pleasure that he should flatter him, or that he should speak his thoughts to him freely and truly. Xerxes having declared that he desired

* Herod. l. vii. 89, 90.

† Plut. in Apoph. Lacon. p. 220.

‡ *Amicior patriæ post fugam, quam regi post beneficia.*—Justin.

him to act with entire sincerity, he spoke in the following terms: "Great prince," said Demaratus, "since it is agreeable to your pleasure and commands, I shall deliver my sentiments to you with the utmost truth and sincerity. It must be confessed, that, from the beginning of time, Greece has been trained up, and accustomed to poverty: but then she has introduced and established virtue within her territories, which wisdom cultivates and the vigor of her laws maintains. And it is by the use which Greece knows how to make of this virtue, that she equally defends herself against the inconveniences of poverty, and the yoke of servitude. But, to speak only of the Lacedæmonians, my particular countrymen, you may assure yourself, that as they are born and bred up in liberty, they will never hearken to any proposals that tend to slavery. Though they were deserted and abandoned by all the other Grecians, and reduced to a band of a thousand men, or even to a more inconsiderable number, they will still come out to meet you, and not refuse to give you battle."* Xerxes, upon hearing this discourse, laughed, and said he could not comprehend how men, in such a state of liberty and independence as the Lacedæmonians were described to enjoy, who had no master to force and compel them to it, could be capable of exposing themselves in such a manner to danger and death. Demaratus replied: "The Spartans indeed are free, and under no subjection to the will of any man; but at the same time they have laws, to which they are subject, and of which they stand in greater awe than your subjects do of your majesty. Now, by these laws they are forbid ever to fly in battle, let the number, of their enemies be ever so superior; and are commanded by abiding firm in their post, either to conquer or to die."†

Xerxes was not offended at the liberty wherewith Demaratus spoke to him, and continued his march.

SECTION IV.—THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS SEND TO THEIR ALLIES IN VAIN TO REQUIRE SUCCORS FROM THEM. THE COMMAND OF THE FLEET GIVEN TO THE LACEDÆMONIANS.

Lacedæmon and Athens, which were the two most powerful cities of Greece, and the cities against which Xerxes was most exasperated, were not indolent or negligent while

* Herod. l. vii. c. 101-105.

† Idem. c. 145, 146.

so formidable an enemy was approaching. Having received intelligence long before of the designs of that prince, they had sent spies to Sardis, in order to have a more exact information of the number and quality of his forces. These spies were seized and as they were just on the point of being put to death, Xerxes countermanded it, and gave orders that they should be conducted through his army and then sent back without any harm being done to them. At their return, the Grecians understood what they had to apprehend from so potent an enemy.*

They sent deputies at the same time to Argos, into Sicily, to Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, to the isles of Coreyra and Crete, to desire succors from them, and to form a league against the common enemy.

The people of Argos offered a considerable succor, on condition they should have an equal share of the authority as either of the two kings of Sparta. This was granting them a great deal: but into what errors and mischiefs are not men led by a mistaken point of honor, and a foolish jealousy of command! The Argives were not contented with this offer, and refused to enter into a league with the Grecians, without considering, that if they suffered them to be destroyed, their own ruin must inevitably follow.†

The deputies proceeded from Argos to Sicily, and addressed themselves to Gelon, who was the most potent prince of the Greeks at that time. He promised to assist them with two hundred vessels of three benches of oars, with an army of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, two thousand light-armed soldiers, and the same number of bow-men and slingers, and to supply the Grecian army with provisions during the whole war, on condition they would make him generalissimo of all the forces both by land and sea. The Lacedæmonians were highly offended at such a proposal. Gelon then abated somewhat in his demands, and promised the same, provided he had at least the command either of the fleet or of the army. This proposal was strenuously opposed by the Athenians, who made answer that they alone had a right to command the fleet, in case the Lacedæmonians were willing to give it up. Gelon had a more substantial reason for not leaving Sicily unprovided with troops, which was the approach of the formidable army of the Carthaginians, commanded by Amilcar, which consisted of three hundred thousand men. ‡

* Herod. l. vii. c. 145, 146.

† Idem. c. 148-152.

‡ Idem. c. 153-161.

The inhabitants of Corcyra, now called Corfu, gave the envoys a more favorable answer, and immediately put to sea with a fleet of sixty vessels. But they advanced no farther than to the coasts of Laconia, pretending they were hindered by contrary winds, but in reality waiting to see the success of an engagement, that they might afterwards range themselves on the side of the conqueror.*

The people of Crete, having consulted the Delphic oracle, to know what resolution they were to take on this occasion, refused to enter into the league.†

Thus were the Lacedæmonians and Athenians left almost to themselves, all the rest of the cities and nations having submitted to the heralds that Xerxes had sent to require earth and water of them, excepting the people of Thespia and of Plataeæ.‡ In so pressing a danger, their first care was to put an end to all discord and division among themselves; for which reason the Athenians made peace with the people of Ægina, with whom they were actually at war.§

Their next care was to appoint a general: for there never was any occasion wherein it was more necessary to choose one capable of so important a trust, than in the present conjuncture, when Greece was upon the point of being attacked by the whole force of Asia. The most able and experienced captains, terrified at the greatness of the danger, had taken the resolution of not presenting themselves as candidates. There was a certain citizen at Athens, whose name was Epicydes, who had some eloquence, but in other respects was a person of no merit, was in disrepute for his want of courage, and notorious for his avarice. Notwithstanding all which, it was apprehended, that, in the assembly of the people, the votes would run in his favor. || Themistocles, who was sensible that in calm weather almost any mariner may be capable of conducting a vessel, but that in storms and tempests, the most able pilots are at a loss, was convinced that the commonwealth was ruined, if Epicydes was chosen general, whose venal and mercenary soul gave them the justest reason to fear that he was not proof against the Persian gold.¶ There are occasions, when, in order to act wisely, I had almost said regularly, it is necessary to dispense with and rise above all rule. Themistocles, who knew very

* Herod. l. vii. c. 168. † Idem. c. 169-171. ‡ Idem. c. 132.

§ Idem. c. 145.

|| Plut. in Themist. p. 114.

¶ Quilibet nautarum vectorumque tranquillo mari gubernare potest: ubi orta sæva tempestas est, ac turbato mari rapitur vento navis, tum viro et gubernatore opus est.—Liv. l. xxiv. n. 8.

well that in the present state of affairs he was the only person capable of commanding, did for that reason make no scruple of employing bribes and presents to remove his competitor: and having found means to satisfy the ambition of Epicydes by gratifying his avarice, he got himself elected general in his stead.* We may here, I think, very justly apply to Themistocles what Titus Livius says of Fabius on a like occasion. This great commander finding, when Hannibal was in the heart of Italy, that the people were inclined to make a man of no merit consul, employed all his own influence, as well as that of his friends, to be continued in the consulship, without being concerned at the clamor that might be raised against him, and succeeded in the attempt. The historian adds, "the conjuncture of affairs, and the extreme danger the commonwealth was exposed to, were arguments of such weight, that they prevented any one from being offended at a conduct which might appear to be contrary to rules, and removed all suspicion of Fabius's having acted upon any motive of interest or ambition. On the contrary, the public admired his generosity and greatness of soul, in that, as he knew the commonwealth had occasion for an accomplished general, and could not be ignorant or doubtful of his own singular merit in that respect, he had chosen rather in some sort to hazard his own reputation, and perhaps expose his character to the reproaches of envious tongues, than to be wanting in any service he could render his country."†

The Athenians also passed a decree to recall all their citizens who were in banishment. They feared that Aristides would join their enemies, and influence a great many others to side with the barbarians. But they had a very false opinion of their citizen, who was infinitely remote from such sentiments. Be that as it might, at this extraordinary juncture they thought fit to recall him, and Themistocles was so far from opposing the decree for that purpose, that he promoted it with all his credit and authority. The hatred and division of these great men had nothing of that implacable, bitter, and outrageous spirit, which prevailed among the Romans in the latter times of the republic. The danger of the state was the means of their reconciliation, and when

* Χρήμασι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἐξωνήσατο παρὰ τοῦ Ἐπικύδου.

† Tempus ac necessitas belli, et discrimen summæ rerum, faciebant ne quis aut in exemplum lexquireret, aut suspectum cupiditatis imperii consulem haberet. Quin laudabant potius magnitudinem animi, quod cum summo imperatore esse opus reip. sciret, seque cum haud dubie esse, minoris invidiam suam, si qua ex re oriretur, quam utilitatem reip. fecisset.—Liv. l. xxiv. n. 9.

their service was necessary to the preservation of the public, they laid aside all their jealousy and rancor : and we shall see, hereafter, that Aristides was so far from secretly thwarting his ancient rival, that he zealously contributed to the success of his enterprises, and to the advancement of his glory.*

The alarm increased in Greece, in proportion as they received advice that the Persian army advanced. If the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been able to make no other resistance than with their land forces, Greece had been utterly ruined and reduced to slavery. This exigence taught them how to set a right value upon the prudent foresight of Themistocles, who, upon some other pretext, had caused a hundred galleys to be built. Instead of judging like the rest of the Athenians, who looked upon the victory of Marathon as the end of the war, he, on the contrary, considered it rather as the beginning, or as the signal of still greater battles, for which it was necessary to prepare the Athenian people ; and from that very time he began to think of raising Athens to a superiority over Sparta, which for a long time had been the mistress of all Greece. With this view he judged it expedient to make the Athenian power entirely maritime, perceiving very plainly that, as she was so weak by land, she had no other way to render herself useful to her allies, or formidable to her enemies. His opinion herein prevailed among the people in spite of the opposition of Miltiades, whose difference of opinion undoubtedly arose from the little probability there was, that a people entirely unacquainted with fighting at sea, and who were only capable of fitting out and arming very small vessels, should be able to withstand so formidable a power as that of the Persians, who had both a numerous land army, and a fleet of above a thousand ships.

The Athenians had some silver mines in a part of Attica, called Laurium, the whole products and revenue of which used to be distributed among them. Themistocles had the courage to propose to the people, that they should abolish these distributions, and employ that money in building vessels with three benches of oars, in order to make war upon the people of Ægina, against whom he endeavored to inflame their ancient jealousy. No people are ever willing to sacrifice their private interests to the general utility of the public : for they seldom have so much generosity or public spirit, as

* Plut. in Arist. pp. 322, 323.

to purchase the welfare or preservation of the state at their own expense. The Athenian people, however, did it upon this occasion: moved by the lively remonstrances of Themistocles, they consented that the money which arose from the product of the mines, should be employed in building a hundred galleys. Upon the arrival of Xerxes they doubled the number, and to that fleet Greece owed its preservation.*

When they came to the point of naming a general for the command of the navy, the Athenians, who alone had furnished two-thirds of it, laid claim to that honor as appertaining to them, and their pretensions were certainly just and well grounded. It happened, however, that the suffrages of the allies all concurred in favor of Eurybiades, a Lacedæmonian. Themistocles, though very aspiring after glory, thought it incumbent upon him on this occasion, to sacrifice his own interests for the common good of the nation: and giving the Athenians to understand, that, provided they behaved themselves with courage and conduct, all the Grecians would quickly desire to confer the command upon them of their own accord, he persuaded them to consent, as he himself would do, to give up that point at present to the Spartans.† It may justly be said that this prudent moderation in Themistocles was another means of saving the state. For the allies threatened to separate themselves from them, if they refused to comply; and if that had happened, Greece must have been inevitably ruined.

SECTION V.—THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ. THE DEATH OF LEONIDAS.

The only thing that now remained to be discussed, was to know in what place they should resolve to meet the Persians, in order to dispute their entrance into Greece. The people of Thessaly represented that as they were the most exposed, and likely to be first attacked by the enemy, it was but reasonable that their defence and security, on which the safety of all Greece so much depended, should first be provided for; without which they should be obliged to take other measures, that would be contrary to their inclinations, but yet absolutely necessary, in case their country was left unprotected and defenceless. It was hereupon resolved that ten thousand men should be sent to guard the passage which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, near the river Peneus, between the mountains of Olympus and Ossa. But

* Plut. in Themist. p. 113.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 213.

Alexander, the son of Amyntas, king of Macedonia, having given them to understand that if they waited for the Persians in that place, they must inevitably be overpowered by their numbers, they retired to Thermopylæ. The Thessalians finding themselves thus abandoned, without any farther deliberation, submitted to the Persians.*

Thermopylæ is a strait or narrow pass of mount Cæta, between Thessaly and Phocis, but twenty-five feet broad, which therefore might be defended by a small number of forces, and which was the only way through which the Persian land army could enter Achaia, and advance to besiege Athens. This was the place where the Grecian army thought fit to wait for the enemy; the person who commanded it was Leonidas, one of the two kings of Sparta.†

Xerxes in the mean time was upon his march; he had given orders for his fleet to follow him along the coast, and to regulate their motions according to those of the land army. Wherever he came, he found provisions and refreshments prepared beforehand, pursuant to the orders he had sent; and every city he arrived at gave him a magnificent entertainment, which cost immense sums of money. The vast expense of these treats gave occasion to a witty saying of a certain citizen of Abdera in Thrace, who, when the king was gone, said, they ought to thank the gods that he eat but one meal a-day. ‡

An extraordinary instance of magnanimity was shown on this occasion by the king of the Bisaltes, a people of Thrace. While all the other princes ran into servitude, and basely submitted to Xerxes, he bravely refused to receive his yoke, or to obey him. Not being in a condition to resist him with open force, he retired to the top of the mountain Rhodope, into an inaccessible place, and forbade all his sons, who were six in number, to carry arms against Greece. But they, either out of fear of Xerxes, or out of a curiosity to see so important a war, followed the Persians, in opposition to their father's injunction. On their return home, their father, to punish so direct a disobedience, condemned all his sons to have their eyes put out. Xerxes continued his march through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, every thing giving way before him till he came to the strait of Thermopylæ.§

One cannot behold without the utmost astonishment,

* A. M. 3524. Ant. J. C. 480. Herod. l. vii. c. 172, 173.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 175, 177.

‡ Idem. c. 108, 132.

§ Herod. l. viii. c. 116.

with what a handful of troops the Grecians opposed the innumerable army of Xerxes. We find a particular account of their number in Pausanias. All their forces joined together amounted only to eleven thousand two hundred men; of which number only four thousand were employed at Thermopylæ to defend the pass. But these soldiers, adds the historian, were all determined to a man either to conquer or die. And what is it that an army of such resolution is not able to effect?*

When Xerxes advanced near the strait of Thermopylæ, he was strangely surprised to find that they were prepared to dispute his passage. He had always flattered himself, that on the first hearing of his arrival, the Grecians would betake themselves to flight; nor could he ever be persuaded to believe, what Demaratus had told him from the beginning of his project, that at the first pass he came to, he would find his whole army stopped by a handful of men. He sent out a spy before him to reconnoitre the enemy. The spy brought him word, that he found the Lacedæmonians out of their entrenchments, and that they were diverting themselves with military exercises, and combing their hair, which was the Spartan manner of preparing themselves for battle.†

Xerxes, still entertaining some hopes of their flight, waited four days on purpose to give them time to retreat. And in this interval of time he used his utmost endeavors to gain Leonidas, by making him magnificent promises, and assuring him that he would make him master of all Greece, if he would come over to his party. Leonidas rejected his proposal with scorn and indignation. Xerxes, having afterwards written to him to deliver up his arms, Leonidas, in a style and spirit truly laconic, answered him in these words, "Come and take them."‡ Nothing remained but to prepare themselves to engage the Lacedæmonians. Xerxes first commanded his Median forces to march against them, with orders to take them all alive, and bring them to him. These Medes were not able to stand the charge of the Grecians; and being shamefully put to flight, they showed, says Herodotus, that Xerxes had a great many men, but few soldiers.§ The next that were to face the Spartans, were those Persians called the Immortal Band, which consisted of ten

* Paus. l. v. p. 646.

† Herod. l. vi. c. 207-231. Diod. l. xi. pp. 5, 10.

‡ Αντέγραψε, Μόλων λάβε.

§ "Οτι πολλοί μὲν ἄνθρωποι εἶεν ὀλιγοί, δε ἄνδρες. Quod multi homines essent, pauci autem viri.

thousand men, and were the best troops in the whole army. But these had no better success than the former.*

Xerxes, out of all hopes of being able to force his way through troops so determined to conquer or die, was extremely perplexed, and could not tell what resolution to take, when an inhabitant of the country came to him and discovered a secret path to the top of an eminence, which overlooked and commanded the Spartan forces.† He quickly despatched a detachment thither, which marching all night, arrived there at the break of day, and possessed themselves of that advantageous post.

The Greeks were soon apprised of this misfortune, and Leonidas, seeing that it was now impossible to repulse the enemy, obliged the rest of the allies to retire, but stayed himself with his three hundred Lacedæmonians, all resolved to die with their leader, who being told by the oracle, that either Lacedæmon or her king must necessarily perish, determined, without the least difficulty or hesitation, to sacrifice himself for his country. The Spartans lost all hopes either of conquering or escaping, and looked upon Thermopylæ as their burying-place. The king, exhorting his men to take some nourishment, and telling them at the same time, that they should sup together with Pluto, they set up a shout of joy, as if they had been invited to a banquet, and full of ardor advanced with their king to battle. The shock was exceedingly violent and bloody. Leonidas himself was one of the first that fell. The endeavors of the Lacedæmonians to defend his dead body were incredible. At length, not vanquished, but oppressed by numbers, they all fell, except one man, who escaped to Sparta, where he was treated as a coward and traitor to his country, and nobody would keep company or converse with him. But soon afterwards he made glorious amends for his fault at the battle of Platææ, where he distinguished himself in an extraordinary manner. Xerxes, enraged to the last degree against Leonidas for daring to make a stand against him, caused his dead body to be hung up on a gallows, and made this intended dishonor of his enemy his own immortal shame.‡

Some time after these transactions, by order of the Amphictyons, a magnificent monument was erected at Ther-

* Plut. in Lacon. Apoph. p. 225.

† When the Gauls, two hundred years after this, came to invade Greece, they possessed themselves of the strait of Thermopylæ by means of the same by-path which the Grecians had still neglected to secure.—Pausan. 1. i. pp. 7, 8.

‡ Herod. 1. vii. c. 238.

mopylæ to the honor of these brave defenders of Greece, and upon the monument were two inscriptions; one of which was general, and related to all those that died at Thermopylæ, importing, that the Greeks of Peloponnesus, to the number only of four thousand, had withstood the Persian army, which consisted of three millions of men: the other related to the Spartans in particular. It was composed by the poet Simonides, and is very remarkable for its simplicity. It is as follows:

‘Ὁ ξείν’, ἄγγελον Λακεδαιμονίους, ὅτι τῇ δὲ
Κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων πειθόμενοι νομίμοις.*

That is to say, “go passenger, and tell at Lacedæmon, that we died here in obedience to her sacred laws.” Forty years afterwards, Pausanias, who obtained the victory of Plataeæ, caused the bones of Leonidas to be carried from Thermopylæ to Sparta, and erected a magnificent monument to his memory; near which was likewise another erected for Pausanias. Every year at these tombs was a funeral oration pronounced to the honor of those heroes, and a public game, wherein none but the Lacedæmonians had a right to participate; in order to show, that they alone were concerned in the glory obtained at Thermopylæ.

Xerxes in that affair lost above twenty thousand men, among whom were two of the king’s brothers. He was very sensible, that so great a loss, which was a manifest proof of the courage of their enemies, was capable of alarming and discouraging his soldiers. In order, therefore, to conceal the knowledge of it from them, he caused all his men that were killed in that action, except a thousand, whose bodies he ordered to be left upon the field, to be thrown together into large holes, which were secretly made, and covered over afterwards with earth and herbs. This stratagem succeeded very ill; for when the soldiers in his fleet, being curious to see the field of battle, obtained leave to come thither for that purpose, it served rather to discover his own littleness of soul, than to conceal the number of the slain.†

Dismayed with a victory that had cost him so dear, he asked Demaratus if the Lacedæmonians had many such soldiers? that prince told him, that the Spartan republic had a great many cities belonging to it, all the inhabitants of

* *Pari animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopyliæ occidi: rursum, in duos Simonides: Dic, hospes, Spartæ nos te hic vidiisse iacentes, Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur.*

C13. T1usc. Quæst. l. i. n. 101.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 24, 25.

which were exceedingly brave ; but that the inhabitants of Lacedæmon, who were properly called Spartans, and who were about eight thousand in number, surpassed all the rest in valor, and were all of them such as those who had fought under Leonidas.*

I return for a short time to the battle of Thermopylæ, the issue of which, fatal in appearance, might make an impression upon the minds of the reader to the disadvantage of the Lacedæmonians, and occasion their courage to be looked upon as the effect of a presumptuous temerity, or a desperate resolution.

That action of Leonidas, with his three hundred Spartans, was not the effect of rashness or despair, but was a wise and noble conduct, as Diodorus Siculus has taken care to observe, in the magnificent encomium upon that famous engagement, to which he ascribes the success of all the ensuing victories and campaigns.† Leonidas, knowing that Xerxes marched at the head of all the forces of the East, in order to overwhelm and crush a little country by his overwhelming numbers, rightly conceived, from the superiority of his genius and understanding, that if they pretended to place their hopes of success in that war in opposing force to force, and numbers to numbers, all the Grecian nations together would never be able to equal the Persians, or to dispute the victory with them ; that it was therefore necessary to point out to Greece other means of safety and preservation, while she was under these alarms ; and that they ought to show to the world whose eyes were upon them, what glorious things may be done, when greatness of mind is opposed to force of body, true courage and bravery to blind impetuosity, the love of liberty to tyrannical oppression, and a few disciplined veteran troops to a confused multitude, however numerous. These brave Lacedæmonians thought it became them, who were the choicest soldiers of the chief people of Greece, to devote themselves to certain death, in order to impress upon the Persians how difficult it is to reduce free men to slavery, and to teach the rest of Greece, by their example, either to vanquish or to perish.

These sentiments do not originate in fancy, nor do I ascribe them to Leonidas without foundation : they are plainly comprised in the short answer which that worthy king of Sparta made to a certain Lacedæmonian, who, being astonished at the generous resolution the king had taken, spoke

* Herod. l. viii. c. 134, 137.

† Diod. l. xi. p. 9.

to him in this manner: "Is it possible then, sir, that you can think of marching with a handful of men against such a mighty and innumerable army?" "If we are to rely upon numbers," replied Leonidas, "all the people of Greece together would not be sufficient, since a small part of the Persian army is equal to her entire population: but if we are to rely upon valor, my little troop is more than sufficient."*

The event showed the justness of this prince's sentiments. That illustrious example of courage astonished the Persians, and gave new spirit and vigor to the Greeks. The lives then of this heroic leader and his brave troop were not thrown away, but usefully employed; and their death was attended with a double effect, greater and more lasting than they themselves had imagined. On one hand it was in a manner the cause of their ensuing victories, which made the Persians for ever after lay aside all thoughts of attacking Greece; so that during the seven or eight succeeding reigns, there was neither any prince, who durst entertain such a design, nor any flatterer in his court, who durst propose the thing to him. On the other hand, so singular and exemplary an instance of intrepidity made an indelible impression upon all the rest of the Grecians, and left a persuasion deeply rooted in their hearts, that they were able to subdue the Persians, and subvert their vast empire. Cimon was the first who made the attempt with success. Agesilaus afterwards pushed that design so far, that he made the great monarch tremble in his palace at Susa. Alexander at last accomplished it with incredible facility. He never had the least doubt, any more than the Macedonians who followed him, or the whole country of Greece that chose him general in that expedition, that with thirty thousand men he could reduce the Persian empire, as three hundred Spartans had been sufficient to check the united forces of the whole East.

SECTION VI. NAVAL BATTLE NEAR ARTEMISIUM.

The very same day on which the glorious action was fought at Thermopylæ, there was also an engagement at sea between the two fleets. That of the Grecians, exclusive of the little galleys and small boats, consisted of two hundred and seventy-one vessels. This fleet had lain by near Artemisium, a promontory of Eubœa, upon the northern coast towards the strait. That of the enemy, which was much more numerous, was near the same place, but had

* Plut. in Lacon. Apoph. p. 225.

lately suffered in a violent tempest, which had destroyed above four hundred of their vessels. Notwithstanding this loss, as it was still vastly superior in number to that of the Grecians which they were preparing to attack, they detached two hundred of their vessels with orders to wait about Eubœa, so that none of the enemy's vessels might be able to escape them. The Grecians having got intelligence of this separation, immediately set sail in the night, in order to attack that detachment at daybreak the next morning. But not meeting with it, they went, towards the evening, and fell upon the main body of the enemy's fleet, which they treated very roughly. Night coming on, they were obliged to separate, and both parties retired to their post. But the very night that parted them, proved more destructive to the Persians than the engagement which had preceded, from a violent storm of wind, accompanied with rain and thunder, which distressed and harassed their vessels till break of day: and the two hundred ships also that had been detached from their fleet, as we mentioned before, were almost all cast away upon the coasts of Eubœa, it being the will of the gods, says Herodotus, that the two fleets should become very nearly equal.*

The Athenians having the same day received a reinforcement of fifty-three vessels, the Grecians, who were apprised of the disaster that had befallen part of the enemy's fleet, fell upon the ships of the Cilicians, at the same hour they had attacked the fleet the day before, and sunk a great number of them. The Persians, ashamed of seeing themselves thus insulted by an enemy so much inferior in number, thought fit the next day to appear first in a disposition to engage. The battle was very obstinate this time, and the success pretty nearly equal on both sides; but the Persians, who were incommoded by the great size and number of their vessels, sustained the greater loss. Both parties, however, retired in good order.

All these actions, which took place near Artemisium, did not bring matters to an absolute decision, but contributed very much to animate the Athenians, as they were convinced by experience, that there is nothing really formidable, either in the number and magnificent ornaments of vessels, or in the insolent shouts and songs of victory of barbarians, to men that know how to come to close engagement, and have the courage to fight with steadiness and resolution; and

* Herod. l. vii. 1-18. Diod. l. xi. pp. 10, 11.

that the best way of dealing with such an enemy, is to despise all that vain appearance, to advance bodily up to them, and to charge briskly and vigorously, without ever giving ground.*

The Grecian fleets having by this time had intelligence of what had passed at Thermopylæ, resolved upon the course they were to take without any farther deliberation. They immediately sailed away from Artemisium and advancing towards the heart of Greece, they stopped at Salamis, a small island very near and opposite to Attica. While the fleet was retreating, Themistocles passed through all the places where the enemy was obliged to land, in order to take in fresh water or other provisions, and engraved in large characters, upon the rocks and the stones, the following words, which he addressed to the Ionians: "Be of our side, ye people of Ionia: come to the party of your fathers, who exposed their own lives for no other object than to maintain your liberty: or, if you cannot possibly do that, at least do the Persians all the mischief you can, when we are engaged with them, and put their army into disorder and confusion." By this means Themistocles hoped either to bring the Ionians really over to their party, or at least to cause them to be suspected by the barbarians. We see this general had his thoughts always intent upon his business, and neglected nothing that could contribute to the success of his designs.†

SECTION VII.—THE ATHENIANS ABANDON THEIR CITY, WHICH IS TAKEN AND BURNT BY XERXES.

Xerxes in the mean time had entered into the country of Phocis by the upper part of Doris and was burning and plundering the cities of the Phocians. The inhabitants of Peloponnesus having no thoughts but to save their own country, resolved to abandon all the rest, and to collect all the Grecian forces, within the isthmus, which they intended to fortify by a strong wall, extending from one sea to the other, a distance of nearly five English miles. The Athenians were highly provoked at so base a desertion, seeing themselves ready to fall into the hands of the Persians, and likely to bear the whole weight of their fury and vengeance. Some time before, they had consulted the oracles of Delphos, which had given them for answer, "that there would be no way of saving the city but by walls of wood." The senti-

* Alut. in Themist. pp. 115, 117. Herod. l. viii. c. 21, 22. † Herod. l. viii. c. 40, 41.

ments of the people were much divided about this ambiguous expression : some thought it was to be understood to mean the citadel, because, therefore, it had been surrounded with wooden palisades. But Themistocles gave another sense to the words, which was much more natural, understanding it to mean shipping ; and demonstrated, that the only measures they had to take, were to leave the city empty, and to embark all the inhabitants. But this was a resolution the people would not listen to, thinking they would relinquish all hope of victory and even of safety when once they had abandoned the temples of their gods and the tombs of their ancestors. Here Themistocles had occasion for all his address and all his eloquence, to prevail upon the people. After he had represented to them, that Athens did not consist either of its walls, or its houses, but of its citizens, and that the saving of these was the preservation of the city, he endeavored to persuade them, by the argument most capable of making an impression upon them, in the unhappy, afflicted, and dangerous condition they were then in, I mean the argument and motive of divine authority ; giving them to understand by the very words of the oracle, and by the prodigies which had happened, that their removing for a time from Athens was manifestly the will of the gods.*

A decree was therefore passed, by which, in order to soften what appeared so hard, in the resolution of deserting the city, it was ordained, "that Athens should be given up in trust into the hands, and committed to the keeping and protection of Minerva, patroness of the Athenian people ; that all such inhabitants as were able to bear arms, should go on board of ships ; and that every citizen should provide as well as he could for the safety and security of his wife, children and slaves." †

The extraordinary behavior of Cimon, who was at this time very young, was of great weight on this singular occasion. Followed by his companions, with a gay and cheerful countenance, he went publicly along the street of the Ceramicus to the citadel, in order to consecrate the bit of a a bridle, which he carried in his hand, in the temple of Minerva, intending to impress upon the people by this religious and affecting ceremony, that they had no farther business with land-forces, and that it behooved them now to betake themselves entirely to the sea. After he had made an offering of this bit, he took one of the shields that hung upon

* Herod. l. vii. c. 139-143.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 51-54. Plut. in Themist. p. 117.

the wall of the temple, paid his devotions of the goddess, went down to the water-side, and was the first who by his example inspired the greatest part of the people with confidence and resolution, and encouraged them to embark.*

The greater part of them sent their fathers and mothers, that were old, together with their wives and children, to the city of Trœzene,† where the inhabitants received them with great humanity and generosity; for they made an ordinance that they should be maintained at the expense of the public, and assigned for each person's subsistence two oboli a day, which were worth about twopence English money. Besides this, they permitted the children to gather fruit wherever they pleased, or wherever they came, and settled a fund for the payment of the masters who had the care of their education. How noble, how magnanimous, in a city, exposed as this was to the greatest dangers and calamities, to extend her care and generosity, in the very midst of such alarms, even to the education of other people's children!

When the whole city came to embark, so moving and melancholy a scene drew tears from the eyes of all that were present, and at the same time occasioned great admiration with regard to the steadiness and courage of those men, who sent their fathers and mothers another way, and to other places, and who, without being moved either at their grief and lamentations, or at the tender embraces of their wives and children, passed over with so much firmness and resolution to Salamin. But what extremely raised and augmented the general compassion, was the great number of old men they were forced to leave in the city on account of their age and infirmities, many of whom voluntarily remained there, from a motive of religion, believing the citadel to be the thing meant by the oracle in the above-mentioned ambiguous expression of wooden walls. There was no creature, for history has deemed this circumstance worthy of being remembered, there was no creature, even to the very domestic animals, but what took part in this public mourning; nor was it possible to look on those poor creatures, running, howling and crying after their masters, who were going on board, without being affected. Among these animals, particular notice is taken of a dog belonging to Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, which, unwilling to be abandoned by his master, jumped into the sea after him, and

* Plat. in Cim. p. 481.

† This was a small city situated upon the sea-side, in that part of the Peloponnesus called Argolis.

continued swimming as near as he could to the vessel his master was on board of, till he landed, quite spent, at Salamin, and died the moment after upon the shore. In the same place, even in Plutarch's time, they used to show the spot wherein this faithful animal was said to be buried, which was called "the dog's burying place."

While Xerxes was continuing his march, some deserters from Arcadia came and joined his army. The king having asked them what the Grecians were then doing, was extremely surprised when he was told, that they were employed in seeing the games and combats then celebrating at Olympia: and his surprise was still increased, when he understood that the victor's reward in those engagements was only a crown of olive. "What men must they be," cried one of the Persian nobles with great wonder and astonishment, "that are influenced only by honor, and not by money!" *

Xerxes had sent off a considerable detachment of his army to plunder the temple of Delphos, in which he knew there were immense treasures, being resolved to treat Apollo with no more favor than the other gods whose temples he had pillaged. If we may believe what Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus say of this matter, no sooner had this detachment advanced near the temple of Minerva, surnamed the Provident, than the air suddenly grew dark, and a violent tempest arose, accompanied with impetuous winds, thunder and lightning; and two huge rocks being detached from the mountain, fell upon the Persian troops, and crushed the greatest part of them.†

The other part of the army marched towards the city of Athens, which was deserted by all its inhabitants, except a small number of citizens who had retired into the citadel, where they defended themselves with incredible bravery till they were all killed, and would hearken to no terms of accommodation whatever. Xerxes having stormed the citadel, reduced it to ashes. He immediately despatched a courier to Susa, to carry the agreeable news of his success to Artabanus his uncle; and at the same time sent him a great number of pictures and statues.‡ Those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, the ancient deliverers of Athens, were sent with the rest. One of the Antiochuses, kings of Syria (I do not know which of them, nor at what time it was), returned them to the Athenians, being persuaded he could not possibly make them a more acceptable present.§

* Herod. l. viii. c. 16. † Idem. c. 25-29. Diod. l. xi. p. 12.

‡ Herod. l. viii. c. 50-54.

§ Pausan. l. i. p. 14.

SECTION VIII.—THE BATTLE OF SALAMIN, ETC.

At this time a division arose among the commanders of the Grecian fleet; and the confederates, in a council of war which was held for that purpose, were of very different sentiments concerning the place for engaging the enemy. Some of them, and indeed the major part, at the head of whom was Eurybiades, the generalissimo of the fleet, were for having them advance near the isthmus of Corinth, that they might be nearer the land army, which was posted there to guard that pass, under the command of Cleombrotus, brother of Leonidas, and more ready for the defence of Peloponnesus. Others, at the head of whom was Themistocles, alleged that it would be betraying their country to abandon so advantageous a post as that of Salamin. And as he supported his opinion with great warmth, Eurybiades lifted up his cane over him in a menacing manner. "Strike," said the Athenian, unmoved by the insult, "but hear me:" and continuing his discourse, proceeded to show of what importance it was for the Grecians, whose vessels were lighter and much fewer in number than those of the Persians, to engage in such a strait as that of Salamin, which would render the enemy incapable of using a great part of their forces. Eurybiades, who could not help being surprised at this moderation in Themistocles, submitted to his reasons, or at least complied with his opinion, for fear the Athenians, whose ships constituted more than one half of the fleet, should separate themselves from the allies, as their general had taken occasion to insinuate.*

A council of war was also held on the side of the Persians, in order to determine whether they should hazard a naval engagement. Xerxes himself also went on board the fleet to take the advice of his captains and officers; who were all unanimous for the battle, because they knew it was agreeable to the king's inclination. Queen Artemisia was the only person who opposed that resolution. She represented the dangerous consequences of coming to blows with people much more conversant and more expert in maritime affairs than the Persians; alleging, that the loss of a battle at sea would be attended with the ruin of their land army: whereas, by protracting the war, and approaching Peloponnesus, they would create jealousies and divisions among their enemies, or rather augment the division already very

* Herod. l. viii. c. 56-65. Plut. in Themist. p. 117.

great among them : that the confederates in that case would not fail to separate from one another, to return and defend their respective countries ; and that then the king without difficulty, and almost without striking a blow, might make himself master of all Greece. This wise advice was not followed, and a battle was resolved upon.*

Xerxes, imputing the ill success of all his former engagements at sea to his own absence, was resolved to be a witness of this from the top of an eminence, where he caused a throne to be erected for that purpose. This might have contributed in some measure to animate his forces : but there is another much more sure and effectual means of doing it ; I mean, by the prince's real presence and example, when he himself shares in the danger, and thereby shows himself worthy of being the soul and head of a brave and numerous body of men ready to die for his service. A prince that has not this sort of fortitude, which nothing can shake, and which even takes new vigor from danger, may nevertheless be endued with other excellent qualities, but then he is by no means proper to command an army. No qualification whatever can supply the want of courage in a general ; and the more he labors to show the appearance of it, when he has not the reality, the more he discovers his cowardice and fear.† There is, it must be owned, a vast difference between a general officer and a private soldier. Xerxes ought not to have exposed his person otherwise than became a prince ; that is to say, as the head, not as the hand ; as he whose business it is to direct and give orders, not as those who are to put them in execution. But to keep himself entirely at a distance from danger, and to act no other part than that of a spectator, was really renouncing the quality and office of a general.

Themistocles, knowing that some of the commanders in the Grecian fleet still entertained thoughts of sailing towards the isthmus, contrived to have notice secretly given to Xerxes, that as the Grecian allies were now assembled together in one place, it would be an easy matter for him to subdue and destroy them altogether ; whereas, if they once separated from one another, as they were about to do, he might never meet with another opportunity so favorable. The king adopted this opinion ; and immediately commanded a great number of his vessels to surround Salamin

* Herod. l. viii. c. 67-70.

† Quanto magis occultare ac abdere pavorem nitebantur, manifestius, pavidi.
—Tacit. Hist.

by night, in order to make it impracticable for the Greeks to quit their post.*

It was not perceived among the Grecians that their army was surrounded in this manner. Aristides came the same night from Ægina, where he had some forces under his command, and with very great danger passed through the whole fleet of the enemy. When he came to the tent of Themistocles, he took him aside, and spoke to him in the following manner: "If we are wise, Themistocles, we shall from henceforward lay aside the vain and childish dissension that has hitherto existed between us, and strive, with a more noble and useful emulation, which of us shall render the best service to his country; you by commanding, and doing the duty of a wise and able captain, and I by obeying your orders, and by assisting you with my person and advice." He then informed him of the army's being surrounded with the ships of the Persians, and warmly exhorted him to give them battle, without delay. Themistocles, extremely astonished at such magnanimity, and such noble and generous frankness, was somewhat ashamed that he had suffered himself to be so much excelled by his rival; but, without being ashamed to own it, he promised Aristides, that he would henceforward imitate his generosity, and even exceed it, if it were possible, in the whole of his future conduct. Then, after having imparted to him the stratagem he had contrived, to deceive the barbarian, he desired him to go in person to Eurybiades, in order to convince him that there was no other means of safety than to engage the enemy by sea at Salamin; which commission Aristides executed with pleasure and success; for he was in great credit and esteem with that general.†

Both sides therefore prepared themselves for the battle. The Grecian fleet consisted of three hundred and eighty sail of ships, which in every thing followed the direction and orders of Themistocles. As nothing escaped his vigilance, and as, like an able commander, he knew how to improve every circumstance and incident to advantage, before he would begin the engagement, he waited till a certain wind, which rose regularly every day at a certain hour, and which was directly contrary to the enemy, began to blow. As soon as this wind rose, the signal was given for battle. The Persians, who knew that their king had his eyes upon them, advanced with such courage and impetuosity, as were capa-

* Herod. l. viii. c. 74-78. † Plut. in Arist. p. 323. Herod. l. viii. c. 78-82.

ble of striking an enemy with terror. But the heat of the first attack quickly abated, when they came to be engaged. Every thing was against them; the wind, which blew directly in their faces; the height, and the heaviness of their vessels, which could not move and turn without great difficulty; and even the number of their ships, which was so far from being of use to them, that it only served to embarrass them in a place so straight and narrow as that they fought in: whereas on the side of the Grecians, every thing was done with good order, and without hurry or confusion; because they were all directed by one commander. The Ionians, whom Themistocles had advised, by characters engraven upon stones along the coast of Eubœa, to remember from whom they derived their origin, were the first that betook themselves to flight, and were quickly followed by the rest of the fleet. But queen Artemisia distinguished herself by incredible efforts of resolution and courage, so that Xerxes, when he saw in what manner she behaved herself, cried out, that the men had behaved like women in this engagement, and that the women had showed the courage of men.* The Athenians, being enraged that a woman had dared to appear in arms against them, had promised a reward of ten thousand drachms to any one that should be able to take her alive, but she had the good fortune to escape their pursuit. If they had taken her, she could have deserved nothing from them but the highest commendations, and the most honorable and generous treatment.†

The manner in which that queen escaped ought not to be omitted. ‡ Seeing herself warmly pursued by an Athenian ship, from which it seemed impossible for her to escape, she hung out Grecian colors, and attacked one of the Persian vessels, on board of which was Damasithymus, king of Calynda, § with whom she had some difference, and sunk it: this made her pursuers believe that her ship was one of the Grecian fleet, and they gave up the chase. ||

* Οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες γεγόνασι μοι γυναῖκες, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες ἄνδρες.

Artemisia inter primos duces bellum acerrimes sciebat. Quippe, ut in viro muliebrem timorem, ita in muliere virilem audaciam cernebat.—Just. l. ii. c. 12.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 84-96.

‡ It appears that Artemisia valued herself no less upon stratagem than courage, and at the same time was not very delicate in the choice of the measures she used. It is said, that being desirous of seizing Latmus, a small city of Caria, that lay very commodiously for her, she put her troops in ambush, and, under pretence of celebrating the feast of the mother of the gods, in a wood consecrated to her near that city, she repaired thither with a great train of eunuchs, women, drums, and trumpets. The inhabitants ran in throngs to see that religious ceremony; and in the mean time Artemisia's troops took possession of the place.—Polyæn. Stratag. l. viii. c. 53.

§ A city of Lycia.

|| Herod. l. viii. c. 87, 88. Polyæn. l. viii. c. 53.

Such was the success of the battle of Salamin, one of the most memorable actions related in ancient history, and which has, and will render the name and courage of the Grecians forever famous. A great number of the Persian ships were taken, and a much greater sunk on this occasion. Many of their allies, who dreaded the king's cruelty no less than the enemy, made the best of their way into their own country.

Themistocles, in a secret conversation with Aristides, proposed to his consideration, in order to sound him and to learn his true sentiments, whether it would not be proper for them to send some vessels to break down the bridge which Xerxes had caused to be built; to the end, says he, that we may take Asia into Europe: but though he made this proposal, he was far from approving it. Aristides, believing him to be in earnest, argued very warmly and strenuously against any such project, and represented to him how dangerous it was to reduce so powerful an enemy to despair, from whom it was their interest to deliver themselves as soon as possible. Themistocles seemed to acquiesce in his reasons; and in order to hasten the king's departure, contrived to have him secretly informed, that the Grecians designed to break down the bridge. The object Themistocles seems to have had in view by this feigned confidence, was to strengthen himself with Aristides' opinion, which was of great weight against that of the other generals, in case they inclined to go and break down the bridge. It may be too, that he aimed at guarding himself by this means against the ill-will of his enemies, who might one day accuse him of treason before the people, if ever they came to know that he had been the author of that secret advice to Xerxes.

This prince, being alarmed with such news, made the best use he could of his time, and set out by night, leaving Mardonius behind him, with an army of three hundred thousand men in order if possible to reduce Greece.* The Grecians, who expected that Xerxes would come to another engagement the next day, understanding that he had fled, pursued him as fast as they could, but to no purpose. They had destroyed two hundred of the enemy's ships, besides those which they had taken. The remainder of the Persian fleet, after having suffered extremely by the winds in their passage, retired towards the coast of Asia, and entered into

* Herod. l. viii. c. 115-120.

the port of Cuma, a city in Æolia, where they passed the winter, without daring afterwards to return into Greece.*

Xerxes took the rest of his army along with him and marched by the way of the Hellespont. As no provisions had been previously prepared for them, they underwent great hardships during their whole march, which lasted forty-five days. After having consumed all the fruits they could find, the soldiers were obliged to live upon herbs, and even upon the bark and leaves of trees. This occasioned a great sickness in the army, and great numbers died of fluxes and the plague.

The king, through eagerness and impatience to make his escape, left his army behind him, and travelled on before with a small retinue, in order to reach the bridge with the greater expedition; but when he arrived at the place, he found the bridge broken down by the violence of the waves, in a great tempest that had happened, and was reduced to the necessity of passing the strait in a cock-boat. This scene was to show mankind the mutability of all earthly things and the instability of human greatness; a prince, whose armies and fleets but a short time before, the land and sea were scarcely able to contain, now stealing away in a little boat, almost without any servants or attendants!† Such was the event and success of Xerxes's expedition against Greece.

If we compare Xerxes with himself at different times and on different occasions, we shall hardly know him for the same man. When affairs were under consideration and debate, no person could show more courage and intrepidity than this prince; he is surprised, and even offended, if any one foresees the least difficulty in the execution of his projects, or shows any apprehension concerning events. But when he comes to the point of execution, and to the hour of danger, he flies like a coward, and thinks of nothing but saving his own life and person. Here we have a sensible and evident proof of the difference between true courage, which is never destitute of prudence, and temerity, always blind and presumptuous. A wise and great prince weighs every thing, and examines all circumstances, before he enters into a war, of which he is not afraid, but which at the same

* Herod. l. viii. c. 130.

† *Erat res : i e tuculo digna, et estimationes sortis humanæ, rerum varietate miranda, in exiguo latente videre navigio, quem paulo ante vix æquor omne capiebat; carentem etiam omni servorum ministerio cujus exercitus, propter multitudinem, terris graves erant.*—Justin. l. ii. c. 13

time he does not desire; and when the time of action is come, the sight of danger serves only to animate his courage.* Presumption inverts this order. When she has introduced assurance and boldness where wisdom and circumspection ought to preside, she admits fear and despair where courage and intrepidity ought to be exerted.†

The first care of the Grecians after the battle of Salamin, was to send the first fruits of the rich spoil they had taken to Delphos. Cimon, who was then very young, signalized himself in a particular manner in that engagement, and performed actions of such distinguished valor, as acquired him a great reputation, and made him be considered from henceforth as a citizen that would be capable of rendering the most important services to his country on future occasions.‡

But Themistocles carried off almost all the honor of this victory, which was the most signal that ever the Grecians obtained over the Persians. The force of truth obliged even those who envied his glory most, to render him this testimony. It was a custom in Greece, that after a battle, the commanding officers should declare who had distinguished themselves most, by writing in a paper the name of the man who had merited the first prize, and of him who had merited the second.§

On this occasion, by a judgment which shows the good opinion natural for every man to have of himself, each officer concerned adjudged the first rank to himself, and allowed the second to Themistocles, which was indeed giving him the preference to them all.

The Lacedæmonians, having carried him to Sparta, in order to pay him the honors due to his merit, decreed to their general Eurybiades the prize of valor, and to Themistocles that of wisdom, which was a crown of olive for both of them. They also made a present to Themistocles of the finest chariot in the city; and on his departure sent three hundred young men of the most considerable families to wait upon him to the frontiers: an honor they had never before shown to any person whatever.

But what gave him a still more sensible pleasure, were the public acclamations he received at the first Olympic games that were celebrated after the battle of Salamin, where all the people of Greece were met together. As soon

* Non times bella, non provocas.—Plin. de Traj. Fortissimus in ipso discrimine, qui ante discrimen quietissimus.—Tacit. Hist. l. i. c. 14.

† Ante discrimen feroces, in periculo pavidi.—Tacit. Hist. l. i. c. 63.

‡ Herod. l. vii. c. 122, 125.

§ Plut. in Themist. p. 120.

as he appeared, the whole assembly rose up to do him honor, nobody regarded either the games or the combats; Themistocles was the only object of attention. The eyes of all the company were fixed upon him, and every person was eager to show him and point him out to the strangers that did not know him. He acknowledged afterwards, to his friends, that he looked upon that day as the happiest of his life; that he had never tasted any joy so sensible and so transporting; and that this reward, the genuine fruit of his labors, exceeded all his desires.

The reader has undoubtedly observed in Themistocles two or three principal strokes of his character, which entitle him to be ranked among the greatest men. The design which he formed and executed, of making the whole force of Athens maritime, showed him to have a superior genius, capable of the highest views, penetrating into futurity, and judicious in seizing the decisive moment in great affairs. As the territory belonging to Athens was of a barren nature and small extent, he rightly conceived that the only way that city had to enrich and aggrandize herself was by sea. And, indeed, that scheme may justly be looked upon as the source and cause of all those great events, which subsequently raised the republic of Athens to so flourishing a condition.

But in my opinion, though this wisdom and foresight is a most excellent and valuable talent, yet it is infinitely less meritorious than that uncommon temper and moderation, which Themistocles showed on two critical occasions, when Greece had been utterly undone, if he had listened to the dictates of an ill-judged ambition, and had piqued himself upon a false point of honor, as is usual among persons of his age and profession. The first of these occasions was, when, notwithstanding the crying injustice that was committed, both in regard to the republic of which he was a member, and to his own person, in appointing a Lacedæmonian generalissimo of the fleet, he exhorted and prevailed with the Athenians to desist from their pretensions, however justly founded, in order to prevent the fatal effects with which a division among the confederates must have been necessarily attended. And what an admirable instance did he give of his presence of mind and coolness of temper, when the same Eurybiades not only insulted him with harsh and offensive language, but lifted up his cane at him in a menacing manner! Let it be remembered at the same time, that Themistocles was then but young; that he was full of an

ardent ambition for glory; that he was commander of a numerous fleet; and that he had right and reason on his side. How would our young officers behave on a like occasion? Themistocles bore all patiently, and the victory of Salamin was the fruit of his patience.

As to Aristides, I shall hereafter have occasion to speak more extensively upon his character and merit. He was, properly speaking, the man of the commonwealth; provided that was well and faithfully served, he was very little concerned by whom it was done. The merit of others was far from offending him; but rather, became his own by the approbation and encouragement he gave it. We have seen him make his way through the enemy's fleet, at the peril of his life, in order to give Themistocles some good intelligence and advice: and Plutarch takes notice, that during all the time the latter had the command, Aristides assisted him, on all occasions, with his counsel and influence, notwithstanding he had reason to look upon him not only as his rival, but his enemy.* Let us compare this nobleness and greatness of soul with the littleness of spirit and meanness of those men, who are so nice, punctilious, and jealous in regard to command; who are unwilling to assist their colleagues, using all their endeavors and industry to engross the glory of every thing to themselves; always ready to sacrifice the public to their private interests, or to suffer their rivals to commit blunders, that they themselves may reap advantage from them.

On the very same day that the action at Thermopylæ happened, the formidable army of the Carthaginians, which consisted of three hundred thousand men, was entirely defeated by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse. Herodotus places this battle on the same day with that of Salamin. The circumstances of that victory in Sicily I have related in the history of the Carthaginians.†

After the battle of Salamin, the Grecians being returned from pursuing the Persians, Themistocles sailed to all the islands that had declared for them, to levy contributions and exact money from them. The first he began with was that of Andros, from whose inhabitants he required a considerable sum, speaking to them in this manner: "I come to you accompanied with two powerful divinities, Persuasion and Force." The answer they made him was. "We also have

* Πάντα συνέπραττε καὶ συνεβούλευεν, ἐνδοξότατον ἐπὶ σωτηρία κοινῇ ποιῶν τὸν ἔχθιστον.—In Vis. Arist. p. 323.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 165, 167.

two other divinities on our side, no less powerful than yours, and which do not permit us to give the money you demand of us, Poverty and Weakness. Upon this refusal he made a feint of besieging them, and threatened that he would entirely ruin their city. He dealt in the same manner with several other islands, which durst not resist him as Andros had done, and drew great sums from them without the privity of the other commanders; for he was considered as a lover of money, and desirous of enriching himself.*

SECTION IX.—THE BATTLE OF PLATÆÆ.

Mardonius, who remained in Greece with a body of three hundred thousand men, let his troops pass the winter in Thessaly, and in the spring following, led them into Bœotia. There was a very famous oracle in that country, the oracle of Lebadia, which he thought proper to consult, in order to know what would be the success of the war. The priest, in his enthusiastic fit, answered in a language which nobody that was present understood, as much as to insinuate, that the oracle would not deign to speak intelligibly to a barbarian. At the same time Mardonius sent Alexander, king of Macedonia, with several Persian noblemen, to Athens, and by them, in the name of his master, made very advantageous proposals to the Athenian people, to separate them from the rest of their allies. The offers he made them were, to rebuild their city which had been burnt down, to give them a considerable sum of money, to suffer them to live according to their own laws and customs, and to give them the government and command of all Greece. Alexander, as their ancient friend, exhorted them in his own name to lay hold on so favorable an opportunity for re-establishing their affairs, alleging, that they were not in a condition to withstand a power so formidable as that of the Persians, and so much superior to that of Greece. On the first intelligence of this embassy, the Spartans on their side sent deputies to Athens, in order to prevent its success. These were present when the others had their audience; and, as soon as Alexander had finished his speech, they began in their turn to address themselves to the Athenians, and strongly exhorted them not to separate themselves from their allies, nor to desert the common interest of their country; representing to them, at the same time, that union in the present situation of their affairs was their whole strength, and would render Greece

* Herod. l. viii. c. 111, 112. Plut. in Themist. p. 122.

invincible. They added farther, that the Spartan commonwealth was very sensibly moved with the melancholy state which the Athenians were in, who were destitute both of houses and retreat, and who for two years together had lost all their harvest; that, in consideration of that calamity, she would engage herself, during the continuance of the war, to maintain and support their wives, their children, and their old men, and to furnish a plentiful supply for all their wants. They concluded by adverting to the conduct of Alexander, whose discourse, they said, was such as might be expected from one tyrant who spoke in favor of another; but that he seemed to have forgotten that the people whom he addressed had showed themselves, on all occasions, the most zealous defenders of the common liberty of their country.*

Aristides was at this time in office, that is to say, principal of the archons. As it was therefore his business to answer, he said, that as to the barbarians, who made silver and gold the chief objects of their esteem, he forgave them for thinking they could corrupt the fidelity of a nation, by large bounties and promises: but that he could not help being surprised, and affected with some degree of indignation, to see that the Lacedæmonians, regarding only the present distress and necessity of the Athenians, and forgetting their courage and magnanimity, should come to persuade them to persist steadfastly in the defence of the common liberty of Greece, by arguments and motives of gain, and by proposing to give them victuals and provision: he desired them to acquaint their republic, that all the gold in the world was not capable of tempting the Athenians, or of making them desert the defence of the common liberty; that they had the grateful sense they ought to have, of the kind offers which Lacedæmon had made them; but that they would endeavor to manage their affairs so as not to be a burden to any of their allies. Then, turning himself towards the ambassadors of Mardonius, and pointing with his hand to the sun, "be assured," said he to them, "that as long as that planet shall continue his course, the Athenians will be mortal enemies to the Persians, and will not cease to take vengeance of them for ravaging their lands, and burning their houses and temples." After which, he desired the king of Macedonia, if he was inclined to be truly their friend, that he would not make himself any more the bearer of such

* A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. Herod. l. viii. c. 113-131, 136-140, 144. Plut. in Arist. p. 324. Diod. l. xi. pp. 22, 23. Plut. de Orac. Defect. p. 412.

proposals to them, which would only serve to reflect dishonour upon him, without ever producing any other effect.

Aristides having made this plain and peremptory declaration, did not stop there; but that he might excite still greater horror at such proposals, and for ever prohibit all intercourse with the barbarians, from a principle of religion, he ordained that the Athenian priests should denounce anathemas and execrations upon any person whatever, who should presume to propose the making an alliance with the Persians or the breaking of their alliance with the rest of the Grecians.

When Mardonius had learned, by the answer which the Athenians had sent him, that they were to be prevailed upon by no proposals or advantages whatever to sell their liberty,* he marched with his whole army towards Attica, wasting and destroying whatever he found in his way. The Athenians, not being in a condition to withstand such a torrent, retired to Salamin, and a second time abandoned their city. Mardonius, still entertaining hopes of bringing them to some terms of accommodation, sent another deputy to them to make the same proposals as before. A certain Athenian, called Lycidas, being of opinion that they should hearken to what he had to offer, was immediately stoned, and the Athenian women running at the same time to his house, did the same execution upon his wife and children; so detestable a crime did they think it to propose any peace with the Persians. But notwithstanding this, they respected the character wherewith the deputy was invested, and sent him back without offering him any indignity or ill treatment. Mardonius now found that there was no peace to be expected with them. He therefore entered Athens, and burned and demolished every thing that had escaped their fury the preceding year.†

The Spartans, instead of conducting their troops into Attica, according to their engagements, thought only of keeping themselves shut up within the Peloponnesus for their own security, and with that view had begun to build a wall over the isthmus, in order to prevent the enemy from entering that way, by which means they hoped they should be safe themselves, and should have no further occasion for the assistance of the Athenians. The latter hereupon sent deputies to Sparta, in order to complain of the slowness and

* *Posteaquam nullo pretio libertatem his videt venalem, &c.*—Justin. l. ii. c. 14.

† Herod. l. ix. c. 1–11. Plut. in Arist. p. 324. Dioc. l. xi. p. 2.

neglect of their allies. But the ephori did not seem to be much moved at their remonstrances ; and as that day was the feast of Hyacinthus,* they spent it in feasts and rejoicing, and deferred giving the deputies their answer till the next day. And still procrastinating the affair as much as they could, on various pretexts, they gained ten days' time, during which the building of the wall was completed. They were on the point of dismissing the Athenian envoys in a scandalous manner, when a private citizen expostulated with them, and represented to them, how base it would be to treat the Athenians in such a manner, after all the calamities and voluntary losses they had so generously suffered for the common defence of liberty, and all the important services they had rendered Greece in general. This opened their eyes and made them ashamed of their perfidious design. The very next night following they sent off, unknown to the Athenian deputies, five thousand Spartans, who had each of them seven helots, or slaves, to attend him. In the morning afterwards, the deputies renewed their complaints with great warmth and resentment, and were extremely surprised when they were told that the Spartan succors were on their march, and by this time were not far from Attica.

Mardonius had left Attica at this time, and was on his return into the country of Bœotia. As the latter was an open and flat country, he thought it would be more advantageous for him to fight there, than in Attica, which was uneven and rugged, full of hills and narrow passes, and which for that reason would not allow him space enough for drawing up his numerous army in order of battle, nor leave room for his cavalry to act. When he came back into Bœotia, he encamped by the river Asopus. The Grecians followed him thither under the command of Pausanias, king of Sparta, and of Aristides, general of the Athenians. The Persian army, according to Herodotus, consisted of three hundred thousand, and according to Diodorus, of five hundred thousand men. That of the Grecians did not amount to seventy thousand ; of which there were but five thousand Spartans ; but as these were accompanied with thirty-five thousand of the helots, viz. : seven for each Spartan, they made up together forty thousand : the latter of these were

* Among the Lacedæmonians the feast of Hyacinthus continued three days ; the first and last of which were days of sorrow and mourning for the death of Hyacinthus, but the second was a day of rejoicing, which was spent in feasting, sports, and shows, and all kinds of diversions. The festival was celebrated every year in the month of August, in honor of Apollo and Hyacinthus.

light-armed troops, the Athenian forces consisted but of eight thousand, and the troops of the allies made up the remainder. The right wing of the army was commanded by the Spartans, and the left by the Athenians, an honor which the people of Tegæa pretended to, and disputed with them, but in vain.*

While all Greece was in suspense, expecting a battle that should determine their fate, a secret conspiracy formed in the midst of the Athenian camp, by some discontented citizens, who intended the subversion of their popular government, or to deliver up Greece into the hands of the Persians, gave Aristides a great deal of perplexity and trouble. On this emergency he had occasion for all his prudence: not knowing exactly how many persons might be concerned in this conspiracy, he contented himself with having eight of them taken up; and of those eight the only two whom he caused to be accused, because they had the most laid to their charge, made their escape out of the camp while their trial was preparing. There is no doubt but Aristides favored their escape, lest he should be obliged to punish them, and their punishment might occasion some tumult and disorder. The others, who were in custody, he released, leaving them room to believe, that he had found nothing against them; and telling them that the battle with the enemy should be the tribunal, where they might fully justify their characters, and show the world how unlikely it was that they had ever entertained a thought of betraying their country. This well-timed and wise dissimulation, which opened a door for repentance, and avoided driving the offenders to despair, appeased all commotion, and quashed the whole affair.†

Mardonius, in order to try the Grecians, sent out his cavalry, in which he was strongest, to skirmish with them. The Megarians, who were encamped upon a plain, suffered extremely by them; and in spite of all the vigor and resolution with which they defended themselves, they were upon the point of giving way when a detachment of three hundred Athenians, with some troops armed with missive weapons, advanced to their succor. Masistius, the general of the Persian horse, and one of the most considerable noblemen of his country, seeing them advance towards him in good order, made his cavalry face about and attack them. The Athenians stood their ground, and waited to receive them.

* Herod. l. ix. c. 12-76. Plut. in Arist. pp. 325-330. Diod. l. xi. pp. 24, 26.

† Plut. in Arist. p. 326.

The shock was very fierce and violent, both sides endeavoring equally to show, by the issue of this encounter, what would be the success of the general engagement. The victory was a long time disputed; but at last Masistius's horse being wounded, threw his master, who was quickly after killed; upon which the Persians immediately fled. As soon as the news of his death reached the barbarians, their grief was excessive. They cut off the hair of their heads, as also the manes of their horses and mules, filling the camp with their cries and lamentations, having lost, in their opinion, the bravest man of their army.

After this encounter with the Persian cavalry, the two armies were a long time without coming to any action; because the soothsayers and diviners, upon their inspecting the entrails of their victims, equally foretold both parties, that they should be victorious, provided they acted only upon the defensive; whereas, on the other hand, they threatened them equally with a total overthrow, if they acted offensively, or made the first attack.

They passed ten days in this manner in sight of each other: but Mardonius, who was of a fiery impatient nature, grew very uneasy at so long a delay. Besides, he had only a few days' provision left for his army; and the Grecians grew stronger every day by the addition of new troops, that were continually coming to join them. He therefore called a council of war, in order to deliberate whether they should give battle. Artabazus, a nobleman of singular merit and great experience, was of opinion, that they should not hazard a battle, but should retire under the walls of Thebes, where they would be in a condition to supply the army with provision and forage. He alleged, that delays alone would be capable of diminishing the ardor of the allies; that they would thereby have time to tamper with them, and might be able to draw some of them off by gold and silver, which they would take care to distribute among the leaders, and among such as had the greatest sway and authority in their several cities; and that, in short, this would be both the easiest and surest method of subjecting Greece. This opinion was very wise, but was overruled by Mardonius, whom the rest had not courage to contradict. The result therefore of their deliberations was, that they should give battle next day. Alexander, king of Macedonia, who was on the side of the Grecians in his heart, came secretly about midnight to their camp and informed Aristides of all that had passed.

Pausanias forthwith gave orders to the officers to prepare themselves for battle; and imparted to Aristides the design he had formed of changing his order of battle, by placing the Athenians in the right wing, instead of the left, in order to oppose them to the Persians, with whom they had been accustomed to engage. Whether it was fear or prudence that induced Pausanias to propose this new disposition, the Athenians accepted it with pleasure. Nothing was heard among them but mutual exhortations, to acquit themselves bravely, bidding each other remember, that neither they nor their enemies were changed since the battle of Marathon, unless it were, that victory had increased the courage of the Athenians, and had dispirited the Persians. We do not fight, said they, as they do, for a country only, or a city, but for the trophies erected at Marathon and at Salamin, that they may not appear to be the work only of Miltiades and of Fortune, but the work of the Athenians. Encouraging one another in this manner, they went with all the alacrity imaginable to change their post. But Mardonius, upon the intelligence he received of this movement, having made the like change in his order of battle, both sides ranged their troops again according to their former disposition. The whole day passed in this manner without their coming to action.

In the evening the Grecians held a council of war, in which it was resolved that they should decamp from the place they were in, and march to another more conveniently situated for water. Night being arrived, and the officers endeavoring at the head of their corps to make more haste than ordinary to the camp marked out for them, great confusion happened among the troops, some going one way and some another, without observing any order or regularity in their march. At last they halted near the little city of Plataeæ.

On the first news of the Grecians having decamped, Mardonius drew his whole army in order of battle, and pursued them with the hideous shouting and howling of his barbarian forces, who thought they were marching, not so much in order to fight, as to strip and plunder a flying enemy; and their general likewise, making himself sure of victory, proudly insulted Artabazus, reproaching him with his fearful and cowardly prudence, and with the false notion he had conceived of the Lacedæmonians, who never fled, as he pretended, before an enemy; whereas here was an instance

to the contrary. But the general quickly found this was ~~no~~ false or ill grounded notion. He happened to fall in with the Lacedæmonians, who were alone and separated from the body of the Grecian army, to the number of fifty thousand men, together with three thousand of the Tegeans. The encounter was exceedingly fierce and resolute : on both sides the men fought with the courage of lions ; and the barbarians perceived what they had to do with soldiers who were determined to conquer or die in the field. The Athenian troops, to whom Pausanias sent an officer, were already upon their march to aid them : but the Greeks, who had taken part with the Persians, to the number of fifty thousand men, went out to meet them on their way, and hindered them from proceeding any farther. Aristides, with his little body of men, bore up firmly against them, and withstood their attack, showing them of how little avail a superiority of numbers is against true courage and bravery.

The battle being thus divided into two, they fought in two different places ; the Spartans were the first who broke in upon the Persian forces, and threw them into disorder. Mardonius, their general, falling dead of a wound he had received in the engagement, all his army betook themselves to flight ; and those Greeks, who were engaged against Aristides, did the same as soon as they understood the barbarians were defeated. The latter ran away to their former camp, which they had quitted, where they were sheltered and fortified with an enclosure of wood. The Lacedæmonians pursued them thither, and attacked them in their intrenchment ; but this they did poorly and weakly, like people that were not much accustomed to sieges, and to attack walls. The Athenian troops, having advice of this, left the pursuit of their Grecian adversaries, and marched to the camp of the Persians, which after several assaults they carried, and made a horrible slaughter of the enemy.

Artabazus, who from Mardonius's imprudent management had but too well foreseen the misfortune that befel them, after having distinguished himself in the engagement, and given all possible proofs of his courage and intrepidity, made a timely retreat with the forty thousand men he commanded ; and preventing his flight from being known by the expedition of his march, he arrived safe at Byzantium, and from thence returned into Asia. Of all the rest of the Persian army, not four thousand men escaped after that day's slaughter ; all were killed and cut to pieces by the Grecians,

who by that means delivered themselves at once from all farther invasions by that nation, no Persian army having ever afterwards appeared on this side of the Hellespont.

This battle was fought on the fourth day of the month Bœdromion,* according to the Athenian manner of reckoning. Soon after, the allies, as a testimony of their gratitude to heaven, caused a statue of Jupiter to be made at the joint and common expense, which they placed in his temple at Olympia. The names of the several nations of Greece that were present in the engagement, were engraven on the right side of the Pedestal of the statue; the Lacedæmonians first, the Athenians next, and all the rest in order.†

One of the principal citizens of Ægina came and addressed himself to Pausanias, desiring him to avenge the indignity that Mardonius and Xerxes had shown to Leonidas, whose dead body was hung upon a gallows by their order, and urging him to use Mardonius's body after the same manner. As a farther motive for doing so, he added, that by thus satisfying the manes of those that were killed at Thermopylæ, he would be sure to immortalize his own name throughout all Greece, and make his memory precious to the latest posterity. "Carry thy base counsel elsewhere," replied Pausanias, "thou must have a very wrong notion of true glory, to imagine that the way for me to acquire it is to resemble the barbarians. If the esteem of the people of Ægina is not to be purchased but by such actions, I shall be content with preserving that of the Lacedæmonians only, among whom the base and ungenerous spirit of revenge is never put in competition with that of showing clemency and moderation to their enemies, and especially after their death. As for the souls of my departed countrymen, they are sufficiently avenged by the death of the many thousand Persians slain upon the spot in the last engagement."‡

A dispute, which arose between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, about determining which of the two people should have the prize of valor adjudged to them, as also which of them should have the privilege of erecting a trophy, had like to have sullied all the glory and embittered the joy of their late victory. They were just on the point of carrying things to the last extremity, and would certainly have decided the difference by the sword, had not Aristides prevailed upon them, by the wisdom of his counsel

* This day answers to the nineteenth of our September.

† A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. Paus. l. v. p. 532. ‡ Herod. l. ix. c. 77, 78.

and reasonings, to refer the determination of the matter to the judgment of the Grecians in general. This proposition being accepted by both parties, and the Greeks being assembled upon the spot to decide the contest, Theogiton of Megara, speaking upon the question, gave it as his opinion, that the prize of valor ought to be adjudged neither to Athens nor to Sparta, but to some other city; unless they desired to kindle a civil war, of more fatal consequences than that they had just put an end to. After he had finished his speech, Cleocritus of Corinth rose up to deliver his sentiments of the matter: and when he began, nobody doubted that he was going to claim that honor for the city of which he was a member and a native; for Corinth was the next city of Greece in power and dignity after Athens and Sparta. But everybody was agreeably deceived when they found that all his discourse tended to the praise of the Plataeans, and that all the conclusion he made from the whole was, that in order to extinguish so dangerous a contention, they ought to adjudge the prize to them only, against whom neither of the contending parties could have any grounds of anger or jealousy. This discourse and proposal were received with general applause by the whole assembly. Aristides immediately assented to it on the part of the Athenians, and Pausanias on the part of the Lacedæmonians.*

All parties being thus agreed, before they began to divide the spoil of the enemy, they put fourscore talents † aside for the Plataeans, who laid them out in building a temple to Minerva, in erecting a statue to her honor, and in adorning the temple with curious and valuable paintings, which existed still in Plutarch's time, that is to say, above six hundred years afterwards, and which were then as fresh as if they had but lately come out of the hands of the painters. As for the trophy, which had been another article of the dispute, the Lacedæmonians erected one for themselves in particular, and the Athenians another. ‡

The spoil was immense: in the camp of Mardonius they found prodigious sums of money in gold and silver, besides cups, vessels, beds, tables, necklaces, and bracelets of gold and silver, not to be valued or numbered. It is observed by a certain historian, that these spoils proved fatal to Greece, by becoming the instruments of introducing avarice and luxury among her inhabitants. § According to the religious

* Plut. in Arist. p. 331.

† About \$80,000.

‡ Herod. l. ix. c. 79, 80.

§ *Victo Mardonio, castra referta regalis opulentiae capta, unde primum Græcos, diviso inter se cum Persico, divitiarum luxuria cepit.*—Justin. l. ii. c. 14.

customs of the Grecians, before they divided the treasure, they appropriated the tithe or tenth part of the whole to the use of the gods; the rest was distributed equally among the cities and nations that had furnished troops; and the chief officers who had distinguished themselves in the field of battle were likewise distinguished in this distribution. They sent a present of a golden tripod to Delphos, in the inscription upon which Pausanius caused these words to be inserted: "That he had defeated the barbarians at Plataeæ; and that, in acknowledgment of that victory, he had made this present to Apollo." *

This arrogant inscription, wherein he ascribed the honor both of the victory and the offering to himself only, offended the Lacedæmonian people, who, in order to punish his pride in the very point and place where he thought to exalt himself, as also to do justice to their confederates, caused his name to be erased and that of the cities which had contributed to the victory to be inserted instead of it. Too ardent a thirst after glory, on this occasion, did not allow him to consider that a man loses nothing by discreet modesty, which forbears the setting too high a value upon one's own services, and which, by screening a man from envy, serves really to enhance his reputation. †

Pausanius gave a still farther specimen of his Spartan spirit and humor, in two entertainments which he ordered to be prepared a few days after the engagement; one of which was costly and magnificent, in which was served all the variety of delicacies and dainties that used to be served at the table of Mardonius; the other was plain and frugal, after the manner of the Spartans. Then comparing the two entertainments together, and observing the difference of them to his officers, whom he had invited on purpose: "What madness," said he, "was it in Mardonius, who was accustomed to such a luxurious diet, to think of attacking a people like us, who live without any superfluities, and indulge in no delicacies."

All the Grecians sent to Delphos, to consult the oracle concerning the sacrifice that was proper to be offered. The answer they received from the god was, "that they should erect an altar to Jupiter Liberator; but that they should take care not to offer any sacrifice upon it, before they had extinguished all the fire in the country, because it had been polluted and profaned by the barbarians; and that they should

* Corn. Nep. in Pausan. c. i. † *Ipsò dissimulatione famæ famam auxit.*—Tacit.

come as far as Delphos, to obtain pure fire, which they were to take from the altar, called the common altar." *

This answer being brought to the Grecians from the oracle, the generals immediately dispersed themselves throughout the whole country, and caused all the fires to be extinguished; and Euchidas, a citizen of Plataeæ, having taken upon himself to go and fetch the sacred fire with all possible expedition, made the best of his way to Delphos. On his arrival he purified himself, sprinkled his body with consecrated water, put on a crown of laurel, and then approached the altar, from whence, with great reverence, he took the holy fire, and carried it with him to Plataeæ, where he arrived before the setting of the sun, having travelled a thousand stadia, equal to a hundred and twenty-five English miles, in one day. As soon as he came back, he saluted his fellow-citizens, delivered the fire to them, fell down at their feet, and died in a moment afterwards. His countrymen carried away his body, and buried it in the temple of Diana, surnamed Eucleia, which signifies "of good renown," and put the following epitaph upon his tomb in the compass of one verse: "Here lies Euchidas, who went from hence to Delphos, and returned back the same day."

In the next general assembly of Greece, which was held not long after this occurrence, Aristides proposed the following decree, that all the cities of Greece should every year send their respective deputies to Plataeæ, in order to offer sacrifices to Jupiter Liberator, and to the gods of the city; (this assembly was still regularly held in the time of Plutarch); that every five years there should be games celebrated there, which should be called the Games of Liberty; that the several states of Greece should raise a body of troops, consisting of ten thousand foot and a thousand horse, and should equip a fleet of a hundred ships, which should be constantly maintained for making war against the barbarians: and that the inhabitants of Plataeæ, entirely devoted to the service of the gods, should be looked upon as sacred and inviolable, and be occupied in no other function than that of offering prayers and sacrifices for the general preservation and prosperity of Greece.

All these articles being approved and passed into a law, the citizens of Plataeæ took upon them to solemnize, every year, the anniversary festival in honor of those persons who were slain in this battle. The order and manner of

* Plut. in Arist. pp. 231, 332.

performing this sacrifice was as follows; the sixteenth day of the month Maimacterion, which answers to our month of December,* at the first appearance of daybreak, they walked in a solemn procession, which was preceded by a trumpet that sounded to battle. Next to the trumpeter marched several chariots, filled with crowns and branches of myrtle. After these chariots was led a black bull, behind which marched a company of young persons, carrying pitchers in their hands, full of wine and milk, the ordinary libations offered to the dead, and vials of oil and incense. All these young persons were freemen; for no slave was allowed to have any part in this ceremony, which was instituted for men who had lost their lives for liberty. In the rear of this pomp followed the archon, or chief magistrate of the Platæans, for whom it was unlawful, at any other time, even so much as to touch iron, or to wear any other garment than a white one. But upon this occasion, being clad in purple raiment, having a sword by his side, and holding an urn in his hands, which he took from the place where they kept their public records, he marched quite through the city to the place where the tombs of his memorable countrymen were erected. As soon as he came there, he drew out water with his urn from the fountain, washed with his own hands the little columns that stood by the tombs, rubbed them afterwards with incense, and then killed the bull upon a pile of wood prepared for that purpose. After having offered up certain prayers to the terrestrial Jupiter † and Mercury, he invited those valiant souls deceased to come to their feast, and to partake of their funeral libations; then taking a cup in his hand, and having filled it with wine, he poured it on the ground, and said with a loud voice, "I present this cup to those valiant men, who died for the liberty of the Grecians." These ceremonies were annually performed even in the time of Plutarch.

Diodorus, adds that the Athenians in particular embellished the monuments of their citizens who died in the war with the Persians, with magnificent ornaments, instituted funeral games to their honor, and appointed a solemn panegyric to be pronounced over them, which in all probability was repeated every year. ‡

* Three months after the battle of Platææ was fought. Probably these funeral rites were not at first performed, till after the enemies were entirely gone, and the country was free.

† The terrestrial Jupiter is no other than Pluto; and the same epithet of terrestrial was also given to Mercury, because it was believed to be his office to conduct departed souls to the infernal regions.

‡ Diod. l. xi. p. 26.

The reader will be sensible, without my observing it, how much these solemn testimonies and perpetual demonstrations of honor, esteem, and gratitude, for soldiers who had sacrificed their lives in the defence of liberty, conduced to enhance the merit of valor, and of the services they rendered their country, and to inspire the spectators with emulation and courage; and how exceedingly proper all this was for cultivating and perpetuating a spirit of bravery in the people, and for making their troops victorious and invincible.

The reader, no doubt, will be as much surprised, on the other hand, to see how wonderfully careful and exact these people were in acquitting themselves on all occasions of the duties of religion. The great event which I have just been relating, viz: the battle of Plataeæ, affords us very remarkable proofs of this, in the annual and perpetual sacrifice they institute to Jupiter Liberator, which was still continued in the time of Plutarch; in the care they took to consecrate the tenth part of all their spoil to the gods; and in the decree proposed by Aristides to establish a solemn festival for ever, as an anniversary commemoration of that success. It is a delightful thing, in my opinion, to see pagan and idolatrous nations thus publicly confessing and declaring, that all their expectations centre in the Supreme Being; that they think themselves obliged to ascribe the success of all their undertakings to him; that they look upon him as the author of all their victories and prosperities, as the sovereign ruler and disposer of states and empires, as the source from whence all salutary counsel, wisdom and courage are derived, and as entitled on all these accounts to the first and best part of their spoils, and to their perpetual acknowledgments and thanks given for such distinguished favors and benefits.

SECTION X.—THE BATTLE NEAR MYCALE. THE DEFEAT OF THE PERSIANS.

On the same day that the Greeks fought the battle of Plataeæ, their naval forces obtained a memorable victory in Asia over the remainder of the Persian fleet. For while that of the Greeks lay at Ægina, under the command of Leotychides, one of the kings of Sparta, and of Xanthippus the Athenian, ambassadors came to those generals from the Ionians, to invite them into Asia to deliver the Grecian cities from their subjection to the barbarians. On this invitation they immediately set sail from Asia, and steered their

course by Delos; where, when they arrived, other ambassadors came from Samos, and brought them intelligence, that the Persian fleet, which had passed the winter at Cumæ, was then at Samos, where it would be an easy matter to defeat and destroy it, earnestly pressing them at the same time not to neglect so favorable an opportunity. The Greeks hereupon sailed away directly for Samos. But the Persians, receiving intelligence of their approach, retired to Mycale, a promontory of the continent of Asia, where their land army, consisting of a hundred thousand men, who were the remainder of those that Xerxes had carried back from Greece the year before, was encamped. Here they drew their vessels ashore, which was a common practice among the ancients, and encompassed them with a strong rampart. The Grecians followed them to the very place, and with the help of the Ionians defeated their land army, forced their rampart, and burnt all their vessels.*

The battle of Plataeæ was fought in the morning, and that of Mycale in the afternoon of the same day: and yet all the Greek writers pretend that the victory of Plataeæ was known at Mycale before the latter engagement was begun, though the whole Ægean sea, which requires several days' sailing to cross it, was between these two places. But Diodorus, the Sicilian, explains this mystery to us. He tells us, that Leotychides, observing his soldiers to be much dejected for fear their countrymen at Plataeæ should sink under the numbers of Mardonius's army, contrived a stratagem to reanimate them; and that therefore, when he was just upon the point of making the first attack, he caused a rumor to be spread among his troops, that the Persians were defeated at Plataeæ, though at that time he had no manner of knowledge of the matter.†

Xerxes, hearing the news of these two overthrows, left Sardis with as much haste as he had before left Athens, after the battle of Salamis, and retired with great precipitation into Persia, in order to put himself, as far as he possibly could, out of the reach of his victorious enemies. ‡ But, before he set out, he gave orders that his people should burn and demolish all the temples belonging to the Grecian cities in Asia, which order was so far executed, that not one escaped, except the temple of Diana at Ephesus. § He acted

* Herod. l. ix. c. 89-103. Diod. l. xi. pp. 26-28.

† What we are told also of Paulus Æmilius's victory over the Macedonians, which was known in Rome the very day it was obtained, without doubt happened in the same manner.

‡ Diod. l. xi. p. 28.

§ Strab. l. xiv. p. 634.

in this manner at the instigation of the Magi, who were professed enemies to temples and images.* The second Zoroaster had thoroughly instructed him in their religion, and made him a zealous defender of it. Pliny informs us, that Ostanès, the head of the magi, and the patriarch of that sect, who maintained its maxims and interests with the greatest violence, attended Xerxes upon this expedition against Greece.† This prince, as he passed through Babylon on his return to Susa, destroyed also all the temples in that city, as he had done those of Greece and Asia Minor: doubtless through the same principle, and out of hatred to the sect of the Sabæans, who made use of images in their divine worship, which was a thing extremely detested by the magi. Perhaps, also, the desire of making himself amends for the charges of his Grecian expedition by the spoil and plunder of those temples, might be another motive that induced him to destroy them; for it is certain he found immense riches and treasure in them, which had been amassed together through the superstition of princes and people during a long series of ages.‡

The Grecian fleet, after the battle of Mycale, set sail towards the Hellespont, in order to possess themselves of the bridges which Xerxes had caused to be thrown over that narrow passage, and which they supposed were still entire. But finding them broken by tempestuous weather, Leotychides and his Peloponnesian forces returned towards their own country. As for Xanthippus, he stayed with the Athenians and their Ionian confederates, and they made themselves masters of Sestus and the Thracian Chersonesus, in which places they found great booty, and took a vast number of prisoners. After which, before winter came on, they returned to their own cities.

From this time all the cities of Ionia revolted from the Persians, and having formed an alliance with the Grecians, most of them preserved their liberty during the time that empire subsisted.

SECTION XI.—THE BARBAROUS AND INHUMAN REVENGE OF AMESTRIS, THE WIFE OF XERXES.

During the residence of Xerxes at Sardis, he conceived a violent passion for the wife of his brother Masistus, who was a prince of extraordinary merit, had always served the

* Cic. l. ii. de Leg. n. 28.

† Plin. l. xxx. c. i.

‡ Arrian. l. vi.

king with great zeal and fidelity, and had never done any thing to disoblige him. The virtue of this lady, and her great affection and fidelity to her husband, made her inexorable to all the king's solicitations. He, however, still flattered himself, that by a profusion of favors and liberalities, he might possibly gain upon her: and among other kind things he did to oblige her, he married his eldest son Darius, whom he intended for his successor, to Artainta, this lady's daughter, and ordered that the marriage should be consummated as soon as he arrived at Susa. But Xerxes, finding the princess still unyielding to all his temptations and attacks, immediately changed his object, and fell passionately in love with her daughter, who did not imitate the glorious example of her mother's constancy and virtue. While this intrigue was carrying on, Amestris, wife of Xerxes, made him a present of a rich and magnificent robe of her own making. Xerxes, being extremely pleased with this robe, thought fit to put it on, upon the first visit he afterwards made to Artainta; and in the conversation he had with her, he mightily pressed her to let him know what she desired he should do for her, assuring her, at the same time, with an oath, that he would grant her whatever she asked of him. Artainta, upon this, desired him to give her the robe he had on. Xerxes, foreseeing the ill consequence that would necessarily ensue his making her this present, did all that he could to dissuade her from insisting upon it, and offered her any thing in the world instead of it. But, not being able to prevail upon her, and thinking himself bound by the imprudent promise and oath he had made to her, he gave her the robe. The lady no sooner received it, than she put it on, and wore it publicly by way of trophy.*

Amestris, being confirmed by this action in the suspicions she had entertained, was enraged to the highest degree. But, instead of taking vengeance upon the daughter, who was the only offender, she resolved to wreak it upon the mother, whom she looked upon as the author of the whole intrigue, though she was entirely innocent of the matter. For the better executing of her purpose, she waited until the grand feast, which was every year celebrated on the king's birthday, and which was not far off; on which occasion the king, according to the established custom of the country, granted her whatever she demanded. On the arrival of that day, she desired of his majesty that the wife of

* A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. Herod. l. ix. c. 107-109.

Masistus should be delivered into her hands. Xerxes, who apprehended the queen's design, and who was struck with horror at the thoughts of it, as well out of regard to his brother, as on account of the innocence of the lady, against whom he perceived his wife was so violently exasperated, at first refused her request, and endeavored by all means to dissuade her from it. But unable either to prevail upon her, or to act with steadiness and resolution himself, he at last yielded, and was guilty of the weakest and most cruel piece of complaisance that ever was acted, making the inviolable obligations of justice and humanity give way to the arbitrary laws of a custom, that had only been established to give occasion for the doing of good, and for acts of beneficence and generosity. In consequence, then, of this compliance, the lady was apprehended by the king's guards, and delivered to Amestris, who caused her breasts, tongue, nose, ears, and lips, to be cut off, ordered them to be cast to the dogs in her own presence, and then sent her home to her husband's house in that mutilated and miserable condition. In the mean time, Xerxes had sent for his brother, in order to prepare him for this melancholy and tragical adventure. He first gave him to understand, that he should be glad he would put away his wife, and to induce him thereto, offered to give him one of his daughters in her stead. But Masistus, who was passionately fond of his wife, could not prevail upon himself to divorce her: whereupon Xerxes in great wrath told him, that since he had refused his daughter, he should neither have her nor his wife; and that he would teach him not to reject the offers his master had made him: and with this inhuman reply dismissed him.

This strange proceeding threw Masistus into the greatest anxiety; who, thinking he had reason to apprehend the worst of accidents, hastened home, to see what had passed there during his absence. On his arrival he found his wife in that deplorable condition we have just been describing. Being enraged thereat to the degree we may naturally imagine, he assembled all his family, his servants and dependents, and set out with all possible expedition for Bactriana, of which he was governor, determined, as soon as he arrived there, to raise an army and make war against the king, in order to avenge himself for his barbarous treatment. But Xerxes being informed of his hasty departure, and from thence suspecting the design he had conceived against him, sent a party of horse in pursuit of him; which having

overtaken him, cut him in pieces, together with his children and all his retinue. I do not know that a more tragical example of revenge than I have now related, is to be found in history.

There is still another action, no less cruel or impious than the former, related of Amestris. She caused fourteen children of the best families in Persia to be burnt alive as a sacrifice to the infernal gods, in compliance with a superstitious custom practised by the Persians.*

Masistus being dead, Xerxes gave the government of Bactriana to his second son Hystaspes; who, being by that means obliged to live at a distance from the court, gave his younger brother Artaxerxes the opportunity of ascending the throne after the death of their father, as we shall hereafter see.†

Here the history of Herodotus terminates, viz: at the battle of Mycale, and the siege of the city of Sestos by the Athenians.

SECTION XII.—THE ATHENIANS REBUILD THE WALLS OF THEIR CITY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE OPPOSITION OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS.

The war, commonly called the war of Media, which had lasted about two years, being terminated in the manner we have mentioned, the Athenians returned to their own country, and sending for their wives and children whom they had committed to the care of their friends during the war, began to think of rebuilding their city, which was almost entirely destroyed by the Persians, and of surrounding it with strong walls, in order to secure it from farther violence.‡ The Lacedæmonians having intelligence of this, conceived a jealousy, and began to apprehend that Athens, which was already very powerful by sea, if it should go on to increase its strength by land also, might take upon her in time to give laws to Sparta, and to deprive her of that authority and pre-eminence which she had hitherto exercised over the rest of Greece. They therefore sent an embassy to the Athenians, the purport of which was to represent to them, that the common interest and safety required that there should be no fortified city out of the Peloponnesus, lest, in case of a second invasion, it should fall into the hands of the Persians, who would be sure to settle themselves in it, as

* Herod. i. vii. c. 114. † Diod. i. xi. p. 53.

‡ A. M. 3526. Ant. J. C. 478. Thucyd. i. i. pp. 59-62. Diod. i. xi. pp. 30, 31. Justin. i. ii. c. 15.

they had done before at Thebes, and who from thence would be able to infest the whole country, and to make themselves masters of it very speedily. Themistocles, who, since the battle of Salamis was greatly considered and respected at Athens, easily penetrated into the true design of the Lacedæmonians, though it was concealed under the specious pretext of public good ; but, as the latter were able with the assistance of their allies, to hinder the Athenians by force from carrying on the work, in case they should positively and absolutely refuse to comply with their demands, he advised the senate to make use of cunning and dissimulation as well as they. The answer, therefore, they made the envoys was, that they would send an embassy to Sparta, to satisfy the commonwealth concerning their jealousies and apprehensions. Themistocles, procured himself to be nominated one of the ambassadors, and persuaded the senate not to let his colleagues set out along with him, but to send them one after another, in order to gain time for carrying on the work. The matter was executed pursuant to his advice : and he accordingly went alone to Lacedæmon, where he let a great many days pass without waiting upon the magistrates, or applying to the senate. And upon their pressing him to do it, and asking the reason why he deferred it so long, he made answer that he waited for the arrival of his colleagues, that they might all have their audience of the senate together, and seemed to be very much surprised that they were so long coming. At length they arrived, but came singly, and at a considerable distance of time one from another. During all this while, the work was carried on at Athens with the utmost industry and vigor. The women, children, strangers, and slaves, were all employed in it ; nor was it interrupted night or day. The Spartans were not ignorant of this matter, but made great complaints of it to Themistocles, who positively denied the fact, and pressed them to send other deputies to Athens, in order to inform themselves better of the fact, desiring them not to give credit to loose and flying reports without foundation. At the same time he secretly advised the Athenians to detain the Spartan envoys as so many hostages, until he and his colleagues returned from their embassy, fearing, not without good reason, that they themselves might be served in the same manner at Sparta. At last, when all his fellow ambassadors were arrived, he desired an audience, and declared in full senate that it was really true the Athenians

had resolved to fortify their city with strong walls ; that the work was almost completed ; that they had judged it to be absolutely necessary for their own security, and for the public good of the allies ; telling them at the same time, that, after the great experience they had of the Athenian people's behavior, they could not well suspect them of being wanting in their zeal for the common interest of their country ; that, as the condition and privileges of all the allies ought to be equal, it was just the Athenians should provide for their own safety by all the means they judged necessary, as well as the other confederates ; that they had thought of this expedient, and were in a condition to defend their city against whoever should presume to attack it ; and that, as for the Lacedæmonians, it was not much for their honor that they should desire to establish their power and superiority rather upon the weak and defenceless condition of their allies than upon their own strength and valor.* The Lacedæmonians were extremely displeased with this discourse ; but, either out of a sense of gratitude and esteem for the Athenians, who had rendered such important services to the country, or out of a conviction that they were not able to oppose their enterprise, they dissembled their resentments ; and the ambassadors on both sides, having all suitable honors paid them, returned to their respective cities.

Themistocles, who always had his thoughts fixed upon raising and augmenting the power and glory of the Athenian commonwealth, did not confine his views to the walls of the city. He went on with the same vigorous application to finish the building and fortifications of the Piræus ; for, from the time he entered into office, he had commenced that great work. Before this time they had no other port at Athens but that of Phalerus, which was neither very large nor commodious, and consequently not capable of answering the great designs of Themistocles. For this reason he had cast his eyes upon the Piræus, which seemed to invite him by its advantageous situation, and by the conveniency of its three spacious havens, which were capable of containing above four hundred vessels. This undertaking was prosecuted with so much diligence and activity, that the work was considerably advanced in a very little time. Themistocles likewise obtained a decree, that every year they should build twenty vessels for the augmentation of their fleet : and

* *Graviter castigat eos, quod non virtute, sed imbecillitate sociorum potentiam quærerent.*—Justin. l. ii. c. 15.

in order to engage the greater number of workmen and sailors to resort to Athens, he caused particular privileges and immunities to be granted in their favor. His design was, as I have already observed, to make the whole force of Athens maritime; in which he followed a very different course of politics from what had been pursued by their ancient kings, who, endeavoring all they could to alienate the minds of the citizens from seafaring business and from war, and to make them apply themselves wholly to agriculture and to peaceable employments, published this fable: that Minerva, disputing with Neptune, to know which of them should be declared patron of Attica, and give their name to the city newly built, gained her cause by showing her judges the branch of an olive-tree, the happy symbol of peace and plenty, which she had planted; whereas Neptune had caused a fiery horse, the symbol of war and confusion, to rise out of the earth before them.*

SECTION XIII.—THE BLACK DESIGN OF THEMISTOCLES REJECTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE PEOPLE OF ATHENS.

Themistocles, who conceived the design of supplanting the Lacedæmonians, and of taking the government of Greece out of their hands, in order to put it into those of the Athenians, kept his eyes and his thoughts continually fixed upon that great project. And as he was not very nice or scrupulous in the choice of his measures, whatever tended towards accomplishing the end he had in view, he looked upon as just and lawful. He one day declared, in a full assembly of the people, that he had a very important design to propose, but that he could not communicate it to the people, because its success required that it should be carried on with the greatest secrecy; he therefore desired they would appoint a person to whom he might explain himself upon the matter in question. Aristides was unanimously chosen by the whole assembly, who referred themselves entirely to his opinion of the affair; so great a confidence had they both in his probity and prudence. Themistocles therefore having taken him aside, told him that the design he had conceived was to burn the fleet belonging to the rest of the Grecian states, which then lay in a neighboring port, and that by this means Athens would certainly become mistress of all Greece. Aristides hereupon returned to the assembly, and

* Thueyd. l. i. pp. 62, 63. Diod. l. xi. pp. 32, 33.

only declared to them that indeed nothing could be more advantageous to the commonwealth than the proposition of Themistocles, but at the same time nothing in the world could be more unjust. The people unanimously ordained that Themistocles should entirely desist from his project. We see in this instance, that the title of Just was not given to Aristides, even in his life-time, without some foundation; a title, says Plutarch, infinitely superior to all those which conquerors pursue with so much ardor, and which in some measure assimilates a man to the Divinity.*

I do not know whether all history can afford us a fact more worthy of admiration than this. It is not a company of philosophers with whom it is easy to establish fine maxims and sublime ideas of morality in the schools, who determine on this occasion, that the consideration of profit and advantage ought never to prevail in preference to what is honest and just. It is an entire people, who are highly interested in the proposal made to them, who are convinced that it is of the greatest importance to the welfare of the state, and who, however, reject it with unanimous consent, and without a moment's hesitation, and that for this only reason, that it is contrary to justice. How black and perfidious on the other hand, was the design which Themistocles proposed to them of burning the fleet of their Grecian confederates, at a time of profound peace, solely to aggrandize the power of the Athenians! Had he a hundred times the merit ascribed to him, this single action would be sufficient to sully all his glory. For it is the heart, that is to say, integrity and probity, that constitutes and distinguishes true merit.

I am sorry that Plutarch, who generally judges of things with great justness, does not seem, on this occasion, to condemn Themistocles. After having spoken of the works he had effected in the Piræus, he goes on to the fact in question; of which he says, "Themistocles projected something **STILL GREATER** for the augmentation of their maritime power."†

The Lacedæmonians having proposed in the council of the Amphictyons, that all the cities which had not taken arms against Xerxes should be excluded from that assembly, Themistocles, who apprehended that if the Thessalians, the Argives, and the Thebans, were excluded from that council, the Spartans would by that means become masters of the

* Plut. in Themist. pp. 121, 122; in Arist. p. 332. † Μέγιστον τι διανοήθη.

suffrages, and consequently determine all affairs according to their pleasure ; made a speech in behalf of the cities they were for excluding, and brought the deputies that composed the assembly over to his sentiments. He represented to them, that the greatest part of the cities that had entered into the confederacy, which were but thirty-one in the whole, were very small and inconsiderable ; that it would therefore be a very strange, as well as a very dangerous proceeding, to deprive all the other cities of Greece of their votes and places in the grand assembly of the nation, and by that means suffer the august council of the Amphietyons to fall under the direction and influence of two or three of the most powerful cities, which for the future would give law to all the rest, and would subvert and abolish that equality of power, which was justly regarded as the basis and soul of all republics. Themistocles, by this plain and open declaration of his opinion, drew upon himself the hatred of the Lacedæmonians, who from that time became his professed enemies. He had also incurred the displeasure of the rest of the allies, by his having exacted contributions from them in too rigorous and rapacious a manner.*

When the city of Athens was entirely rebuilt, the people, finding themselves in a state of peace and tranquillity, endeavored, by all means to get the government into their hands, and to make the Athenian state entirely popular. This design of theirs, though kept as secret as possible, did not escape the vigilance and penetration of Aristides, who saw all the consequences with which such an innovation would be attended. But, as he considered on one hand, that the people were entitled to some regard on account of the valor they had shown in all the late battles which had been gained ; and on the other, that it would be no easy matter to curb and restrain a people who still, in a manner, had their arms in their hands, and who were grown more insolent than ever from their victories ; on these considerations, he thought it proper to compromise with them, and to find out some medium to satisfy and appease them. He therefore passed a decree, by which it was ordained that the government should be common to all the citizens, and that the archons, who were the chief magistrates of the commonwealth, and who were formerly chosen out of the richest of its members, or those who received at least five hundred medimni of grain out of the product of their lands,

* Plut. in Themist. p. 122.

should, for the future, be elected indiscriminately from the general body of the Athenians. By thus giving up something to the people, he prevented all dissensions and commotions, which might have proved fatal, not only to the Athenian state, but to all Greece.*

SECTION XIV.—THE LACEDÆMONIANS LOSE THE CHIEF COMMAND THROUGH THE PRIDE AND ARROGANCE OF PAUSANIAS.

The Grecians, encouraged by the happy success which had every where attended their victorious arms, determined to send a fleet to sea in order to deliver such of their allies as were still under the yoke of the Persians, out of their hands. Pausanias was the commander of the fleet for the Lacedæmonians, and Aristides, and Cimon, the son of Miltiades, commanded for the Athenians. They first directed their course to the isle of Cyprus, where they restored all the cities to their liberty; then steering towards the Hellespont, they attacked the city of Byzantium, of which they made themselves masters, and took a vast number of prisoners, a great part of whom were of the richest and most considerable families of Persia.†

Pausanias, who from this time conceived thoughts of betraying his country, judged it proper to make use of this opportunity to gain the favor of Xerxes. To this end he caused a report to be spread among his troops, that the Persian noblemen, whom he had committed to the guard and care of one of his officers, had made their escape by night and were fled: but he had set them at liberty himself, and sent a letter by them to Xerxes, wherein he offered to deliver the city of Sparta and all Greece into his hands on condition he would give him his daughter in marriage. The king did not fail to give him a favorable answer, and to send him very large sums of money also, in order to win over as many of the Grecians as he should find disposed to enter into his designs. The person he appointed to manage this intrigue with him was Artabazus; and to the end that he might have it in his power to transact the matter with the greater ease and security, he made him governor of all the sea-coasts of Asia Minor.

Pausanias, who was already dazzled with the prospect of his future greatness, began from this moment to change his whole conduct and behavior. The poor, modest, and frugal way of living at Sparta; the subjection to rigid and

* Plut. in Arist. p. 332. † A. M. 3528. Ant. J. C. 476. Thucyd. l. i. pp. 63, 84-86.

austere laws, which neither spared nor respected any man's person, but were altogether as inexorable and inflexible to the greatest as to the meanest condition: all this became insupportable to Pausanias. He could not bear the thoughts of going back to Sparta, after having been possessed of such high commands and employments, to return to a state of equality that would confound him with the meanest of the citizens; and this was the cause of his entering into a treaty with the barbarians. He therefore entirely laid aside the manners and behavior of his country; assumed both the dress and state of the Persians, and imitated them in all their expensive luxuries and magnificence. He treated the allies with an insufferable rudeness and insolence; never spoke to the officers but with menaces and arrogance; required extraordinary and unusual honors to be paid him; and by his whole behavior rendered the Spartan dominion odious to all the confederates. On the other hand, the courteous, affable, and obliging deportment of Aristides and Cimon; their total disdain of all imperious and haughty airs, which only tend to alienate people and multiply enemies; a gentle, kind, and beneficent disposition, which showed itself in all their actions, and which served to temper the authority of their commands, and to render it both easy and amiable; the justice and humanity conspicuous in every thing they did; the great care they took to offend no person whatever, and to do kind offices and services to all about them; all this hurt Pausanias exceedingly, by the contrast of their opposite characters, and greatly increased the general discontent. At last this dissatisfaction publicly broke out; and all the allies deserted him, and put themselves under the command and protection of the Athenians. Thus did Aristides, says Plutarch, by the prevalence of that humanity and gentleness, which he opposed to the arrogance and roughness of Pausanias, and by inspiring Cimon his colleague with the same sentiments, insensibly draw off the minds of the allies from the Lacedæmonians, without their perceiving it, and at length deprived them of the command; not by open force, or by sending out armies or fleets against them, and still less by making use of any arts or perfidious practices, but by the wisdom and moderation of his conduct, and by rendering the government of the Athenians respectable.*

It must be confessed at the same time, that the Spartan

* Plut. in Arist. pp. 332, 333.

people on this occasion showed a greatness of soul and a spirit of moderation that can never be sufficiently admired. For when they were convinced that their commanders grew haughty and insolent from their too great authority, they willingly renounced the superiority which they had hitherto exercised over the rest of the Grecians, and forebore sending any more of their generals to command the Grecian armies; choosing rather, adds the historian, to have their citizens wise, modest and submissive to the discipline and laws of the commonwealth, than to maintain their pre-eminence and superiority over all the Grecian states.

SECTION XV.—THE SECRET CONSPIRACY OF PAUSANIAS WITH
THE PERSIANS. HIS DEATH.

Upon the repeated complaints which the Spartan commonwealth received on all hands against Pausanias, they recalled him home to give an account of his conduct. But not having sufficient evidence to convict him of his having carried on a correspondence with Xerxes, they were obliged to acquit him on his first trial; after which he returned of his own accord, and without the consent and approbation of the republic, to the city of Byzantium, from whence he continued to carry on his secret practices with Artabazus. But as he was still guilty of many violent and unjust proceedings while he resided there, the Athenians obliged him to leave the place; and he then retired to Colonæ, a small city of the Troas. There he received an order from the ephori to return to Sparta, on pain of being declared, in case of disobedience, a public enemy and traitor to his country. He complied with the summons and went home, hoping he should still be able to bring himself off by the power of money. On his arrival he was committed to prison, and was soon afterwards brought again upon his trial before the judges. The charge brought against him was supported by many suspicious circumstances and strong presumptions. Several of his own slaves confessed that he had promised to give them their liberty, in case they would enter into his designs, and serve him with fidelity and zeal in the execution of his projects. But, as it was the custom for the ephori never to pronounce sentence of death against a Spartan, without a full and direct proof of the crime laid to his charge, they looked upon the evidence against him as insufficient; and the more so, as he was of the royal family,

and was actually invested with the administration of the regal office; for Pausanias exercised the function of king, as being the guardian and nearest relation to Plistarchus, the son of Leonidas, who was then in his minority. He was therefore acquitted a second time, and set at liberty.*

While the ephori were thus perplexed for want of clear and plain evidence against the offender, a certain slave, who was called the Argilian, came to them, and brought them a letter, written by Pausanias himself to the king of Persia, which the slave was to have carried and delivered to Artabazus. It must be observed, by the way, that this Persian governor and Pausanias had agreed together to put to death all the couriers sent from one to the other, as soon as their packets or messages were delivered, that there might be no possibility left of tracing out or discovering their correspondence. The Argilian, who saw none of his fellow-servants that were sent expresses return again, had some suspicion, and when it came to his turn to go, he opened the letter he was entrusted with, in which Artabazus was positively desired to kill him, pursuant to their agreement. This was the letter the slave put into the hands of the ephori; who still thought even this proof insufficient in the eye of the law, and therefore endeavored to corroborate it by the testimony of Pausanias himself. The slave, in concert with them, withdrew to the temple of Neptune in Tenaros, as to a secure asylum. Two small closets were purposely made there, in which the ephori and some Spartans hid themselves. The instant Pausanias was informed that the Argilian had fled to this temple, he hastened thither to inquire the reason. The slave confessed that he had opened the letter; and that, finding by the contents of it that he was to be put to death, he had fled to the temple to save his life. As Pausanias could not deny the fact, he made the best excuse he could: promised the slave a great reward; obliged him to promise not to mention what had passed between them to any person whatever. Pausanias then left him.

His guilt was now but too evident. The moment he returned to the city, the ephori were resolved to seize him. From the aspect of one of these magistrates, he plainly perceived that some danger was impending over him, and therefore ran with the utmost speed to the temple of Pallas, called

* A. M. 3529. Ant. J. C. 475. Thucyd. l. i. pp. 86, 89. Diod. l. xi. pp. 34-36. Corn. Nep. in Pausan.

Chalciæcos, near that place, and got into it before his pursuers could overtake him. The entrance was immediately stopped up with great stones, and history informs us that the criminal's mother set the first example on that occasion. They now tore off the roof of the building; but as the ephori did not dare to take him out of it by force, because this would have been a violation of that sacred asylum, they resolved to leave him exposed to the inclemencies of the weather, and accordingly he was starved to death. His corpse was buried not far from that place; but the oracle of Delphos, whom they consulted soon after, declared, that to appease the anger of the goddess, who was justly offended on account of the violation of her temple, two statues must be set up there in honor of Pausanias, which was done accordingly.

Such was the end of Pausanias, whose wild and inconsiderate ambition had stifled in him all sentiments of probity, honor, love of country, zeal for liberty, and of hatred and aversion for the barbarians; sentiments which, in some measure, were inherent in all the Greeks, and particularly the Lacedæmonians.

SECTION XVI.—THEMISTOCLES FLIES FOR SHELTER TO KING
ADMETUS.

Themistocles was also charged with being an accomplice of Pausanias. He was then in exile. A passionate thirst of glory, and a strong desire to command arbitrarily over the citizens, had made him very odious to them. He had built, very near his house, a temple in honor of Diana, under this title, "to Diana, goddess of good counsel;" thereby hinting to the Athenians, that he had given good counsel to their city, and to all Greece; and he had also placed his statue in it, which was standing in the time of Plutarch, who says it appeared, from this statue, that his physiognomy was as heroic as his valor. Finding that men listened with pleasure to all the calumnies his enemies spread against him, to silence them he was for ever expatiating, in all public assemblies, on the services he had rendered his country. As they were at last tired with hearing him repeat the same thing so often, "how!" said he, "are you weary of having good offices frequently done you by the same persons?" He did not consider that putting them so often in mind of his services was in a manner reproaching them with their having

forgotten them, which was not very obliging ;* and he seemed not to know, that the surest way to acquire applause, is to leave it to be bestowed by others, and to resolve to do such things only as are praiseworthy ; and that a frequent mention of one's own virtue and exalted actions, is so far from appeasing envy, that it only inflames it.†

Themistocles, after having been banished from Athens by the ostracism, withdrew to Argos. He was there when Pausanias was prosecuted as a traitor who had conspired against his country. He had at first concealed his designs from Themistocles, though he was one of his best friends ; but as soon as he was expelled his country, and had highly resented that injury, he disclosed his projects to him, and pressed him to join in them. To induce this compliance, he showed him the letters which the king of Persia wrote to him ; and endeavored to animate him against the Athenians by painting their injustice and ingratitude in the strongest colors. Themistocles, however, rejected with indignation the proposals of Pausanias, and refused peremptorily to engage in any manner in his schemes ; but then he concealed what had passed between them, and did not discover the enterprise he had formed, whether it was that he imagined Pausanias would renounce it of himself, or was persuaded that it would be discovered some other way : it not being possible for so dangerous and ill-concerted an enterprise to take effect.‡

After the death of Pausanias, several letters and other things were found among his papers, which raised a violent suspicion of Themistocles. The Lacedæmonians sent deputies to Athens, to accuse and have sentence of death passed upon him ; and those citizens who envied him joined these accusers. Aristides had now a fair opportunity of revenging himself on his rival, for the injurious treatment he had received from him, had his soul been capable of receiving so cruel a satisfaction. But he refused absolutely to join in so horrid a combination ; as little inclined to delight in the misfortunes of his adversary, as he had been before to regret his success. Themistocles answered by letters all the calumnies with which he was charged ; and represented to the Athenians, that as he had ever been fond of ruling, and his temper being such as would not

* Hoc molestum est. Nam isthæc commemoratio quasi exprobatio est immemoris beneficii.—Terrent. in Andr.

† Thucyd. l. i. pp. 89, 90. Plut. in Themist. pp. 123, 124. Corn. Nep. in Themist. c. viii.

‡ Plut. in Themist. p. 112.

suffer him to be lorded over by others, it was highly improbable that he should have a design to deliver up himself, and all Greece, to enemies and barbarians.

In the mean time the people, too strongly wrought upon by his accusers, sent some persons to seize him, that he might be tried by the council of Greece. Themistocles, having timely notice of it, went into the island of Corcyra, to whose inhabitants he had formerly done some service: however, not thinking himself safe there, he fled to Epirus, and finding himself still pursued by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, out of despair he made a very dangerous choice, which was, to fly to Admetus, king of Molossus, for refuge. This prince, having formerly desired the aid of the Athenians, and being refused with ignominy by Themistocles, who at that time presided in the government, had retained the deepest resentment on that account, and declared, that he would take the first opportunity to revenge himself. But Themistocles, imagining that in the unhappy situation of his affairs, the recent envy of his fellow-citizens was more to be feared than the ancient grudge of that king, was resolved to run the hazard of it. On his arrival at the palace of that monarch, on being informed that he was absent, he addressed himself to the queen, who received him very graciously, and instructed him in the manner in which it was proper to make his request. When Admetus returned Themistocles took the king's son in his arms, seated himself on his hearth amidst his household gods, and there telling him who he was, and the cause why he fled to him for refuge, he implored his clemency, owned that his life was in his hand, entreated him to forget the past; and represented to him, that no action can be more worthy in a great king than to exercise clemency. Admetus, surprised and moved with compassion in seeing at his feet, in so humble a posture, the greatest man of all Greece, and the conqueror of all Asia, raised him immediately from the ground, and promised to protect him against all his enemies. Accordingly, when the Athenians and Lacedæmonians came to demand him, he absolutely refused to deliver up a person who had made his palace his asylum, in the firm persuasion that it would be sacred and inviolable.

While he was at the court of this prince, one of his friends found an opportunity to carry off his wife and children from Athens, and to send them to him; for which that person was sometime after seized, and condemned to

die. His friends secured the greatest part of his effects for him, which they afterwards found opportunity to remit to him; but all that could be discovered, which amounted to a hundred talents,* was carried to the public treasury. When he entered upon the administration, he was not worth three talents. I shall leave this illustrious exile for some time at the court of king Admetus, to resume the sequel of this history.

SECTION XVII.—DISINTERESTED ADMINISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC TREASURE BY ARISTIDES. HIS DEATH AND EULOGIUM.

I have before observed, that the command of Greece had passed from Sparta to the Athenians. Hitherto the cities and nations of Greece had indeed contributed some sums of money towards the expense of carrying on the war against the barbarians; but this partition or division had always occasioned great feuds, because it was not made in a just or equal proportion. It was thought proper, under this new government, to lodge in the island of Delos, the common treasure of Greece; to fix new regulations with regard to the public moneys; and to lay such a tax as might be regulated according to the revenue of each city and state; in order that, the expenses being equally borne by the several individuals who composed the body of the allies, no one might have reason to murmur. The business was, to find a person of so honest and incorrupt a mind, as to discharge an employment of so delicate and dangerous a kind, the due administration of which so nearly concerned the public welfare. All the allies cast their eyes on Aristides; accordingly they invested him with full powers, and appointed him to levy a tax on each of them, relying entirely on his wisdom and justice. †

They had no cause to repent of their choice. He presided over the treasury with the fidelity and disinterestedness of a man who looks upon it as a capital crime to embezzle the smallest portion of another's possessions; with the care and activity of a father of a family, in the management of his own estate; and with the caution and integrity of a person who considers the public moneys as sacred. In fine, he succeeded in what is equally difficult and extraordinary, viz.: in acquiring the love of all, in an office in which

* About one hundred thousand dollars.

† Plut. in Arist. pp. 333, 334. Diod. l. xi. p. 36.

he that escapes the public odium gains a great point.* Such is the glorious character which Seneca gives of a person charged with an employment of almost the same kind, and the noblest eulogium that can be given of such as administer the public revenue. It is the exact picture of Aristides. He discovered so much probity and wisdom in the exercise of this office, that no man complained; and those times were considered ever after as the golden age, that is, the period in which Greece had attained its highest pitch of virtue and happiness. And, indeed, the tax which he had fixed in the whole to four hundred and sixty talents* was raised by Pericles to six hundred, and soon after to thirteen hundred talents: it was not that the expenses of the war were increased, but the treasure was employed to very useless purposes, in distributions to the Athenians, in solemnizing games and festivals, in building temples and public edifices; not to mention, that the hands of those who superintended the treasury were not always clean and uncorrupt, as those of Aristides. This wise and equitable conduct secured to him, to the latest posterity, the glorious surname of "the Just."

Nevertheless, Plutarch relates an action of Aristides, which shows that the Greeks (and the same may be said of the Romans) had a very narrow and imperfect idea of justice. They confined the exercise of it to the interior, as it were, of civil society; and acknowledged that individuals were bound to observe strictly its several maxims: but with regard to their country, to the republic, their great idol, to which they reduced every thing, they thought in a quite different manner; and imagined themselves essentially obliged to sacrifice to it, not only their lives and possessions, but even their religion and the most sacred engagements, contrary to and in contempt of the most solemn oaths. This will appear evidently in what follows.

After the regulation had been made in respect to the tributes of which I have just spoken, Aristides, having settled the several articles of the alliance, made the confederates take an oath to observe them punctually, and he himself swore in the name of the Athenians; and in denouncing the curses which always accompanied the oaths, he threw into the sea, pursuant to the usual custom, large bars of red-hot

* Tu quidem orbis terrarum rationes administras; tam abstinenter quam alienas, tam diligenter quam tuas, tam religiose quam publicas. In officio amorem consequeris, in quo odium vivere difficile est.—Senec. lib. de Brevit. Vit. cap. xviii.

† The talent is worth about a thousand dollars.

iron. But the ill state of the Athenian affairs forcing them afterwards to infringe some of those articles, and to govern a little more arbitrarily, he entreated them to vent those curses on him, and discharge themselves thereby of the punishment due to such as had forsworn themselves, and who had been reduced to it by the unhappy situation of their affairs. Theophrastus tells us, that in general (these words are borrowed from Plutarch) Aristides, who executed all matters relating to himself or the public with the most impartial and rigorous justice, used to act, during his administration, in several things, according as the exigency of affairs, and the welfare of his country, might require; it being his opinion, that a government, in order to support itself, is, on some occasions, obliged to have recourse to injustice; of which he gives the following example. One day, as the Athenians were debating in their council, about bringing to their city, in opposition to the articles of the treaty, the common treasures of Greece, which were deposited in Delos: the Samians having opened the debate when it was Aristides's turn to speak, he said that the dislodging of the treasure was an unjust action, but useful, and caused this opinion to prevail. The incident shows, that the pretended wisdom of the heathens was overspread with great obscurity and error.*

It was scarcely possible to have a greater contempt for riches than Aristides had. Themistocles, who was not pleased with the encomiums bestowed on other men, hearing Aristides applauded for the noble disinterestedness with which he administered the public treasures, did but laugh at it; and said, that the praises bestowed upon him for it, showed no greater merit or virtue than that of a strong chest, which faithfully preserves all the moneys that are shut up in it, without retaining any. This low sneer was by way of revenge for a stroke of raillery that had stung him to the quick. Themistocles saying, that, in his opinion, the greatest talent a general could possess, was to be able to foresee the designs of an enemy. "This talent," replied Aristides, "is necessary; but there is another no less noble and worthy in a general; that is, to have clean hands, and a soul superior to venality and views of interest." Aristides might very justly answer Themistocles in this manner, since he was really very poor, though he had possessed the highest employments in the state. He seemed to have an innate love for poverty; and, so far from being ashamed of it, he thought

* Plut. in Vit. Arist. pp. 333, 334.

it reflected as much glory on him, as all the trophies and victories he had won. History gives us a shining instance of this.

Callias, who was a near relation of Aristides, and the most wealthy citizen in Athens, was cited to appear before the judges. The accuser, laying very little stress on the cause itself, reproached him especially with permitting Aristides, his wife and children, to live in poverty, while he himself wallowed in riches. Callias perceiving that these reproaches made a strong impression on the judges, summoned Aristides to declare before them, whether he had not often pressed him to accept of large sums of money; and whether he had not obstinately refused to accept of his offer, asserting, that he had more reason to boast of his poverty, than Callias of his riches; that many persons were to be found who had made a good use of their wealth, but that there were few who bore their poverty with magnanimity, and even joy; and that none had cause to blush at their abject condition, but such as had reduced themselves to it by their idleness, their intemperance, their profusion, or dissolute conduct. Aristides declared, that this kinsman had told nothing but the truth; and added, that a man whose frame of mind is such as to suppress a desire of superfluous things, and who confines the wants of life within the narrowest limits, besides being freed from a thousand importunate cares, and left so much master of his time, as to devote it entirely to the public, is also assimilated in some measure to the Deity, who is wholly void of cares or wants. There was no man in the assembly, but at his leaving it, would have chosen to be Aristides, though so poor, rather than Callias with all his riches.*

Plutarch gives us, in few words, Plato's glorious testimony to the virtue of Aristides, for which he looks upon him as infinitely superior to all the illustrious men who were his contemporaries. "Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles," says he, "did indeed fill their city with splendid edifices, with porticoes, statues, rich ornaments, and other vain superfluities of that kind; but Aristides did all that lay in his power to enrich every part of it with virtue: now, to raise a city to true happiness, it must be made virtuous, not rich."

Plutarch takes notice of another circumstance in the life of Aristides, which, though of the simplest kind, reflects the greatest honor on him, and may serve as an excellent lesson.

* Plut. in Compar. Arist. et Caton, p. 355.

It is in that beautiful treatise in which he inquires whether it is proper for old men to concern themselves with affairs of government; and where he points out in an admirable manner, the various services they may do the state, even in an advanced age. "We are not to fancy," says he, "that all public services require great action and tumult, such as, to harangue the people, to preside in the government, or head armies: an old man, whose mind is informed with wisdom, may, without going abroad, exercise a kind of magistracy in it, which, though secret and obscure, is not therefore the less important; and that is, in training up youth by good counsel, teaching them the various springs of policy, and how to act in public affairs. Aristides," adds Plutarch, "was not always in office, but was always useful to his country. His house was a public school of virtue, wisdom and policy. It was open to all young Athenians, who were lovers of virtue, and these used to consult him as an oracle. He gave them the kindest reception, heard them with patience, instructed them with familiarity; and endeavored, above all things, to animate their courage, and inspire them with confidence." It is observed particularly, that Cimon, afterwards so famous, was obliged to him for this important service.*

Plutarch divided the life of statesmen into three ages. In the first, he would have them learn the principles of government; in the second, reduce them to practice; and in the third, instruct others.†

History does not mention the exact time when, nor place where, Aristides died; but then it pays a glorious testimony to his memory, when it assures us, that this great man, who had possessed the highest employments in the republic, and had the absolute disposal of its treasures, died poor, and did not leave money enough to defray the expenses of his funeral: so that the government was obliged to bear the charge of it, and to maintain his family. His daughters were married, and Lysimachus his son was maintained at the expense of the Prytaneum; which also gave the daughter of the latter, after his death, the pension with which those were honored who had been victorious at the Olympic games. ‡ Plutarch relates on this occasion, the liberality of the Athenians in favor of the posterity of Aristogiton their

* Plut. in Compar. Arist. et Caton. pp. 795-796.

† He applies on this occasion the custom used in Rome, where the vestals spent the first ten years in learning the duties of their office, and this was a kind of noviciate; the next ten years they employed in the exercise of their functions; and the last ten in instructing the young novices in them.

‡ Plut. in Arist. pp. 334, 335.

deliverer, who was fallen to decay; and he adds, that even in his time, almost six hundred years after, the same goodness and liberality still subsisted: it was glorious for the city, to have preserved, for so many centuries, its generosity and gratitude; and a strong motive to animate individuals, who were assured that their children would enjoy the rewards which death might prevent them from receiving! It was delightful to see the remote posterity of the defenders and deliverers of the commonwealth, who had inherited nothing from their ancestors but the glory of their actions, maintained for so many ages at the expense of the public, in consideration of the services their families had rendered. They lived in this manner with much more honor, and called up the remembrance of their ancestors with much greater splendor, than a multitude of citizens whose fathers had been studious only of leaving them great estates, which generally did not long survive those who raised them, and often left their posterity nothing but the odious remembrance of the injustice and oppression by which they were acquired.*

The greatest honor which the ancients conferred on Aristides, was bestowing on him the glorious title of "the Just." He gained it, not by one particular action, but by the uniform tenor of his conduct. Plutarch makes a reflection on this occasion, which being very remarkable, I think it incumbent on me not to omit.

"Among the several virtues of Aristides," says this judicious author, "that for which he was most renowned, was his justice; because this virtue is of most general use; its benefits extending to a greater number of persons: as it is the foundation, and in a manner the soul, of every public office and employment. Hence it was that Aristides, though in low circumstances and, of mean extraction, merited the title of Just; a title" says Plutarch, "truly noble, or rather truly divine; but one of which princes are seldom ambitious, because generally ignorant of its beauty and excellency.† They choose rather to be called the conquerors of cities, and the thunderbolts of war; and sometimes even eagles and lions, preferring the vain honor of pompous titles, which convey no other idea than of violence and slaughter, to the solid glory of those expressive of goodness and virtue.‡ They do not know," continues Plutarch, "that of the three chief attributes of the

* Vid. Book, V. Art. viii.

† Plut. in Vit. Arist. pp. 321, 322.

‡ Poliorcetes, Ceraunus, Nicator.

Deity, of whom kings boast themselves the image, I mean, immortality, power, and justice; that of these three attributes, the first of which excites our admiration and desire, the second fills us with dread and terror, and the third inspires us with love and respect, this last only is truly and personally communicated to man, and is the only one that can conduct him to the other two; it being impossible for man to become truly immortal and powerful without being just."

Before I resume the sequel of this history, it may not be improper to observe, that it was about this period the fame of the Greeks, still more renowned for the wisdom of their polity than the glory of their victories, induced the Romans to have recourse to their lights and knowledge.* Rome, formed under kings, was in want of such laws as were necessary for the good government of a commonwealth. For this purpose the Romans sent deputies to copy the laws of the cities of Greece, and particularly of Athens, which were still better adapted to the popular government that had been established after the expulsion of the kings. On this model the ten magistrates, called Decemviri, and who were invested with absolute authority, were created; these digested the laws of the twelve tables, which are the basis of the Roman law.†

SECTION XVIII. XERXES KILLED BY ARTABANUS. HIS CHARACTER.

The ill success of Xerxes in his expedition against the Greeks, which continued afterwards, at length discouraged him. Renouncing all thoughts of war and conquest, he abandoned himself entirely to luxury and ease, and was studious of nothing but his pleasures.‡ Artabanus, § a native of Hyrcania, captain of his guards, and who had long been one of his chief favorites, found that his dissolute conduct had drawn upon him the contempt of his subjects. He therefore imagined that this would be a favorable opportunity to conspire against his sovereign; and his ambition was so vast, that he flattered himself with the hopes of succeeding

* A. M. 3532. A. Rome, 302.

† Missi legati Athenas, jussique inclytas leges Solonis describere, et aliarum Græciæ civitatum instituta, mores juraque noscere. Decem tabularum leges perlatæ sunt (quibus adjectæ postea duæ), qui nunc quoque in hoc immenso aliarum super alias privatarum legum cumulo, fons omnis publici privatique est juris.—Liv. l. iii. n. 31, et 34.

‡ A. M. 3531. Ant. J. C. 473. Ctes. c. ii. Diocl. l. xi. p. 52. Justin l. iii. c. 1.

§ This was not Artabanus the uncle of Xerxes.

him in the throne. It is very probable, that he was excited to the commission of this crime from another motive. Xerxes had commanded him to murder Darius, his eldest son, but for what cause history is silent. As this order had been given at a banquet, and when the company was heated with wine, he did not doubt that Xerxes would forget it, and therefore was not in haste to obey it; however, he was mistaken, for the king complained upon that account, which made Artabanus dread his resentment, and therefore he resolved to prevent him. Accordingly he prevailed upon Mithridates, one of the eunuchs of the palace, and great chamberlain, to engage in the conspiracy; and by his means entered the chamber where the king lay, and murdered him in his sleep. He then went immediately to Artaxerxes, the third son of Xerxes, and informed him of the murder; charging Darius his eldest brother with it; as if impatience to ascend the throne had prompted him to that execrable deed. He added, that to secure the crown to himself, he was resolved to murder him also, for which reason it would be absolutely necessary for him to keep upon his guard. These words having made such an impression on Artaxerxes, a youth, as Artabanus desired, he went immediately into his brother's apartment, where, being assisted by Artabanus and his guards, he murdered him. Hystaspes, the second son of Xerxes, was next heir to the crown after Darius; but as he was then in Bactriana, of which he was governor, Artabanus seated Artaxerxes on the throne but did not design to suffer him to enjoy it longer than until he had formed a faction strong enough to drive him from it, and ascend it himself. His great authority had gained him a multitude of creatures; besides this, he had seven sons who were of a very tall stature, handsome, strong, courageous, and raised to the highest employments in the empire. The aid he hoped to receive from them was the chief motive of his raising his views so high. But, while he was attempting to complete his design, Artaxerxes, being informed of this plot by Megabyzus, who had married one of his sisters, endeavored to anticipate him and killed him before he had an opportunity of putting his treason in execution. His death established this prince in the possession of the kingdom.*

Thus we have seen the end of Xerxes, who was one of the most powerful princes that ever lived. It would be needless for me to anticipate the reader with respect to the

* Arist. Polit. l. v. c. 10, p. 404.

judgment he ought to form of him. We see him surrounded with whatever is greatest and most august in the opinion of mankind ; the most extensive empire at that time in the world ; immense treasures, and an incredible number of land as well as sea forces. But all these things are around him, not in him, and add no lustre to his natural qualities : for, by a blindness too common in princes and great men, born in the midst of all terrestrial blessings, heir to boundless power, and a lustre that cost him nothing, he had accustomed himself to judge of his own talents and personal merit from the exterior of his exalted station and rank. He disregards the wise counsels of Artabanus his uncle, and of Demaratus, who alone had courage enough to speak truth to him, and he abandons himself to courtiers, the adorers of his fortune, whose sole study it was to soothe his passions. He proportions, and pretends to regulate the success of his enterprises by the extent of his power. The slavish submission of so many nations no longer soothes his ambition ; and little affected with too easy an obedience, he takes pleasure in exercising his power over the elements in cutting his way through the mountains, and making them navigable ; in chastising the sea for having broken down his bridge, and in foolishly attempting to shackle the waves by throwing chains into them. Elated with a childish vanity and a ridiculous pride, he looks upon himself as the arbiter of nature : he imagines, that not a nation in the world will dare to oppose him ; and fondly and presumptuously relies on the millions of men and ships which he drags after him. But when after the battle of Salamin, he beholds the sad ruins, the shameful remains of his numberless troops scattered over all Greece, he then is sensible of the wide difference between an army and a crowd of men.* In a word, to form a right judgment of Xerxes, we need but contrast him with a plain citizen of Athens, a Miltiades, Themistocles, or Aristides. In the latter we find all the good sense, prudence, ability in war, valor, and greatness of soul ; in the former we see nothing but vanity, pride, obstinacy, the meanest and most grovelling sentiments, and sometimes the most horrid barbarity.

* *Stratusque per totam passim Græciam Xerxes intellexit, quantum ab exercitu turba distaret*—Senec. de. Benef. l. vi. c. 32.

BOOK SEVENTH.

THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

PLAN.

The first and third chapters of this book include the history of the Persians and Grecians during 42 years, and some months, which contain the reign of Artaxerxes Longimanus; the last six years of which answer to the first six of the Peloponnesian war. This space of time begins at the year of the world 3531, and ends at 3579.

The second chapter comprehends the other transactions of the Greeks, which happened both in Sicily and Italy, during the interval above mentioned.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter includes the history of the Persians and Greeks, from the beginning of the reign of Artaxerxes to the Peloponnesian war, which began in the forty-second year of that king's reign.

SECTION I.—ARTAXERXES RUINS THE FACTION OF ARTABANUS, ETC.

The Greek historians give this prince the surname of Longimanus. Strabo says, it was because his hands were so long, that when he stood upright he could touch his knees with them; * but according to Plutarch, it was because his right hand was longer than his left.† Had it not been for this blemish, he would have been the most graceful man of his age. He was still more remarkable for his goodness and generosity. He reigned about forty-nine years.

Although Artaxerxes, by the death of Artabanus, was delivered from a dangerous competitor, there still were two obstacles in his way to be removed before he could establish himself in the quiet possession of his throne; one of which

* Lib. xv. p. 735. A. M. 3531. Ant. J.

† In Artax. p. 1011.

was his brother Hystaspes, governor of Bactria; and the other the faction of Artabanus. He began with the latter.*

Artabanus had left seven sons, and a great number of partisans, who assembled to avenge his death. These and the adherents of Artaxerxes fought a bloody battle, in which a great number of Persian nobles lost their lives. Artaxerxes having at last entirely defeated his enemies, put to death all who had engaged in this conspiracy. He took an exemplary vengeance of those who were concerned in his father's murder, and particularly of Mithridates the eunuch, who had betrayed him, and who was executed in the following manner. He was laid on his back in a kind of horse-trough, and strongly fastened to the four corners of it. Every part of him, except his head, his hands, and his feet, which came out of holes made for that purpose, was covered with another trough. In this horrid situation victuals were given him from time to time; and in case of his refusal to eat, they were forced down his throat: honey mixed with milk was given him to drink, and all his face was smeared with it, which by that means attracted a numberless multitude of flies, especially as he was constantly exposed to the scorching rays of the sun. The worms which bred in his excrements preyed upon his bowels. The criminal lived fifteen or twenty days in inexpressible torments.†

Artaxerxes having crushed the faction of Artabanus, was powerful enough to send an army into Bactriana, which had declared in favor of his brother, but he was not successful on this occasion. The two armies engaging, Hystaspes stood his ground so well, that, if he did not gain the victory, he at least sustained no loss; so that both armies separated with equal success; and each retired to prepare for a second battle. Artaxerxes having raised a greater army than his brother, and having the whole empire in his favor, defeated him in a second engagement, and entirely ruined his party. By this victory he secured to himself the quiet possession of the empire. ‡

To maintain himself in the throne, he removed all such governors of cities and provinces from their employments, as he suspected of holding a correspondence with either of the factions he had overcome, and substituted others on whom he could rely. He afterwards applied himself to re-

* Ctes. c. 30.

† Plut. in Artax. p. 1019.

‡ Ctes. c. 31.

forming the abuses and disorders which had crept into the government. By his wise conduct and zeal for the public good, he soon acquired great reputation and authority, with the love of his subjects, the strongest support of sovereign power.*

SECTION II.—THEMISTOCLES FLIES TO ARTAXERXES.

According to Thucydides, Themistocles fled to this prince in the beginning of his reign; but other authors, as Strabo, Plutarch, Diodorus, fix this incident under Xerxes his predecessor. Dr. Prideaux is of the latter opinion; he likewise thinks that the Artaxerxes in question is the same person that is called Ahasuerus in Scripture, and who married Esther; but we suppose with the learned Archbishop Usher, that it was Darius the son of Hystaspes, who espoused this illustrious Jewess. I have already declared more than once, that I would not engage in controversies of this kind; and therefore, with regard to this flight of Themistocles into Persia, and the history of Esther, I shall follow the opinion of the learned Usher, my usual guide on these occasions.†

We have seen that Themistocles had fled to Admetus, king of the Molossi, and had met with a gracious reception from him: but the Athenians and Lacedæmonians would not suffer him to live in peace, and required that prince to deliver him up; threatening, in case of refusal, to carry their arms into his country. Admetus, who was unwilling to draw such formidable enemies upon himself, and much more to deliver up the man who had fled to him for refuge, informed him of the great danger to which he was exposed, and favored his flight. Themistocles went as far by land as Pydna, a city of Macedonia, and there embarked on board a merchant ship, which was sailing to Ionia. None of the passengers knew him. A storm having carried this vessel near the island of Naxos, then besieged by the Athenians, the imminent danger to which Themistocles was exposed, obliged him to discover himself to the pilot and master of the ship; after which, by entreaties and menaces, he forced them to sail towards Asia.‡

Themistocles might on this occasion call to mind an expression which his father had made use of, when he was

* Diod. l. xi. p. 54.

† A. M. 3531. Ant. J. C. 473.

‡ Thuc. l. i. pp. 90, 91. Plut. in The. pp. 125-127. Diod. l. xi. pp. 42-44. Corn. Nep. in The. c. 3-10.

very young, in order to warn him to lay very little stress on the favor of the common people. They were then walking together in the harbor. His father pointing to some rotten galleys that lay neglected on the strand, "Look there," said he, "my son," pointing to them, "thus do the people treat their governors, when they can do them no farther service." *

He was now arrived in Cumæ, a city of Æolia, in Asia Minor. The king of Persia had set a price upon his head, and promised two hundred talents † to any man who should deliver him up. The whole coast was covered with people who were watching for him. He fled to Ægæ, a little city of Æolia, where no one knew him except Nicogenes, at whose house he lodged. He was the most wealthy man in that country, and very intimate with all the lords of the Persian court. Themistocles was concealed some days in his house, till Nicogenes sent him under a strong guard to Susa, in one of those covered chariots in which the Persians, who were extremely jealous, used to carry their wives; those who carried him telling everybody, that they were carrying a young Greek lady to a courtier of great distinction.

On his arrival at the Persian court, he waited upon the captain of the guards, and told him that he was a Grecian by birth, and begged the king would admit him to an audience, having matters of great importance to communicate to him. The officer informed him of a ceremony which he knew was insupportable to some Greeks, but without which none were allowed to speak to the king; and this was, to fall prostrate before him. "Our laws," said he, "command us to honor the king in that manner, and to worship him as the living image of the immortal God, who maintains and preserves all things." Themistocles promised to comply. Being admitted to audience, he fell on his face before the king, after the Persian manner; and afterwards rising up, "great king," said he by an interpreter, "I am Themistocles the Athenian, who having been banished by the Greeks, have come to your court in hopes of finding an asylum in it. I have indeed brought many calamities on the Persians; but, on the other side, I have done them no less services by the salutary advices I have given them more than once; and I now am able to do them more important services than ever. My life is in your hands. You may now display your clemency, or exert your vengeance; by the former you

* Plut. in Themist. p. 112.

† About two hundred thousand dollars.

will preserve your suppliant; by the latter you will destroy the greatest enemy of Greece.*

The king made him no answer at this audience, though he was struck with admiration at his great sense and boldness; but history informs us, that he told his friends he considered the arrival of Themistocles as a very great happiness; that he implored his god Arimanius always to inspire his enemies with such thoughts, and to prompt them to banish and make away with their most illustrious personages. It is added, that when the king was asleep, he started up three times in excess of joy, and exclaimed, "I have got Themistocles the Athenian!"

The next morning, at daybreak, he sent for the greatest lords of his court, and commanded Themistocles to be brought before him, who expected nothing but destruction; especially after what one of his guards, upon hearing his name, had said to him the night before, even in the presence-chamber, just as he had left the king: "thou serpent of Greece, thou compound of fraud and malice, the good genius of our prince brings thee hither!" However, the serenity which appeared in the king's face seemed to promise him a favorable reception. Themistocles was not mistaken, for the king began by making him a present of two hundred talents,† which sum he had promised to any one who should deliver him up, which consequently was his due, as Themistocles had brought him his head, by surrendering himself to him. He afterwards desired him to give an account of the affairs of Greece. But as Themistocles could not express his thoughts to the king without the assistance of an interpreter, he desired time might be allowed him to learn the Persian tongue; hoping he should then be able to explain those things he was desirous of communicating to him better than he could by the aid of a third person. It is the same, says he, with the speech of a man, as with a piece of tapestry, which must be spread out and unfolded to show the figures and other beauties wrought in it. Themistocles, having studied the Persian tongue twelve months, made so great a progress, that he spoke it with greater elegance than the Persians themselves, and consequently could converse with the king without the help of an interpreter. This prince treated him with uncommon marks of friendship and

* Thucydides relates very nearly the same words; but informs us that Themistocles did not speak then to the king, but sent them in writing before he was introduced to him.

† Two hundred thousand French crowns, or about \$200,000.

esteem ; he made him marry a lady descended from one of the noblest families in Persia ; gave him a palace and an equipage suitable to it, and settled a noble pension on him. He used to carry him abroad on his parties of hunting, and to every banquet and entertainment ; and sometimes conversed privately with him, so that the lords of the court grew jealous and uneasy on that account. He even presented him to the princesses, who honored him with their esteem and received his visits. It is observed, as a proof of the peculiar favor showed him, that by the king's special order, Themistocles was admitted to hear the lectures and discourses of the magi, and was instructed by them in all the secrets of their philosophy.

Another proof of his great credit is related. Demaratus of Sparta, who was then at court, being commanded by the king to ask any thing of him, he desired that he might be suffered to make his entry on horseback into the city of Sardis, with the royal tiara on his head ; a ridiculous vanity ! equally unworthy of the Grecian grandeur, and simplicity of a Lacedæmonian ! The king, exasperated at the insolence of his demand, expressed his disgust in the strongest terms, and seemed resolved not to pardon him ; but Themistocles having interceded, the king restored him to favor.

In fine, Themistocles was in such great credit, that under the succeeding reigns, in which the affairs of Persia were still more blended with those of Greece, whenever the kings were desirous of drawing over any Greek to their interest, they used to declare expressly in their letters that he should be in greater favor with them than Themistocles had been with king Artaxerxes.

It is said also, that Themistocles, when in his most flourishing condition in Persia, and was honored and esteemed by all the world, who were emulous in making their court to him, said one day, when his table was covered magnificently, "Children, we should have been ruined, if we had not been ruined."

But at last it was judged necessary for the king's interest that Themistocles should reside in some city of Asia Minor, that he might be ready on any occasion which should present itself ; accordingly he was sent to Magnesia, situated on the Meander ; and for his subsistence, besides the whole revenues of that city, which amounted to fifty talents * annually, he had those of Myus and Lampsacus assigned him. One

* Fifty thousand crowns, or about \$50,000.

of the cities was to furnish him with bread, another with wine, and a third with other provisions. Some authors add two more, viz.: for his furniture and clothes. Such was the custom of the ancient kings of the East: instead of settling pensions on persons they rewarded, they gave them cities, and sometimes even provinces, which, under the name of bread, wine, etc., were to furnish them abundantly with all things necessary for supporting, in a magnificent manner, their family and equipage. Themistocles lived for some years in Magnesia in the utmost splendor, till he came to his end in the manner which will be related hereafter.

SECTION III.—CIMON BEGINS TO MAKE A FIGURE AT ATHENS.

The Athenians having lost one of their most distinguished citizens, as well as ablest generals, by the banishment of Themistocles, endeavored to retrieve that loss by bestowing the command of the armies on Cimon, who was not inferior to him in merit.*

He spent his youth in such excesses as did him no honor, and presaged no good with regard to his future conduct. The example of this illustrious Athenian, who passed his juvenile years in so dissolute a manner, and afterwards rose to so exalted a pitch of glory, shows that parents must not always despair of the happiness of a son, when wild and irregular in his youth; especially when nature has endued him with genius, goodness of heart, generous inclinations, and esteem for persons of merit.† Such was the character of Cimon. The dishonor he had drawn upon himself having prejudiced the people against him, he at first was very ill received by them; when, being discouraged by this repulse, he resolved to lay aside all thoughts of concerning himself with the affairs of the public. But Aristides, perceiving that his dissolute turn of mind was united with many fine qualities, consoled him, inspired him with hope, pointed out the paths he should take, instilled good principles into him, and did not a little contribute, by the excellent instructions he gave him, and the affection he expressed for him on all occasions, to make him the man he afterwards appeared. What more important service could he have done his country?

Plutarch observes, that after Cimon had laid aside his

* A. M. 3333. Ant. J. C. 471. Diod. l. xi. p. 45. Plut. in Cim. pp. 482-483.

† Plut. in Cim. p. 480.

juvenile extravagances, his conduct was in all things great and noble; and that he was not inferior to Miltiades either in courage or intrepidity, nor to Themistocles in prudence and sense, but that he was more just and virtuous than either of them; and that, without being at all inferior to them in military excellence, he surpassed them far in the practice of the moral virtues.*

It would be of great advantage to a state, if those who excel in professions of every kind, would take pleasure, and make it their duty to fashion and instruct such youths as are remarkable for the fertility of their genius and goodness of disposition. They would thereby have an opportunity of serving their country even after their death, and of perpetuating in it, and in the person of their pupils, a taste and inclination for true merit, and the practice of the wisest maxims.

The Athenians, shortly after Themistocles had left his country, having put to sea a fleet under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades, took Eion, on the banks of the Strymon, Amphipolis, and other places of Thrace; and as this was a very fruitful country, Cimon planted a colony in it, and sent ten thousand Athenians thither for that purpose.

The fate of Eion is too singular to be omitted here. Bages† was governor of it under the king of Persia, and acted with a zeal and fidelity for his sovereign, of which we have but few examples. When besieged by Cimon and the Athenians, it was in his power to have capitulated upon honorable terms, and he might have retired to Asia with his family and all his effects. Being persuaded, however, that he could not do this with honor, he resolved to die rather than surrender. The city was assaulted with the utmost fury, and he defended it with incredible bravery. Being at last in the utmost want of provisions, he threw from the walls into the river Strymon all the gold and silver in the place; caused a pile to be set on fire, and after having killed his wife, his children, and his whole family, he threw them into the midst of the flames, and then rushed into them himself. Xerxes could not but admire, and at the same time bewail, so surprising an example of generosity. The heathens, indeed, might give this name to what is rather savage ferocity and barbarity.‡

* Plut. in Cim. p. 481.

† Plutarch calls him Batis. Herodotus seems to place this history under Xerxes; but it is more probable that it happened under Artaxerxes, his successor.

‡ Herod. l. vii. c. 107. Plut. p. 482.

Cimon made himself master also of the island of Seyros where he found the bones of Theseus, the son of Ægeus, who had fled from Athens to that city, and there ended his days. An oracle had commanded that search should be made after his bones. Cimon put them on board his galley, adorned them magnificently, and carried them to his native country, nearly eight hundred years after Theseus had left it. The people received them with the highest expressions of joy; and to perpetuate the remembrance of this event, they founded a disputation of prize for tragic writers, which became very famous, and contributed exceedingly to the improvement of the drama, by the wonderful emulation it excited among the tragic poets, whose pieces were represented in it. For Sophocles having, in his youth, brought his first play on the stage, the archon, or chief magistrate, who presided at these games, observing there was a strong action among the spectators, prevailed with Cimon and the rest of the generals, his colleagues, who were ten in number, and chosen out of each tribe, to sit as judges. The prize was adjudged to Sophocles, which so deeply afflicted Æschylus, who till then had been considered as the greatest dramatic poet, that Athens became insupportable to him, and he withdrew to Sicily, where he died.

The confederates had taken a great number of barbarian prisoners in Sestos and Byzantium; and, as a proof of the high regard they had for Cimon, entreated him to distribute the booty. Accordingly Cimon placed all the captives, stark naked, on one side, and on the other all their riches and spoils. The allies complained of this partition as too unequal; but Cimon giving them the choice, they immediately took the riches which had belonged to the Persians, and left the prisoners for the Athenians. Cimon therefore set out with his portion, and was thought a person no ways qualified to settle the distribution of prizes: for the allies carried off a great number of chains, necklaces, and bracelets of gold; a large quantity of rich habits, and fine purple cloaks; while the Athenians had only for their share, a multitude of human creatures, quite naked and unfit for labor. However, the relations and friends of these captives came soon after from Phrygia and Lydia, and purchased them all at a very high price; so that, with the moneys arising from the ransom of them, Cimon had enough to maintain his fleet four months, besides a great sum of money which was put into the exchequer, not to mention what he himself had for his own

share. He afterwards used to take very great pleasure in relating this adventure to his friends.*

He made the best use of his riches, as Gorgias the rhetorician has happily expressed it in few, but strong and elegant words: † “Cimon,” says he, “amassed riches only to use them; and he employed them so as to acquire esteem and honor.” We may here perceive, by the way, what was the scope and aim of the most exalted actions of the heathens; and with what justice Tertullian defined a pagan, however perfect he might appear, to be a vain-glorious animal, “animal gloriæ.” The gardens and orchards of Cimon were always open, by his order, to the citizens in general, who were allowed to gather whatever fruits they pleased. His table was daily covered frugally but elegantly. It was entirely different from those delicate and sumptuous tables, to which only a few persons of great distinction are admitted; and which are covered merely to display a vain magnificence or elegance of taste. That of Cimon was neat but abundant, and all the poor citizens were received at it without distinction. In thus banishing from his entertainments whatever had the least air of ostentation and luxury, he reserved to himself an inexhaustible fund, not only for the expenses of his house, but for the wants of his friends, his domestics, and a very great number of citizens; demonstrating by this conduct, that he knew much better than most rich men the true use and value of riches. ‡

He was always followed by some servants, who were ordered to slip privately some piece of money into the hands of such poor as they met, and to give clothes to those who were in want of them. He often buried such persons as had not left money enough behind them to defray the expenses of their funeral; and what is admirable, and which Plutarch does not fail to observe, he did not act in this manner to gain favor among the people, nor to purchase their votes; since we find him, on all occasions, declaring for the opposite faction, that is, in favor of such citizens as were most considerable for their wealth or authority.

Although he saw all the rest of the governors of his time enrich themselves by the plunder and oppression of the public, he was always incorruptible, and his hands were never stained with extortion, or the smallest present; and he continued during his whole life, not only to speak, but to act

* Plut. in Cim. p. 484.

† Φησὶ τὸν Κίμωνα τὰ χρήματα καταβαί μὲν ὡς χρῶτο, χαίρειν δὲ ὡς τιμῶτο.

‡ Plut. in Cim. p. 484. Corn. Nep. in Cim. c. iv. Athen. l. xii. p. 533.

sincerely, and without the least view of interest, whatever he thought might be of advantage to the commonwealth.*

Besides a great number of other excellent qualities, Cimon possessed sound judgment, extraordinary prudence, and a deep knowledge of the genius and characters of men. The allies, besides the sums of money in which each of them was taxed, were to furnish a certain number of men and ships. Several among them, who, from the retreat of Xerxes, were studious of nothing but their ease, and applied themselves entirely to tilling and cultivating their lands, to free themselves from the toils and dangers of war, chose to furnish their quota in money rather than in men, and left to the Athenians the care of manning with soldiers and rowers, the ships they were obliged to furnish. The other generals who had no forecast and penetration for the future, gave such people some uneasiness at first, and were for obliging them to observe the treaty literally. But Cimon, when in power, acted in a quite different manner, and suffered them to enjoy the tranquillity they chose; plainly perceiving that the allies, from being warlike in the field, would insensibly lose their martial spirit, and be fit for nothing but husbandry and trade; while the Athenians, by exercising the oar perpetually, would be more and more inured to hardships, and daily increase in power. What Cimon had foreseen happened; this very people purchased themselves masters at their own expense; so that they who before had been companions and allies, became in some measure the subjects and tributaries of the Athenians.

No Grecian general ever gave so great a blow to the pride and haughtiness of the Persian monarch, as Cimon. After the barbarians had been driven out of Greece, he did not give them time to take breath, but sailed immediately after them with a fleet of upwards of two hundred ships, took their strongest cities, and brought over all their allies; so that the king of Persia had not one soldier left in Asia, from Ionia to Pamphylia. Still pursuing his design, he bravely attacked the enemy's fleet, though much stronger than his own. It lay near the mouth of the river Eury-medon, and consisted of three hundred and fifty sail of ships, supported by the land army on the coast. It was soon put to flight, and two hundred sail were taken, besides those that were sunk. A great number of the Persians had left their ships, and leaped into the sea, in order to join their

* Plut. in Cim. p. 485.

land-army, which lay on the shore. It was very hazardous to attempt a descent in sight of the enemy; and to lead on troops which were already fatigued by their late battle, against fresh forces much superior in number. Cimon, however, finding that the whole army was eager to engage the barbarians, thought proper to take advantage of the ardor of the soldiers, who were greatly animated with their first success. He accordingly landed,* and marched them directly against the barbarians, who waited resolutely for their coming up, and sustained the first onset with great valor; however, being at last obliged to give way, they broke and fled. A great slaughter ensued, and an infinite number of prisoners and immensely rich spoils were taken. Cimon having in one day gained two victories which almost equalled those of Salamin and Plataeæ, to crown all, sailed out to meet a reinforcement of eighty-four Phœnician ships, which were come from Cyprus, to join the Persian fleet, and knew nothing of what had passed. They were all either taken or sunk, and most of the soldiers were killed or drowned.†

Cimon, having achieved such glorious exploits, returned in triumph to Athens, and employed part of the spoils in fortifying the harbor, and in beautifying the city. The riches which a general amasses in the field, are applied to the noblest uses when they are disposed of in this manner, and must reflect infinitely greater honor upon him than if he expended them in building magnificent palaces for himself, which must one time or other devolve on strangers; whereas works, built for public use, are his property in some measure for ever, and transmit his name to the latest posterity. It is well known that such embellishments in a city give infinite pleasure to the people, who are always struck with works of this kind; and this, as Plutarch observes in the life of Cimon, is one of the surest, and at the same time, the most lawful methods of acquiring their friendship and esteem. ‡

The year following, this general sailed towards the Hellespont; and having driven the Persians out of the Thracian Chersonesus, of which they had possessed themselves, he conquered it in the name of the Athenians, though he himself had more right to it, as Miltiades his father had been

* We do not find that the ancients made use of long boats in making descents; the reason of which perhaps was, that, as their galleys were flat-bottomed, they were brought to shore without any difficulty.

† A. M. 353. Ant. J. C. 470. Plut. in Cim. pp. 485-487. Thucyd. l. i. p. 66; Diod. l. xi. pp. 45-47.

‡ Plut. de Gerend. Rep. p. 818.

its sovereign.* He afterwards attacked the people of the island of Thasus, who had revolted from the Athenians, and defeated their fleet. These maintained their revolt with an almost unparalled obstinacy and fury. As if they had been in arms against the most cruel and barbarous enemies, from whom they had the worst of evils to fear, they made a law that the first man who should only mention the concluding of a treaty with the Athenians, should be put to death.† The siege was carried on three years, during which the inhabitants suffered all the calamities of war with the same obstinacy. The women were no less inflexible than the men; for, when the besieged wanted ropes for their military engines, all the women cut off their hair in a seeming transport; and when the city was in the utmost distress by famine, which swept away a great number of the inhabitants. Hegetorides, a Thasian, deeply afflicted with seeing such multitudes of his fellow-citizens perish, resolutely determined to sacrifice his life for the preservation of his country. Accordingly, he put a halter round his neck, and presenting himself to the assembly, "countrymen," said he, "do with me as you please, and do not spare me if you judge proper; but let my death save the rest of the people, and prevail with you to abolish the cruel law you have enacted, so contrary to your welfare." The Thasians, struck with these words, abolished the law, but would not suffer it to cost so generous a citizen his life; for they surrendered themselves to the Athenians, who spared their lives, and only dismantled their city.‡

After Cimon had landed his troops on the shore opposite to Thrace, he seized on all the gold mines of those coasts, and subdued every part of that country as far as Macedonia. He might have attempted the conquest of that kingdom, and, in all probability, could have easily possessed himself of part of it, had he improved the occasion. And indeed, for his neglect in this point, at his return to Athens, he was prosecuted, as having been bribed by the money of the Macedonians, and of Alexander their king. But Cimon had a soul superior to all temptations of that kind, and proved his innocence in the clearest light.

The conquests of Cimon, and the power of the Athenians, which increased every day, gave Artaxerxes great uneasiness. To prevent the consequences of it, he resolved to send

* Plut. in Cim. p. 407. Thucyd. l. i. pp. 66, 67. Diod. l. xi. p. 53.

† Polyæn. Str. l. ii.

‡ Polyæn. l. viii.

Themistocles into Attica with a great army, and accordingly proposed it to him.*

Themistocles was in great perplexity on this occasion. On one side, the remembrance of the favors the king had heaped upon him; the positive assurances he had given that monarch to serve him with the utmost zeal on all occasions; the earnestness of the king, who claimed his promise; all these considerations would not permit him to refuse the commission. On the other side, the love of his country, which the injustice and ill treatment of his fellow-citizens could not banish from his mind; his strong reluctance to sully the glory of his former laurels and mighty achievements, by so ignominious a step; perhaps, too, the fear of being unsuccessful in a war, in which he should be opposed by excellent generals, and particularly Cimon, who hitherto had been as successful as valiant; these different reflections would not suffer him to declare against his country in an enterprise, which, whether successful or not, would reflect shame on himself.

To relieve himself at once, of all these inward struggles, he resolved to put an end to his life, as the only method for him not to be wanting in the duty he owed his country, nor to the promises he had made that prince.† He therefore prepared a solemn sacrifice, to which he invited all his friends; when, after embracing them all, and taking a last farewell of them, he drank bull's blood, or, according to others, swallowed a dose of poison, and died in this manner at Magnesia, aged sixty-five years, the greatest part of which he had spent either in the government of the republic, or the command of the armies. When the king was told the cause and manner of his death, he esteemed and admired him still more, and continued his favor to his friends and domestics. But the unexpected death of Themistocles proved an obstacle to the design he meditated of attacking the Greeks. The Magnesians erected a splendid monument to the memory of that general in the public square, and granted peculiar privileges and honors to his descendants. They continued to enjoy them in Plutarch's time, that is, nearly six hundred years after, and his tomb was still standing.‡

Atticus, in the beautiful dialogue of Cicero, entitled *Brutus*, refutes, in an agreeable and ingenious manner, the

* A. M. 3538 Ant. J. C. 466. Thucyd. l. i. p. 92. Plut. in Themist. p. 127.

† The wisest heathens did not think that a man was allowed to lay violent hands on himself.

‡ Cic. de Senec. n. 72.

tragic end which some writers ascribe to Themistocles, as related above; pretending that the whole is a fiction, invented by rhetoricians, who, on the bare rumor that this great man had poisoned himself, had added all the other particulars to embellish the story which otherwise would have been very dry and uninteresting.* He appeals for this to Thucydides, that judicious historian, who was an Athenian, and almost contemporary with Themistocles. This author, indeed, owns that a report had prevailed that this general had poisoned himself; however, his opinion was that he died a natural death, and that his friends conveyed his bones secretly to Athens, where, in Pausanias's time, his mausoleum was standing near the great harbor.† This account seems much more probable than the other.

Themistocles was certainly one of the greatest men that Greece ever produced. He had a great soul and invincible courage, which danger ever inflamed; was fired with an incredible thirst for glory, which his love of country would sometimes temper and allay, but which often carried him too far; his presence of mind was such that it immediately suggested whatever was most necessary to be done; in fine, he had a sagacity and penetration with regard to futurity, that revealed to him, in the clearest light, the most secret designs of his enemies, pointing out to him at a distance the several measures he should take to disconcert them, and inspiring him with great, noble, bold, extensive views, with regard to the honor of his country.‡ The most essential qualities of the mind were, however, wanting in him; I mean sincerity, integrity and fidelity; nor was he altogether free from suspicions of avarice, which is a great blemish in such as are charged with public affairs.

Nevertheless, a noble sentiment as well as action are related of him, which speak a great and disinterested soul. § His daughter being asked of him in marriage, he preferred an honest poor man to a rich one of a different character; and gave for his reason, "that in the choice of a son-in-law, he would much rather have merit without riches, than riches without merit." ||

* Brut. n. 42, 43.

† Lib. i. p. 1.

‡ De instantibus, ut ait Thucydides, verissime judicabat, et de futuris callidissime conjiciebat.—Corn. Nep. in Themist. c. i.

§ Plut. in Themist. p. 121.

|| Themistocles, cum consuleretur utrum bono viro pauperi, an minus probato diviti, filiam collocaret. Ego vero, inquit, *malo virum qui pecunia egeat, quam pecuniam quæ viro.*—Cic. de Offic. l. ii. c. 71.

SECTION IV.—THE EGYPTIANS, SUPPORTED BY THE ATHE-
NIANS, RISE AGAINST PERSIA.

About this time the Egyptians, to free themselves from a foreign yoke, which was insupportable to them, revolted from Artaxerxes, and made Inarus, prince of the Libyans, their king. They demanded aid of the Athenians, who, having at that time a fleet of two hundred ships at the island of Cyprus, accepted the invitation with pleasure, and immediately set sail for Egypt; judging this a very favorable opportunity to weaken the power of the Persians, by driving them out of so great a kingdom.*

Advice being brought to Artaxerxes of this revolt, he raised an army of three hundred thousand men, and resolved to march in person against the rebels. But his friends advising him not to venture himself in that expedition, he gave the command of it to Achæmenes, one of his brothers. The latter, on his arrival in Egypt, encamped his great army on the banks of the Nile. During this interval the Athenians, having defeated the Persian fleet, and either destroyed or taken fifty of their ships, again ascended that river, landed their forces under the command of Charitimis, their general, and having joined Inarus and his Egyptians, they charged Achæmenes, and defeated him in a great battle, in which that Persian general and a hundred thousand of his soldiers were slain. Those who escaped fled to Memphis, whither the conquerors pursued them, and immediately made themselves masters of two quarters of the city; but the Persians, having fortified themselves in the third, called the White Wall, which was the strongest and largest of the three, were besieged in it three years, during which they made a most vigorous defence, till they at last were delivered by the forces sent to their aid.†

Artaxerxes, hearing of the defeat of his army, and how much the Athenians had contributed to it, in order to make a diversion of their forces, and oblige them to turn their arms another way, sent ambassadors to the Lacedæmonians, with a large sum of money, to engage them to declare war against the Athenians.‡ But the Lacedæmonians having rejected the offer, their refusal did not abate his ardor; and accordingly he gave Megabyzus and Artabazus the command of the forces designed against Egypt.§ These generals im-

* A. M. 3544. Ant. J. C. 460. Thucyd. l. i. pp. 68, 71, 72. Ctes. c. 32-35. Diod. l. xi. pp. 54-59.

† A. M. 3545. Ant. J. C. 459. ‡ A. M. 3540. Ant. J. C. 458. § A. M. 3547. Ant. J. C. 457.

mediately raised an army of three hundred thousand men in Cilicia and Phœnicia. They were obliged to wait till the fleet was equipped, which was not till the next year. Artabazus then took upon him the command of it, and sailed to the Nile, while Megabyzus, at the head of the land army, marched towards Memphis. He raised the siege of that city, and afterwards fought Inarus. All the forces on both sides were engaged in this battle, in which Inarus was entirely defeated; but the Egyptians, who had rebelled, suffered most in the slaughter. After this defeat, Inarus, though wounded by Megabyzus, retreated with the Athenians, and such Egyptians as were willing to follow him, and reached Biblos, a city in the island of Prosopitis, which is surrounded by two arms of the Nile, both navigable. The Athenians ran their fleet into one of these arms, where it was secured from the attacks of the enemy, and held out a siege of a year and a half in this island.*

After the battle, all the rest of Egypt submitted to the conqueror, and was re-united to the empire of Artaxerxes; but Amyrteus, who had still a small party in the fens, long supported himself through the difficulty the Persians found in penetrating far enough to reduce him.

The siege of Prosopitis was still carried on.† The Persians, finding that they made no advance in attacking it after the usual methods, because of the stratagems and intrepidity of the besieged, had recourse to an extraordinary expedient, which soon produced what force had not been able to effect. They turned the course of the arm of the Nile within which the Athenians lay, by several canals, and by that means opened a passage for their whole army to enter the island. Inarus, seeing that all was lost, capitulated with Megabyzus for himself, for all his Egyptians, and about fifty Athenians, and surrendered on condition that their lives should be spared. The remainder of the auxiliary forces, which formed a body of six thousand men, resolved to hold out longer; and for this purpose they set fire to their ships, and drawing up in order of battle, resolved to die sword in hand, and sell their lives as dear as they could, in imitation of the Lacedæmonians, who refused to yield, and were all cut to pieces at Thermopylæ. The Persians, hearing that they had taken so desperate a resolution, did not think it advisable to attack them. A peace was therefore offered them, with a promise that they should all be permitted to leave

* A. M. 3543. Ant. J. C. 456.

† A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454.

Egypt, and have free passage to their native country, either by sea or land. They accepted the conditions, put the conquerors in possession of Biblos and of the whole island, and went by sea to Cyrene, where they embarked for Greece; but most of the soldiers who had served in this expedition perished in it.

This was not the only loss the Athenians sustained on this occasion. Another fleet of fifty ships, which they had sent to the aid of their besieged countrymen, sailed up one of the arms of the Nile, just after the Athenians had surrendered, not knowing what had happened. The instant they entered, the Persian fleet, which kept out at sea, followed them and attacked their rear, while the army discharged showers of darts upon them from the banks of the river. Thus only a few ships escaped, which opened themselves a way through the enemy's fleet, and all the rest were lost. Here ended the fatal war carried on by the Athenians for six years in Egypt, which kingdom was now again united to the Persian empire, and continued so during the rest of the reign of Artaxerxes, who had now been on the throne twenty years.* But the prisoners who were taken in this war met with the most unhappy fate.

SECTION V.—INARUS IS DELIVERED UP TO THE KING'S MOTHER. THE AFFLICTION AND REVOLT OF MEGABYZUS.

Artaxerxes, after refusing to gratify the request of his mother, who for five years together had been daily importuning him to put Inarus and his Athenians into her hands, in order that she might sacrifice them to the manes of Achæmenes her son, at last yielded to her solicitations.† But how blind, how barbarously weak, must this king have been, to break through the most solemn engagements merely through complaisance; who, deaf to remorse, violated the law of nations solely to avoid offending a most unjust mother! This inhuman princess, without regard to the faith of the treaty, caused Inarus to be crucified, and beheaded all the rest.‡ Megabyzus was in the deepest affliction on that account; for as he promised that no injury should be done them, the affront reflected principally on him. He therefore left the court and withdrew to Syria, of which he was governor; and his discontent was so great that he raised an army, and revolted openly.

* A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454. † A. M. 3556. Ant. J. C. 448. Ctes. c. 35-40
‡ Thucyd. l. 1. p. 72.

The king sent Osiris, who was one of the greatest lords of the court, against him, with an army of two hundred thousand men. Megabyzus engaged Osiris, wounded him, took him prisoner, and put his army to flight. Artaxerxes sending to demand Osiris, Megabyzus generously dismissed him as soon as his wounds were cured.*

The next year Artaxerxes sent another army against him, the command of which he gave to Menostanes, son to Artarius the king's brother, and governor of Babylon. This general was not more fortunate than the former. He also was defeated and put to flight, and Megabyzus gained as signal a victory as the former.†

Artaxerxes, finding he could not reduce him by force of arms, sent his brother Artarius and Amytis his sister, who was the wife of Megabyzus, with several other persons of the first quality, to persuade the latter to return to his allegiance. They succeeded in their negotiation; the king pardoned him, and he returned to the court.

One day as they were hunting, a lion, raising himself on his hinder feet, was going to rush upon the king, when Megabyzus, seeing the danger he was in, and fired with zeal and affection for his sovereign, hurled a dart at the lion, which killed him. But Artaxerxes, upon pretence that he had affronted him, in darting at the lion before him, commanded Megabyzus's head to be struck off. Amytis, the king's sister, and Amestris, his mother, with the greatest difficulty prevailed upon the king to change this sentence into perpetual banishment. Megabyzus was therefore sent to Cyrta, a city on the Red Sea, and condemned to end his days there; however, five years after, disguising himself like a leper, he made his escape and returned to Susa, where, by the assistance of his wife and mother-in-law, he was restored to favor, and continued so till his death, which happened some years after, in the seventy-sixth year of his age. Megabyzus was extremely regretted by the king and the whole court. He was a man of the greatest abilities in the kingdom, and at the same time the best general. Artaxerxes owed both his crown and life to him: but it is of dangerous consequence for a subject, when his sovereign is under too many obligations to him.‡ This was the cause of all the misfortunes of Megabyzus.

It is surprising that so judicious a prince as Artaxerxes

* A. M. 3557. Ant. J. C. 477.

† A. M. 3558. Ant. J. C. 446.

‡ Beneficia eo usque læta sunt, dum videntur exsolvi posse: ubi multum antevertere, pro gratia odium edditur.—Tacit. Annal. l. iv, c. 18.

should have been so imprudent, as to be fired with jealousy against a nobleman of his court, merely because, in a party of hunting, he had wounded the beast they were pursuing before him. Could any thing be so weak? Was this worthy of being considered the point of honor by a king? History, however, furnishes us with many instances of this kind. I am inclined to believe from some expressions of Plutarch, that Artaxerxes was ashamed of the wild fury to which this false delicacy had raised him, and that he made some public kind of atonement for it: for, according to this author, he published a decree, importing that any man who was hunting with the king, should be allowed to throw his javelin first at the beast, if opportunity should offer; and he, according to Plutarch, was the first Persian monarch who granted such a permission.*

SECTION VI.—ARTAXERXES SENDS ESDRAS, AND AFTERWARDS NEHEMIAH, TO JERUSALEM.

Before I proceed in the history of the Persians and Greeks, I shall relate, in few words, what events happened among the people of God, during the first twenty years of Artaxerxes, which is an essential part of the history of that prince.

In the seventh year of the reign of Artaxerxes,† Esdras obtained of the king and his seven counsellors an ample commission, empowering him to return to Jerusalem with all such Jews as would follow him thither, in order to settle the Jewish government and religion agreeably to their own laws. Esdras was descended from Saraia, who was high-priest of Jerusalem when it was destroyed by Nebuchodonosor, and was put to death by his command. Esdras was a very learned and pious man, and was chiefly distinguished from the rest of the Jews by his great knowledge in the Scriptures; it being said of him, “that he was very ready in the law of Moses that was given by the God of Israel.”‡ He now set out from Babylon with the gifts and offerings which the king, his courtiers, and such Israelites as had staid in Babylon, had put into his hands for the service of the temple, and which he gave to the priests upon his arrival at Jerusalem. It appears by the commission which Artaxerxes gave him, that this prince had a high veneration for the God of Israel, as, in commanding his officers to furnish the Jews with all

* Plut. in Apoph. p. 173. † A. M. 3537. Ant. J. C. 467. Esdras, vii. &c.
‡ I. Esdras, viii. 3.

things necessary for their worship, he adds, "let all things be performed after the law of God diligently, unto the Most High God, that wrath come not upon the kingdom of the king and his son."* This commission, as I observed, empowered him to settle the religion and government of the Jews pursuant to the laws of Moses; to appoint magistrates and judges to punish evil-doers, not only by imprisoning their persons, and confiscating their possessions, but also by sending them into banishment, and even sentencing them to death, according to the crimes they should commit. Such was the power with which Esdras was invested, and which he exercised faithfully during thirteen years, till Nehemiah brought a new commission from the Persian court.

Nehemiah was also a Jew of distinguished merit and piety, and one of the cupbearers to king Artaxerxes. † This was a very considerable employment in the Persian court, because of the privileges annexed to it, viz. : of being often near the king's person, and of being allowed to speak to him in the most favorable moments. However, neither his exalted station, nor the settlement of his family in that land of captivity, could obliterate from his mind the country of his ancestors, nor their religion : neither his love for the one, nor his zeal for the other, were abated ; and his heart was still in Zion. Some Jews who were come from Jerusalem, having informed him of the sad state of that city, that its walls lay in ruin, its gates were burnt down, and the inhabitants thereby exposed to the insults of their enemies, and made the scorn of all their neighbors ; the affliction of his brethren, and the dangers with which they were menaced, made such an impression on his mind, as might naturally be expected from one of his piety. One day, as he was waiting upon the king, the latter observing an unusual air of melancholy in Nehemiah's countenance, asked him the cause of it ; a proof that this monarch had a tenderness of heart rarely found in kings, and which is nevertheless much more valuable than the most shining qualities. Nehemiah took this opportunity to acquaint him with the calamitous state of his country ; owned that that was the subject of his grief ; and humbly entreated that leave might be given him to go to Jerusalem, in order to repair the fortifications of it. The kings of Persia, his predecessors, had permitted the Jews to rebuild the temple, but not the walls of Jerusalem. But Artaxerxes immediately decreed that the walls and

* Esdras, viii. 3, ver. 21.

† A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 451. Nehem. c. i. et il.

gates of Jerusalem should be rebuilt; and Nehemiah, as governor of Judea, was appointed to put this decree in execution. The king, to do him the greater honor, ordered a body of horse, commanded by a considerable officer, to escort him thither. He likewise wrote to the governors of the provinces on this side the Euphrates, to give him all the assistance possible in forwarding the work for which he was sent. This pious Jew executed every part of his commission with incredible zeal and activity.

It is from this decree, enacted by Artaxerxes in the twentieth year of his reign, for the rebuilding of the walls of Jerusalem, that we date the beginning of the seventy weeks mentioned in the famous prophecy of Daniel, after which the Messiah was to appear and to be put to death. I shall here insert the whole prophecy, but without giving the explication of it, as it may be found in other writers, and is not a part of this history.*

“Thou art greatly beloved, therefore understand the matter, and consider the vision. Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sin, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to anoint the Most Holy. Know therefore and understand, THAT FROM THE GOING FORTH OF THE COMMANDMENT, TO RESTORE AND TO BUILD JERUSALEM, unto the Messiah the prince, shall be seven weeks; and threescore and two weeks the street shall be built again, and the wall, even in troublous times. And after threescore and two weeks shall Messiah be cut off, but not for himself: and the people of the prince that shall come shall destroy the city and the sanctuary, and the end thereof shall be with a flood: and unto the end of the war desolations are determined. And he shall confirm the covenant with many for one week; and in the midst of the week he shall cause the sacrifice and the oblation to cease, and for the overspreading of abominations, he shall make it desolate, even until the consummation, and that determined, shall be poured upon the desolate.” †

When Esdras was in power, as his chief view was to restore religion to its ancient purity, he disposed the books of Scripture into their proper order, revised them all very carefully, and collected the incidents relating to the people of God in ancient times; in order to compose out of them the

* Dan. ix. 23-27.

† Idem.

books of the Chronicles, to which he added the history of his own times, which was finished by Nehemiah. With their books ends the long history which Moses had begun, and which the writers who came after him continued in a direct series, till the repairing of Jerusalem. The rest of the sacred history is not written in that uninterrupted order. While Esdras and Nehemiah were compiling the latter part of that great work, Herodotus, whom profane authors call the Father of History, began to write. Thus we find that the latest authors of the books of Scripture flourished about the same time with the first authors of the Grecian history; and when it began, that of God's people, to compute only from Abraham, included already fifteen centuries. Herodotus makes no mention of the Jews in his history; for the Greeks desired to be informed of such nations only as were famous for their wars, their commerce, and grandeur; so that, as Judea was then but just rising from its ruins, it did not excite the attention of that people.*

SECTION VII.—CHARACTER OF PERICLES, ETC.

I now return to Greece. From the banishment of Themistocles, and the death of Aristides, the exact time of which is not known, two citizens, Cimon and Pericles, enjoyed all the influence and authority in Athens. Pericles was much younger than Cimon and of a quite different character. As he will make a very considerable figure in the following history, it is of importance to the reader to know who he was, in what manner he had been educated, and his plan and mode of government.

Pericles was descended, by both his parents, from the greatest and most illustrious families of Athens. His father Xanthippus, who defeated at Mycale the king of Persia's lieutenants, married Agarista, niece to Clisthenes, who expelled the Pisistratidæ, or descendants of Pisistratus the tyrant, and established a popular government in Athens. Pericles had long prepared himself for the designs he formed of engaging in state affairs.†

He was brought up under the most learned men of his age, and particularly Anaxagoras of Clazomene, surnamed the Intelligent, from his being the first, as we are told, who ascribed human events, as well as the formation and government of the universe, not to chance, as some philoso-

* Bishop of Meaux's Universal History.

† Plut. in Vit. Pericl. pp. 153-156

phers, nor to a fatal necessity, as others, but to a superior intelligence, who disposed and governed all things with wisdom. This tenet or opinion prevailed long before his time, but he perhaps set it in a stronger light than all others had done, and taught it methodically and from principle. Anaxagoras instructed his pupil perfectly in that part of philosophy that relates to nature, and which is therefore called *Physics*.* This study gave him a strength and greatness of soul which raised him above an infinite number of vulgar prejudices, and vain practices generally observed in his time; and which, in affairs of government and military enterprises, often disconcerted the wisest and most necessary measures, or defeated them by scrupulous delays, authorized and covered by the special veil of religion. These were sometimes dreams or auguries, at other times dreadful phenomena, as eclipses of the sun or moon, or omens and presages; not to mention the wild chimeras of judicial astrology. The knowledge of nature, free from the grovelling and weak superstitions to which ignorance gives birth, inspired him, says Plutarch, with a well-grounded piety towards the gods, attended with a strength of mind that was immovable, and a calm hope of the blessings to be expected from them. Although he found infinite charms in this study, he did not however devote himself to it as a philosopher, but as a statesman: and he had so much power over himself (a very difficult thing), as to prescribe to himself limits in the pursuit of knowledge.

But the talent he cultivated with the greatest care, because he looked upon it as the most necessary instrument to all who are desirous of conducting and governing the people, was eloquence. And indeed those who possessed this talent, in a free state like that of Athens, were sure of governing in the assemblies, engrossing suffrages, determining affairs, and exercising a kind of absolute power over the hearts and minds of the people. He therefore made this his chief object, and the mark to which all his other improvements, as well as the several sciences he had learned from Anaxagoras, were directed; adorning, to borrow Plutarch's expression, the study of philosophy with the dye of rhetoric;† the meaning of which is, that Pericles, to embellish and adorn his discourse, heightened the strength and solidity of reasoning, with the coloring and graces of eloquence.

* The ancients, under this name, comprehended what we call physics and metaphysics; that is, the knowledge of spiritual things, as God and spirits; and that of bodies.

† Βαφή τῇ ῥητορικῇ τὴν φυσιολογίαν ὑποφθεόμενος.

He had no cause to repent his having bestowed so much time to this study, for his success far exceeded his utmost hopes. The poets, his contemporaries, used to say, that he lightened, thundered, and agitated all Greece, so powerful was his eloquence.* It had those piercing and lively strokes that reach the inmost soul; and his discourse left always an irresistible incentive, a kind of spur, behind it in the minds of his auditors.† He had the art of uniting beauty with strength; and Cicero observes, that at the very time he opposed most strenuously the inclinations and desires of the Athenians, he had the art to make even severity itself, and the kind of cruelty with which he spoke against the flatterers of the people, popular. There was no resisting the solidity of his arguments, or the harmony of his words; whence it was said that the goddess of persuasion, with all her graces, resided on his lips. So that Thucydides, ‡ his rival and adversary, being one day asked, whether he or Pericles was the best wrestler: answered, “whenever I have given him a fall, he affirms the contrary, in such strong and forcible terms, that he persuades all the spectators that I did not throw him, though they themselves saw him on the ground.” Nor was he less prudent and reserved, than strong and vehement in his speeches; and it is related that he never spoke in public, till after he had besought the gods not to suffer any expression to drop from him either unsuitable to his subject, or offensive to the people. Whenever he went to the assembly, before he came out of the house, he used to say to himself, “remember, Pericles, that thou art going to speak to men born in the arms of liberty; to Greeks, to Athenians.” §

The uncommon endeavors which Pericles, according to historians, made use of to improve his mind in knowledge, and to attain a perfection in eloquence, are an excellent lesson to such persons as are one day to fill the important offices of state; and a just censure of those, who, disregarding whatever is called study or learning, bring into those employments, upon which they enter without knowledge or experience, nothing but a ridiculous self-sufficiency and a rash

* Ab Aristophane poeta fulgurare, tonare, permiscere Greciam dictus est.—Cic. in Orat. n. 29.

† Quid Pericles? De cujus dicendi copia sic accepimus, ut, cum contra voluntatem Atheniensium loqueretur pro salute patriæ, severius tamen id ipsum, quod ille contra populare homines diceret, populare omnibus et jucundum videretur: cujus in labris veteres comici—leporem habitasse dixerunt: tantamque vim in eo fuisse, ut in eorum mentibus, qui audissent, quasi aculeos quosdam relinqueret.—Cic. 1. 3, de Orat. n. 138.

‡ Not the historian.

§ Plut. in Symp. l. 1. p. 620.

boldness of decision.* Plutarch, in a treatise where he shows that a philosopher ought chiefly to attach himself to statesmen in preference to any other class of men, because, in instructing them, he at the same time teaches whole cities and republics, verifies his assertion by the example of the greatest men both of Greece and Italy, who derived this help from philosophy.† Pericles, of whom we are now writing, was taught by Anaxagoras; Dionysius of Syracuse, by Plato; many princes of Italy, by Pythagoras; Cato, the famous censor, travelled to the place where Athenodorus lived, for the same purpose; and lastly the famous Scipio, the destroyer of Carthage, always kept Panætius the philosopher near his person.

One of the chief endeavors of Pericles also was, to study thoroughly the genius and disposition of the Athenians, that he might discover the secret springs which were to be employed in order to set them in motion; and in what manner it was proper to act to acquire their confidence; for it was principally these things that, among the great men of the ancients, constituted skill in politics.‡ He found, by the reflections he had made on several transactions of his time, that the predominant passions of this people were, a violent aversion to tyranny, and an ardent love of liberty, which inspired them with sentiments of fear, jealousy, and suspicion of all such citizens as were too conspicuous for their birth, their personal merit, their own reputation and authority, or that of their friends. He not only strongly resembled Pisistratus in the melody of his voice and fluency of expression, but also in the features of his face, and his whole air and manner; and he observed that the Athenians who had seen the tyrant, were prodigiously struck at the resemblance. Besides, he was very rich, was descended from an illustrious family, and had very powerful friends. To prevent, therefore, his being obnoxious to the suspicion and jealousy of the people, he at first shunned all affairs of government, which requires a constant attendance in the city, and was solely intent upon distinguishing himself in war and dangers.

Seeing Aristides dead, Themistocles banished, and Cimon engaged almost continually in foreign wars, and absent from Greece, he began to appear in public with greater confidence

* Nunc contra plerique a l' honores adipiscendos, et ad remp. gerendam, nudi veniant et inermes, nulla cogitatione rerum, nulla scientia ornati.—Cic. l. 3, de Orat. n. 136.

† Plut. in Symp. l. i. p. 777.

‡ Olim noscenda vulgi natura, et quibus modis temperanter haberetur; senatusque et optimatum ingenia qui maxime perdidicerant, callidi temporum et sapientes habebantur.—Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 33.

than before, and entirely devoted himself to the party of the people; but not out of inclination, for he was far from affecting popular power, but to remove all suspicions of his aspiring to the tyranny, and still more, to raise a strong bulwark against the power and authority of Cimon who had joined with the nobles.

At the same time, he quite changed his conduct and way of life, and assumed, in all things, the character of a statesman, wholly busied in affairs of government, and entirely devoted to the service of his country. He was never seen in the streets, except when he was going either to the assembly of the people, or to the council. He left off going to banquets, assemblies, and other diversions of that kind which he had used to frequent; and during the many years that he presided in the administration, he was never seen to go to supper with his friends, except once at the nuptials of a near relation.

He knew that the people, who are naturally fickle and inconstant,* commonly increase their disregard for those who are always in their sight; and that too strong a desire to please them grows at last tiresome and importunate, and it was observed that such a behavior did Themistocles great prejudice. To avoid this error, he used to go very rarely to the assemblies; and never appeared before the people but at intervals, in order to make himself desired; and to preserve an ascendancy over their minds that might be always new, and never weakened by too great an assiduity; wisely reserving himself for great and important occasions.† Hence it was said that he imitated Jupiter, who, in the government of the world, according to some philosophers, busied himself in great events only, and left the direction of those of less importance to inferior deities. And indeed Pericles used to transact all petty affairs by his friends, and by certain orators who were entirely devoted to him, among whom was Ephialtes.‡

Pericles employed all his industry and application to gain the favor and esteem of the people, in order to counterbalance the fame and influence of Cimon. He could not, however, equal the magnificence and liberality of his rival, whose immense riches gave him an opportunity of bestowing such presents as appear to us almost incredible, so much did they differ from us in that respect. Finding it impossible

* *Ista nostra assiduitas, Servi, nescis quantum interdum afferat hominibus fastidii, quantum satietatis.*—*Utrique nostrum desiderium nihil obfuisse.*—Cic. pro. Mur. n. 21. † *Plut. desui laude*, p. 441. ‡ *Plut. de Ger. Rep.* p. 311.

for him to rival Cimon in this particular, he had recourse to another expedient, in order to gain the love of the populace, no less effectual perhaps, but certainly not so lawful and honorable. He was the first who divided the conquered lands among the citizens; who distributed among them the public revenues for the expense of their games and shows, and annexed pensions to all public employments; so that certain sums were bestowed on them regularly, as well to gratify them at the games, as for their presence in the courts of justice, and the public assemblies. It is impossible to say how fatal these unhappy politics were to the republic, and the many evils with which they were attended. For these new regulations, besides their draining the public treasury, gave the people a luxurious and dissolute turn of mind; whereas they were before sober and modest, and contented themselves with getting a livelihood by their sweat and labor.*

By such arts as these, Pericles had gained so great an ascendant over the minds of the people, that he may be said to have attained a monarchical power under a republican form of government; moulding the citizens into whatever shape he pleased, and presiding with unlimited authority in all the assemblies. And indeed, Valerius Maximus makes scarcely any other difference between Pisistratus and Pericles, except that the one exercised a tyrannical power by force of arms, and the other by the strength of his eloquence, in which he had made a very great progress under Anaxagoras.†

This influence and authority, however enormous, could not yet restrain the comic writers from lashing him very severely in the theatres; and it does not appear that any of the poets who censured Pericles with so much boldness, were ever punished, or even called to account for it by the people. Perhaps it was out of prudence and policy that he did not attempt to curb the licentiousness of the stage, nor to silence the poets; that he might amuse and content the people by this vain shadow of liberty and prevent their discovering that they really were enslaved.

But Pericles did not stop here. He boldly resolved, if possible, to weaken the authority of the tribunal of the Areopagus, of which he was not a member, because he had

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 156.

† Pericles felicissimis naturæ incrementis, sub Anaxagora præceptore summo studio perpolitus et instructus, liberis Athenarum cervicibus jugum servitutis imposuit: egit enim ille urbem, et versavit arbitrio suo. Quid inter Pisistratum et Periclem interfuit, nisi quod ille armatus, hic sine armis, tyrannidem exercuit? —Val. Max. l. 8. c. 9.

never been elected either archon, thesmotheta, king of the sacrifices, nor polemarch.* These were different employments in the republic, which from time immemorial had been given by lot; and none but those who had behaved uprightly in them, were allowed a seat in the Areopagus. Pericles, taking advantage of Cimon's absence, set Ephialtes, who was his creature, at work clandestinely; and at last lessened the power of that illustrious body, in which the chief strength of the nobility consisted. The people, emboldened and supported by so powerful a faction, subverted all the fundamental laws and ancient customs; took from the senate of the Areopagus the cognizance of most causes that used to be brought before it, leaving it very few, and such only as were of little consequence, and made themselves absolute masters of all the tribunals.†

Cimon on his return to Athens, was afflicted to see the dignity of the senate trampled under foot, and therefore set every engine at work to restore it to its pristine authority, and to revive the aristocracy in the same form as it had been established under Clisthenes. But now his enemies began to exclaim and excite the people against him, reproaching him, among many other things, for his strong attachment to the Lacedæmonians. Cimon had himself given some room for this reproach, by his not paying sufficient regard to the Athenian delicacy; for, in speaking to them, he would for ever extol Lacedæmon; and whenever he censured their conduct on any occasion, he used to say, "the Spartans do not act in this manner." Such expressions as these drew upon him the hatred and envy of his fellow-citizens; but an event, in which he nevertheless had no share, made him the object of their utmost detestation.

SECTION VIII.—AN EARTHQUAKE IN SPARTA, ETC.

In the fourth year of the reign of Archidamus, there happened the most dreadful earthquake in Sparta that had ever been known. In several places the country was entirely swallowed up; Taygetus and other mountains were shaken to their foundations; many of their summits, being torn away, came tumbling down; and the whole city was laid in ruins,

* After some changes had been made in the form of the Athenian government, the supreme authority was at last vested in nine magistrates, called archons, and lasted but one year. One was called rex, another polemarchus, a third archon, and this magistrate was properly at the head of the rest, and gave his name to the year; and six thesmothetæ, who presided immediately over the laws and decrees.

† Plut. in Pericl. p. 157. In Cim. p. 488.

five houses only excepted. To heighten the calamity, the Helots, who were slaves to the Lacedæmonians, looking upon this as a favorable opportunity to recover their liberty, pervaded every part of the city to murder such as had escaped the earthquake; but finding them under arms and drawn up in order of battle by the prudent foresight of Archidamus, who had assembled them round him, they retired into the neighboring cities, and commenced that very day open war, having entered into an alliance with several of the neighboring nations, and being strengthened by the Messenians, who at that time were engaged in a war with the Spartans.*

The Lacedæmonians in this extremity sent to Athens to implore succor; but this was opposed by Ephialtes, who declared that it would be no way advisable to assist them, nor to rebuild a city that was the rival of Athens, which, he said, ought to be left in ruins, and the pride of Sparta thereby humbled for ever. But Cimon, being struck with horror at these politics, did not hesitate a moment to prefer the welfare of the Lacedæmonians to the aggrandizement of his country; declaring in the strongest terms, that it was absolutely weak and inconsistent, "to leave Greece lame of one of its legs, and Athens without a counterpoise:" the people acceded to his opinion, and accordingly a succor was voted. Sparta and Athens might indeed be considered as the two limbs on which Greece stood; so that if one of them was destroyed, the rest were inevitably crippled. It is also certain that the Athenians were so elated with their grandeur, and were become so proud and enterprising, that they wanted a check; for which none was so proper as Sparta, that state being the only one that was capable of being a counterpoise to the headstrong disposition of the Athenians. Cimon, therefore, marched to the aid of the Lacedæmonians with four thousand men.

We have here an example of the prodigious influence which a man of fine talents and abilities has in a state, when a great fund of merit unites in his person with a well-established reputation for probity, disinterestedness, and zeal for the good of his country. Cimon, with very little difficulty, prevailed so far as to inspire the Athenians with noble and magnanimous sentiments, which in outward appearance interfered with their interest; and this in spite of the suggestions of a secret jealousy, which never fails to show itself in the most sensible manner on these occasions. By the as-

* A. M. 3534. Ant. J. C. 470. Plut. in Cim. pp. 488, 489.

pendancy and authority which his virtue gave him, he raised them above the grovelling and unjust, though too common, political views, which prompt a people to consider the calamities of their neighbors as an advantage, which the interest of their own country permits and even enjoins them to lay hold of. The counsels of Cimon were perfectly wise and equitable; but it is surprising, how he could prevail so far as to make a whole people approve them, since that is all that could be expected from an assembly of the wisest and gravest senators.

Some time after, the Lacedæmonians again implored the aid of the Athenians against the Messenians and Helots, who had seized upon Ithoma. But on the arrival of those forces under the command of Cimon, the Spartans began to dread their intrepidity, their power, and great fame; and affronted them so far as to send them back, upon suspicion of their harboring ill designs, and of intending to turn their arms against them.*

The Athenians returning full of anger and resentment, declared themselves, from that very day, enemies to all who should favor the Lacedæmonian interest; for which reason they banished Cimon by the ostracism, the first opportunity that presented itself for that purpose. This is the first time that the misunderstanding between these two nations, which afterwards augmented through mutual discontent, displayed itself in so strong a manner. It was however suspended for some years, by truces and treaties, which prevented its consequences: but it at last broke out in the most violent manner, in the Peloponnesian war.

Those who had shut themselves up in Ithoma, after defending themselves for ten years, surrendered at last to the Lacedæmonians, who gave them their lives upon condition that they should never return to Peloponnesus. The Athenians, to exasperate the Lacedæmonians, received them with their wives and children, and settled them in Naupactus, of which they had just before possessed themselves. The inhabitants of Megara at the same time went over from the Spartans to the Athenians. In this manner several leagues were concluded on both sides, and many battles were fought, the most famous of which was that of Tanagra in Bœotia, which Diodorus equals with those of Marathon and Plataeæ, and in which Myronides, the Athenian general, defeated the Spartans, who came to the aid of the Thebans.†

* Plut. in Cim. Thucyd. 1. i. pp. 67, 68.

† A. M. 3548. Ant. J. C. 456. Thucyd. 1. i. pp. 69-71. Diod. 1. xl. pp. 59-65.

It was on this occasion that Cimon, thinking himself dispensed from his proscription, repaired with some soldiers to his tribe to serve his country, and to fight in the Athenian army against the Lacedæmonians: but his enemies caused him to be ordered to retire. However, before he went away, he exhorted his companions, who were no less suspected than himself of favoring the Lacedæmonians, to exert themselves to the utmost, and fight with the greatest courage, to prove their innocence, and, if possible, to efface from the minds of the citizens a suspicion so injurious to them all. Accordingly those brave soldiers, to the number of one hundred, fired by his words, demanded his whole armor of him, which they placed in the centre of their little battalion, in order to have him in a manner present and before their eyes. They fought with so much valor and fury that they were all cut to pieces, to the great regret of the Athenians, who deeply repented their having accused them so unjustly.*

I omit several events of little importance.

SECTION IX.—CIMON IS RECALLED, ETC. HIS DEATH.

The Athenians, perceiving the great occasion they had for Cimon, recalled him from banishment, in which he had spent five years.† It was Pericles himself who proposed and drew up that decree; "so moderate in these times," says Plutarch, "were feuds and animosities, and so easy to be appeased, when the welfare of their country required it; and so happily did ambition, which is one of the strongest and most lively passions, yield to the necessity of the times, and comply with the occasions of the public."

The instant Cimon returned, he stifled the sparks of war which were about to break out among the Greeks, reconciled the two cities, and prevailed with them to conclude a truce for five years. And to prevent the Athenians, who were grown haughty on account of the many victories they had gained, from having an opportunity, or harboring a design of attacking their neighbors and allies, he thought it advisable to lead them at a great distance from home against the common enemy; thus endeavoring, in an honorable way, to inure the citizens to war, and enrich them at the same time. Accordingly he put to sea with a fleet of two hundred sail. He sent sixty of these into Egypt to the aid of Amyrteus, and himself sailed with the rest against the

* Plut. in Cim. p. 489.

† Idem., p. 490.

island of Cyprus.* Artabazus was at that time in those seas with a fleet of three hundred sail; and Megabyzus, the other general of Artaxerxes, with an army of three hundred thousand men, on the coast of Cilicia. As soon as the squadron which Cimon sent into Egypt had joined his fleet, he sailed and attacked Artabazus, and took one hundred of his ships. He sunk many of them, and chased the rest as far as the coast of Phœnicia. But, as if this victory had been only a prelude to a second, he made a descent on Cilicia in his return, attacked Megabyzus, defeated him, and cut to pieces a prodigious number of his troops. He afterwards returned to Cyprus with this double triumph, and laid siege to Citium, a strong city of very great importance. His design, after he had reduced that island, was to sail for Egypt, and again embroil the affairs of the barbarians; for he had very extensive views, and meditated no less a design than that of the entire subversion of the mighty empire of Persia. The rumors which prevailed, that Themistocles was to command against him, added fresh fire to his courage; and almost assured of success, he was infinitely pleased with the occasion of trying his abilities with those of that general. But we have already seen that Themistocles laid violent hands on himself about this time.

Artaxerxes, tired with a war in which he had sustained such great losses, resolved, with the advice of his counsel, to put an end to it. Accordingly he sent orders to his generals to conclude a peace with the Athenians upon the most advantageous conditions they could. Megabyzus and Artabazus sent ambassadors to Athens to propose an accommodation. Plenipotentiaries were chosen on both sides, and Callias was at the head of those of Athens. The conditions of the treaty were as follows: 1. That all the Grecian cities of Asia should enjoy their liberty, with such laws and forms of government as they should think fit to choose. 2. That no Persian ship of war should be allowed to enter the seas between the Cyanean and Chelidonian islands, that is, from the Euxine sea to the coasts of Pamphylia. 3. That no Persian general should lead any troops within three days' march of those seas. 4. That the Athenians should not invade any part of the dominions of the king of Persia. These articles being ratified by both parties, peace was proclaimed.†

* A. M. 3554. Ant. J. C. 450. Plut. in Cim. p. 490. Diod. l. xii. pp. 73, 74.

† Diod. pp. 74, 75.

Thus ended this war, which, from the burning of Sardis by the Athenians, had lasted fifty-one years, and in which infinite numbers of Persians, as well as Greeks, had perished.*

While the treaty was negotiating, Cimon died, either of sickness, or of a wound he had received at the siege of Cium. When he was near his end, he commanded his officers to sail with a fleet immediately for Athens, and to conceal his death with the utmost care. Accordingly this was executed with so much secrecy, that neither the enemy nor the allies once suspected it; and they returned safe to Athens, still under the conduct and auspices of Cimon, though he had been dead more than thirty days.

Cimon was universally regretted, which is no wonder, since he was possessed of all those qualities which dignify the soul; the most tender son; a faithful friend; zealous for the good of his country; a great politician; an accomplished general; modest when raised to the highest employments and most distinguished honors; liberal and beneficent almost to profusion; simple and averse to ostentation of every kind, even in the midst of riches and abundance; in fine, so great a lover of the poor citizens, as to share his whole estate with them, without being ashamed of such companions of his fortune.† History mentions no statues or monuments erected to his memory, nor any magnificent obsequies celebrated after his death; but the greatest honor that could be paid him, were the sighs and tears of the people; these were permanent and lasting statues, which are not subject to the inclemencies of weather or the injuries of time, and endear the memory of the good and virtuous to the remotest ages. For the most splendid mausoleums, the works of brass and marble that are raised in honor of wicked great men, are despised by posterity, as sepulchres which enclose nothing but vile dust and putrefaction.‡

What followed proved more strongly the loss which Greece had sustained by his death; for Cimon was the last of all the Grecian generals who did any thing considerable or glorious against the barbarians. Excited by the orators, who gained the strongest ascendancy over the minds of the people, and sowed the seeds of division in their public as-

* A. M. 3555. Ant. J. C. 449.

† Sic se gerendo minime est mirandum, si et vita ejus fuit secura, et mors acerba.—Corn. Nep. in Cim. c. 4.

‡ Hæ pulcherrimæ effigies et mansuræ. Nam quæ saxa struuntur, si judicium posterorum in odium vertit pro sepulchris spernuntur.—Tacit. Annal. l. 4 c. 38.

semblies, they turned their animosity against each other, and at last proceeded to open war, the fatal consequences of which no one endeavored to prevent; a circumstance that was of great advantage to the king of Persia, and the utmost prejudice to the affairs of Greece.

SECTION X.—THUCYDIDES IS OPPOSED TO PERICLES, ETC.

The nobles of Athens, seeing Pericles raised to the highest degree of power, and far above all the rest of the citizens, resolved to oppose him with a man, who, in some measure, might make head against him, and prevent his authority from growing up to monarchy. Accordingly they opposed him with Thucydides, Cimon's brother-in-law, a man who had displayed his wisdom on numberless occasions. He, indeed, did not possess military talents in so eminent a degree as Pericles; but then he had as great an influence over the people, shaping their opinions, and directing their assemblies as he pleased: and as he never stirred out of the city, but continually combated Pericles in all his designs, he soon restored things to an equilibrium. On the other side, Pericles was solicitous of pleasing the people on all occasions, and slackened the rein more than ever, entertaining them as often as possible with shows, festivals, games, and other diversions.*

He found means to maintain, during eight months in the year, a great number of poor citizens, by putting them on board a fleet consisting of sixty ships, which he fitted out every year; and thereby did his country an important service, by training up a great number of seamen for its defence; he also planted several colonies in Chersonesus, in Naxos, in Andros, and among the Bisaltæ in Thrace. There was a very noble one in Italy, of which we shall soon have occasion to speak, and which built Thurium. Pericles had different views in settling those colonies, besides the particular design he might have of gaining the affections of the people by that means. His chief motives were, to clear the city of a great number of idle persons, who were ever ready to disturb the government; to relieve the wants of the lowest class of people, who before were unable to subsist themselves; in fine, to awe the allies, by settling native Athenians among them as so many garrisons, which might prevent their engaging in any measure contrary to the interests of the people. The Romans acted in the same manner; and it

* Plut. in Pericl. pp. 158-161.

may be said that so wise a policy was one of the most effectual methods used by them to secure the tranquillity of the state.

But the circumstances which did Pericles the greatest honor in the opinion of the people, was his adorning the city with magnificent edifices and other works, which raised the admiration and astonishment of all foreigners, and gave them a high idea of the power of the Athenians. It is surprising that, in so short a space, so many works of architecture, sculpture, engraving, and painting, should have been performed, and at the same time carried to the highest perfection; for it is generally found, that edifices raised in haste boast neither a solid and durable grace, nor the regularity required in works of an exquisitely beautiful kind. Commonly, nothing but length of time, joined to assiduous labor, can give them such a strength as may preserve, and make them triumph over ages; and this raises our wonder still more in regard to the works of Pericles, which were finished with so much rapidity, and yet subsisted through so great a length of time. For each of those works, the very instant it was finished, had the beauty of an antique; and at this time, *i. e.*, "above five hundred years after," says Plutarch, "they retained a freshness and youth as if just finished by the artist; so happily do they preserve the graces and charms of novelty, which will not suffer time to diminish their lustre; as if an ever-blooming spirit, and a soul exempt from age, were diffused into every part of those works.

But that circumstance, which excited the admiration of the whole world, raised the jealousy of the people against Pericles. His enemies were for ever crying aloud in the assemblies, that it was dishonorable to the Athenians to appropriate to themselves the bank of all Greece, which he had sent for from Delos where it had been deposited; that the allies must necessarily consider such an attempt as a manifest tyranny, when they found that the sums which had been extorted from them, upon pretence of their being employed in the war, were laid out by the Athenians in gilding and embellishing their city, in making magnificent statues, and raising temples that cost millions. They did not exaggerate on these occasions; for the temple of Minerva, alone, called the Parthenon, had cost three millions of livres.*

Pericles, on the contrary, remonstrated to the Athenians, that they were obliged to give the allies an account of the

* About \$641,444.

moneys they had received from them : that it was enough they defended them from the barbarians, whom they had repulsed, while the allies furnished neither soldiers, horses, nor ships ; and were excused for some sums of money, which, from the instant they were paid in, were no longer the property of the donors, but of those who received them, provided they performed the conditions agreed upon, and in consideration of which they were received. He added, that as the Athenians were sufficiently provided with all things necessary for war, it was but just that they should employ the rest of their riches in edifices and other works, which, when finished, would give immortal glory to their city ; and the whole time they were carrying on, diffused a plenty of all things, and gave bread to an infinite number of citizens : that they had themselves all kinds of materials, as timber, stone, brass, ivory, gold, ebony, and cyprus wood ; and all sorts of artificers capable of working them, as carpenters, masons, smiths, stone-cutters, dyers, goldsmiths ; artificers in ebony, painters, embroiderers, and turners ; men fit to conduct their naval affairs, as merchants, sailors, and experienced pilots ; others for land-carriage, as cartwrights, waggoners, carters, rope-makers, pavers, etc. That it was for the advantage of the state to employ the different artificers and workmen, who, as so many separate bodies, formed, when united, a kind of peaceable and domestic army, whose different functions and employments diffused gain and increase among all sexes and ages : lastly, that while men of robust bodies, and of an age fit to bear arms, whether soldiers or mariners, and those who were in the different garrisons, were supported with the public moneys, it was but just that the rest of the people who lived in the city should also be maintained in their way ; and that, as all were members of the same republic, they all should reap the same advantages, by doing it services, which, though of a different kind, did however all contribute to its security or ornament.

One day, as the debates were growing warm, Pericles offered to defray the expense of all these things, provided it should be declared in the public inscription, that he only had been at the charge of them. At these words the people, either admiring his magnanimity, or fired with emulation, and determined not to let him engross that glory, cried with one voice, that he might take out of the public treasury all the sums necessary for his purpose.

Phidias, the celebrated sculptor, presided over all these

works, as director-general. It was he who particularly cast the gold and ivory statue representing Pallas, which was so highly valued by all the judges of antiquity.* There arose an incredible ardor and emulation among the several artificers, who all strove to excel each other, and immortalize their names by master-pieces of art.

The Odeon, or music-theatre, which had a great number of seats and columns within it, and whose roof grew narrower by degrees, and terminated in a point, was built, as history informs us, after the model of Xerxes's tent, according to the direction of Pericles. It was at that time he proposed, with great warmth, a decree, by which it was ordained that musical games should be celebrated on the festival called Panathenæa; and having been chosen the judge and distributor of the prizes, he regulated the manner in which musicians should play on the flute and lyre, as well as sing. From that time, the musical games were always exhibited in this theatre.

I have already taken notice, that the more the beauty and splendor of these works were admired, the greater envy and clamor were raised against Pericles. The orators of the opposite faction were continually exclaiming against him, and tearing his character to pieces; accusing him of squandering the public moneys, and laying out very unseasonably the revenues of the state in edifices, whose magnificence was of no use. At last the rupture between him and Thucydides rose to such a height, that one or the other must necessarily be banished by the ostracism. He got the better of Thucydides, prevailed in having him banished, by that means crushed the faction which opposed him, and obtained a despotic authority over the city and government of Athens. He now disposed at pleasure of the public moneys, troops, and ships. The land and sea were subject to him; and he reigned singly and alone in that wide domain, which extended, not only over the Greeks, but the barbarians also, and which was cemented and strengthened by the obedience and fidelity of the conquered nations, by the friendship of kings, and treaties concluded with various princes.

Historians expatiate greatly on the magnificent edifices and other works with which Pericles adorned Athens, and I have related faithfully their testimony; but I cannot say whether the complaints and murmurs raised against him were

* Non Minervæ Athenis factæ amplitudine utemur, cum ea sit cubitorum xxvi. Ebre hæc et auro constat.—Plin. l. xxxvi. c. 5. This statue was twenty-six cubits in height.

very ill grounded. And indeed, was it just in him to expend in superfluous buildings and vain decorations, the immense sums* intended for carrying on the war ; and would it not have been better to have released the allies from part of the contributions, which, in his administration, were raised to a third part more than before? According to Cicero, such edifices and other works only are worthy of admiration as are of use to the public, as aqueducts, city walls, citadels, arsenals, sea-ports ; and to these we must add the works made by Pericles, to join Athens to the port of Piræus.† But Cicero observes, at the same time, that Pericles was blamed for squandering away the public treasure, merely to embellish the city with superfluous ornaments. Plato, who formed a judgment of things, not from their outward splendor, but from truth, observes, after his master Socrates, that Pericles, with all his grand edifices and other works, had not improved the mind of one of the citizens in virtue, but rather corrupted the purity and simplicity of their ancient manners.‡

SECTION XI.—PERICLES CHANGES HIS CONDUCT WITH REGARD TO THE PEOPLE.

When Pericles saw himself invested with the whole authority, he began to change his behavior. He was no longer mild and tractable as before, and ceased to submit or abandon himself to the whims and caprice of the people, as to so many winds ; but drawing in, says Plutarch, the reins of this too loose popular government, in the same manner as we screw up the strings of an instrument when too slack, he changed it into an aristocracy, or rather a kind of monarchy, without departing from the public good. Choosing always what was most expedient, and becoming irreproachable in all things, he gained so powerful an ascendancy over the minds of the people, that he turned and directed them at pleasure. Sometimes, by his bare counsel, and by persuasive methods, he would win them over gently to his will, and gain their assent spontaneously ; at other times, when he found them obstinate, he would in a manner drag them forward against their will to those things that were for their good ; imitating on this occasion a skilful physician, who, in a tedious and stubborn disease, knows what times are proper for him to indulge his patient in innocent medicaments

* They amounted to upwards of ten millions, French money, or \$1,875,000.

† *Offic.* l. ii. p. 60.

‡ In *Gorg.* p. 515. In *Alcib.* c. i. p. 119.

that are pleasing ; in order afterwards to administer those of a strong and violent nature, which indeed put him to pain, but are alone capable of restoring his health.*

And, indeed, it is manifest that the utmost skill and abilities were required to manage and govern a populace haughty from their power, and exceedingly capricious ; and on this occasion Pericles succeeded wonderfully. He used to employ, according to the different situation of things, sometimes hope, and at other times fear, either to check the wild transports and starts of the people, or to raise them when dejected and desponding. By this conduct he showed that eloquence, as Plato observes, is the only art of directing the minds of the people at will ; and that the chief excellency of this art consists in moving seasonably the various passions, whether gentle or violent ; which being to the soul what strings are to a musical instrument, need only to be touched by an ingenious and skilful hand to produce their effect.

It must nevertheless be confessed that the circumstance which gave Pericles this great authority, was not only the force of his eloquence, but, as Thucydides observes, the reputation of his life, and great probity.

Plutarch points out in Pericles one quality which is very essential to statesmen ; a quality well adapted to win the esteem and confidence of the public, and which supposes a great superiority of mind ; and that is, for a man to be fully persuaded that he wants the counsel of others, and is not able to manage and direct all things alone ; to associate with himself persons of merit in his labors, to employ each of these according to his talents ; and to leave the management of small matters which only consume time, and deprive him of the liberty of mind so necessary in the conduct of important affairs. Such conduct, says Plutarch, is productive of two advantages. First, it extinguishes or at least breaks the force of envy and jealousy, by dividing, in some measure, a power which is grating and offensive to us when we see it united in one single person, as if all merit centered in him alone. Secondly, it advances and facilitates the execution of affairs, and makes their success more certain. Plutarch, the better to explain his thoughts, employs a very natural and beautiful comparison. "The hand," says he, "which, from its being divided into five fingers, so far from being weaker, is the stronger, more active, and better adapted to motion

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 161.

on that very account." It is the same with a statesman, who has the skill to divide his cares and functions in a proper manner, and who by that means makes his authority more active, more extensive and decisive, whereas the indiscreet fire of a narrow-minded man, who takes umbrage at, and is for engrossing all things, serves no other purpose than to set his weakness and incapacity in a stronger light, and to disconcert his affairs. But Pericles, says Plutarch, did not act in this manner. Like a skilful pilot, who though he stands almost motionless himself, yet puts every thing in motion, and will sometimes seat subaltern officers at the helm: so Pericles was the soul of the government; and, seeming to do nothing of himself, he actuated and governed all things; employing the eloquence of one man, the credit and interest of another, the prudence of a third, the bravery and courage of a fourth, and so on.*

To what has been here related, we may add another quality which is no less rare and valuable: I mean, a noble and disinterested soul. Pericles had so great a disinclination to receiving gifts, so utter a contempt for riches, and was so far above all rapaciousness and avarice, that, though he had raised Athens to the richest and most flourishing state; though his power had surpassed that of many tyrants and kings; though he had long disposed in an absolute manner of the treasures of Greece, he did not, however, add a single drachm to the estate he inherited from his father. This was the source, the true cause, of the supreme authority of Pericles in the republic; the just and merited reward of his integrity and perfect disinterestedness.†

It was not only for a few short moments, nor during the first heats of favor, which are generally short-lived, that he preserved his authority. He maintained it forty years, notwithstanding the opposition of Cimon, of Tolmides, of Thucydides, and many others, who all declared against him; and of these forty years, he spent fifteen without a rival, from the banishment of Thucydides, and disposed all affairs with absolute power. Nevertheless, in the midst of this supreme authority, which he had rendered perpetual and unlimited in his own person, his soul was always superior to the charms and allurements of wealth, though he never neglected improving his estate to the utmost of his power. For Pericles did not act like those rich men, who, notwithstanding their immense revenues, either through negligence or want of

* Plut. in Præc. de Rep. Ger. p. 812.

† Plut. in Vit. pp. 161, 162.

economy, or the expenses of pride and folly, are always poor in the midst of their riches; unable and unwilling to do the least service to their virtuous friends, or their faithful and zealous domestics; and at last die in every one's debt, whence their name and memory are had in the utmost detestation by their unfortunate creditors. I shall not expatiate on another extreme, to which this negligence and want of economy generally lead, I mean rapine, a love of gifts and exactions; for here, as well as in the management of the public moneys, the maxim of Tacitus may be applied, viz.: that when a man has squandered away his estate, he then makes it his whole study to retrieve the loss of it by all means, not excepting the most criminal.*

Pericles knew much better the use a statesman should make of his riches. He was sensible that he ought to expend them in the service of the public, in procuring able men to assist him in the administration; in relieving good officers, who too often are in unhappy circumstances; and in rewarding and encouraging merit of every kind, and a thousand such things; to which, doubtless, either on account of the exquisite joy they give, or the solid glory that results from them, no one will be so thoughtless, as to compare the expenses lavished away in entertainments, equipages, or gaming. In this view Pericles managed his estate with the utmost economy; having himself taught one of his old servants to take care of his domestic concerns; and he always had the account brought him, at stated times, of all things that had been received as well as expended; confining himself and his family to a decent subsistence (from which he excluded rigidly all superfluities of a vain and ostentatious kind), suitable to his estate and condition. This way of life did by no means please his children when they were come to years of maturity, and much less his wife. They thought Pericles did not live at sufficient expense for persons of their rank; and murmured at that low, sordid economy, as they called it, which carried no air of the plenty which generally reigned in houses where riches and authority are united. Pericles, however, paid little regard to these complaints, and directed his view to things of much greater importance.

I believe it will not be improper to apply on this occasion, a very just remark of Plutarch, in his parallel of Aristides and Cato. After saying that political virtue, or the art

* Si ambitione ærarium exhauserimus per scelus supplendum erit.—
Tacit. Annal. l. ii. c. 38

of governing cities and kingdoms, is the greatest and most perfect that man can acquire, he adds that economy is not one of the most inconsiderable branches of this virtue. And indeed, as riches are one of the means which may most contribute to the security or ruin of a state, the art that teaches to dispose of, and make a good use of them, and which is called economy, is certainly a branch of the art of policy, and not one of the most inconsiderable branches of it, since great wisdom is required, in order to observe a just medium on these occasions, and to banish poverty and too great opulence from a country. It is this art, which, avoiding industriously all trifling and needless expenses, prevents a magistrate from being forced to overburden a people with taxes; and keeps always in reserve, in the public coffers, moneys sufficient for carrying on wars that may break out, or for providing against any unforeseen accident. Now what is said of a kingdom, or of a city, may be applied to particular persons. For a city, which is composed of an assemblage of houses, and which forms a whole of several parts united, is either powerful or weak when taken together, in proportion as all the members of which it consists are powerful or weak. Pericles certainly acquitted himself well with regard to that part of this science which relates to the government of a family; but I do not know whether the same may be said of his administration of the public revenues.

SECTION XII.—JEALOUSY AND CONTESTS ARISE BETWEEN THE ATHENIANS AND LACEDÆMONIANS.

Such was the conduct of Pericles with respect to his domestic concerns:* and he was no less famous for his administration of public affairs. The Lacedæmonians beginning to grow jealous of the prosperity of the Athenians, and to take umbrage at it, Pericles, to inspire his citizens with greater courage and magnanimity, published a decree, importing that orders should be sent to all the Greeks, inhabiting either Europe or Asia, and all the cities great or small, to send immediately their deputies or representatives to Athens, to examine and debate on ways and means to rebuild the temples that had been burnt by the barbarians; to perform the sacrifices, which they had engaged themselves to offer up, for the preservation and safety of Greece, when

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 162.

war was carrying on against them : as also, to determine on the expedients necessary for establishing such an order and discipline in their navy, that all ships might sail in safety, and the Greeks live in peace one with another.

Accordingly twenty persons were chosen for this embassy, each of whom was upwards of fifty years old. Five of these were sent to the Ionians and Dorians of Asia, and the inhabitants of the islands as far as Lesbos and Rhodes ; five to the countries of the Hellespont and Thrace, as far as Byzantium. Five were ordered to go Bœotia, to Phocis, and to Peloponnesus ; and from thence by the country of the Locrians, to proceed to the several cities of the upper continent, as far as Acarnania and Ambracia. The last five were ordered to cross Eubœa, and to go to the people of mount Ceta, and those of the gulf of Malea, and to the inhabitants of Phthiotis, of Achaia, and of Thessaly ; and to induce the several nations to come to the assembly convened at Athens, and to assist at the debates which should be there carried on, concerning peace, and the general affairs of Greece. I judged it necessary to enter into this detail, as it shows how far the power of the Greeks extended, and the authority which the Athenians enjoyed among them.

But all these solicitations were in vain ; as the cities did not send their deputies, which, according to historians, was owing to the opposition made by the Lacedæmonians, a circumstance we are not to wonder at. They were sensible that the design of Pericles was to have Athens acknowledged as mistress and sovereign of all the other Grecian cities ; and Lacedæmon was far from allowing her that honor. A secret spirit of dissension had, for some years, begun to disturb the tranquillity of Greece ; and we shall find by the sequel, that this discord augmented continually.

Pericles had acquired great fame for the wisdom with which he formed and conducted his enterprises. The troops reposed the highest confidence in him, and whenever they followed him, assured themselves of success. His chief maxim of war was, never to venture a battle unless he was almost certain of victory, and not to lavish the blood of the citizens. He used to say frequently, that were it in his power, they should be immortal ; that when trees were felled, they shoot to life again in a little time, but when men once die, they are lost for ever. A victory that was only the effect of happy temerity, appeared to him to merit but little praise, though it was often much admired.

His expedition into the Thracian Chersonesus did him great honor, and was of great advantage to all the Greeks of that country ; for he not only strengthened the Grecian cities of that peninsula, by the colonies of Athenians which he carried thither, but also shut up the isthmus with a strong wall, and with forts at proper distances from sea to sea ; by that means securing the whole country from the perpetual incursions of the Thracians, who were very near neighbors to it.

He also sailed with a hundred ships round Peloponnesus, spreading the terror of the Athenian arms wherever he came, the success of which was not once interrupted on this occasion.

He advanced as far as the kingdom of Pontus with a large, well-manned and magnificent fleet ; and granted the Grecian cities all they thought fit to ask of him. At the same time he displayed to the barbarian nations in that neighborhood, and to their kings and princes, the greatness of the power of the Athenians, and proved to them, by the security with which he sailed to all parts, that they possessed the empire of the seas without a rival.

But so constant and such brilliant success began to dazzle the eyes of the Athenians. Intoxicated with the idea of their power and grandeur, they now resolved on the boldest and most lofty projects. They were for ever speaking of new attempts upon Egypt ; of attacking the maritime provinces of the great king ; of carrying their arms into Sicily, a fatal and unhappy design, which at that time did not take effect, though it was revived soon after ; and to extend their conquests towards Etruria on one side, and Carthage on the other. Pericles was far from encouraging such extravagant designs, or supporting them with his influence and approbation. On the contrary, his whole study was to damp that restless ardor, and check an ambition which no longer knew either bounds or measure. It was his opinion that the Athenians ought to employ their forces for the future, only in securing and preserving their present acquisitions ; and he thought he had gained a great point, in restraining the power of the Lacedæmonians, the reducing of which he always meditated ; and this was particularly seen in the sacred war.*

This name was given to the war which was raised on account of Delphos. The Lacedæmonians, having entered

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 164.

armed into the country where that temple is situated, had dispossessed the people of Phocis of the superintendence of that temple, and bestowed it on the Delphians. As soon as they left it, Pericles went thither with an army, and restored the Phocians.*

The Eubœans having rebelled at the same time, Pericles was obliged to march thither with an army. He was no sooner arrived there, than the news was brought that the inhabitants of Megara had taken up arms; and that the Lacedæmonians, headed by Plistonax their king, were on the frontiers of Attica. This obliged him to quit Eubœa, and to go with all possible expedition to defend his country. The Lacedæmonian army being retired, he returned against the rebels, and again subjected all the cities of Eubœa to the Athenians.

After this expedition, a truce for thirty years was concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. This treaty restored tranquillity for the present: but as it did not descend to the root of the evil, nor cure the jealousy and enmity of the two nations, the calm was not of long duration.†

SECTION XIII.—NEW SUBJECTS OF CONTENTION BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS.

The Athenians, six years after, took up arms against Samos in favor of Miletus. These two cities were contesting for that of Priene, to which each claimed a right. It is pretended that Pericles fomented this war to please a famous courtesan, of whom he was very fond: her name was Aspasia, a native of Miletus. After several events and battles, Pericles besieged the capital of the island of Samos. It is said that this was the first time he used military engines, as battering-rams and tortoises, invented by Artemon the engineer, who was lame, and therefore was always carried in a chair to the batteries; whence he was surnamed Periphoretus. The use of these machines had long been known in the East. The Samians, after sustaining a siege of nine months, surrendered; Pericles demolished their walls, dispossessed them of their ships, and demanded immense sums to defray the expenses of the war. Part of this sum they paid down; agreed to disburse the rest at a cer-

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 164.

† A. M. 3558. Ant. J. C. 446. Thucyd. l. 1. p. 75. Diod. p. 87.

tain time, and gave hostages by way of security for the payment.*

After the reduction of Samos, Pericles being returned to Athens, buried in a splendid manner all who had lost their lives in this war, and pronounced in person the funeral oration over their graves. This custom, which he first introduced, was afterwards regularly observed. The senate of the Areopagus always appointed the orator on these occasions. He was chosen, ten years after, for the like ceremony, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

Pericles, who foresaw that a rupture would soon ensue between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, advised the former to send aid to the people of Coreyra, whom the Corinthians had invaded; and to win over to their interest that island, which was so very formidable at sea: foretelling them that they should be attacked by the Peloponnesians. The occasion of the quarrel between the people of Coreyra and Corinth, which gave rise to that of Peloponnesus, one of the most considerable events in the Grecian history, was as follows.†

Epidamnum, ‡ a maritime city of Macedonia among the Taulantians, was a colony of Coreyrans, founded by Phalius of Corinth. This city growing in time very large and populous, divisions arose in it, and the common people expelled the most wealthy inhabitants, who went over to the neighboring nations, and infested them greatly with their incursions. In this extremity they first had recourse to the Coreyrans, and being refused by them, they addressed the Corinthians, who took them under their protection, sent succors to, and settled other inhabitants in it. But they did not continue long unmolested there, the Coreyrans besieged it with a large fleet. The people of Corinth hastened to its aid, but having been defeated at sea, the city surrendered that very day, upon condition that the foreigners should be slaves, and the Corinthians prisoners, till farther orders. The Coreyrans erected a trophy, murdered all their prisoners except the Corinthians, and laid waste the whole country.

The year after the battle, the Corinthians raised a greater army than the former, and fitted out a new fleet. The people of Coreyra, finding it would be impossible for them

* A. M. 3564. Ant. J. C. 440. Thucyd. 1. i. pp. 75, 76. Diod. 1. xii. pp. 88, 89. Plut. in Pericl. pp. 165-167.

† A. M. 3572. Ant. J. C. 432. Thucyd. 1. i. pp. 17-37. Diod. 1. xii. pp. 90-93. Plut. in Pericl. p. 167.

‡ This city was afterwards called Dyrrachium.

alone to resist such powerful enemies, sent to the Athenians to desire their alliance. The treaty of peace, concluded between the states of Greece, left such Grecian cities as had not declared themselves, the liberty of joining whom they pleased, or of standing neutral. This the Coreyrans had hitherto done; judging it their interest not to espouse any party; in consequence of which they had hitherto been without allies. They now sent for this purpose to Athens, which coming to the knowledge of the Corinthians, they also sent deputies thither. The affair was debated with great warmth in presence of the people, who heard the reasons on both sides, and it was twice to the vote in the assembly. The Athenians declared the first time in favor of the Corinthians; but afterwards changing their opinion (doubtless on the remonstrances of Pericles), they received the Coreyrans into their alliance. However, they did not go so far as to conclude a league offensive and defensive with them, for they could not declare war against Corinth, without breaking at the same time with all Peloponnesus; but only agreed to succor each other mutually, in case they should be attacked, either personally, or in their allies. Their real design was, to set these two states, very powerful by sea, at variance; and after each should have exhausted the other by a tedious war, to triumph over the weakest: for, at that time, there were but three states in Greece, who possessed powerful fleets; and these were, Athens, Corinth, and Coreyra. They also had a design on Italy and Sicily, which their taking the island of Coreyra would very much promote.

On this plan they concluded an alliance with the Coreyrans, and accordingly sent them ten galleys, but with an order for them not to engage the Corinthians, unless they should first invade the island of Coreyra, or some other place belonging to their allies; this precaution was used, in order that the articles of the truce might not be infringed.

But it was very difficult to obey their orders. A battle was fought between the Coreyrans and the Corinthians near the island of Sybota, opposite to Coreyra. It was one of the most considerable, with regard to the number of ships, that ever was fought between the Greeks. The advantage was almost equal on both sides. About the end of the battle, as night was drawing on, twenty Athenian galleys came up. The Coreyrans, with this reinforcement, sailed the next morning by daybreak towards the port of Sybota,

whither the Corinthians had retired, to see if they would venture a second engagement. The latter, however, contented themselves with sailing away in order of battle without fighting. Both parties erected a trophy in the island of Sybota, each claiming the victory to themselves.

From this war arose another, which occasioned an open rupture between the Athenians and Corinthians, and afterwards the war of Peloponnesus. Potidæa, a city of Macedonia, was a colony belonging to the Corinthians, which sent magistrates thither annually; but it was dependent at that time on Athens, and paid tribute to it. The Athenians, fearing this city would revolt, and prevail with the rest of the Thracian allies to join them, commanded the inhabitants to demolish their walls on the side next Pallene; to deliver hostages to them as sureties for their fidelity; and to send back the magistrates which Corinth had given them.* Demands of so unjust a nature only fomented the revolt. The Potidæans declared against the Athenians, and several neighboring cities followed their example. Both Athens and Corinth armed and sent forces thither. The two armies engaged near Potidæa, and that of the Athenians had the advantage. Alcibiades, who was then very young, and Socrates, his master, signalized themselves on this occasion. It is something very singular, to see a philosopher put on his coat of mail, as well as to consider his behavior and conduct in a battle. There was not a soldier in the whole army who so resolutely supported all the toils and fatigues of the campaign as Socrates. Hunger, thirst and cold, were enemies he had long accustomed himself to despise and subdue with ease. Thrace, the scene of this expedition, was a frozen region. While the other soldiers, covered with thick clothes and warm furs lay close in their tents, and scarcely ever dared to stir out of them, Socrates used to come into the open air as thin clad as usual, and barefooted. His gayety and wit were the life of all tables, and induced others to push the glass round cheerfully, though he himself never drank wine to excess. When the armies engaged, he performed his duty to a miracle. Alcibiades having been thrown down and wounded, Socrates placed himself before him, defended him valiantly, and, in sight of the whole army, prevented him and his arms from being taken by the enemy. The prize of valor was justly due to Socrates; but as the generals seemed inclined to decree it

* Thucyd. l. i. pp. 37-42. Diod. l. xii. pp. 93, 94.

to Alcibiades, on account of his illustrious birth, Socrates, who only sought for opportunities to inflame him with desire of true glory, contributed more than any other person, by the eulogy he made on his courage, to cause the crown and complete suit of armor, which was the prize of valor, to be adjudged to Alcibiades.*

Notwithstanding the loss which the Corinthians had sustained in the battle, the inhabitants of Potidæa did not change their conduct. The city was therefore besieged. The Corinthians fearing to lose a place of so much importance, addressed their allies in the strongest terms; who all in conjunction with them, sent a deputation to Lacedæmon, to complain of the Athenians as having infringed the articles of peace. The Lacedæmonians admitted them to audience in one of their ordinary assemblies. The people of Ægina, though very much disgusted at the Athenians, did not send a deputation publicly thither, for fear of giving umbrage to a republic to which they were subject; but they acted in secret as strenuously as the rest. The Megarians complained vehemently against the Athenians, that, contrary to the law of nations, and in violation of the treaty concluded between the Greeks, they had prohibited them, by a public decree, access to their fairs and markets, and excluded them from all the ports dependent on them.† By that decree, according to Plutarch,‡ the Athenians declared an eternal and irreconcilable hatred against Megara; and ordained that all Megarians should be put to death that set foot in Athens; and that all the Athenian generals, when they took the usual oath, should swear expressly that they would send a body of soldiers twice a year, to lay waste the territories of that hostile city.§

The chief complaints were made by the Corinthian ambassador, who spoke with the utmost force and freedom. He represented to the Lacedæmonians, that as they themselves never swerved from the most inviolable integrity, either in public or private transactions, they, for that very reason, were less suspicious of the probity of others; and

* Plut. in Conviv. pp. 219, 220. Plut. in Alcib. p. 194.

† Thucyd. l. i. pp. 43-59.

‡ According to Plutarch, some persons pretended that Pericles had caused this decree to be enacted, to revenge the private injury done to Aspasia, from whose house the people of Megara had carried off two courtezans; and he cites some verses of Aristophanes, who, in a comedy entitled the Acharnians, reproaches Pericles with this action. But Thucydides, a contemporary author, and who was very well acquainted with all the transactions of Athens, does not say a word of this affair; and he is much more worthy of belief than a poet who was a professed slanderer and satirist.

§ Plut. in Pericl. p. 168.

that their own moderation prevented their discovering the ambition of their enemies: that instead of flying with instant activity to meet dangers and calamities, they never attempted to remedy them, till they were quite crushed by them: that by their indolence and supineness, they had given the Athenians an opportunity of attaining, by insensible degrees, their present height of grandeur and power. That it was quite different with regard to the Athenians. "That this active, vigilant, and indefatigable people, were never at rest themselves, nor would suffer any other nation to be so. Employed," says he, "wholly in their projects, they form only such as are of the greatest and most intrepid nature: their deliberations are speedy, and their execution the same. One enterprise serves only as a step to a second. Whether they are successful or unfortunate, they turn every thing to their advantage; and never stop in their career, or are discouraged. But you, who are oppressed by such formidable enemies, are lulled asleep in a fatal tranquillity; and do not reflect, that a man who desires to live calm and at ease, must not only forbear injuring others, but also hinder any one from injuring himself; and that justice consists not only in forbearing to commit evil ourselves, but in avenging that done to others. Shall I be so free as to say it? Your integrity is of too antique a cast for the present state of affairs. It is necessary for men, in politics as well as in all other things, to conform always to the times. When a people are at peace, they may follow their ancient maxims; but when they are involved in a variety of difficulties, they must try expedients, and set every engine at work to extricate themselves. It was by these arts that the Athenians have increased their power so much. Had you imitated their activity, they would not have dispossessed us of Coreyra, and would not now be laying siege to Potidæa. Follow their example on this occasion, by succoring the Potidæans and the rest of your allies, as your duty obliges you; and do not force your friends and neighbors, by forsaking them, to have recourse out of despair to other powers."

The Athenian ambassador, who had come to Sparta upon other affairs, and was in the assembly, did not think it advisable to let this speech go unanswered; but put the Lacedæmonians in mind of the still recent services that the republic, by which he was sent, had done to all Greece, which, he said, merited some regard; and that therefore it

ought not to be envied, much less should endeavors be used to lessen its power. That the Athenians should not be charged with having usurped an empire over Greece; since it was merely at the entreaty of their allies, and in some measure with the consent of Sparta, that they had been forced to take the abandoned helm; that those who murmured did it without grounds, and only from the aversion which mankind in general have to dependance and subjection, though of the gentlest and most equitable kind; that he exhorted them to employ a sufficient time in deliberating before they came to a resolution, and not involve themselves and all Greece in a war, which would necessarily be attended with the most fatal consequences. That gentle methods might be found for terminating the differences of the allies, without coming at once to open violence. However, that the Athenians, in case of an invasion, were able to oppose force with force, and would prepare for a vigorous defence, after having invoked against Sparta the deities who take vengeance on those who forswear themselves, and who violate the faith of treaties.

The ambassadors having withdrawn, and the affair being debated, the majority were for war. But before it passed into an act, Archidamus, king of Sparta, setting himself above those prejudices which so strongly biassed the rest, and directing his views to futurity, made a speech, in which he set forth the dreadful consequences of the war, in which they were about to embark; showed the strength of the Athenians; exhorted them first to try gentle methods, which they themselves had seemed to approve; but to make, in the mean time the necessary preparations for carrying-on so important an enterprise, and not to be under any apprehension, that their moderation and delays would be branded with the name of cowardice, since their past actions secured them from any suspicion of that kind.

But, notwithstanding all these wise expostulations, a war was resolved on. The people caused the allies to return into the assembly, and declared to them, that in their opinion the Athenians were the aggressors; but that it would be expedient first to assemble all those who were in the alliance, in order that peace or war might be agreed upon unanimously. This decree of the Lacedæmonians was made in the fourteenth year of the truce, and was not owing so much to the complaints of the allies, as to the jealousy of the Athenian power, which had already subjected a considerable part of Greece.

Accordingly, the allies were convened a second time. They all gave their votes, in their several turns, from the greatest city to the least, and war was resolved on by general consent. However, as they had not yet made any preparations, it was judged advisable to begin them immediately; and while this was doing, in order to gain time, and observe the necessary formalities, to send ambassadors to Athens, to complain of the violation of the treaty.*

The first who was sent thither revived an ancient complaint, which required from the Athenians to expel from their city the descendants of those who had profaned the temple of Minerva in the affair of Cylon.† As Pericles was of that family by the mother's side, the purpose of the Lacedæmonians, in their making this demand, was either to procure his banishment or lessen his authority. However, it was not complied with. The second ambassadors required that the siege of Potidæa should be raised, and the liberty of Ægina restored, and above all, that the decree against the Megarians should be repealed; declaring, that otherwise no accommodation could take place. In fine, a third ambassador came, who took no notice of any of these particulars, but only said that the Lacedæmonians were for peace; but that this could never be except the Athenians should cease to infringe the liberties of Greece.

SECTION XIV.—TROUBLES EXCITED AGAINST PERICLES, ETC.

Pericles opposed all these demands with great vigor, and especially that relating to the Megarians.‡ He had great influence in Athens, and at the same time had many enemies. Not daring to attack him first in person, they cited his most intimate friends, and those for whom he had the greatest esteem, as Phidias, Aspasia, and Anaxagoras, before the people; and their design in this was to sound how the people stood towards Pericles himself.

Phidias was accused of having embezzled considerable sums in casting the statue of Minerva, which was his masterpiece. The prosecution having been carried on with the usual forms, before the assembly of the people, not a single proof of Phidias's pretended embezzlement appeared; for

* Thucyd. l. i. pp. 77-83, et 93.

† This Cylon seized on the citadel of Athens above one hundred years before. Those who followed him, being besieged in it, and reduced to extreme famine, fled for shelter to the temple of Minerva: where they afterwards were taken out by force, and cut to pieces. Those who advised this murder were declared guilty of impiety and sacrilege, and as such banished. They were, however, recalled some time after.

‡ Plut. in Pericl. 168, 169.

that artist, on beginning the statue, had, by the advice of Pericles, contrived the workmanship of the gold in such a manner, that all of it might be taken off and weighed; which accordingly Pericles bid the informers do in presence of all the spectators. But Phidias had witnesses against him, the truth of whose evidence he could neither dispute nor silence; these were the fame and beauty of his works, the ever-existing causes of the envy which attacked him. The circumstance which they could least forgive in him was, his having represented to the life in the battle of the Amazons, engraved on the shield of the goddess, his own person, and that of Pericles: * and, by an imperceptible art, he had so blended and incorporated these figures with the whole work, that it was impossible to erase them, without disfiguring and taking to pieces the whole statue. Phidias was therefore dragged to prison, where he came to his end, either by the common course of nature or by poison. Other authors say that he was only banished, and that after his exile he made the famous statue of Jupiter at Olympia. It is not possible to excuse in any manner the ingratitude of the Athenians, in thus making a prison or death the reward of a masterpiece of art; nor their excessive rigor, in punishing, as a capital crime, an action that appears innocent in itself; or, which, to make the worst of it, was a vanity very pardonable in so great an artist.

Aspasia, a native of Miletus in Asia, had settled in Athens, where she was become very famous, not so much for the charms of her person, as for her vivacity and solidity of wit, and her great knowledge. All the illustrious men in the city thought it an honor to frequent her house. Socrates himself used to visit her constantly; and was not ashamed to pass for her pupil, and to own that he had learned rhetoric from her. Pericles declared also, that he was obliged to Aspasia for his eloquence, which so greatly distinguished him in Athens; and that it was from her conversation he had imbibed the principles of the art of policy; for she was exceedingly well versed in the maxims of government. Their intimacy was owing to still greater motives. Pericles did not love his wife; he resigned her very freely to another man, and supplied her place with Aspasia, whom he loved passionately, though her reputation was more than suspicious. Aspasia was therefore accused of impiety and dissolute conduct; and it was with the utmost difficulty that Pericles

* Aristot. in *Tractat de Mund.* p. 613.

saved her, by his entreaties, and by the compassion he had raised in the judges, by shedding abundance of tears while her cause was pleading; a behavior little consistent with the dignity of his character, and the rank of the supreme head of the most powerful state of Greece.*

A decree had passed, by which informations were ordered to be taken out against all such persons as denied what was ascribed to the ministry of the gods; or those philosophers and others who taught preternatural things, and the motions of the heavens, doctrines on this occasion considered injurious to the established religion.† The scope and aim of this decree was, to render Pericles suspected with regard to those matters, because Anaxagoras had been his master. This Philosopher taught, that one only Intelligence had modified the chaos, and disposed the universe in the beautiful order in which we now see it; which tended directly to depreciate the gods of the pagan system. Pericles, thinking it would be impossible for him to save his life, sent him out of the city to a place of safety.

The enemies of Pericles seeing that the people approved and received with pleasure all these accusations, impeached that great man himself, and charged him with embezzling the public moneys during his administration. A decree was made, by which Pericles was obliged to give in his accounts immediately; was to be tried for oppression and rapine; and the cause to be adjudged by fifteen hundred judges. Pericles had not real cause of fear, because, in the administration of the public affairs, his conduct had always been irreproachable, especially on the side of interest: he could not, however, but be under some apprehensions from the ill-will of the people, when he considered their great levity and inconstancy. One day when Alcibiades, then very young, went to visit Pericles, he was told that he was not to be spoken with, because of some affairs of great consequence in which he was then engaged. Alcibiades inquiring what these great affairs were, was answered, that Pericles was preparing to give in his accounts. "He should rather," said Alcibiades, "not give them in:" and indeed this was what Pericles at last resolved. To allay the storm, he resolved to oppose the incli-

* Plut. in Menex. p. 235.

† Τὰ θεία μὴ νομίζοντας, ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεραρσίων διδάσκοντας. Anaxagoras teaching, that the divine Intelligence alone gave a regular motion to all the parts of nature, and presided in the government of the universe, destroyed, by that system, the plurality of gods, their powers, and all the peculiar functions which were ascribed to them.

nation the people discovered for the Peloponnesian war no longer, preparations for which had been long carrying on, firmly persuaded that this would soon silence all complaints against him ; that envy would soon yield to a more powerful motive ; and that the citizens, when in such imminent danger, would not fail of throwing themselves into his arms, and submit implicitly to his conduct, for his great power and exalted reputation.

This is what some historians have related ; and the comic poets, in the lifetime, and under the eye as it were of Pericles, spread such a report in public, to sully, if possible, his reputation and merit, which drew upon him the envy and enmity of many. Plutarch, on this occasion, makes a reflection which may be of great service, not only to those in the administration of public affairs, but to all persons, as well as of advantage in the ordinary commerce of life. He thinks it strange, when actions are good in themselves, and manifestly laudable in all respects, that men, merely to discredit illustrious personages, should pretend to dive into their hearts ; and from a spirit of the vilest and most abject malice, should ascribe such views and intentions to them, as they possibly never so much as imagined. He, on the contrary, wishes, when the motive is obscure, and the same action may be considered in different lights, that men would always view it most favorably and incline to judge candidly of it. He applies this maxim to the reports which had been spread concerning Pericles, as the fomentor of the Peloponnesian war, merely for private views of interest ; whereas the whole tenor of his past conduct ought to have convinced everybody, that it was wholly from reasons of state, and for the good of the public, that he at last acquiesced in an opinion, which he had hitherto thought it incumbent on him to oppose.*

While this affair was carrying on at Athens, the Lacedæmonians sent several embassies thither, one after another, to make the various demands above mentioned. At last the affair was debated in the assembly of the people, and it was resolved that they should first deliberate upon all the articles, before they gave a positive answer. Opinions, as is usual in these cases, were divided ; and some were for abolishing the decree enacted against Megara which seemed the chief obstacle to the peace.†

* Plut. de Herod. Malign. pp. 855, 856.

† Thucyd. l. i. pp. 93-99. Diod. l. xii. pp. 95-97.

Pericles spoke on this occasion with the utmost force of eloquence, which his view to the public welfare, and the honor of his country rendered more vehement and triumphant than it had ever appeared before. He showed, in the first place, that the decree relating to Megara, on which the greatest stress was laid, was not of so little consequence as they imagined: that the demand made by the Lacedæmonians on that head, was merely to sound the disposition of the Athenians, and to try whether it would be possible to frighten them out of their design; that should they recede on this occasion, it would betray fear and weakness; that the affair was of no less importance than the giving up to the Lacedæmonians the empire which the Athenians had possessed during so many years, by their courage and resolution: that should the Athenians submit on this occasion, the Lacedæmonians would immediately prescribe new laws to them, as to a people seized with dread; whereas, if they made a vigorous resistance, their opponents would be obliged to treat them at least as equals: that with regard to the present matters in dispute, arbiters might be chosen, in order to adjust them in an amicable way; but that it did not become the Lacedæmonians to command the Athenians, in an imperious way, to quit Potidæa, to free Ægina, and to revoke the decree relating to Megara: that such imperious behavior was directly contrary to the treaty, which declared in express terms, "that should any disputes arise among the allies, they should be decided by pacific means, AND WITHOUT ANY PARTY'S BEING OBLIGED TO GIVE UP ANY PART OF WHAT THEY POSSESSED:" that the surest way to prevent a government from perpetually contesting its possessions, is to take up arms and dispute its rights by the sword: that the Athenians had just reason to believe they would gain their cause this way; and to give them a stronger idea of this truth, he set before them in the most pompous light, the present state of Athens, giving a very particular account of its treasures, revenues, fleets, land as well as sea forces and those of its allies; contrasting these several things with the poverty of the Lacedæmonians, who, he said, had no money, which is the sinews of war, not to mention the poor condition of their navy, on which they most depended. And indeed it appeared by the treasury that the Athenians had brought from Delos to their city nine thousand six hundred talents, which amount to more than five millions, three hundred thousand dollars. The annual contributions of the

allies amounted to four hundred and sixty talents.* In cases of necessity, the Athenians would find infinite resources from the ornaments of the temples, since those of the statue of Minerva alone amounted to fifty talents of gold, which might be taken from the statue without spoiling it in any manner, and be afterwards fixed on again in more auspicious times. With regard to the land forces, they amounted to very near thirty thousand men, and the fleet consisted of three hundred galleys. Above all, he advised them not to venture a battle in their own country against the Peloponnesians, whose troops were superior in number to theirs; not to regard the laying waste of their lands, as they might easily be restored to their former condition; but to consider the loss of their men as highly important, because irretrievable; to make their whole policy consist in defending their city, and preserving the empire of the sea, which would certainly one day give them the superiority over their enemies. He laid down the plan for carrying on the war, not for a single campaign, but during the whole time it might last; and enumerated the evils they had to fear, if they deviated from that system. After adding other considerations, taken from the genius or character, and the internal government of the two republics; the one uncertain and fluctuating in its deliberations, and rendered still slower in the execution, from its being obliged to wait for the consent of its allies; the other, speedy, determinate, independent, and mistress of its resolutions, which is no indifferent circumstance with regard to the success of enterprises, Pericles concluded his speech, and gave his opinion as follows: "We have no more to do but to dismiss the ambassadors, and to give them this answer, that we permit those of Megara to trade with Athens, upon condition that the Lacedæmonians do not prohibit either us, or our allies, to trade with them. With regard to the cities of Greece, we shall leave those free that were so at the time of our agreement, provided they shall do the same with regard to those dependent on them. We do not refuse to submit the decision of our differences to arbitration, and will not commit the first hostilities; however, in case of being attacked, we shall make a vigorous defence." †

The ambassadors were answered as Pericles had dictated. They returned home, and never came again to Athens; soon after which the Peloponnesian war broke out.

* \$262,506.

† *Diod. l. xii. pp. 96, 97.*

CHAPTER II.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE GREEKS IN SICILY AND ITALY.

As the Peloponnesian war is a great event of considerable duration, before I enter on the history of it, it may be proper to relate, in few words, the most considerable transactions which had happened in Grecia Major, to the time we now speak of, whether in Sicily or Italy.

SECTION I.—THE CARTHAGINIANS DEFEATED IN SICILY. OF GELON AND HIS TWO BROTHERS.

I. Gelon. We have seen that Xerxes, whose design was no less than the total extirpation of the Greeks, had prevailed with the Carthaginians to make war against the people of Sicily. They landed in it an army of above three hundred thousand men, and sent thither a fleet of two thousand ships, and upwards of three thousand small vessels for the baggage, etc. Hamilcar, the ablest of the Carthaginian generals at that time, was charged with this expedition. However, the success was not answerable to these mighty preparations; the Carthaginians were entirely defeated by Gelon, who at that time had the chief authority in Syracuse,*

This Gelon was born in a city of Sicily, situated on the southern coast between Agrigentum and Camarina, called Gela, whence perhaps he received his name. He had signalized himself very much in the wars which Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, carried on against the neighboring powers, most of whom he subdued, and was very near taking Syracuse. After the death of Hippocrates, Gelon, upon pretence of defending the right and possession of the tyrant's children, took up arms against his own citizens, and having overcome them in a battle, possessed himself of the government in his own name. Some time after, he made himself also master of Syracuse, by the assistance of some exiles, whom he had caused to return into it, and who had engaged the populace to open the gates of that city to him. He then gave Gela to Hiero his brother, and applied himself wholly in extending the limits of the territory of Syracuse, and soon rendered himself very powerful. We may form a judgment of this

* A. M. 3520. Ant. J. C. 484. Diod. l. xi. p. 1, et 16-22.

from the army which he offered the Grecian ambassadors, who came to desire his aid against the king of Persia; and by his demand of being appointed generalissimo of all their forces, which, however, they refused.* The fear he was in at that time of being soon invaded by the Carthaginians, was the chief occasion of his not succoring the Greeks. He was extremely politic in his conduct; and when news was brought him of Xerxes' having crossed the Hellespont, he sent a trusty person with rich presents, with orders for him to wait the issue of the first battle, and in case Xerxes should be victorious, to pay homage to him in his name, otherwise to bring back the money.† I now return to the Carthaginians.

They landed in Sicily at the earnest solicitations of Terillus, formerly tyrant of Himera, but dethroned by Theron, another tyrant, who reigned at Agrigentum. The family of the latter was one of the most illustrious of all Greece, being descended in a direct line from Cadmus. He married into the family which at that time ruled at Syracuse, and which consisted of four brothers, Gelon, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus. He married his daughter to the first, and himself married the daughter of the third.

Hamilcar having landed at Panormus, began by laying siege to Himera. Gelon hastened with a great army to the succor of his father-in-law; and uniting, they defeated the Carthaginians. This perhaps was the most complete victory ever gained.

The battle was fought the same day with that of Thermopylæ,‡ the circumstances of which I have related in the history of the Carthaginians.§ One remarkable circumstance in the conditions of the peace which Gelon prescribed to the conquered, was, that they should cease to sacrifice their children to the god Saturn; which shows, at the same time, the cruelty of the Carthaginians, and the piety of Gelon.||

The spoils won on this occasion were of immense value. Gelon allotted the greatest part of them for the ornament of the temples in Syracuse. They also took an incredible

* He promised to furnish two hundred ships, and thirty thousand men.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 153-167.

‡ Herodotus says, that this battle was fought on the same day with that of Salamin, which does not appear so probable. For the Greeks, informed of Gelon's successes, entreated him to succor them against Xerxes, which they would not have done after the battle of Salamin, which exalted their courage so much that after this battle, they imagined themselves strong enough to resist their enemies, and to put an end to the war, to their own advantage, without the assistance of any other power.

§ Vol. I.

|| Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

number of prisoners. These he shared, with the utmost equity, with his allies, who employed them, after putting irons on their feet, in cultivating their lands, and in building magnificent edifices, as well for the ornament as the utility of the cities. Many of the citizens of Agrigentum had each five hundred for his own share.

Gelon, after so glorious a victory, so far from growing more proud and haughty, behaved with greater affability and humanity than ever towards the citizens and his allies.* On his return from the campaign, he convened the assembly of the Syracusans, who were ordered to come armed. He however came unarmed thither; declared to the assembly every step of his conduct, the uses to which he had applied the several sums with which he had been intrusted, and in what manner he had employed his authority; adding, that if they had any complaints to make against him, his person and life were at their disposal. All the people, struck with so unexpected a speech, and still more with the unusual confidence he reposed in them, answered by acclamations of joy, praise, and gratitude; and immediately, with one consent, invested him with the supreme authority, and the title of king. And to preserve to the latest posterity, the remembrance of Gelon's memorable action, who had come into the assembly, and put his life into the hands of the Syracusans, they erected a statue in honor of him, wherein he was represented in the ordinary habit of a citizen, ungirded, and unarmed. This statute afterwards met with a very singular fate, and worthy of the motives which had occasioned its being set up. Timoleon, above a hundred and thirty years after, having restored the Syracusans to their liberty, thought it advisable, in order to erase from it all traces of tyrannical government, and at the same time to assist the wants of the people, to sell publicly all the statues of those princes and tyrants who had governed it till that time. But first he brought them to a trial, as so many criminals; hearing the depositions and witnesses upon each of them. They all were condemned unanimously, the statue of Gelon only excepted, which found an eloquent advocate and defender, in the warm and sincere gratitude which the citizens retained for that great man, whose virtue they revered as if he had been still alive.

The Syracusans had no cause to repent their having intrusted Gelon with unlimited power and authority. This did

* A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. Plut. in Timol. p. 247. Ælian. l. xiii. c. 37.

not add to his known zeal for their interests, but only enabled him to do them more important services. For, by a change till then unheard-of, and of which Tacitus found no example, except in Vespasian, he was the first whom sovereignty made a better man.* He made upwards of ten thousand foreigners, who had served under him, denizens. His views were, to people the capital, to increase the power of the state, to reward the services of his brave and faithful soldiers; and to attach them more strongly to Syracuse, from the sense of the advantageous settlement they had obtained in being incorporated with the citizens.†

He was particularly famous for his inviolable sincerity, truth, and fidelity to his engagements; a quality very essential to a prince, the only one capable of gaining him the love and confidence of his subjects and of foreigners, and which therefore ought to be considered as the basis of all just policy and good government. Having occasion for money to carry on an expedition he meditated, which, very probably was before he had triumphed over the Carthaginians, he addressed the people, in order to obtain a contribution from them; but finding the Syracusans unwilling to be at that expense, he told them, that he asked nothing but a loan, and that he would engage to repay it as soon as the war should be over. The money was advanced, and repaid punctually at the promised time.‡ How happy is that government where such justice and equity are exercised! and how mistaken are those ministers and princes, who violate them in the slightest degree!

One of the chief subjects of his attention, and in which his successor imitated him, was to make the cultivation of the lands be considered as an honorable employment.§ It is well known how fruitful Sicily was in corn, and the immense revenues which might be produced from so rich a soil when industriously cultivated. He animated the husbandmen by his presence, and delighted sometimes in appearing at their head, in the same manner as on other occasions he had marched at the head of armies. "His intention," says Plutarch, "was not merely to make the country rich and fruitful, but also to exercise his subjects, to accustom and inure them to toils, and by these means to preserve them from a thousand disorders, which inevitably follows a soft and indolent life." There are few maxims, in point of policy,

* Solus omnium ante se principum in melius mutatus est.—Hist. l. i. c. 50.

† Diod. l. xi. p. 35. ‡ Plut. in Apophth. p. 175. § Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

on which the ancients have insisted more strongly, than on that relating to the cultivation of their lands; a manifest proof of their great wisdom, and the profound knowledge they had of what constitutes the strength and solid happiness of a state. Xenophon, in a dialogue, entitled *Hiero*, the subject of which is government, shows the great advantage it would be to a state, were the king studious to reward those who should excel in husbandry, and what relates to the cultivation of lands. He says the same of war, of trade, and of all the arts; on which occasion, if honors were paid to all those who should distinguish themselves in them, it would give universal life and motion; would excite a noble and laudable emulation among the citizens, and give rise to a thousand inventions for the improvement of those arts.*

It does not appear that Gelon had been educated in the same manner as the children of the rich among the Grecians, who were taught music and the art of playing on instruments very carefully. Possibly this was because of his mean birth, or rather of the little value he set on those kinds of exercises. One day at an entertainment, according to the usual custom, a lyre was presented to each of the guests; when it was Gelon's turn, instead of touching the instrument as the rest had done, he caused his horse to be brought, mounted him with wonderful agility and grace, and showed that he had learned a nobler exercise than playing on the lyre.†

From the defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily, ‡ the several cities of it enjoyed a profound peace, and Syracuse was particularly happy in its tranquillity, under the auspicious government of Gelon. He was not born in Syracuse, and yet all the inhabitants of that city, though so extremely jealous of their liberty, had forced him in a manner to be their king. Though an alien, the supreme power was conferred on him, unsought by any art or inducement other than that of merit. Gelon was thoroughly acquainted with all the duties of the regal office, as well as its great weight; and he accepted it with no other view than the good of his people. He thought himself only king for the defence of the state, to preserve the good order of society, to protect innocence and justice, and to exhibit to all his subjects, in his simple, modest, active, and regular life, a pattern of every civil virtue. The whole of royalty that he assumed were the toils and cares of it, a zeal for the public welfare, and the great

* Xenoph. pp. 916, 917. † Plut. in *Apophth.* p. 175. ‡ Diod. l. xi. pp. 29, 30.

satisfaction which results from making millions happy by his cares: in a word, he considered the sovereignty as an obligation, and a means to procure the felicity of a greater number of men. He banished from it pomp, ostentation, licentiousness, and impunity for crimes. He did not affect the appearance of reigning, but contented himself with making the laws to govern. He never made his inferiors feel that he was their master, but only inculcated on them, that both himself and they ought to submit to reason and justice. To induce their obedience, he employed no other methods than persuasion and a good example, which are the weapons of virtue, and alone produce a sincere and uninterrupted obedience.

A revered old age, a name highly dear to all his subjects, a reputation extended through the world, were the fruits of that wisdom which he retained on the throne through life. His reign was short, and only just showed him in a manner to Sicily, to exhibit in his person an example of a great, good, and true king. To the infinite regret of all his subjects, he left the world, after having reigned only seven years. Every family imagined itself deprived of its best friend, its protector and father. The people erected, in the place where his wife Demarata had been buried, a splendid mausoleum, surrounded with nine towers of a surprising height and magnificence; and decreed those honors to him, which were then paid to the demi-gods or heroes. The Carthaginians afterwards demolished the mausoleum, and Agathocles the towers: "But," says the historian, "neither violence, envy nor time, which destroys all grosser things, could destroy the glory of his name, or abolish the memory of his exalted virtues and noble actions, which love and gratitude had engraved on the hearts of the Sicilians."

II. Hiero. After Gelon's death, the sceptre continued nearly twelve years in his family: he was succeeded by Hiero, his eldest brother.*

It will be necessary for us, in order to reconcile the authors who have written about this prince, some of whom declare him to have been a good king, and others a detestable tyrant, to distinguish the periods. It is very probable that Hiero, dazzled, in the beginning of his reign, by the glitter of sovereign power, and corrupted by the flattery of his courtiers, studiously endeavored to deviate from that path which his predecessor had pointed out to him, and in

which he had found himself so happy. This young prince was avaricious, headstrong, unjust, and studious of nothing but the gratification of his passions, without ever endeavoring to acquire the esteem and affection of the people; who on their side, had the utmost aversion for a prince, whom they looked upon as a tyrant over them, rather than as a king; and nothing but the veneration they had for Gelon's memory, prevented it from breaking out.*

Some time after he had ascended the throne, he had violent suspicions of Polyzelus, his brother, whose great credit among the citizens made him fear that he designed to depose him. In order, however, to rid himself without noise of an enemy whom he fancied very dangerous, he resolved to put him at the head of some forces he was about to send to the succor of the Sibarites against the Crotonians, hoping that he would perish in the expedition. His brother's refusal to accept this command made him the more violent against him.† Theron, who had married the daughter of Polyzelus, joined with his father-in-law. This gave rise to great differences, of long duration, between the kings of Syracuse and Agrigentum; they, however, were at last reconciled by the wise mediation of Simonides the poet, and, to make their reconciliation lasting, they cemented it by a new alliance, Hiero marrying Theron's sister; after which the two kings always lived on good terms with each other.‡

At first an infirm state of health, which was increased by frequent indisposition, gave Hiero an opportunity of thinking seriously; after which he resolved to send for men of learning, who might converse agreeably with him, and furnish him with useful instructions. The most famous poets of the age came to his court, as Simonides, Pindar, Bacchylides, and Epicharmus; and it is affirmed that their delightful conversation did not a little contribute to soften the cruel and savage disposition of Hiero.§

Plutarch relates a noble saying of his, which shows an excellent disposition in a prince. He declared that his palace and his ears should be always open to every man who would tell him the truth, and that without disguise or reserve.||

The poets above mentioned excelled not only in poetry, but were also possessed of a great fund of learning, and were respected and consulted as the sages of their times.

* Diod. l. xi. p. 51.

§ Ælian. l. iv. c. 15.

† Idem. p. 56.

‡ Schol. in Pind.

|| Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

This is what Cicero says particularly of Simonides.* He had a great influence over the king; and the only use he made of it was to incline him to virtue.

They often used to converse on philosophical subjects. I observed on another occasion that Hiero, in one of those conversations, asked Simonides his opinion with regard to the nature and attributes of the Deity. The latter desired one day's time to consider of it; the next day he asked two, and went on increasing in the same proportion. The prince pressing him to give his reasons for these delays, he confessed that the subject was above his comprehension, and that the more he reflected the more obscure it appeared to him.†

Xenophon has left us an excellent treatise on the art of governing well, entitled Hiero, and written as a dialogue between this prince and Simonides. Hiero undertakes to prove to the poet that tyrants and kings are not so happy as is generally imagined. Among the great number of proofs alleged by him, he insists chiefly on their vast unhappiness in being deprived of the greatest comfort and blessing in this life, viz.: the enjoyment of a true friend, to whose bosom they may safely confide their secrets and afflictions; who may share with them in their joy and sorrow; in a word, a second self, who may form but one heart, one soul with them. Simonides, on the other side, lays down admirable maxims with respect to the well governing of a kingdom. He represents to him that a king is not so for himself, but for others; that his grandeur consists, not in building magnificent palaces for his own residence, but in erecting temples and fortifying and embellishing cities; that it is his glory, not that his people should fear, but be afraid for him; that a truly royal care is, not to enter the lists with the first comer at the Olympic games, for the princes of that age were passionately fond of them, and especially Hiero,‡ but to contend with the neighboring kings, who should succeed best in diffusing wealth and abundance throughout his dominions, and in endeavoring to form the felicity of his people.

Nevertheless, another poet, Pindar, praises Hiero for the

* Simonides, non poeta solum suavis, verum etiam cæteroque doctus sapiensque traditur.—Lib. i. de Nat. Deor. n. 60.

† Cic. l. i. de Nat. Deor. n. 60.

‡ It is said that Themistocles, seeing him arrive at the Olympic games with a splendid equipage, would have had him forbidden them, because he had not succored the Greeks against the common enemy, any more than Gelon his brother: which motion did honor to the Athenian general.—Ælian. l. ix. c. 5.

victory he had won in the horse race. "This prince," says he, in his ode, "who governs with equity the inhabitants of opulent Sicily, has gathered the fairest flowers in the garden of virtue. He takes a noble delight in the most exquisite performance of poetry and music. He loves melodious airs, such as it is customary for us to play at the banquets given us by our dearest friends. Then rouse yourself, take your lyre, and raise it to the Doric pitch. If you feel yourself animated by a glorious fire in favor of Pisa and Pherenice ;* if they have waked the sweetest transports in thy breast, when that generous courser, without being quickened by the spur, flew along the banks of the Alpheus, and carried his royal rider to glorious victory : O ! sing the king of Syracuse, the ornament of the Olympic course !"

The whole ode, translated by the late Mr. Massieu, is in the sixth volume of the *Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres*, from which I have made the short extract above. I was very glad to give the readers some idea of Pindar, by this little specimen.

The next ode to this was composed in honor of Theron, king of Agrigentum, victorious in the chariot race. The diction of it is so sublime, the thoughts so noble, and the moral so pure, that many look upon it as Pindar's masterpiece.

I cannot say how far we may depend on the rest of the praises which Pindar gives Hiero, for poets are not always very sincere in the eulogies they bestow on princes ; however, it is certain that Hiero had made his court the resort of all persons of wit and genius ; and that he had invited them to it by his affability and engaging behavior, and much more by his liberality, which is a great merit in a king.

We cannot bestow on Hiero's court the eulogy which Horace gives the house of Mæcenas, in which a character prevailed rarely found among scholars, and, nevertheless, worth all their erudition. In this amiable house, says Horace, the mean and grovelling sentiments of envy and jealousy were utterly unknown ; and men saw, in those who shared in the master's favor, a superior merit or credit, without taking the least umbrage at it.† But it was far other-

* Pisa was the city near to which the Olympic games were solemnized ; and Pherenice was the name of Hiero, a courser, signifying the gainer of victory.

——— Non isto vivimus illic,

Quo tu rere, modo : domus hæc nec purior ulla est,

Nec magis his aliena malis ; nil mi officit unquam,

wise in the court of Hiero, or of Theron. It is said that Simonides and Bacchylides, his nephew, employed all kinds of criticism to lessen the esteem which those princes had for Pindar's works. The latter, by way of reprisal, ridicules them very strongly in his ode to Theron, in comparing them to "ravens who croak in vain against the divine bird of Jove." But modesty was not the virtue which distinguished Pindar.*

Hiero, having driven the ancient inhabitants of Catana and Naxos from their country, settled a colony of ten thousand men there, half of whom were Syracusans and the rest Peloponnesians. This prompted the inhabitants of those two cities to appoint, after their death, the same solemnities in his honor, as were bestowed on heroes or demi-gods, because they considered him as their founder.†

He showed great favor to the children of Anaxilaus, formerly tyrant of Zancle, and a great friend to Gelon his brother. As they were arrived at the years of maturity, he exhorted them to take the government into their own hands, after Micythus, their tutor, should have informed them of the perfect state of it, and how he himself had behaved in the administration. The latter, having assembled the nearest relations and most intimate friends of the young princes, gave, in their presence, so good an account of his guardianship, that the whole assembly in perfect admiration bestowed the highest encomiums on his prudence, integrity, and justice. Matters were carried so far, that the young princes were extremely urgent with him to preside in the administration, as he had hitherto done. However, the wise tutor preferring the sweets of ease to the splendor of authority, and persuaded at the same time, that it would be for the interest of the state, if the young princes took the government into their own hands, resolved to retire from public life. Hiero died after having reigned eleven years.‡

III. Thrasybulus. He was succeeded by Thrasybulus his brother, who, by his evil conduct, contributed very much to the making Hiero be regretted. Swelled with pride and a brutal haughtiness, he considered men as mere

*Ditior hic, aut est quia doctior : est locus uni
Cuique suus.*

—Hor. lib. 1. Sat. 9.

Sir, you mistake ; that's not our course of life ;
We know no jealousies, no brawls, no strife ;
From all those ills our patron's house is free,
None, 'cause more learn'd or wealthy, troubles me ;
We have our stations, all their own pursue, etc.

—Creech.

* Scholiast. Pind.

† Diod. l. xi. p. 37.

‡ Idem. p. 50.

worms; vainly fancying that they were created for him to trample upon, and that he was of a quite different nature from them. He abandoned himself implicitly to the flattering counsels of the giddy young courtiers who surrounded him. He treated all his subjects with the utmost severity; banishing some, confiscating the possessions of others, and putting great numbers to death. So severe a slavery soon grew insupportable to the Syracusans, and therefore they implored the succor of the neighboring cities, whose interest it was also to throw off the tyrant's yoke. Thrasybulus was besieged even in Syracuse, the sovereignty of part of which he had reserved to himself, viz. : Achradina, and the island, which was very well fortified; but the third quarter of the city, called Tyche, was possessed by the enemy. After making a feeble resistance, and demanding to capitulate, he left the city, and withdrew into banishment among the Locrians. He had reigned but a year. In this manner the Syracusans recovered their liberty. They also delivered the rest of the cities of Sicily from tyrants; established a popular government in all places, and maintained that form among themselves during sixty years, till the reign of Dionysius the tyrant, who again enslaved them.*

After Sicily had been delivered from the government of tyrants, and all the cities of it were restored to their liberty, as the country was extremely fruitful in itself, and the peace which all places enjoyed, gave the inhabitants of this island an opportunity of cultivating their lands and feeding their flocks, the people grew very powerful, and amassed great riches. To perpetuate to latest posterity the remembrance of the happy day in which they had thrown off the yoke of slavery by the banishment of Thrasybulus, it was decreed in the general assembly of the nation, that a colossal statue should be set up to Jupiter the Deliverer; that on the anniversary of this day, a festival should be solemnized, by way of thanksgiving, for the restoration of their liberty; and that there should be sacrificed, in honor of the gods, four hundred and fifty bulls, with which the people should be entertained at a common feast.†

There nevertheless lay concealed in the minds of many, a secret spirit of tyranny, which frequently disturbed the harmony of this peace and occasioned several tumults and commotions in Sicily, the particulars of which I shall omit. To prevent the evil consequences of them, the Syracusans

* *Diod. l. xi. pp. 51, 52.* † *A. M. 3544. Ant. J. C. 460. Diod. l. xi. p. 55, &c.*

established the petalism, which differed very little from the Athenian ostracism; and was so called from the Greek *πέταλον*, signifying a leaf, because the votes were then given on an olive leaf. This judgment was pronounced against those citizens whose great power made the people apprehensive that they aspired to the tyranny, and it banished them for ten years; it did not, however, long continue in force, but was soon abolished; because the dread of falling under its censure, having prompted the most virtuous men to retire, and renounce the government; the chief employments were now filled by such citizens only as had the least merit.*

Deucetius, according to Diodorus,† was chief over the people who were properly called Sicilians. Having united them all, the inhabitants of Hybla excepted, into one body, he became very powerful, and formed several great enterprises. It was he who built the city of Palica, near the temple of the gods called Palici. This temple was very famous on account of some wonders which are related of it: and still more from the sacred nature of the oaths which were there taken, the violation of which was said to be always followed by a sudden and exemplary punishment. This was a secure asylum for all persons who were oppressed by superior power; and especially for slaves who were unjustly abused, or too cruelly treated by their masters. They continued in safety in this temple, till certain arbiters and mediators had made their peace; and there was not a single instance of a master's having ever forfeited the promise he had made to pardon his slave; so famous were the gods who presided over this temple, for the severe vengeance they took on those who violated their oaths.

This Deucetius, after having been successful on a great many occasions, and gained several victories, particularly over the Syracusans, found his fortune changed on a sudden by the loss of a battle, and was abandoned by the greatest part of his forces. In the consternation and despondency into which so sudden and so general a desertion threw him, he formed such a resolution as despair only could suggest. He withdrew in the night to Syracuse, advanced as far as the great square of the city, and there falling prostrate at the foot of the altar, he abandoned his life and dominions to the mercy of the Syracusans, that is, to his professed enemies. The singularity of this spectacle drew great numbers of people to it. The magistrates immediately convened the people,

* Diod. l. xi. p. 65.

† Pages 67-70.

and debated on the affair. They first heard the orators, whose business was generally to address the people by speeches; and who greatly inflamed their minds against Deucetius, as a public enemy, whom Providence seemed to throw into their way, to revenge and punish by his death all the injuries he had done the republic. A speech of this kind struck all the virtuous part of the assembly with horror. The most ancient and wisest of the senators represented, "that they were not to consider what punishment Deucetius deserved, but how it behoved the Syracusans to behave on this occasion; that they ought not to look upon him any longer as an enemy, but as a suppliant, a character by which his person was become sacred and inviolable. That there was a goddess, Nemesis, who took vengeance of crimes, especially of cruelty and impiety, and who doubtless would not suffer that to go unpunished; that besides the baseness and inhumanity there is in insulting the unfortunate, and in crushing those who are already under one's foot, it was worthy the grandeur and goodness natural to the Syracusans, to exert their clemency, even to those who least deserved it." All the people assented to this opinion, and with one consent spared the life of Deucetius. He was ordered to reside in Corinth, the metropolis and foundress of Syracuse; and the Syracusans engaged to furnish him with all things necessary for an honorable subsistence there. What reader, who compares these two different opinions, does not perceive which of them was noblest and most generous?

SECTION II.—FAMOUS PERSONS AND CITIES IN GRÆCIA MAJOR, ETC.

I. Pythagoras. In treating of what relates to Græcia Major in Italy, I must not omit Pythagoras, who was the glory of it. He was born in Samos. After having travelled into a great many regions, and enriched his mind with the most excellent learning of every kind, he returned to his native country, but did not remain long in it, because of the tyrannical government which Polycrates had established there, who however had the highest regard for him, and showed him all the esteem due to his extraordinary merit. But the study of the sciences, and particularly of philosophy, is scarcely compatible with slavery, though of the mildest and most honorable kind. He therefore went into Italy, and resided usually either at Crotona, Metapon-

tam, Heraclea, or Tarentum.* Servius Tullius, or Tarquinius Superbus, reigned in Rome at that time; which absolutely refutes the opinion of those who imagined that Numa Pompilius, the second king of the Romans, who lived upwards of a hundred years before, had been the disciple of Pythagoras; an opinion that very probably was grounded on the resemblance of their manners, dispositions and principles.†

The whole country soon felt very happy effects from the presence of this excellent philosopher. ‡ An inclination for study, and a love of wisdom diffused themselves almost universally in a very short time. Multitudes flocked from all the neighboring cities to get a sight of Pythagoras, to hear him, and to improve by his salutary counsels. The several princes of the country took a pleasure in inviting him to their courts, which they thought honored by his presence, and all were delighted with his conversation, and glad to learn from him the art of governing nations with wisdom. His school became the most famous that had ever been till that age. He had no less than four or five hundred disciples. Before he admitted them in that quality, they were probationers five years, during which time he obliged them to keep the strictest silence, thinking it proper for them to be instructed before they should attempt to speak. I shall take notice of his tenets and sentiments, when I come to speak of the various sects of philosophers: it is well known, that the transmigration of souls was one of the chief of them. His disciples had the greatest reverence for every word he uttered; and, if he did but barely aver a thing, he was immediately believed, without its being once examined; and to affirm the truth of any thing, they used to express themselves in this manner, "The master said it." § However, the disciples carried their deference and docility too far, in thus waving all inquiry, and in sacrificing implicitly their reason and understanding; a sacrifice that ought to be made only to the divine authority, which is infinitely superior to our reason and all our knowledge; and which consequently is authorized to prescribe laws to us and dictate absolute obedience.

The school of Pythagoras produced a great number of illustrious disciples, who did infinite honor to their master;

* A. M. 3480. Ant. J. C. 524. Diog. Laert. in Vit. Pythag. † Liv. l. i. n. 18.

‡ Pythagoras, cum in Italiam venisset, exornavit eam Græciam, quæ Magna dicta est, et privatim et publice, præstantissimis et institutis et artibus.—Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. v. n. 10.

§ Ἀντὸς ἔφα.

as wise legislators, great politicians, persons skilled in all the sciences, and capable of governing states, and being the ministers of the greatest princes. A long time after his death, that part of Italy, which he had cultivated and improved by his instructions, was still considered as the nursery and seat of men skilled in all kinds of literature, and it maintained that glorious character for several ages.* The Romans certainly entertained a high opinion of the virtue of Pythagoras, since the oracle of Delphos having commanded that people, during the war of the Samnites, to erect two statues in the most conspicuous part of Rome, the one to the wisest, and the other to the most valiant among the Greeks, they accordingly set up two in the "Comitium," representing Pythagoras and Themistocles.† Historians are not agreed with respect to the time and place of the death of Pythagoras.

II. Crotona. Sybaris. Thurium. Crotona was founded by Myscellus, chief of the Achaïans, the third year of the seventeenth Olympiad. ‡ This Myscellus having gone to Delphos to consult the oracle of Apollo, about the spot on which he should build his city, met Archias the Corinthian there, who had come upon a similar errand. The god gave them a favorable audience; and, after having determined them with regard to the place that would best suit their new settlements, he proposed different advantages to them; and left them, among other particulars, the choice of riches or health. The offer of riches struck Archias, but Myscellus desired health; and if history is to be credited, Apollo performed his promise faithfully to both. Archias founded Syracuse, which soon became the most opulent city of Greece. Myscellus laid the foundations of Crotona, which became so famous for the long life and innate strength of its inhabitants, that its name was used proverbially to signify a very healthy spot, whose air was extremely pure. § The people of it signalized themselves in a great number of victories in the Grecian games, and Strabo relates, that in the same Olympiad, seven Crotonians were crowned in the Olympic games, and carried off all the prizes of the stadium.

Sybaris was ten leagues, two hundred stadia, from Cro-

* Pythagoras tenuit Magnam illam Græciam cum honore, et disciplinam, tum etiam auctoritate, multaque secula postea sic viguit Pythagoreorum nomen, ut nulli alii docti iderentur.—Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. i. n. 38.

† Plin. l. xxxiv. c. 6.

‡ A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709. Strab. l. vi. p. 262, et 269. Dionys. Halicarn. Antiq. Rom. l. ii. p. 122.

§ Κρότωνος ὑγιέστερος.

tona, and had also been founded by the Achæians, but before the other. This city became afterwards very powerful. Four neighboring states and twenty-five cities were subject to it, so that it was, alone, able to raise an army of three hundred thousand men. The opulence of Sybaris was soon followed by luxury, and such a dissoluteness as is scarcely credible. The citizens employed themselves in nothing but banquets, games, shows, parties of pleasure, and carousals. Public rewards and marks of distinction were bestowed on those who gave the most magnificent entertainments; and even to such cooks as were best skilled in the important art of making new discoveries and dressing dishes, and inventing new refinements to please the palate. The Sybarites carried their delicacy and effeminacy to such a height, that they carefully removed from their city all artificers whose work was noisy; and would not suffer any cocks in it, lest their shrill piercing crow should disturb their balmy slumbers.*

All these evils were heightened by dissension and discord, which at last proved their ruin. Five hundred of the wealthiest in the city, having been expelled by the faction of one Telys, fled to Crotona. Telys demanded to have them surrendered to him; and on the refusal of the Crotonians, to deliver them up, prompted to this generous resolution by Pythagoras, who then lived among them, war was declared. The Sybarites marched three hundred thousand men into the field, and the Crotonians only one hundred thousand; but they were headed by Milo, the famous champion, of whom we shall soon have occasion to speak, and over whose shoulders a lion's skin was thrown, and himself armed with a club, like another Hercules. The latter gained a complete victory, and made a dreadful havoc of those who fled, so that very few escaped, and their city was depopulated. About sixty years after, some Thessalians came and settled in it; they did not, however, long enjoy peace, being driven out by the Crotonians. Being thus reduced to the most fatal extremity, they implored the succor of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. The latter moved to compassion at their deplorable condition, after causing proclamation to be made in Peloponnesus, that all who were willing to assist that colony were at liberty to do it, sent the Sybarites a fleet of ten ships under the command of Lampon and Xenocrates.†

* Strab. l. vi. p. 263. Athen. l. xii. pp. 518-520.

† A. M. 3474. Ant. J. C. 530. Diod. l. xii. pp. 76-85.

They built a city near the ancient Sybaris, and called it Thurium. Two men, greatly renowned for their learning, the one an orator, and the other a historian, settled in this colony. The first was Lysias, at that time but fifteen years of age. He lived in Thurium, until the Athenians became unfortunate in Sicily, and then went to Athens. The second was Herodotus. Though he was born in Halicarnassus, a city of Caria, he was, however, considered as a native of Thurium, because he settled there with that colony. I will speak more largely of him hereafter.*

Divisions soon broke out in the city, on account of the new inhabitants, whom the rest would exclude from all public employments and privileges. But as these were much more numerous, they repulsed all the ancient Sybarites, and got the sole possession of the city. Being supported by the alliance they made with the people of Crotona, they soon grew very powerful; and having established a popular form of government in their city, they divided the citizens into ten tribes, which they called by the names of the different nations whence they sprang.

III. Charondas, the legislator. They now bent all their thoughts to the strengthening of their government by wholesome laws; for which purpose they made choice of Charondas, who had been educated in the school of Pythagoras, to digest and draw them up. I will quote some of them in this place.

1. He excluded from the senate, and all public employments, all such as should marry a second wife, in case any children by their first wife were living; being persuaded that any man who was so regardless of his children's interest, would be equally so of his country's, and be as worthless a magistrate as he had been a father.

2. He sentenced all false accusers to be carried through every part of the city, crowned with heath or broom, as the vilest of men; an ignominy which most of them were not able to survive. The city, thus delivered from those pests of society, was restored to its former tranquillity. And indeed from calumniators generally arise all feuds and contests, whether of a public or private nature; and yet, according to the observation of Tacitus, they are too much tolerated in most governments.†

* A. M. 3560. Ant. J. C. 444. Dionys. Halicarn. in Vit. Lys. p. 82. Strab. l. xiv. p. 658.

† Delatores, genus hominum publico exitio repertum, et pœnis quidem, nunquam satis coercitum.—Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 30.

3. He enacted a new kind of law against another species of pests, which in a state generally first occasions depravity of manners; directing all those to be prosecuted who should form a correspondence, or contract a friendship with wicked men, and by laying a heavy fine upon them.

4. He required all the children of the citizens to be educated in the Belles Lettres; the effect of which is to polish and civilize the minds of men, inspiring them with gentleness of manners, and inclining them to virtue; all which constitute the felicity of a state, and are equally necessary to citizens of all conditions. In this view he appointed salaries (paid by the state) for masters and preceptors, in order that learning, by being communicated *gratis*, might be acquired by all. He considered ignorance as the greatest of evils, and the source whence all vices flowed.

5. He made a law with respect to orphans, which appears sufficiently judicious, by intrusting the care of their education to their relations by the mother's side, as their lives would not be in danger from them; and the management of their estates to their paternal relations, it being the interest of these to make the greatest advantage of them, since they would inherit them, in case of the demise of their wards.

6. Instead of putting to death deserters, and those who quitted their ranks and fled in battle, he only sentenced them to make their appearance during three days in the city, dressed in the habit of women, imagining, that the dread of so ignominious a punishment would produce the same effect as putting to death, and being, at the same time desirous of giving such cowardly citizens an opportunity of atoning for their fault.

7. To prevent his laws from being too rashly or easily abrogated, he imposed a very severe and hazardous condition on all persons who should propose to alter or amend them in any manner. These were sentenced to appear in the public assembly with a halter about their neck; and in case the alteration proposed did not pass, they were to be immediately strangled. There were but three amendments ever proposed, and all of them admitted.

Charondas did not long survive his own laws. Returning one day from pursuing some thieves, and finding a tumult in the city, he came armed into the assembly, though he himself had prohibited this by an express law. A certain person objected to him in severe terms, that he violated

his own laws, "I do not violate them," said he, "but thus seal them with my blood," and instantly plunged his sword into his bosom, and expired.

IV. Zaleucus, another lawgiver. At the same time, there arose among the Locrians, another famous legislator, Zaleucus, who, as well as Charondas, had been the disciple of Pythagoras.* There is now scarcely any thing extant of his, except a kind of preamble to his laws, which gives a most advantageous idea of them. He requires, above all things, of the citizens, to believe and be firmly persuaded, that there are gods; and adds, that the bare casting up our eyes to the heavens, and contemplating their order and beauty, is sufficient to convince us that it is impossible so wonderful a fabric could have been formed by mere chance or human power. As the natural consequence of this belief, he exhorts men to honor and revere the gods, as the authors of whatever is good and just among mortals; and to honor them, not merely by sacrifices and splendid gifts, but by a sage conduct, and by purity and innocence of manners; these being more grateful to the immortals, than any sacrifice that can be offered.

After this religious exordium, in which he describes the Supreme Being as the source whence all laws flow, as the chief authority which commands obedience to them, as the most powerful motive for our faithful observance of them, and as the perfect model to which mankind ought to conform; he descends to the particulars of those duties which men owe to one another; and lays down a precept which is very well adapted to preserve peace and unity in society, by enjoining the individuals of it not to make their hatred and dissensions perpetual, which would argue an unsocial and savage disposition, but to treat their enemies as men who would soon be their friends. This is carrying morality to as great a perfection as could be expected from heathens.

With regard to the duty of judges and magistrates, after representing to them, that, in pronouncing sentence, they ought never to suffer themselves to be biassed by friendship, hatred, or any other passion; he only exhorts them not to behave with the least haughtiness or severity towards the parties engaged in law, since such are but too unhappy in being obliged to undergo all the toils and fatigues inseparable from lawsuits. The office indeed of judges, however laborious it may be, is far from giving them a right to use the

* Diod. I. xii. pp. 79-85.

contending parties with ill-nature; the very form and nature of their employment requiring them to behave with impartiality, and to do justice on all occasions; and when they distribute this even with mildness and humanity, it is only a debt they pay, and not a favor they grant.

To banish luxury from his republic, which he looked upon as the certain destruction of a government, he did not follow the practice established in some nations, where it is thought sufficient, for restraining of it, to punish, by pecuniary mulcts, such as infringe the laws made on that occasion; but he acted, says the historian, in a more artful and ingenious, and at the same time more effectual manner. He prohibited women from wearing rich and costly stuffs, embroidered robes, precious stones, ear-rings, necklaces, bracelets, gold rings and such like ornaments; excepting none from this law but common prostitutes. He enacted a like law with regard to the men; excepting, in the same manner, from the observance of it, such only as were willing to pass for debauchees and infamous wretches. By these regulations he easily, and without violence, preserved the citizens from the least approaches to luxury and effeminacy.* For no person was so abandoned to all sense of honor, as to be willing to wear the badges of his shame, under the eye, as it were, of all the citizens; since this would make him the public laughing-stock, and reflect eternal infamy on his family.

V. Milo, the champion. We have seen him at the head of an army obtain a great victory. He was still more renowned for his athletic strength, than for his military bravery. He was surnamed Crotoniensis, from Crotona, the place of his birth. It was his daughter, whom, as was before related, Democedes the famous physician, and Milo's countryman, married, after he had fled from the court of Darius, to Greece, his native country.

Pausanias relates, that Milo, when but a boy, was seven times victorious in one day at the Pythian games; that he won six victories, at wrestling, in the Olympic games; one of which was also gained in his childhood; and that challenging a seventh time, in Olympia, any person to wrestle with him, he could not engage for want of an opponent. He would hold a pomegranate in such a manner, that without breaking it, he would grasp it so fast in his hand, that

* More inter veteres recepto, qui satis pœnarum adversus impudicas in ipsa professione flagitii credebant.—Tacit. *Annal.* l. ii. c. 85.

no one, however strong, could possibly wrest it from him.* He would stand so firm on a discus,† which had been oiled to make it the more slippery, that it was impossible to push him off. He would bind his head with a cord, after which, holding his breath strongly, the veins of his head would swell so prodigiously as to break the rope. When Milo, fixing his elbow on his side, stretched forth his right hand quite open, with his fingers held close, one to another, his thumb excepted, which he raised, the utmost strength of man could not separate his little finger from the other three.

All this was only a vain and puerile ostentation of his strength. Chance, however, gave him an opportunity of making a much more laudable use of it. One day, as he was attending the lectures of Pythagoras, for he was one of his most constant disciples, the pillar which supported the ceiling of the school in which the pupils were assembled, being shaken by some accident, Milo supported it by his single strength, gave the auditors some time to get away, and afterwards escaped himself. ‡

What is related of the voracious appetite of the *athletæ* is almost incredible.

Milo's appetite was scarcely satiated with twenty minæ (pounds) of meat, the same quantity of bread, and three "congi" § of wine every day. || Athenæus relates that this champion, having run the whole length of the stadium with a bull of four years old on his shoulder, he afterwards knocked him down with one stroke of his fist, and eat the whole beast that very day. I will take it for granted, that all the other particulars related of Milo are true: but is it probable, that one man could devour a whole ox in so short a time?

We are told that Milo, when advanced to a very great age, seeing the rest of the champions wrestling, and gazing upon his own arms, which once were so vigorous and robust, but were then very much enfeebled by time, he burst into tears, and cried, "Alas! these arms are now dead." ¶

And yet he either forgot or concealed his weakness from himself, the strong persuasion he entertained of his own strength, which he maintained to the last, proving fatal to him. Happening to meet, as he was travelling, an old oak which had been opened by some wedges that were forced into it, he undertook to split it in two by his bare strength.

* Pausan. l. vi. pp. 369-370. † This discus was a kind of quoit, flat and round.

‡ Strab. l. vi. p. 263.

|| Athen. l. x. p. 412.

§ Thirty pounds, or fifteen quarts.

¶ Cic. de Senect. n. 27.

But after forcing out the wedges, his arms were caught in the trunk of the tree, by the violence with which it closed, so that, being unable to disengage his hands, he was devoured by wolves.*

An author has judiciously observed, that this surprisingly robust champion, who prided himself so much in his bodily strength, was the weakest of men with regard to a passion, which often subdues and captivates the strongest; a courtesan having gained so strong an influence over Milo that she tyrannized over him in the most imperious manner, and made him obey whatever commands she laid upon him.†

CHAPTER III.

THE WAR OF PELOPONNESUS.

THE Peloponnesian war, which I am now entering upon, began about the end of the first year of the eighty-seventh Olympiad, and lasted twenty-seven years.‡ Thucydides has written the history of it to the twenty-first year inclusively. He gives us an accurate account of the several transactions of every year, which he divides into campaigns and winter-quarters. However, I shall not be so minute, and shall only extract such parts of it as appear must entertaining and instructive. Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus will also be of great assistance to me on this occasion.

SECTION I.—THE SIEGE OF PLATÆÆ BY THE THEBANS, ETC., ETC. THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.

The first act of hostility by which the war began, was committed by the Thebans, who besieged Plataeæ, a city of Bœotia, in alliance with Athens. They were introduced into it by treachery; but the citizens falling upon them in the night, killed them, except about two hundred, who were taken prisoners, and shortly after put to death. The Athenians, as soon as the news was brought of the action of Plataeæ, sent succors and provisions thither, and cleared the city of all persons who were incapable of bearing arms.§

The truce being evidently broken, both sides prepared openly for war, and ambassadors were sent to all places to

* Pausan. l. vi. p. 370.

† Ælian. l. ii. c. 24.

‡ A. M. 3573. Ant. J. C. 431.

§ Thucyd. l. ii. pp. 99-122. Diod. l. xii. pp. 97-100. Plut. in Pericl. p. 170.

strengthen themselves by the alliance of the Greeks and barbarians. Every part of Greece was in motion, some few states and cities excepted, which continued neutral, till they should see the event of the war. The majority were for the Lacedæmonians, as being the deliverers of Greece, and espoused their interest very warmly, because the Athenians, forgetting that the moderation and gentleness with which they commanded over others, had procured them many allies, had afterwards alienated the greatest part of them by their pride and the severity of their government, and incurred the hatred, not only of those who were then subject to them, but of all such as were apprehensive of becoming their dependants. Such was the state of public feeling at that time among the Greeks. The confederates of each of those states were as follow.

All Peloponnesus, Argos excepted, which stood neutral, had declared for Lacedæmon. The Achians, the inhabitants of Pellene excepted, were neutral at first, but at length insensibly engaged in the war. Out of Peloponnesus, the people of Megara, Locris, Bœotia, Phocis, Ambracia, Leucadia, and Anactorium, were on the side of the Lacedæmonians.

The confederates of the Athenians were, the people of Chios, Lesbos, Plataæ, the Messenians of Naupactus; the greatest part of the Acarnanians, Coreyrans, Cephallenians, and Zacynthians; besides the several tributary countries, as maritime Caria, Doria, which lies near it, Ionia, the Hellespont; and the cities of Thrace, except Chalcis and Potidæa, all the islands between Crete and Peloponnesus, eastward: and the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera.

Immediately after the attempt on Plataæ, the Lacedæmonians had ordered forces to be levied both within and without Peloponnesus; and made all the preparations necessary for entering the enemy's country. All things being ready, two-thirds of the troops marched to the isthmus of Corinth, and the rest were left to guard the country. Archidamus, king of Lacedæmon, who commanded the army, assembled the generals and chief officers, and calling up the remembrance of the great actions performed by their ancestors, and those they themselves had done or been eye-witnesses to, he exhorted them to support, with the utmost efforts of their valor, the pristine glory of their respective cities, as well as their own fame. He declared that the eyes of all Greece were upon them; and that, in expectation of

the issue of a war which would determine its fate, they were incessantly addressing heaven in favor of a people, who were as dear to them as the Athenians were become odious; that, however, he could not deny that they were going to march against enemies, who though greatly inferior to themselves in numbers and strength, were, nevertheless, very powerful, warlike, and daring; and whose courage would be still more inflamed by the sight of danger, and the laying waste of their territories; that therefore they must exert themselves to the utmost, to spread an immediate terror in the country they were going to enter, and to inspire the allies with new vigor.* The whole army answered with the loudest acclamations of joy, and assured their generals that they would do their duty.

The assembly breaking up, Archidamus, still zealous for the welfare of Greece, and meditating how he might best prevent a rupture, the dreadful consequences of which he foresaw, sent a Spartan to Athens to endeavor, before they should come to hostilities, to prevail if possible with the Athenians to lay aside their designs, or otherwise an army would soon march into Attica. But the Athenians, so far from admitting him to an audience or hearing his reasons, would not so much as suffer him to come into their city: Pericles having prevailed with the people to make an order, that no herald or ambassador should be received from the Lacedæmonians, till they had first laid down their arms. In consequence of this, the Spartan was commanded to leave the country that very day; and an escort was sent to guard him to the frontiers, and to prevent his speaking to any person by the way. At his taking leave of the Athenians, he told them that from that day, great calamities would ensue to all Greece. Archidamus, seeing no hopes of a reconciliation, marched to Attica, at the head of sixty thousand chosen forces.

Pericles, before the Lacedæmonians had entered his country, declared to the Athenians, that should Archidamus, when he was laying waste their territories, spare his (Pericles) lands, either on account of the right of hospitality which subsisted between them, or to furnish his enemies and those who envied him, with a pretext to slander him, as holding intelligence with him, he from that day should make over all his lands and houses to the city of Athens.

* *Gnarus primis eventibus metum, ut fiduciam gigni.*—Tacit. Ann. l. xiii. c. 31.

He remonstrated to the Athenians that it was their interest to consume the enemy's troops by protracting the war; and that, for this purpose, they must immediately remove all their effects out of the country, retire to the city, and shut themselves up in it, without ever hazarding a battle. The Athenians, indeed, had not forces enough to take the field and oppose the enemy. Their troops, including those in garrison, amounted but to thirteen thousand heavy-armed soldiers, and sixteen thousand inhabitants, including the young and old, the citizens as well as others, who were appointed to defend Athens: and besides these, twelve hundred horsemen, including the archers who rode on horseback, and sixteen hundred foot archers. This was the whole army of the Athenians. But their chief strength consisted in a fleet of three hundred galleys, part of which were ordered to lay waste the enemy's country, and the rest to awe the allies, on whom contributions were levied, without which the Athenians could not defray the expenses of the war.

The Athenians, animated by the warm exhortations of Pericles, brought from the country their wives, their children, their movables, and all their effects, after which they pulled down their houses, and even carried off the timber of them. With regard to the cattle of all kinds, they conveyed them into the island of Eubœa and the neighboring isles. However, they were deeply afflicted at the sad and precipitate migration, and it even forced tears from their eyes. From the time the Persians left their country, that is, for nearly fifty years, they had enjoyed the sweets of peace, wholly employed in cultivating their lands and feeding their flocks. But now, sad fate of war! they were obliged to abandon every thing. They took up their habitation in the city, as conveniently as they could, in the midst of much confusion; retiring either to their relations or friends; and some withdrew even to the temples and other public places.

In the mean time the Lacedæmonians, having set out upon their march, entered the country, and encamped at Cœnoe, which is the first fortress towards Bœotia. They employed a long time in preparing the attack, and raising the batteries; for which reason complaints were made against Archidamus, as if he carried on the war indolently, because he had not approved of it. He was accused of being too slow in his marches, and of encamping too long near Cor-

inth. He was also charged with having been too dilatory in raising the army, and having desired to give the Athenians an opportunity to carry off all their effects out of the country; whereas they said, had he marched speedily into it, all they had might have been plundered and destroyed. His design, however, was to engage the Athenians, by these delays, to agree to an accommodation, and to prevent a rupture, the consequences of which he foresaw would be pernicious to all Greece. Finding, after making several assaults, that it would be impossible for him to take the city, he raised the siege, and entered Attica in the midst of the harvest. Having laid waste the whole country, he advanced as far as Acharnæ, one of the largest towns near Athens, and about fifteen hundred paces from the city. He there pitched his camp, in hopes that the Athenians, exasperated at seeing him advance so near, would sally out to defend their country, and give him an opportunity of coming to a battle. It was indeed a great mortification to the Athenians, haughty and imperious, to be braved and insulted in this manner by an enemy, whom they did not think superior to themselves in courage. They were eye-witnesses of the dreadful havoc made of their lands, and saw all their houses and farms in a blaze.

This sad spectacle was now so shocking, that they could not bear it any longer, and therefore demanded fiercely to be led out against the Lacedæmonians, be the consequence what it would. Pericles saw plainly, that the Athenians would thereby hazard every thing, and expose their city to certain destruction, should they march out to engage, under the walls of their city, an army of sixty thousand fighting men, composed of the choicest troops at that time in Bæotia and Peloponnesus. Besides, he had made it his chief maxim to spare the blood of the citizens, since that was an irreparable loss. Pursuing inflexibly, therefore, the plan he had laid down, and studious of nothing but how he might check the impatience and ardor of the Athenians, he was particularly careful not to assemble either the senate or the people, lest they should form some fatal resolution, in spite of all the opposition in his power. His friends used all the entreaties imaginable to make him change his conduct. His enemies, on the other side, endeavored to stagger him by their menaces and slanderous discourses. They strove to rouse him by songs and satires, in which they aspersed him as a man of a cowardly, insensible cast of mind, who basely gave up his

country to the sword of the enemy. But no man showed so much rancor against Pericles as Cleon.* He was the son of a currier, and also followed that trade. He had raised himself by faction, and probably by a species of merit which those must possess who would rise in popular governments. He had a thundering voice and a specious manner; and besides, he possessed, in a wonderful degree, the art of gaining the people and bringing them over to his interests. It was he who enacted a law, that three oboli, not two as before, should be given to each of the six thousand judges. The characteristics which more immediately distinguished him were, an insupportably vain opinion of his own abilities; a ridiculous persuasion of his uncommon merits and a boldness of speech, which he carried to so high a pitch of insolence as to spare no man. But none of those things could move Pericles. His great strength of mind raised him above low, vulgar clamors.† As a good pilot in a raging storm, who, after he has given out the proper orders, and taken all the precautions necessary, is studious of nothing but how to make the best use of his art, without suffering himself to be moved by the tears or entreaties of those whom fear has distracted: so Pericles, after having put the city in a good state of defence, and posted guards in all places to prevent a surprise, followed those counsels which his prudence suggested, entirely regardless of the complaints, the taunts, and licentious discourses of the citizens, from a firm persuasion that he knew much better than they in what manner they were to be governed. “It then appeared evidently,” says Plutarch, “that Pericles was absolute master of the minds of the Athenians, since he prevailed so far, at such a juncture as this, as to keep them from sallying out of the city, as if he had kept the keys of the city in his own possession; and fixed on their arms the seal of his authority, to forbid their making use of them.”‡ Things happened exactly as Pericles had foretold; for the enemy, finding the Athenians determined not to stir out their city, and having advice that the enemy’s fleet carried fire and sword into their territories, raised their camp, and, after making dreadful havoc in the whole country through which they marched, returned to Peloponnesus, and retired to their several homes.

* It is he whom Aristophanes has inveighed so much against, in several of his comedies.

† *Spernendis rumoribus validus*.—Tacit.

‡ Plut. an Seni. ger. sit. Resp. p. 781.

It might be here asked, why Pericles acted, on this occasion, in a quite different manner from what Themistocles had done about fifty years before, when at the approach of Xerxes, he made the Athenians march out of their city, and abandon it to the enemy. But a little reflection will show, that the circumstances differed widely. Themistocles being invaded by all the forces of the East, justly concluded that it would be impossible for him to withstand, in a single city, those millions of barbarians who would have poured upon it like a deluge, and deprive him of all hopes of being succored by the allies. This is the reason given by Cicero. *Fluctum enim totius barbariæ ferre urbs una non poterat.* It was therefore prudent in him to retire for some time, and to let the confused multitude of barbarians consume and destroy one another. But Pericles was not engaged in so formidable and oppressive a war. The odds were not very great, and he foresaw it would allow him time to breathe. Thus, like a judicious man and an able politician, he kept close in Athens, and could not be moved either by the remonstrances or murmurs of the citizens. Cicero writing to his friend Atticus, condemns absolutely the resolution which Pompey formed and executed, of abandoning Rome to Cæsar; whereas, he ought, in imitation of Pericles, to have shut himself up in it with the senate, the magistrates, and the worthiest of the citizens who had declared in his favor.*

After the Lacedæmonians were retired, the Athenians placed forces in all the important posts both by land and sea, pursuant to the plan they intended to follow as long as the war continued. They also came to a resolution, to keep always a thousand talents † in reserve and a hundred galleys; and never to use them, except the enemy should invade Attica by sea; at the same time making it death for any man to propose employing them any other way.

The galleys which had been sent into Peloponnesus committed dreadful depredations there, which consoled the Athenians in some measure for the losses they had sustained. One day, as the forces were going on board, and Pericles was entering his own ship, a sudden and total eclipse of the sun took place, and the earth was overspread with the deepest gloom. This phenomenon filled the minds of the Athenians with the utmost terror; superstition, and the ignorance of natural causes, making them consider such

* Lib. vii. Epist. 11.

† More than \$600,000.

events as fatal omens. Pericles seeing the pilot who was on board his ship astonished, and incapable of managing the helm, threw his cloak over his face, and asked him whether he could see: the pilot answering, that the cloak took away all objects from his sight, Pericles then gave him to understand that the like cause, viz. : the interposition of the vast body of the moon between his eyes and the sun, prevented his seeing its splendor.

The first year of the war of Peloponnesus being now elapsed, the Athenians, during the winter, solemnized public funerals, according to ancient custom, a practice truly humane, and expressive of a just gratitude, in honor of those who had lost their lives in that campaign; a ceremony they observed during the whole course of that war. For this purpose they set up, three days before, a tent, in which the bones of the deceased citizens were exposed, and every person strewed flowers, incense, perfumes, and things of the same kind upon those remains. They afterwards were put on a kind of chariots, in coffins made of cypress wood, every tribe having its particular coffin and chariot; but in one of the latter a large empty coffin * was carried, in honor of those whose bodies had not been found. The procession marched with a grave, majestic, and religious pomp; a great number of inhabitants, both citizens and foreigners, assisted at this mournful solemnity. The relations of the deceased officers and soldiers stood weeping at the sepulchre. These bones were carried to a public monument, in the finest suburb of the city, called the Ceramicus; where were buried in all ages, those who had lost their lives in the field, except the warriors of Marathon, who, to immortalize their extraordinary valor, were interred in the field of battle. Earth was afterwards laid over them, and then one of the citizens of the greatest distinction pronounced their funeral oration. Pericles was now appointed to perform this honorable office. When the ceremony was ended, he went from the sepulchre to the tribunal, in order to be the better heard, and spoke the oration, the whole of which Thucydides has transmitted to us. † Whether it was really composed by Pericles, or by the historian, we may affirm that it is truly worthy the reputation of both those great men, as well for the noble simplicity of the style, as for the just beauty of the thoughts, and the greatness of the sentiments which shine in every part of it. After having paid, in so

* These are called Cenotaphia.

† Thucyd. l. ii. pp. 122-130.

solemn a manner, this double tribute of tears and applauses, to the memory of those brave soldiers who had sacrificed their lives to defend the liberties of their country, the public, who did not confine their gratitude to empty ceremonies and tears, maintained their widows and their infant orphans.* This was a powerful incentive to animate the courage of the citizens; for great men are formed where merit is best rewarded.†

About the close of the same campaign, the Athenians concluded an alliance with Sitalces, king of the Odrysians in Thrace; and, in consequence of this treaty, his son was admitted a citizen of Athens. They also came to an accommodation with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, by restoring to him the city of Thermæ; after which they united their forces, in order to carry on the war in Chalcis.

SECTION II.—THE PLAGUE MAKES DREADFUL HAVOC IN ATTICA, ETC. SECOND AND THIRD YEARS OF THE WAR.

In the beginning of the second campaign, the enemy made an incursion into the country as before, and laid it waste. But the plague made a much greater devastation in Athens; the like having never been known. It is related, that it began in Ethiopia, whence it descended into Egypt, from thence spread over Libya, and a great part of Persia; and at last broke at once like a flood upon Athens.‡ Thucydides, who himself was seized with that deadly disease, has described very minutely the several circumstances and symptoms of it; in order, says he, that a faithful and exact relation of this calamity may serve as an instruction to posterity, in case the like should ever happen. Hippocrates, who was employed to visit the sick, has also described it in a medical, § and Lucretius in a poetical way. || This pestilence baffled the utmost efforts of art; the most robust constitutions were unable to withstand its attack; and the greatest care and skill of the physicians were a feeble help to those who were infected. The instant a person was seized, he was struck with despair, which quite disabled him from attempting a cure. The assistance that was given them was ineffectual, and proved mortal to all such of their relations as had the courage to approach them. The prodi-

* Thucyd. 1. ii. p. 130.

† "Ἄθλα γὰρ οἷς κεῖται ἀρετῆς μέγιστα τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρες ἀριστοὶ πολιτεύουσι.

‡ A. M. 3574. Ant. J. C. 430. Thucyd. 1. ii. pp. 130-147. Diod. pp. 101, 102. Plut. in Pericl. p. 171.

§ Epidem. 1 iii. p. 3.

|| Lib. vi.

gious quantity of baggage, which had been removed out of the country into the city, proved very noxious. Most of the inhabitants, for want of lodging, lived in little cottages, where they could scarcely breathe, during the raging heat of the summer, so that they were seen either piled one upon the other, the dead as well as those who were dying, or else crawling through the streets, or lying along by the side of fountains, to which they had dragged themselves, to quench the raging thirst which consumed them. The very temples were filled with dead bodies, and every part of the city exhibited a dreadful image of death; without the least remedy for the present, or the least hopes with regard to futurity.

The plague, before it spread into Attica, had been very destructive in Persia. Artaxerxes, who had been informed of the great reputation of Hippocrates of Cos, the greatest physician of that or any other age, caused his governors to write him, to invite him into his dominions, in order that he might prescribe to those who were infected. The king made him the most advantageous offers, setting no bounds to his reward on the side of interest, and, with regard to honor, promising to make him equal with the most considerable persons in his court.* The reader has already been told, the high regard which was shown to the Grecian physicians in Persia; and, indeed, was it possible that so useful a man as Hippocrates could be too well rewarded? However, all the glitter of the Persian riches and dignities, were not capable of corrupting him, nor of stifling the hatred and aversion for the Persians, which was become natural to the Greeks ever since the former had invaded them. This great physician, therefore, sent no other answer but this, that he was free from either wants or desires; that he owed all his cares to his fellow-citizens and countrymen; and was under no obligation to barbarians, the declared enemies of Greece. Kings are not used to denials. Artaxerxes, therefore, in the highest transports of rage, sent to the city of Cos, the native place of Hippocrates, and where he was at the time, commanding them to deliver up to him that insolent wretch, in order that he might be brought to condign punishment; and threatening, in case they refused, to lay waste their city and island in such a manner, that not the least trace of it should remain. However, the inhabitants of Cos were not under the least terror. They made answer, that the menaces of Darius and Xerxes had not

* Hippocrat. in Epist.

been able to prevail with them to give them earth and water, or to obey their orders; that the threats of Artaxerxes would be equally impotent; that, let what would be the consequence, they would never give up their fellow-citizen; and that they depended upon the protection of the gods.

Hippocrates had said in one of his letters, that he owed his services entirely to his country. And, indeed, the instant he was sent for to Athens, he went thither, and did not once stir out of the city, till the plague had quite ceased. He devoted himself entirely to the service of the sick; and to multiply himself as it were, he sent several of his disciples into all parts of the country, after having instructed them in what manner to treat their patients. The Athenians were struck with the deepest sense of gratitude, for the generous care of Hippocrates. They therefore ordained, by a public decree, that Hippocrates should be initiated in the most exalted mysteries, in the same manner as Hercules the son of Jupiter; that a crown of gold should be presented to him, of the value of a thousand staters,* amounting to five hundred pistoles French money; † and that the decree by which it was granted him, should be read aloud by a herald in the public games, on the solemn festivals of Panathenæ: that the freedom of the city should be given him, and himself be maintained at the public charge, in the Prytaneum all his lifetime, in case he thought proper: in fine, that the children of all the people of Cos, whose city had given birth to so great a man, might be maintained and brought up in Athens, in the same manner as if they had been born there.

In the mean time the enemy, having marched into Attica, came down towards the coast, and, advancing still forward, laid waste the whole country. Pericles still adhering to the maxim he had established, not to expose the safety of the state to the hazard of a battle, would not suffer his troops to sally out of the city: however, before the enemy left the plains, he sailed to Peloponnesus with a hundred galleys, in order to hasten their retreat by his making so powerful a diversion; and after having made a dreadful havoc, as he had done the first year, he returned into the city. The plague was still there as well as in the fleet, and it spread to those troops that were besieging Potidæa.

The campaign being thus ended, the Athenians, who saw their country depopulated by two great scourges, war and

* The Attic stater was a gold coin weighing two drachms. It is in the original, χρυσῶν χιλίων.

† About nine hundred and thirty-five dollars,

pestilence, began to despond, and to murmur against Pericles; considering him as the author of all their calamities, as he had involved them in that fatal war. They then sent a deputation to Lacedæmon, to obtain, if possible, an accommodation by some means or other, firmly resolved to make whatever concessions should be demanded of them; the ambassadors, however, returned without being able to obtain any terms. Complaints and murmurs now broke out afresh; and the whole city was in such a trouble and confusion, as seemed to prognosticate the worst of evils. Pericles, in the midst of this universal consternation, could not forbear assembling the people; and endeavored to soften, and at the same time to encourage them, by justifying himself "The reasons," said he, "which determined you to undertake this war, and which you approved at the time, are still the same, and are not changed by the alteration of circumstances, which neither you nor myself could foresee. Had it been left to your option to make choice of peace or war, the former would certainly have been the more eligible; but as there was no other means for preserving your liberty than by drawing the sword, was it possible for you to hesitate? If we are citizens who truly love our country, will our private misfortunes make us neglect the common welfare of the state? Every man feels the evil which afflicts him, because it is present; but no one is sensible of the good which will result from it, because it is not come. Have you forgotten the strength and grandeur of your empire? Of the two parts which form this globe of ours, viz.: the land and sea, you have absolute possession of the latter; and no king, or any other power, is able to oppose your fleets. It is now the question whether you will preserve this glory, and this empire, or resign it for ever. Be not therefore grieved because you are deprived of a few country-houses and garraens, which ought to be considered no otherwise than as the frame of the picture, though you would seem to make them the picture itself. Consider that if you do but preserve your liberty, you will easily recover them; but that should you suffer yourselves to be deprived of this blessing, you will lose every valuable possession with it. Do not show less generosity than your ancestors, who for the sake of preserving it, abandoned even their city; and who, though they had not inherited such a glory from their ancestors, yet suffered the worst of evils, and engaged in the most perilous enterprises, to transmit it to you. I will confess that your

present calamities are exceedingly grievous, and I myself am duly sensible and deeply afflicted for them. But is it just in you to exclaim against your general, merely for an accident that was not to be diverted by all the prudence of man; and to make him responsible for an event in which he has not the least concern? We must submit patiently to those evils which heaven inflicts upon us, and vigorously oppose such as arise from our fellow-creatures. As to the hatred and jealousy which attend on your prosperity, they are the usual lot of all who believe themselves worthy of commanding. However, hatred and envy are not of long continuance, but the glory that accompanies exalted actions is immortal. Revolve, therefore, perpetually in your minds, how shameful and ignominious it is for men to bow the neck to their enemies, and how glorious it is to triumph over them; and then, animated by this double reflection, march on to danger with joy and intrepidity, and do not crouch so tamely to the Lacedæmonians; and call to mind, that those who display the greatest bravery and resolution in dangers, acquire the most esteem and applause."

The motives of honor and fame, the remembrance of the great actions of their ancestors, the soothing title of sovereigns of Greece, and above all, the jealousy of Sparta, the ancient and perpetual rival of Athens, were the usual motives which Pericles employed to influence and animate the Athenians, and had hitherto never failed of success. But on this occasion, the sense of the present evils prevailed over every other consideration, and stifled all other thoughts. The Athenians, indeed, did not design to sue the Lacedæmonians any more for peace, but the very sight and presence of Pericles was insupportable to them. They therefore deprived him of the command of the army, and sentenced him to pay a fine which, according to some historians, amounted to fifteen talents, and according to others fifty.*

However, this public disgrace of Pericles was not to be very lasting. The anger of the people was appeased by the first efforts, and had spent itself in the injurious treatment of him, as the bee leaves the sting in the wound. But he was not now so happy with regard to his domestic evils; for besides his having lost a great number of his friends and relations by the pestilence, feuds and divisions had long reigned in his family. Xanthippus, his eldest son, who himself was extremely profuse, and had married a young wife

* About fifteen or fifty thousand dollars.

no less extravagant, could not bear his father's exact economy, who allowed him but a very small sum for his pleasures. This made him borrow money in his father's name. When the lender demanded his debt of Pericles, he not only refused to pay, but even prosecuted him for it. Xanthippus was so enraged, that he inveighed in the most heinous terms against his father, exclaiming against him in all places, and ridiculing openly the assemblies he held at his house, and his conferences with the sophists. He did not consider, that a son, though treated unjustly, which was far otherwise in his case, ought to submit patiently to the injustice of his father; as a citizen is obliged to suffer that of his country.

The plague carried off Xanthippus. At the same time Pericles lost his sister, with many of his relations and best friends, whose assistance he most needed in the administration. But he did not sink under these losses; his strength of mind was not shaken by them; and he was not seen to weep or show the usual marks of sorrow at the grave of any of his relations, till the death of Paralus, the last of his legitimate children. That severestroke exceedingly afflicted him, though he did his utmost to preserve his usual tranquillity, and not show any outward symptoms of sorrow. But when he was to put the crown of flowers upon the head of his dead son, he could not support the cruel spectacle, nor stifle the transports of his grief, which forced its way in cries, in sobs, and a flood of tears.

Pericles, misled by the principles of a false philosophy, imagined, that bewailing the death of his relations and children, would betray a weakness that no way suited the greatness of soul he had ever shown; and on this occasion that the sensibility of the father would sully the glory of the conqueror. How gross an error! how childish an illusion: which either makes heroism consist in wild and savage cruelty, or leaving the same grief and confusion in the mind, assumes a vain outside of constancy and resolution, merely to be admired. But, does martial bravery extinguish nature? Is a man dead to all human sentiments, because he makes a considerable figure in the state? Antoninus the emperor, had a much juster way of thinking, who, when Marcus Aurelius was lamenting the death of the person who had brought him up, said, "Suffer him to be a man, for philosophy nor sovereignty renders us insensible."*

* *Permitte illi ut homo sit: neque enim vel philosophia vel imperium tollit affectus.*—Jul. Capitol. in Vit. Antonini Pii.

Fickleness and inconstancy were the prevailing characters of the Athenians; and as these carried them on a sudden to the greatest excesses, they soon brought them back again within the bounds of moderation and gentleness. It was not long before they repented the injury they had done Pericles, and earnestly wished to see him again in their assemblies. By dint of suffering, they began to bear patiently their domestic misfortunes, and to be fired more and more with a zeal for their country's glory; and in their ardor for reinstating its affairs, they did not know any person more capable than Pericles of the administration. Pericles, at that time, never stirred out of his house, and was in the utmost grief at the loss he had sustained. However, Alcibiades and the rest of his friends entreated him to go abroad, and show himself in public. The people asked him pardon for their ungrateful usage of him; and Pericles, moved with their entreaties, and persuaded that it did not become a good man to harbor the least resentment against his country, resumed the government.

About the end of the second campaign, some ambassadors had set out from Lacedæmon, in order to solicit the king of Persia's alliance, and engage him to furnish a sum of money for maintaining the fleet: this reflected great ignominy on the Lacedæmonians, who called themselves the deliverers of Greece, since they thereby retracted or sullied the glorious actions they had formerly achieved in her defence against Persia. They went by the way of Thrace, in order to disengage, if possible, Sitalees from the alliance of the Athenians, and prevail with him to succor Potidæa. But they here met with some Athenian ambassadors, who caused them to be arrested as disturbers of the public peace, and afterwards to be sent to Athens, where, without suffering them to be heard, they were put to death that same day, and their bodies thrown into the open fields, by way of reprisal on the Lacedæmonians, who treated all who were not of their party in the same inhuman manner. It is scarcely possible to conceive how two cities, which but a short time before were so closely united, and ought to have shown a mutual civility and forbearance for each other, could contract so inveterate a hatred, and break into such cruel acts of violence, as to infringe all the laws of war, humanity and nations; and which prompted them to exercise greater cruelties upon one another, than if they had been at war with the barbarians.

Potidæa had now been besieged almost three years, when the inhabitants reduced to extremities, and in such want of provisions that some fed on human flesh, and not expecting any succors from the Peloponnesians, whose attempts in Attica had all proved abortive, surrendered on conditions. The circumstances which made the Athenians treat them with lenity, were, the severity of the weather, which exceedingly annoyed the besiegers; and the prodigious expense of the siege, which had already cost two thousand talents, or upwards of one million two hundred thousand dollars.* They therefore came out of the city with their wives and children, as well citizens as foreigners, each man having but one suit of clothes, and the women two, and only a little money to carry them home. The Athenians blamed their generals for granting this capitulation without their order; because otherwise, as the citizens were reduced to the utmost extremity, they would have surrendered at discretion. They sent a colony thither.

The first thing that Pericles did, after his being re-elected generalissimo, was to propose the abrogation of that law, which he himself had caused to be enacted against bastards, when there were legitimate children.† It declared, that such only should be considered as true and legitimate Athenians, whose fathers and mothers were both natives of Athens; and it had been executed just before with the utmost rigor. For the king of Egypt ‡ having sent to Athens a present of forty thousand measures of corn to be distributed among the people, the bastards, on account of this new law, were involved in a thousand difficulties, till then unpractised, and which had not been so much as thought of. Near five thousand of them were condemned and sold as slaves, while fourteen thousand and forty citizens were confirmed in their privileges, and recognized as true Athenians. It was thought very strange, that the author and promoter of this law should himself desire to have it repealed. But the Athenians were moved to compassion at the domestic

* The army which besieged Potidæa consisted of three thousand men, exclusive of the sixteen hundred who had been sent under the command of Phormio. Every soldier received daily two drachms, or twenty pence French, for master and man: and those of the galleys had the same pay.—Thucyd. l. iii. p. 182.

† A. M. 3575. Ant. J. C. 429.

‡ Plutarch does not name this king. Perhaps it was Inarus, son to Psammetichus king of Libya, who had caused part of the Egyptians to take up arms against Artaxerxes, and to whom the Athenians, about thirty years before, had sent succors against the Persians.—Thucyd. l. i. p. 68.

calamities of Pericles ; so that they permitted him to enter his bastard ; in his own name, in the register of the citizens of his tribe.

A short time after, he himself was infected with the pestilence. Being extremely ill, and ready to breathe his last, the principal citizens, and such of his friends as had not forsaken him, discoursing together in his bed-chamber about his real merit, they recounted his exploits, and computed the number of his victories ; for while he was generalissimo of the Athenians, he had erected for the glory of their city nine trophies, in memory of as many battles gained by him. They did not imagine that Pericles heard what they were saying, because he seemed to have lost his senses ; but it was far otherwise, for not a single word of their discourse had escaped him ; when, breaking suddenly from his silence, " I am surprised," said he, " that you should treasure up so well in your memories, and extol so highly, a series of actions, in which fortune had so great a share, and which are common to me with so many other generals ; and at the same time should forget the most glorious circumstance in my life ; I mean, my never having caused a single citizen to put on mourning." A noble saying ! which very few in high stations can declare with truth. The Athenians were deeply afflicted at his death.*

The reader has doubtless observed, from what has been said of Pericles, that in him were united most qualities which constitute the great man ; as those of the admiral, by his great skill in naval affairs ; of the great captain, by his conquests and victories ; of the able treasurer, by the excellent order in which he put the finances ; of the great politician, by the extent and justness of his views, by his eloquence in public deliberations, and by the dexterity and address with which he transacted affairs ; of a minister of state, by the methods he employed to increase trade and promote the arts in general ; in fine, of father of his country, by the happiness he procured to every individual, and which he always had in view as the true scope and end of his administration.

But I must not omit another characteristic which was peculiar to him. He acted with so much wisdom, moderation, disinterestedness and zeal for the public good ; he discovered, in all things, so great a superiority of talents, and gave so

* A. M. 3576. Ant. J. C. 428.

exalted an idea of his experience, capacity, and integrity, that he acquired the confidence of all the Athenians; and fixed in his own favor, during forty years that he governed the Athenians, their natural fickleness and inconstancy. He suppressed that jealousy, which an extreme fondness for liberty had made them entertain against all citizens, distinguished by their merit and great authority. But the most surprising circumstance is, he gained his great ascendancy merely by persuasion, without employing force, mean artifices, or any of those arts which a mean politician excuses in himself, upon the specious pretence, that the necessity of the public affairs, and reasons of state, make them necessary.

Anaxagoras died the same year as Pericles. Plutarch relates a circumstance concerning him, which happened some time before, that must not be omitted. He says, that this philosopher, who had voluntarily reduced himself to excessive poverty, in order that he might have the greater leisure to pursue his studies; finding himself neglected in his old age by Pericles, who, in the multiplicity of the public affairs, had not always time to think of him, wrapped his cloak about his head, and threw himself on the ground, in the fixed resolution to starve himself.* Pericles hearing of this accidentally, ran with the utmost haste to the philosopher's house, in the deepest affliction. He conjured him, in the strongest and most moving terms, not to throw his life away; adding that it was not Anaxagoras, but himself, that was to be lamented, if he was so unfortunate as to lose so wise and faithful a friend; one who was so capable of giving him wholesome counsels with regard to the pressing occasions of the state. Anaxagoras then, uncovering his head a little, spoke thus to him: "Pericles, those who use a lamp take care to feed it with oil."† This was a gentle, and at the same time a strong and piercing reproach. Pericles ought to have supplied his wants unasked. Many lamps are extinguished in this manner in a country, by the criminal negligence of those who ought to supply them.

SECTION III.—THE LACEDÆMONIANS BESIEGE PLATÆÆ. FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

The most remarkable transaction of the following years, was the siege of Platææ by the Lacedæmonians. This was

* It was the custom for those to cover their heads with their cloaks, who were reduced to despair, and resolved to die.
† Plut. in Pericl. p. 162.

one of the most famous sieges in antiquity, on account of the vigorous efforts of both parties; but especially for the glorious resistance made by the besieged, and their bold and industrious stratagem, by which several of them got out of the city, and by that means escaped the fury of the enemy. The Lacedæmonians besieged this place in the beginning of the third campaign. As soon as they had pitched their camp round the city, in order to lay waste the places adjacent to it, the Plataëans sent some deputies to Archidamus, who commanded on that occasion, to represent, that he could not attack them with the least shadow of justice, because that, after the famous battle of Plataæ, Pausanias, the Grecian general, offering up a sacrifice in their city to Jupiter the Deliverer, in presence of all the allies, had given them their freedom, to reward their valor and zeal; and therefore, that they ought not to be disturbed in the enjoyment of their liberties, since it had been granted them by a Lacedæmonian. Archidamus answered, that their demand would be very reasonable, had they not joined with the Athenians, the professed enemies to the liberty of Greece; but that, if they would disengage themselves from their present alliance, or at least remain neutral, they then should be left in the full enjoyment of their privileges. The deputies replied, that they could not possibly come to any agreement, without first sending to Athens, whither their wives and their children were retired. The Lacedæmonians permitted them to send thither; when the Athenians promising solemnly to succor them to the utmost of their power, the Plataëans resolved to suffer the last extremities rather than surrender; and accordingly they informed the Lacedæmonians, from their walls, that they could not comply with what was desired.*

Archidamus then, after calling upon the gods to witness that he did not first infringe the alliance, and was not the cause of the calamities which might befall the Plataëans, for having refused the just and reasonable conditions offered them, prepared for the siege. He surrounded the city with a circumvallation of trees, which were laid lengthways, very close together, with their boughs interwoven and turned towards the city, to prevent any person from going out of it. He afterwards threw up a platform to set the batteries on, in hopes that as so many hands were employed, they should

* A. M. 3576. Ant. J. C. 428. Thucyd. l. ii. pp. 147-151. Diod. l. xii. pp. 102-109.

soon take the city. He therefore caused trees to be felled on mount Cithæron, and interwove them with fascines, in order to support the terrace on all sides; he then threw in wood, earth, and stones; in a word, whatever could help to fill it up. The whole army worked night and day, without the least intermission, during seventy days; one half of the soldiers reposing themselves while the others were at work.

The besieged, observing that the work began to rise, threw up a wooden wall upon the walls of the city opposite to the platform, in order that they might always out-top the besiegers, and filled the hollow of this wooden wall with the bricks they took from the rubbish of the neighboring houses; so that the wall of timber served in a manner as a defence to keep the wall from falling as it was carrying up. It was covered, on the outside, with hides, both raw and dry, in order to shelter the works and the workmen from the fires discharged against it. In proportion as it rose, the platform was raised also, which in this manner was carried to a great height. But the besieged made a hole in the opposite wall in order to carry off the earth that sustained the platform; which the besiegers perceiving, they put large panniers filled with mortar, in place of the earth which had been removed, because they could not be so easily carried off. The besieged, therefore, finding their first stratagem defeated, made a mine under ground as far as the platform, in order to shelter themselves, and to remove from it the earth and other materials of which it was composed, and which they passed from hand to hand, as far as the city. The besiegers were a considerable time without perceiving this, till at last they found that their work did not go forward, and that the more earth they laid on, the weaker it grew. But the besieged, judging that the superiority of numbers would at length prevail, without occupying themselves any longer at this work, or carrying the wall higher on the side towards the battery, contented themselves with building another within, in the form of a half-moon, both ends of which joined to the wall; in order that the besieged might retire behind it when the first wall should be forced, and so oblige the enemy to make new works.

In the mean time the besiegers having set up their machines, doubtless after they had filled up the ditch, though Thucydides does not mention this, shook the city wall in a

very terrible manner, which, indeed alarmed the citizens very much, but did not discourage them. They employed every art that fortification could suggest against the enemy's batteries. They prevented the shock of the battering-rams, by ropes which turned aside their strokes.* They also employed another artifice; the two ends of a great beam were made fast by long iron chains to two large pieces of timber, supported at due distance upon the wall in the manner of a balance; so that whenever the enemy played their machine, the besieged lifted up this beam, and let it fall back on the head of the battering-ram, which quite deadened its force, and consequently destroyed its effect.

The besiegers finding that the attack did not go on successfully, and that a new wall was raised against their platform, despaired of being able to storm the place, and therefore changed the siege into a blockade. However, they first endeavored to set fire to it, imagining that the town might easily be burnt down, as it was so small, whenever a strong wind should rise; for they employed every artifice imaginable to make themselves masters of it as soon as possible, and with little expense. They therefore threw fascines into the intervals between the walls of the city and the intrenchment with which they had surrounded them; and filled these intervals in very little time, because of the multitude of hands employed by them; in order to set fire, at the same time, to different parts of the city. They then lighted the fire with pitch and sulphur, which in a moment made a prodigious blaze. This invention was very near carrying the city, which had baffled all others; for the besieged could not at the same time withstand the fire and the enemy in several parts of the town; and had the weather favored the besiegers, as they flattered themselves it would, it had certainly been taken: but history informs us, that an exceeding heavy rain fell, which extinguished the fire.

This last effort of the besiegers having been defeated as successfully as all the rest, they now turned the siege into a blockade, and surrounded the city with a brick wall, strengthened on each side with a deep ditch. The whole army was engaged successively in this work, and when it was finished, they left a guard over half of it, the Bœotians offering to guard the rest; upon which the Lacedæmonians returned to

* The lower end of these ropes were formed into numerous slip-knots, with which they caught the head of the battering-ram, which they raised up by the help of the machine.

Sparta about the month of October. There were now, in Plataeæ, but four hundred inhabitants, and eighty Athenians, with a hundred and ten women to dress their victuals, and no other person, whether freeman or slave, all the rest having been sent to Athens before the siege.

During the campaign, some engagements were fought both by sea and land, which I omit, because of no importance.

The next summer, which was the fourth year of the war, the people of Lesbos, the citizens of Methymna excepted, resolved to break their alliance with the Athenians. They had designed to rebel before the war was declared, but the Lacedæmonians would not receive them at that time. The citizens of Methymna sent advice of this to the Athenians, assuring them, that if an immediate succor was not sent, the island would be inevitably lost. The affliction of the Athenians, who had sustained great losses by the war and the plague, was greatly increased, when news was brought of the revolt of so considerable an island, whose forces, which were quite fresh, would now join the enemy, and reinforce them on a sudden by the addition of a powerful fleet. The Athenians therefore sent forty galleys designed for Peloponnesus, which accordingly sailed for Mitylene. The inhabitants, though in great consternation because they were quite unprepared, yet put on an appearance of bravery, and sailed out of the port with their ships; however, being repulsed, they proposed an accommodation, which the Athenians listened to, from an apprehension that they were not strong enough to reduce the island to their allegiance. A suspension of arms was therefore agreed upon, during which the Mitylenians sent ambassadors to Athens. The fear of not obtaining their demands, made them send others to Lacedæmon, to desire succors. This was not ill judged, the Athenians sending them an answer which they had no reason to interpret in their favor.*

The ambassadors of Mitylene, after a dangerous voyage, having arrived in Lacedæmon, the Spartans deferred giving them audience, till the solemnization of the Olympic games, in order that the allies might hear the complaints they had to make. I shall repeat their whole speech on that occasion, as it may serve at once to give a just idea of the style of Thucydides, and of the disposition of the several states with

* Thucyd. l. iii. pp. 174-207. Diod. l. xii. pp. 108, 109.

regard to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. "We are sensible," said the ambassadors, "that it is the custom to use deserters well at first, because of the service they do those whom they fly to; but to despise them afterwards, as traitors to their country and friends. This is far from being unjust, when they have no inducement to such a change, when the same union subsists, and the same aids are reciprocally granted. But it is far otherwise between us and the Athenians: and we entreat you not to be prejudiced against us, because, after having been treated mildly by the Athenians during the peace, we now renounce their alliance when they are unfortunate. For, having come hither to demand admittance into the number of your friends and allies, we ought to begin our own justification, by showing the justice and necessity of our procedure; it being impossible for a true friendship to be established between individuals, or a solid alliance between cities, unless both are founded on virtue and uniformity of principles and sentiments.

"To come to the point: the treaty we concluded with the Athenians, was not to enslave Greece, but to free it from the yoke of the Barbarians; and it was concluded after the retreat of the Persians, when you renounced the command. We adhered to it with pleasure, as long as the Athenians continued to entertain just designs; but when we saw that they discontinued the war they were carrying on against the enemy, merely to oppress the allies, we could not but suspect their conduct. And as it was extremely difficult, in so great a diversity of interests and opinions, for all of them to continue in strict union, and still harder to make head against them when alone and separated, they have subjected, by insensible degrees, all the allies, except the inhabitants of Chios and our people, and used our own forces for this end. For, at the same time that they left us seemingly at liberty, they obliged us to follow them; though we could no longer rely on their words, and had the strongest reason to fear the like treatment. And, indeed, what probability is there, after their enslaving all the other states, that they should show a regard to us only, and admit us upon terms of equality, if they may become our masters whenever they please; especially as their power increases daily, in proportion as ours lessens? A mutual fear between confederates, is a strong motive to make an alliance lasting, and to prevent unjust and violent attempts, by its keeping all things in an equilibrium. Their leaving us the enjoyment of our

liberties, was merely because they could not intrench upon them by open force, but only by that specious equity and moderation they have shown us. First, they pretended to prove, from their moderate conduct in regard to us, that as we were free, we should not have marched in conjunction with them against the other allies, had they not given them just grounds for complaint. Secondly, by attacking the weakest first, and subduing them one after another, they enabled themselves, by their ruin, to subject the powerful without difficulty, who at last would be left alone and without support; whereas, had they begun by invading us, at the time that the allies were possessed of all their troops, and were able to make some stand, they could not so easily have completed their designs. Besides, as we had a large fleet, which would strengthen considerably whatever party we should declare for, this was a check upon them. Add to this, that the high regard we have always shown for their republic, and the endeavors we have used to gain the favor of those who commanded it, have suspended our ruin. But we had been undone, had not this war broke out; which the fate of others leaves no room to doubt.

“What friendship, then, what lasting alliance can be concluded with those who are never friends and allies, but when force is employed to make them continue such? For, as they were obliged to caress us during the war, to prevent our joining with the enemy; we were constrained to treat them with the same regard in time of peace, to prevent their falling upon us. That which love produces in other places, was with us the effect of fear. It was this circumstance that made an alliance subsist some time, which both parties were determined to break upon the very first favorable opportunity: let therefore no one accuse us for the advantage we now take. We had not always the same opportunity to save, as they had to ruin us; but were under the necessity of waiting for a favorable moment before we could venture to declare ourselves.

“Such are the motives which now oblige us to solicit your alliance; the equity and justice of which appear very strong to us, and consequently call on us to provide for our safety; we should have claimed your protection before, had you been sooner inclined to afford it to us; for we offered ourselves to you even before the war broke out: we have now come, at the persuasion of the Bœotians, your allies, to disengage ourselves from the oppressors of Greece, and join

our arms with its defenders ; and to provide for the security of our state, which is now in imminent danger. If any thing can be objected to our conduct, it is the declaring ourselves so precipitately, with more generosity than prudence, and without having made the least preparations. But this also ought to engage you to be more ready in succoring us ; that you may not lose the opportunity of protecting the oppressed, and avenging yourselves on your enemies. There never was a more favorable conjuncture than that which now offers itself ; a conjuncture, when war and pestilence have consumed their forces, and exhausted their treasure : not to mention that their fleet is divided, by which means they will not be in a condition to resist you, should you invade them at the same time by land and sea. For they either will leave us to attack you, and give us an opportunity of succoring you ; or they will oppose us all together, and then you will have but half their forces to contend with.

“ For the rest, let no one imagine that you will expose yourselves to dangers for a people incapable of doing you service. Our country indeed lies at a considerable distance from you, but our aid is near at hand. For the war will be carried on, not in Attica, as is supposed, but in that country whose revenues are the support of Attica, and we are not far from it. Consider, also, that in abandoning us, you will increase the power of the Athenians by the addition of ours ; and that no state will then dare to take up arms against them. But in succoring us, you will strengthen yourselves with a fleet, which you so much want ; you will induce many other people, after our example, to join you ; and you will take off the reproach cast upon you, of abandoning those who have recourse to your protection, which will be no inconsiderable advantage to you during the course of the war.

“ We therefore implore you, in the name of Jupiter Olympus, in whose temple we now are, not to frustrate the hopes of the Greeks, nor reject suppliants, whose preservation may be highly advantageous, and whose ruin may be infinitely pernicious to you. Show yourselves such now, as the idea entertained of your generosity, and the extreme danger to which we are reduced, may demand ; that is, the protectors of the afflicted and the deliverers of Greece.”

The allies, struck with these reasons, admitted them into

the alliance of Peloponnesus. An immediate incursion into the enemy's country was resolved, and that the allies should rendezvous at Corinth with two-thirds of their forces. The Lacedæmonians arrived first, and prepared engines for transporting the ships from the gulf of Corinth into the sea of Athens, in order to invade Attica both by land and sea. The Athenians were no less active on their side; but the allies, being employed in their harvest, and beginning to grow weary of the war, were a long time before they met.

During this interval, the Athenians, who perceived that all these preparations were made against them, from a supposition that they were very weak, to undeceive the world, and show that they alone were able to support a fleet without the aid of Lesbos, sent to sea a fleet of one hundred sail, which they manned with citizens as well as foreigners; not exempting a single citizen, except such only as were obliged to serve on horseback, or whose revenue amounted to five hundred measures of corn. After having showed themselves before the isthmus of Corinth, the more to display their power, they made descents into whatever parts of Peloponnesus they pleased.

The world never saw a finer fleet. The Athenians guarded their own country, and the coasts of Eubœa and Salamin, with a fleet of a hundred ships; they cruised round Peloponnesus with another fleet of the like number of vessels, without including their fleet before Lesbos and other places. The whole amounted to upwards of two hundred and fifty galleys. The expenses of this powerful armament entirely exhausted their treasure, which had been very much drained before by the siege of Potidæa.

The Lacedæmonians, greatly surprised at so formidable a fleet, which they by no means expected, returned with the utmost expedition to their own country, and only ordered forty galleys to be fitted out for the succor of Mitylene. The Athenians had sent a reinforcement thither, consisting of a thousand heavy armed troops, by whose assistance they made a contravallation, with forts in the most commodious places; so that it was blocked up, both by sea and land, in the beginning of winter. The Athenians were in such great want of money for carrying on this siege, that they were obliged to assess themselves, which they had never done before, and by this means two hundred talents were sent to it.*

* Two hundred thousand dollars.

The people of Mitylene being in want of all things, and having waited to no purpose for the succors which the Lacedæmonians had promised them, surrendered, upon condition that no person should be put to death or imprisoned till the ambassadors whom they should send to Athens were returned; and that, in the mean time, the troops should be admitted into the city.* As soon as the Athenians had got possession of the city, such of the factious Mityleneans as had fled to the altars for refuge were conveyed to Tenedos, and afterwards to Athens. There the affair of the Mityleneans was debated. As their revolt had greatly exasperated the people, because it had not been preceded by any ill treatment, and seemed a mere effect of their hatred for the Athenians, in the first transports of their rage, they resolved to put all the citizens to death indiscriminately, and to make all the women and children slaves, and immediately sent a galley to put the decree in execution.

But night gave them leisure to make different reflections. This severity was judged too cruel, and carried farther than consisted with justice. They imagined to themselves the fate of that unhappy city, entirely abandoned to slaughter, and repented their having involved the innocent with the guilty. This sudden change of the Athenians gave the Mitylean ambassadors some little glimmerings of hope; and they prevailed so far with the magistrates as to have the affair debated a second time. Cleon, who had suggested the first decree, a man of fiery temper, and who had great authority over the people, maintained his opinion with great vehemence and heat. He represented that it was unworthy a wise government to change with every wind, and to annul in the morning what they had decreed the night before; and that it was highly important to take an exemplary vengeance of the Mityleneans, in order to awe the rest of their allies, who were everywhere ready to revolt.

Diodorus, who had contradicted Cleon in the first assembly, now opposed his arguments more strongly than before. After describing, in a tender and pathetic manner, the deplorable condition of the Mityleneans, whose minds, he said, must necessarily be on the rack, while they were expecting a sentence that was to determine their fate, he represented to the Athenians that the fame of their mildness and clem-

* A. M. 3577. Ant. J. C. 427.

ency had always reflected the highest honor on them, and distinguished them gloriously from all other nations; he observed that the citizens of Mitylene had been drawn involuntarily into the rebellion, a proof of which was their surrendering the city to them the instant it was in their power to do it; they, therefore, by this decree, would murder their benefactors, and consequently be both unjust and ungrateful in punishing the innocent with the guilty. He observed farther, that supposing the Mityleneans in general were guilty, it would however be for the interest of the Athenians to dissemble, in order that the rigorous punishment they had decreed might not exasperate the rest of the allies; and that the best way to put a stop to the evil would be to leave room for repentance, and not plunge people into despair by the absolute and irrevocable refusal of a pardon. His opinion, therefore, was that they should examine very deliberately the cause of those factious Mityleneans who had been brought to Athens, and pardon all the rest.

The assembly was very much divided, so that Diodorus carried it only by a few votes. A second galley was therefore immediately fitted out. It was furnished with everything that might accelerate its course; and the ambassadors of Mitylene promised a great reward to the crew, provided they arrived time enough. They therefore did not quit their oars even when they took sustenance, but eat and drank as they rowed, and took their rest alternately; and very happily for them, the wind was favorable. The first galley had got a day and night's sail before them, but as those on board carried ill news, they did not make great haste. Its arrival before the city had spread the utmost consternation in every part of it; but it increased infinitely when the decree, by which all the citizens were sentenced to die, was read in a full assembly. Nothing was now heard in all places but cries and loud lamentation. The moment the sentence was about to be put in execution advice came that a second galley had arrived. Immediately the cruel massacre was suspended. The assembly was again convened; and the decree which granted a pardon was listened to with a silence and joy that is much easier conceived than expressed.

All the factious Mityleneans, though upwards of a thousand, were put to death. The city was afterwards dismantled, the ships delivered up, and the whole island, the

city of Methymna excepted, was divided into three thousand parts or portions, three hundred of which were consecrated to the service of the gods; and the rest divided by lot among such Athenians as were sent thither, to whom the natives of the country gave a revenue of two minæ for every portion; on which condition they were permitted to keep possession of the island, but not as proprietors.* The cities which belonged to the Mityleneans on the coast of Asia were all subjected by the Athenians.

During the winter of the preceding campaign, the inhabitants of Plataeæ having lost all hopes of succor; and being in the utmost want of provisions, formed a resolution to cut their way through the enemy; but half of them, struck with the greatness of the danger, and the boldness of the enterprise, entirely lost courage when they came to the execution; the rest, who were about two hundred and twenty soldiers, persisted in their resolution, and escaped in the following manner.†

Before I begin the relation of their escape, it will be proper to inform my readers in what sense I use certain expressions I shall employ in it. In strictness of speech, the line or fortification which is made round a city, when besieged, to prevent sallies, is called contravallation, and that which is made to prevent any succors from without; is named circumvallation. Both these fortifications were used in the siege; however, for brevity's sake, I shall use only the former term.

The contravallation consisted of two walls, at sixteen feet distance one from the other. The space between the two walls, being a kind of platform or terrace, seemed to be but one single building, and composed a range of cazerns or barracks, where the soldiers had their lodgings. Lofty towers were built around at proper distances, extending from one wall to the other, in order that they might be able to defend themselves at the same time against any attack from within and without. There was no going from one cazern to another without crossing those towers; and on the top of the wall was a parapet on both sides, where a guard was commonly kept; but in rainy weather the soldiers used to shelter themselves in the towers, which served the purpose

* The Attic minæ was worth a hundred drachms, that is, fifty French livres, or \$9.37½.

† Thucyd. l. iii. pp. 18-188.

of guard-houses. Such was the contravallation, having on both sides a ditch, the earth of which had been employed in making the bricks of the wall.

The besieged first took the height of the wall by counting the rows of bricks which composed it ; and this they did at different times, and employed several men for that purpose, in order that they might not mistake in the calculation. This was the easier, because, as the wall stood but at a short distance, every part of it was very visible. They then made ladders of a proper length.

All things being now ready for executing the design, the besieged left the city on a dark night, in the midst of a storm of wind and rain. After crossing the first ditch, they drew near to the wall undiscovered through the darkness of the night ; not to mention that the noise made by the wind and rain prevented their being heard. They marched at some distance from one another, to prevent the clashing of their arms, which were light, in order that those who carried them might be the more active ; and one of their legs was naked to keep them from slipping so easily in the mire. Those who carried the ladders placed them in the space between the towers, where they knew no guard was posted, because it rained. That instant twelve men mounted the ladders, armed with only a coat of mail and a dagger, and marched directly to the towers, six on each side. They were followed by soldiers armed only with javelins, that they might mount the easier ; and their shields were carried after them to be used in the charge.

When most of these were got to the top of the wall, they were discovered by the falling of a tile, which one of their comrades, in taking hold of the parapet had thrown down. The alarm was immediately given from the towers, and the whole camp approached the wall without discovering the occasion of the outcry, from the gloom of the night, and the violence of the storm. Besides which, those who had stayed behind in the city, beat an alarm at the same time in another quarter, to make a diversion ; so that the enemy did not know which way to turn themselves, and were afraid to quit their posts. But a corps of reserve, of three hundred men who were kept for any unforeseen accident that might happen, quitted the contravallation, and ran to that part where they heard the noise ; and torches were held up towards Thebes, to show that they must run that way. But

those in the city, to render the signal of no use, made others at the same time in different quarters, having prepared them on the wall for that purpose.

In the mean time, those who had mounted first, having possessed themselves of the two towers which flanked the interval where the ladders were set, and having killed those who guarded them, posted themselves there to defend the passage and keep off the besiegers. Then, setting ladders from the top of the wall against the two towers, they caused a great number of their comrades to mount in order to keep off, by the discharge of their arrows, as well those who were advancing to the foot of the wall, as the others who were hastening from the neighboring towers. While this was doing, they had time to set several ladders, and to throw down the parapet, that the rest might come up with greater ease. As fast as they came up, they went down on the other side and drew up near the ditch on the outside, to shoot at those who appeared. After they were passed over, the men who were in the towers came down last, and made to the ditch to follow after the rest.

That instant the guard of three hundred, with torches, came up. However as the Plataeans saw their enemies by this light better than they were seen by them, they took a surer aim, by which means the last crossed the ditch, without being attacked in their passage: but this was not done without difficulty, because the ditch was frozen-over, and the ice would not bear, on account of the thaw and heavy rains. The violence of the storm was of great advantage to them.

After all were passed, they took the road towards Thebes, the better to conceal their retreat; because it would not appear likely that they had fled towards an enemy's city. Immediately they perceived the besiegers, with torches in their hands, pursuing in the road that led to Athens. After keeping that of Thebes about six or seven stadia,* they turned short towards the mountain, and resumed the route of Athens, where two hundred and twelve arrived, out of two hundred and twenty who had quitted the place; the rest having returned through fear, one archer excepted, who was taken on the side of the ditch of contravallation. The besiegers, after having pursued them to no purpose, returned to their camp.

* Upwards of a quarter of a league.

In the mean time, the Plataeans who remained in the city, supposing that all their companions had been killed, because those who returned, in order to justify themselves, affirmed that they were, sent a herald to demand the dead bodies; but being told the true state of the affair, he withdrew

About the end of the following campaign, which is that wherein Mitylene was taken, the Plataeans, being in absolute want of provisions, and unable to make the least defence, surrendered upon condition that they should not be punished till they had been tried and adjudged in due form of justice. Five commissioners came for this purpose from Lacedæmon; and these, without charging them with any crime, barely asked them whether they had done any service to the Lacedæmonians and the allies in this war? The Plataeans were much surprised as well as puzzled at this question; and were sensible, that it had been suggested by the Thebans, their professed enemies, who had vowed their destruction. They therefore put the Lacedæmonians in mind of the services they had done to Greece in general, both at the battle of Artemisium and that of Plataeæ; and particularly in Lacedæmon at the time of the earthquake, which was followed by the revolt of their slaves. The only reason, they declared, of their having joined the Athenians afterwards, was to defend themselves from the hostilities of the Thebans, against whom they had implored the assistance of the Lacedæmonians to no purpose: that if that was imputed to them for a crime, which was only their misfortune, it ought not however entirely to obliterate the remembrance of their former services. "Cast your eyes," said they, "on the monuments of your ancestors which you see here, to whom we annually pay all the honors which can be rendered to the manes of the dead. You thought fit to intrust their bodies with us, as we were eye-witnesses of their bravery; and yet you will now give up their ashes to their murderers, in abandoning us to the Thebans, who fought against them at the battle of Plataeæ. Will you enslave a province where Greece recovered its liberty? Will you destroy the temples of those gods to whom you owe the victory? Will you abolish the memory of their founders, who contributed so greatly to your safety? On this occasion, we may venture to say, our interest is inseparable from your glory; and you cannot deliver up your ancient friends and benefactors

to the unjust hatred of the Thebans, without eternal infamy to yourselves." *

One would conclude that these just remonstrances should have made some impression on the Lacedæmonians; but they were biassed more by the answer the Thebans made, and which was expressed in the most bitter and haughty terms against the Plataëans; and besides, they had brought their instructions from Lacedæmon. They stood therefore to their first question, "Whether the Plataëans had done them any service since the war?" and making them pass one after another, as they severally answered no, they were immediately butchered, and not one escaped. About two hundred were killed in this manner; and twenty-five Athenians, who were among them, met with the same unhappy fate. Their wives, who had been taken prisoners, were made slaves. The Thebans afterwards peopled their city with exiles from Megara and Plataæ; but the year after they demolished it entirely. It was in this manner the Lacedæmonians, in the hopes of reaping great advantage from the Thebans, sacrificed the Plataëans to their animosity, ninety-three years after their first alliance with the Athenians.

In the sixth year of the war of Peloponnesus, the plague broke out anew in Athens, and again swept away great numbers.†

SECTION IV.—THE ATHENIANS POSSESS THEMSELVES OF PYLUS, ETC. SIXTH AND SEVENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

I pass over several particular incidents of the succeeding campaigns, which differ very little from one another; the Lacedæmonians making regularly every year incursions into Attica, and the Athenians into Peloponnesus: I likewise omit some sieges in different places: that of Pylus, a little city of Messenia, only four hundred furlongs ‡ from Lacedæmon, was one of the most considerable. The Athenians, headed by Demosthenes, had taken that city, and fortified themselves very strongly in it; this was the seventh year of the war. The Lacedæmonians left Attica immediately, in order to go and recover, if possible, that place, and accord-

* Thucyd. l. iii. pp. 203-220. Diod. l. xii. p. 108.

† A. M. 3578. Ant. J. C. 426. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 232.

‡ Twenty French leagues.

ingly they attacked it both by sea and land. Brasidas, one of their leaders, signalized himself here by the most extraordinary acts of bravery. Opposite to the city was a little island called Sphacteria, whence the besieged might be greatly annoyed, and the entrance of the harbor shut up. They therefore threw a chosen body of Lacedæmonians into it; making in all, four hundred and twenty, exclusive of the Helots. A battle was fought at sea, in which the Athenians were victorious, and accordingly erected a trophy. They surrounded the island, and set a guard in every part of it, to prevent any of the inhabitants from going out, or any provisions from being brought into them.*

The news of the defeat being carried to Sparta, the magistrate thought the affair of the utmost importance, and therefore came himself upon the spot, in order that he might be better able to take proper measures; when, concluding that it would be impossible for him to save those who were on the island, and that they at last must necessarily be starved out, or be taken by some other means, he proposed an accommodation. A suspension of arms was concluded, in order to give the Lacedæmonians time to send to Athens; but upon condition that in the mean time they should surrender up all their galleys, and not attack the place either by sea or land, till the return of the ambassadors: that if they complied with these conditions, the Athenians would permit them to carry provisions to those who were in the island, at the rate of so much for the master, and half for the servant; † and that the whole should be done publicly, and in sight of both armies; that, on the other side, the Athenians should be allowed to keep guard round the island, to prevent any thing from going in or out of it, but should not attack it in any manner; that in case this agreement should be infringed in the least, the truce should be broken; otherwise, that it should continue in full force till the return of the ambassadors, whom the Athenians obliged themselves, by the articles, to convey backwards and forwards; and that then the Lacedæmonians should have their ships restored, in the same condition in which they had been delivered up. Such were the articles of the treaty. The

* A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 425. Thucyd. l. iv. pp. 253-280. Diod. l. xii. pp. 112-124.

† For the masters, two chœnices of flour, making about four pounds and a half, two cotyles, or half pints of wine, and a piece of meat, with half this quantity for the servants.

Lacedæmonians began to put it in execution, by surrendering about sixty ships; after which they sent ambassadors to Athens.

Being admitted to an audience before the people, they began by saying that they had come to the Athenians to sue for that peace which they themselves were, a little before, in a condition to grant: that they now might acquire the glory of having restored the tranquillity of all Greece, as the Lacedæmonians consented to their being arbitrators in this treaty: that the danger to which their citizens were exposed in the island, had determined them to take such a step as could not but be very grating to the Lacedæmonians: however, that their affairs were far from being desperate. and therefore, that now was the time to establish, between the two republics, a firm and solid friendship, because the affairs of both were still fluctuating, and fortune had not yet declared absolutely in favor of either: that the gods frequently abandoned those whom success makes proud, by changing the scene, and rendering them as unfortunate as they before had been happy: that they ought to consider, that the fortune of war is very uncertain; and that the means to establish a lasting peace, is not to triumph over an enemy by oppressing him, but to agree to a reconciliation on just and reasonable terms, for then, conquered by generosity and not by violence, his future thoughts being all employed, not on revenge, but on gratitude, he is delighted, and thinks it his duty to observe his engagements with inviolable fidelity.

The Athenians had now a happy opportunity for terminating the war by a peace which would have been as glorious to them, as advantageous to all Greece. But Cleon, who had a great power over the people, prevented its taking effect. They therefore answered, by his advice, that those who were in the island should first surrender at discretion, and afterwards be carried to Athens, on the condition of being sent back from it, as soon as the Lacedæmonians should have restored the cities, etc., which the Athenians had been forced to give up by the last treaty; and that, these things being done, a firm and lasting peace should be concluded. The Lacedæmonians demanded that deputies should be appointed, and that the Athenians should engage to ratify what they should conclude. But Cleon exclaimed against this proposal, and said it was plain they did not deal fairly,

since they would not negotiate with the people, but with particular men, whom they might easily bribe : and that, if they had any thing to offer, they should do it immediately. The Lacedæmonians, finding there was no possibility for them to treat with the people without advising with their allies, and that if any thing had been granted by them to their prejudice, they must be responsible for it, went away without concluding any thing ; fully persuaded that they must not expect equitable treatment from the Athenians, in the present state of their affairs and dispositions consequent on prosperity.

As soon as they were returned to Pylus, the suspension ceased : but when the Lacedæmonians came to demand back their ships, the Athenians refused to give them up, upon pretence that the treaty had been infringed in some particulars of little consequence. The Lacedæmonians inveighed strongly against this refusal, as being a manifest perfidy ; and immediately prepared for war with greater vigor and animosity than before. A haughty deportment in success, and want of faith in the observation of treaties, never fail, eventually, to involve a people in great calamities. This will appear by what follows.

The Athenians continued to keep a strict guard round the island, to prevent any provisions from being brought into it, and hoped they should soon be able to starve out the inhabitants. But the Lacedæmonians engaged the whole country in their interest by the views of gain, laying a heavy tax upon provisions, and giving such slaves their freedom as should bring any into it. Provisions were therefore now brought at the hazard of men's lives, from all parts of Peloponnesus. There were even many who swam from the coast to the island, opposite to the harbor, and drew after them goats' skins filled with pounded linseed, and poppies mixed with honey.

Those who were besieged in Pylus were reduced to almost the like extremities, being in want of both water and provisions. When advice was brought to Athens that their countrymen, so far from reducing the enemy by famine, were themselves almost starved, it was feared, that as it would not be possible for the fleet to subsist during the winter, on a desert coast which belonged to the enemy, nor to lie at anchor in so dangerous a road, the island must by that means be less securely guarded, which would give the

prisoners an opportunity of escaping. But the circumstance they chiefly dreaded was, that the Lacedæmonians, after their countrymen were once extricated from their danger, would refuse to hearken to any conditions of peace; so that they now repented their having refused it when offered them.

Cleon saw plainly that these complaints would all fall on him. He therefore began by asserting that it was all a false report concerning the extreme want of provisions, to which the Athenians, both within and without Pylus, were said to be reduced. He next exclaimed, in presence of the people, against the supineness and inactivity of the leaders who besieged the island, pretending that were they to exert the least bravery, they might soon take the island; and that had he commanded, he would soon have taken it. Upon this he was immediately appointed to command the expedition; Nicias, who was before elected, resigning voluntarily that honor to him, either through weakness, for he was naturally timid, or out of a political view, in order that the ill success which it was generally believed Cleon would meet with in this enterprise, might lose him the favor of the people. But now Cleon was greatly surprised as well as embarrassed; for he did not expect that the Athenians would take him at his word, he being a better talker than soldier, and much more able with his tongue than his sword. However, he desired leave to waive the honor they offered him, for which he alleged several excuses: but finding that the more he declined the command, the more they pressed him to accept it, he changed his note; and supplying his want of courage with rhodomontade, he declared before the whole assembly, with a firm and resolute air, that he would bring, in twenty days, those of the island prisoners, or lose his life. The whole assembly, on hearing these words, set up a laugh, for they knew the man.

Cleon, however, contrary to the expectation of every body, made good his words. He and Demosthenes (the other chief) landed in the island, attacked the enemy with great vigor, drove them from post to post, and gaining ground perpetually, at last forced them to the extremity of the island. The Lacedæmonians had stormed a fort that was thought inaccessible. There they drew up in order of battle, faced about to that side only where they could be attacked, and defended themselves like so many lions. As

the engagement had lasted the greatest part of the day, and the soldiers were oppressed with heat and weariness, and parched with thirst, the general of the Messenians, addressing himself to Cleon and Demosthenes, said that all their efforts would be to no purpose, unless they charged their enemy's rear; and promised, if they would give him but some troops armed with massive weapons, that he would endeavor to find a passage. Accordingly, he and his followers climbed up certain steep and craggy places which were not guarded, when coming down unperceived into the fort, he appeared on a sudden at the rear of the Lacedæmonians, which entirely damped their courage, and afterwards completed their overthrow. They now made but a very feeble resistance; and being oppressed with numbers, attacked on all sides, and dejected through fatigue and despair, they began to give way: but the Athenians seized on all the passes to cut off their retreat. Cleon and Demosthenes, finding that, should the battle continue, not a man of them would escape, and being desirous of carrying them alive to Athens, commanded their soldiers to desist; and caused proclamation to be made by a herald, for them to lay down their arms, and surrender at discretion. At these words, the greatest part lowered their shields, and clapped their hands in token of approbation. A kind of suspension of arms was agreed upon; and their commander desired leave might be granted him to despatch a messenger to the camp, to know the resolution of the generals. This was not allowed, but they called heralds from the coast; and after several messages, a Lacedæmonian came forward and cried aloud, that they were permitted to treat with the enemy, provided they did not submit to dishonorable terms. Upon this they held a conference; after which they surrendered at discretion, and were kept till the next day. The Athenians then raising a trophy, and restoring the Lacedæmonians their dead, embarked for their own country, after distributing the prisoners among the several ships, and committing the guard of them to the captain of the galleys.

In this battle a hundred and twenty-eight Lacedæmonians fell, out of four hundred and twenty, their number at first; so that there survived not quite three hundred, one hundred and twenty of whom were Spartans, that is, inhabitants of the city of Sparta. The siege of the island, to compute from the beginning of it, including the time em-

ployed in the truce, had lasted seventy-two days. They all now left Pylus; and Cleon's promise, though so vain and rash, was found literally true. But the most surprising circumstance was the capitulation that had been made; for it was believed that the Lacedæmonians, so far from surrendering their arms, would die sword in hand.

BOOK EIGHTH.

THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CONTINUED DURING THE REIGNS OF
XERXES II., OF SOGDIANUS, AND OF DARIUS
NOTHUS.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter contains the history of thirteen years of the Peloponnesian war to the nineteenth inclusively.

SECTION I.—THE VERY SHORT REIGNS OF XERXES II. AND SOGDIANUS, ETC.

Artaxerxes died about the beginning of the forty-ninth year of his reign.* Xerxes, who succeeded him, was the only son which the queen his wife had brought him; but he had seventeen others by his concubines, among whom were Sogdianus (who is called Secondianus by Ctesias), Ochus, and Arsites. Sogdianus, in concert with Pharnacias, one of Xerxes's eunuchs, came insidiously one festival day to the new king, who, after drinking too immoderately, had retired to his chamber, in order to give the fumes of the wine he had drank time to evaporate, where he killed him without any difficulty, after he had reigned but forty-five days, and was declared king in his stead.†

He was scarcely on the throne, when he put to death Bagorazus, the most faithful of his father's eunuchs. It was he who had been appointed to superintend the interment of Artaxerxes, and the queen, Xerxes's mother, who died the

* A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 425. Ctes. c. xlvii-li. Diod. l. xii. p. 115.

† A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424.

same day with her royal consort. After having deposited the two bodies in the mausoleum, where the kings of Persia were interred, he found, at his return, Sogdianus on the throne, who did not receive him favorably, upon account of some difference with him in the lifetime of his father. But the new king did not stop here: not long after he took an opportunity to quarrel with him, on some trifling circumstance relating to the obsequies of his father, and caused him to be stoned.

By these two murders, that of his brother Xerxes and of Bagorazus, he became the horror of the army and nobility, so that he did not think himself safe on a throne, to which he had forced his way by such horrid murders. He suspected that his brothers harbored the like design: and Ochus, to whom his father had left the government of Hyrcania, was the chief object of his suspicion. Accordingly he sent for him, with the intention of getting him murdered as soon as he arrived. Ochus, however, who saw through his design, delayed coming upon various pretences; which he continued till he advanced at the head of a strong army, which he openly declared he would employ to revenge the death of his brother Xerxes. This declaration brought over to him a great number of the nobility, and several governors of the provinces, they being justly dissatisfied at the cruelty and ill conduct of Sogdianus. They put the tiara on Ochus's head and proclaimed him king. Sogdianus, seeing himself abandoned in this manner, was as mean and cowardly in the slight defence he made to maintain his crown, as he had been before unjust and barbarous in usurping it. Contrary to the advice of his best friends, and the wisest persons who still adhered to him, he concluded a treaty with his brother, who, getting him into his hands, caused him to be thrown into ashes, where he died a cruel death. This was a kind of punishment peculiar to the Persians, and exercised only on great criminals. One of the largest towers was filled to a certain height with ashes. The criminal was then thrown headlong from the top of the tower into them; after which, the ashes were by a wheel turned perpetually round him till he was suffocated. Thus this wicked prince lost his life and empire, which he enjoyed six months and fifteen days.*

Ochus, by the death of Sogdianus, now found himself possessed of the empire. As soon as he was well settled in

* Val. Max. l. ix. c. ii. II. Maccab. c. xiii.

it, he changed his name from Ochus to that of Darius. To distinguish him, historians add the epithet *Néθος*, signifying bastard. He reigned nineteen years.*

Arsites, seeing in what manner Sogdianus had supplanted Xerxes, and had himself been dethroned by Ochus, meditated to serve the latter in the same manner. Though he was his brother by the father's as well as the mother's side, he openly revolted against him, and was assisted in it by Artyphius, son of Megabyzus. Ochus, whom hereafter we shall always call Darius, sent Artasyras, one of his generals, against Artyphius; and himself, at the head of another army, marched against Arsites. Artyphius, with the Grecian troops in his pay, twice defeated the general sent against him. But, engaging a third time, the Greeks were corrupted, and he himself was beat, and forced to surrender, upon his being flattered with hopes that a pardon would be granted him. The king would have had him put to death, but was diverted from that resolution by queen Parysatis, Darius's sister and queen. She also was the daughter of Artaxerxes, but not by the same mother as Darius. She was an intriguing, artful woman, and the king her husband was governed by her on most occasions. The counsel she now gave was perfidious to the last degree. She advised him to exercise his clemency towards Artyphius, and show him kind usage, in order that his brother might hope, when he heard of his treating a rebellious servant with so much generosity, that he himself should meet at least with as mild treatment, and therefore be prompted to lay down his arms. She added, that when once he should have seized that prince, he might dispose of him and Artyphius as he pleased. Darius followed her counsel, which proved successful. Arsites being informed of the gentle usage which Artyphius met with, concluded, that as he was the king's brother, he should consequently meet with still more indulgent treatment; and with this hope he concluded a treaty, and surrendered himself. Darius was very much inclined to save his life, but Parysatis, by representing to him, that he ought to punish this rebel to secure himself, at last prevailed with him to put his brother to death; and accordingly he was suffocated in ashes with Artyphius. Darius, however, had a violent struggle with himself before he could give orders for this sacrifice, having a very tender affection for his brother. He afterwards put some other persons to death, which ex-

* A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423.

ecutions did not procure him the tranquillity he had expected from them; for his reign was afterwards disturbed with such violent commotions, that he enjoyed but little repose.

One of the most dangerous commotions was occasioned by the rebellion of Pisuthnes, who, being governor of Lydia, wanted to throw off his allegiance to the Persian empire, and make himself king in his province. What flattered him with the hopes of succeeding in this attempt, was his having raised a considerable body of Grecian troops, under the command of Lycon the Athenian. Darius sent Tissaphernes against this rebel, and gave him, with a considerable army, the commission of governor of Lydia, of which he was to dispossess Pisuthnes. Tissaphernes, who was an artful man, and capable of acting in all characters, found means of tampering with the Greeks under Pisuthnes; and by dint of presents and promises brought over the troops with their general to his party. Pisuthnes, who by this desertion was unable to carry on his designs, surrendered, upon being flattered with the hopes of obtaining his pardon; but the instant he appeared before the king, he was sentenced to be suffocated in ashes, and accordingly met with the same fate as the rest of the rebels.* But his death did not put an end to all troubles; for Amorges his son, with the remainder of his army, still opposed Tissaphernes; and for two years laid waste the maritime provinces of Asia Minor, till he at last was taken by the Greeks of Peloponnesus, in Iasus, a city of Ionia, and delivered up by the inhabitants to Tissaphernes, who put him to death.†

Darius was involved in fresh troubles by one of his eunuchs. This kind of officers had for many years engrossed all power in the court of Persia; and we shall find by the sequel of this history, that they always governed absolutely in it.‡ We may know their character, and the danger to which they expose princes, by the picture which Diocletian, after he had resigned the empire and reduced himself to a private station of life, drew of freemen, who had gained a like ascendant over the Roman emperors. "Four or five persons," says he, "who are closely united, and resolutely determined to impose on a prince, may do it very easily. They never show things to him but in such a light as they are sure will please. They conceal whatever would contribute to enlighten him: as they alone beset him con-

* A. M. 3500. Ant. J. C. 414. Ctes. c. li.
† Ctes. c. lii.

† Thucyd. l. viii. pp. 554-567, 568

tinually, he cannot be informed of any thing but through their channel, and does nothing but what they think fit to suggest to him. Hence it is, that he bestows employments on those he ought to exclude from them; and, on the other side, removes from offices such persons as are most worthy of filling them. In a word, the best prince is often sold by these men, though he be ever so vigilant, and even suspicious of them." "Quid multa? Ut Diocletianus ipse dicebat, bonus, cautus, optimus venditur imperator."*

In this manner was Darius's court governed. Three eunuchs had usurped all power in it; an infallible mark that a government is bad, and the prince of little merit.† But one of those three eunuchs, whose name was Artoxares, presided over and governed the rest. He had found Darius's weak side, by which he insinuated himself into his confidence. He had studied all his passions, to know how to indulge them, and govern his prince by their means. He plunged him continually in pleasures and amusements, to engross his whole authority to himself. In fine, under the name and protection of queen Parysatis, to whose will and pleasure he was the most devoted of slaves, he managed all the affairs of the empire, and nothing was transacted but by his orders. Intoxicated by the supreme authority which the favor of his sovereign gave him, he resolved to make himself king, instead of being prime minister; and accordingly formed a design to get Darius out of the way, and afterwards ascend the throne. However, his plot being discovered, he was seized and delivered up to Parysatis, who put him to a most ignominious and cruel death.

But the greatest misfortune which happened in the reign of Darius, was the revolt of the Egyptians. This took place the same year which Pisuthnes rebelled.‡ But Darius could not reduce Egypt as he had done that rebel. The Egyptians weary of the Persian government, flocked from all parts to Amyrteus of Sais, who at last was come out of the fens where he had defended himself since the suppression of the revolt of Inarus. The Persians were driven out, and Amyrteus proclaimed king of Egypt, where he reigned six years.§

After having established himself securely on the throne, and entirely expelled the Persians out of Egypt, he prepared to pursue them as far as Phœnicia, and had already concerted

* Vopis. in Vit. Aurelian. Imper.

† Scis præcipuum esse indicium non magni principis, magnos libertos.—Plin. ad Tragan.

‡ Euseb. in Chron.

§ Thucyd. l. i. pp. 72, 73.

measures with the Arabians, to attack them in that country. News of this being brought to the king of Persia, he recalled the fleet which he had promised to the Lacedæmonians, to employ it in the defence of his own dominions.

While Darius was carrying on the war in Egypt and Arabia, the Medes rebelled; however, they were defeated, and reduced to their allegiance by force of arms. To punish them for this revolt, their yoke, which till then had been tolerably easy, was made heavier: a fate that rebellious subjects always experience, when the government which they have endeavored to throw off, gain the upper hand.

Darius's arms seem to have had the like success against the Egyptians. Amyrteus dying, or probably falling in battle after he had reigned sixty years, was, according to Herodotus, succeeded in the throne by his son Pausiris, assisted by the Persians. To effect this, they must either have been masters of Egypt, or their party the strongest in that kingdom.*

After having crushed the rebels in Media, and restored the affairs of Egypt to their former situation, Darius gave Cyrus, the youngest of his sons, the supreme command of all the provinces of Asia Minor: an important commission, by which he commanded all the provincial governors in that part of the empire.†

I thought it necessary to anticipate events and draw together the facts which relate to the kings of Persia, to prevent my being often obliged to interrupt the history of the Greeks, to which I now return.

SECTION II.—THE ATHENIANS MAKE THEMSELVES MASTERS OF THE ISLAND OF CYTHERA, ETC., ETC. THE EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

The three or four campaigns which followed the reduction of the small island of Sphacteria were distinguished by very few considerable events.

The Athenians under Nicias took the little island of Cythera, situated on the coast of Lacedæmon, near Cape Malea, and from thence infested the whole country.‡

Brasidas, on the other side, marched towards Thrace. The Lacedæmonians were induced by more than one motive to undertake the expedition: imagining they should oblige the Athenians, who had fallen upon them in their

* Herod. i. iii. c. 15.

† A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 497.

‡ A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424. Thucyd. i. iv. p. 286.

country, to divide their forces. The inhabitants of it invited them thither, and offered to pay the army. In fine, they were extremely glad to embrace that opportunity, to rid themselves of the Helots, who they expected would rise in rebellion, on the taking of Pylus. They had already made away with two thousand of them in a most horrid manner. Upon the specious pretence of rewarding merit even in slaves, but, in reality, to get rid of a body of men whose courage they dreaded, they caused proclamation to be made, that such of the Helots as had done the greatest service to the state in the last campaigns, should enter their names in the public registers, in order to their being made free. Accordingly two thousand gave in their names. They were carried in procession through the temples, with chaplets of flowers on their heads, as if they were really to be set at liberty. After this ceremony, they all disappeared, and were never heard of more. We have here an instance, in what manner a suspicious policy and power, when filled with jealousy and distrust, excite men to the commission of the blackest crimes, without scrupling to make even religion itself and the authority of the gods subservient to their dark designs.*

They therefore sent seven hundred Helots with Brasidas, whom they had appointed to head this enterprise. This general brought over several cities, either by force or secret understanding, but still more by his wisdom and moderation. The chief of these were Acanthus and Stagira, two colonies from Andros. He also marched afterwards towards Amphipolis, an Athenian colony on the river Strymon. The inhabitants immediately despatched a messenger to Thucydides † the Athenian general, who was then in Thasus, a little island of the Ægean sea, half a day's journey from Amphipolis. He instantly set sail with seven ships that were near him, to secure the place before Brasidas could seize it; or, at worst, to get into Eion, which lay very near Amphipolis. Brasidas, who was afraid of Thucydides, from his great influence throughout that country, where he was possessed of some gold mines, made all the despatch imaginable to get there before him; and offered such advantageous conditions to the besieged, who did not expect succors so soon, that they surrendered. Thucydides arrived the same evening at Eion; and had he failed to come that day, Brasidas would have

* Thucyd. l. iv. pp. 304-311. Diocl. l. xii. pp. 117, 118

† The same who wrote the history of the Peloponnesian war.

taken possession of it the next morning by day-break. Although Thucydides had made all imaginable despatch, the Athenians charged him with being the cause of the taking of Amphipolis, and accordingly banished him.*

The Athenians were greatly afflicted at the loss of that city, as well because they drew great revenues from it, and timber to build their ships, as because it was a kind of gate for entering Thrace. They were afraid that all their allies in that neighborhood would revolt; especially as Brasidas discovered great moderation and justice, and continually gave out, that he came with no other view but to free the country. He declared to the several nations that, at his leaving Sparta, he had taken an oath, in presence of the magistrates, to leave all those the enjoyment of their liberties, who would conclude an alliance with him; and that he ought to be considered as the most abandoned of men, should he employ oaths to ensnare their credulity. "For," according to Brasidas, "a fraud cloaked with a specious pretence, reflects infinitely greater dishonor on persons in high stations, than open violence; because the latter is the effect of power which fortune has put into our hands; and the former is founded wholly on perfidy, which is the pest of society. Now I (said he) should do a great injury to my country, besides dishonoring it eternally, if, by procuring it some slight advantages, I should ruin the reputation it enjoys of being just and faithful to its promises; which renders it much more powerful than all its forces united together, because this acquires it the esteem and confidence of other states." Upon such noble and equitable principles as these, Brasidas always formed his conduct; believing that the strongest bulwark of a nation is justice, moderation, integrity; and the firm persuasion which their neighbors and allies entertain, that they are not so base as to harbor a design to usurp their dominions, or deprive them of their liberty. By this conduct he brought over a great number of the enemy's allies.

The Athenians, under the command of Demosthenes and Hippocrates, had entered Bœotia, expecting that several cities would join them the moment they should appear. The Thebans marched out to meet them near Delium. A considerable engagement ensued, in which the Athenians were defeated and put to flight.† Socrates was in this battle; and Laches, who accompanied that great man in it, gives the

* Thucyd. l. iv. pp. 320-324. † Idem. pp. 311-319.

following testimony of him in Plato, that, had the rest of the army behaved as gallantly as Socrates, the Athenians would not have sustained so great a loss before Delium. He was borne away by the crowds who fled and was on foot; Alcibiades, who was on horseback, when he saw him, rode up to him, and did not stir from him, but defended him with the utmost bravery from the enemy who were pursuing him.*

After the battle, the victors besieged the city. Among other engines employed by them to batter it, they used one of a very extraordinary kind. This was a long piece of timber, cut into two parts, and afterwards made hollow and joined again so that its shape resembled very much that of a flute. At one of the ends was fixed a long iron tube, with a caldron attached to it; so that, by blowing a large pair of bellows at the other end of the piece of timber, the wind being carried from thence into the tube, lighted a great fire with pitch and brimstone that lay in the caldron. This engine being carried on carts as far as the rampart, to that part where it was lined with stakes and fascines, threw out so great a flame, that the rampart being immediately abandoned, and the palisades burned, the city was easily taken.

SECTION III.—A TWELVEMONTH'S TRUCE IS AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO STATES, ETC., ETC. NINTH, TENTH, AND ELEVENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

The losses and advantages on both sides were nearly equal; and the two nations began to grow weary of a war, which put them to great expense, and did not procure them any real advantage. A truce for a year was therefore concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.† The former resolved on it, in order to check the progress of Brasidas's conquests; to secure their cities and fortresses; and afterwards to conclude a general peace, in case they judged it would be of advantage to them. The latter were induced to it, in order that, by the sweets of repose, peace might become desirable to their enemy; and to get out of their hands such of their citizens as the Athenians had taken prisoners in the island of Sphacteria, and which they could never expect to do if Brasidas extended his conquests farther. The news of this accommodation sensibly afflicted Brasidas, as it stopped him in the midst of his career, and disconcerted all his projects. He could not even prevail with himself to

* Plut. in Laek. p. 181. In conviv. p. 221. Plut. in Alcib. p. 195.

† A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423. Thucyd. l. iv. pp. 328-333. Diod. l. xii. p. 120.

abandon the city of Scione, which he had taken two days before, but without knowing that a truce was concluded. He still went farther, and did not scruple to take Mende, a little city not far from Scione, that surrendered to him as the former had done, which was a direct violation of the treaty ; but Brasidas pretended he had other infractions to object to the Athenians.

It will naturally be supposed, that they were far from being pleased with the conduct of Brasidas. Cleon, in all public assemblies, was for ever inflaming the minds of the Athenians, and blowing up the fire of war. His great success in the expedition of Sphacteria had raised his credit infinitely with the people: he was now grown insupportably proud, and his audaciousness was not to be restrained. He had a vehement, impetuous, and furious kind of eloquence, which prevailed over the minds of his auditors, not so much by the strength of his arguments, as by the boldness and fire of his style and utterance. It was Cleon who first set the example of bawling in assemblies, where the greatest decorum and moderation had till then been observed ; of throwing his robe behind him, to give him the more liberty to display his arms ; of striking his thigh ; and of running up and down the rostra while he was speaking. In a word, he first introduced among the orators, and all those who were in public employments, an ungovernable licentiousness, and a contempt of decency ; a licentiousness and contempt which soon introduced terrible irregularities and confusion in public affairs.*

Thus two men, each on his own side, opposed the tranquillity of Greece, and raised, but in a very different way, an invincible obstacle to its peace. These were Cleon and Brasidas. The former, because the war screened his vices and malversations ; and the latter, because it added a new lustre to his virtues. And indeed, it gave Cleon an opportunity of committing enormous oppressions, and Brasidas of performing great and noble actions. But their death, which happened about the same time, made way for a new accommodation.†

The Athenians had appointed Cleon to command the troops which were to oppose Brasidas, and reduce those cities that had revolted from their allegiance. The Athenians were solicitous for none of them so much as Amphipolis : and Brasidas threw himself into that city in order to

* Plut. in vit. Niciae, p. 528.

† Idem.

defend it. Cleon had written to Perdicas, king of Macedonia, and to the king of the Odomantes, to furnish him with as many troops as possible, and with the utmost expedition. He waited for them, and had resolved to march immediately towards the enemy; but finding his soldiers, who had followed him involuntarily and with regret, grow weary of continuing so long inactive, and to begin to compare his cowardice and inexperience with the ability and valor of Brasidas, he could no longer bear their contempt and murmurs; and imagining himself a great captain by his taking Sphaacteria, he now fancied that the same good fortune would attend him at Amphipolis. He therefore approached it, as he said, to take a view of the place, till such time as all his forces should arrive; not that he thought he wanted them to carry that city, or that he doubted in any manner his success; for he was persuaded that no one would dare to oppose him, but only to enable him to invest the place on all sides, and afterwards to take it by storm. Accordingly he encamped before Amphipolis: when viewing very leisurely its situation, he fondly supposed that it would be in his power to retire whenever he pleased, without drawing the sword; for not a man came out or appeared on the walls; and all the gates of the city were kept shut, so that Cleon began to repent his not having brought the engines, imagining that he wanted only these to make himself master of the city. Brasidas, who was perfectly well acquainted with Cleon's disposition and character, studiously affected an air of fear and reserve, to increase his temerity, and the good opinion he had of himself; besides, he knew that Cleon had brought with him the flower of the Athenian forces and the choicest troops of Lemnos and of Imbrus. Accordingly Cleon, despising an enemy who did not dare to appear before him, but shut himself up in a cowardly manner in the city, went boldly from place to place without precaution, or observing any discipline among his soldiers. Brasidas, whose intention was to attack him on a sudden before all his forces should come up, thought this the critical juncture. He had concerted proper measures, and given the necessary orders. Accordingly he made a sudden sally on the Athenians, which surprised and disconcerted them exceedingly. Immediately the left wing drew off from the main body and fled. Brasidas then turned the whole force of his arms against the right wing, which gave him a warm reception. Here he was wounded

and disabled, upon which the soldiers carried him off unperceived by the Athenians. As for Cleon, not having resolved to fight, he fled and was killed by a soldier who happened to meet him. The troops he commanded defended themselves for some time, and sustained two or three attacks without giving ground, but at last they were entirely broken and routed. Brasidas was then carried into the city, where he survived his victory but a few moments.*

The whole army having returned from the pursuit, stripped the dead, and afterwards set up a trophy. After which, all the allies under arms solemnized the funeral obsequies of Brasidas in a public manner; and the inhabitants of Amphipolis celebrated funeral honors every year to his memory, as to a hero, with games, combats and sacrifices. They considered him as their founder; and to secure this title the better to him, they demolished all the monuments of him † who had really been so; so that they might not appear to owe their establishment to an Athenian, and at the same time to make their court to the Lacedæmonians, on whom they depended wholly for their security. The Athenians, after having carried off, with the consent of the victors, their dead, returned to Athens, during which the Lacedæmonians settled the affairs of Amphipolis.

A saying is ascribed to the mother of Brasidas, which strongly intimates the Spartan character. As some persons were applauding in her presence the fine qualities and exalted actions of her son, and declaring him superior to all other generals: "You are mistaken," said she, "my son was a valiant man, but Sparta has many citizens braver than he." A mother's generosity, in thus preferring the glory of the state to that of her son, was admired and did not go unrewarded; for the ephori paid her public honors. ‡

After this last engagement, in which two persons who were the greatest obstacles to the peace lost their lives, both nations seemed more inclined to an accommodation, and the war was suspended in a manner on both sides. The Athenians, from the loss of the battles of Delium and Amphipolis, which had very much brought down their haughtiness, were undeceived with regard to the opinion that they hitherto entertained of their own strength, which had made them refuse the advantageous offers of their enemies. Be-

* A. M. 3582. Ant. J. C. 422. Thucyd. I. iii. pp. 342-351. Diod. I. xii. pp. 121, 122.

† Agnon the Athenian.

‡ Diod. I. xii. p. 122.

sides, they were afraid of the revolt of their allies, who, being discouraged by their losses, might thereby be induced to abandon them, as several had already done.

These reflections made them strongly repent their not having concluded a treaty, after the advantages they had gained at Pylus. The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, no longer flattered themselves with the hopes of being able to ruin the Athenians by laying waste their country; and were besides terrified and dejected by their loss in the island, the greatest they had ever sustained.

They also considered that their country was depopulated by the garrison of Pylus and Cythera; that their slaves deserted; that they had reason to dread a more considerable revolt; and that, as the truce they had concluded with the inhabitants of Argos was near expiring, they had reason to be apprehensive of being abandoned by some of their allies of Peloponnesus, as they accordingly were. These several motives, enforced by the desire they had of recovering the prisoners, the greatest part of whom were the most considerable citizens of Sparta, made them desirous of peace.*

Those who were most solicitous for having it concluded, and whose interest it was chiefly to wish it, were the chiefs of the two states, viz.: Plistonax king of Lacedæmon, and Nicias general of the Athenians. The former was lately returned from banishment, to which he had been sentenced, on account of his being suspected to have received a bribe in order to draw off his troops from the Athenian territories; and to this precipitate retreat was ascribed several misfortunes which followed after it. He was also charged with having corrupted by gifts the priestess of Delphos, who had commanded the Spartans, in the name of the god, to recall him from his exile. Plistonax was therefore desirous of peace, in order to put an end to the reproaches which, on account of the perpetual calamities of the war, were daily revived. As for Nicias, the most fortunate general of his age, he was afraid that some unhappy accident should eclipse his glory; and he wished to enjoy the fruits of peace in ease and tranquillity, and that his country might possess the same happiness. Both states began by agreeing to a suspension of arms for twelve months, during which, being every day together, and tasting the sweets of security and repose, and the pleasure of corresponding with their friends and with foreigners, they grew passionately desirous of

* Thucyd. l. v. pp. 351-354.

leading an easy, undisturbed life, remote from the alarms of war, and the horrors of blood and slaughter. They heard with the utmost demonstrations of joy the choruses of their tragedies sing, "May spiders henceforward weave their cobwebs on our lances and shields!" And they remembered with pleasure him who said, "those who sleep in the arms of peace, do not start from it at the sound of the trumpet; and nothing interrupts their slumbers but the peaceful crowing of the cock."*

The whole winter was spent in conferences and interviews, in which each party proposed their rights and pretensions.† At last a peace was concluded and ratified for fifty years, one of the chief articles of which was, that they should reciprocally restore the prisoners on each side. This treaty was concluded ten years and some days from the first declaration of the war.‡ The Bæotians and Corinthians were exceedingly disgusted at it, and for that reason used their utmost endeavors to excite fresh troubles. But Nicias persuaded the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to give the last hand to this peace, by concluding an alliance offensive and defensive, which would render them more formidable to those who should desire to break with them, and more assured with regard to each other. The Athenians, in consequence of this treaty, at last restored the prisoners they had taken in the island of Sphacteria. §

SECTION IV.—THE CHARACTER OF ALCIBIADES. BANISHMENT OF HYPERBOLUS, ETC., ETC. TWELFTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

Alcibiades began now to advance himself in the state, and appear in the public assemblies. Socrates had been attached to him for many years, and adorned his mind with a great variety of the noblest erudition. ||

The strict intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates is one of the most remarkable circumstances in his life. This philosopher, observing excellent natural qualities in him, which were greatly heightened by the beauty of his person, bestowed incredible means in cultivating so valuable a plant, lest, being neglected, it should wither as it grew, and absolutely degenerate. And indeed Alcibiades was exposed to numberless dangers; his high birth, his vast riches, the authority of his family, the credit of his guardians, his personal

* Thucyd. l. v. p. 354. Plut. in Nic. pp. 528, 529. + Diod. l. xii. p. 122.

† A. M. 3583. Ant. J. C. 421.

|| Plut. in Alcib. pp. 192, 194.

§ Thucyd. l. v. pp. 358, 359.

talents, his exquisite beauty, and still more than these, the flattery and complaisance of all who approached him. One would have concluded, says Plutarch, that fortune had surrounded and invested him with all these pretended advantages as with so many ramparts and bulwarks, to render him inaccessible and invulnerable to all the darts of philosophy ; those salutary darts which strike to the heart, and leave in it the strongest incitements to virtue and solid glory. But these very obstacles redoubled the zeal of Socrates.

Notwithstanding the strong endeavors that were used to divert this young Athenian from an attachment which alone was capable of securing him from so many snares, he devoted himself entirely to it. As he had abundance of wit, he was fully sensible of Socrates's extraordinary merit ; and could not resist the charms of his insinuating eloquence, which at that time had a greater ascendant over him than the allurements of pleasure. He was so zealous a disciple of that great master, that he followed him wherever he went, took the utmost delight in his conversation, was extremely well pleased with his principles, received his instructions, and even his reprimands, with a wonderful docility, and would be so moved with his discourses, as even to shed tears and abhor himself ; so weighty was the force of truth in the mouth of Socrates, and in so loathsome and odious a light did he expose the vices to which Alcibiades was prone.

Alcibiades, in those moments when he listened to Socrates, differed so much from himself, that he appeared quite another man. However, his headstrong fiery temper, and his natural fondness for pleasure, which was heightened and inflamed by the discourses and advice of young people, soon plunged him into former irregularities, and tore him, as it were, from his master ; who was obliged to run after him as after a slave who had escaped. This vicissitude of flights and returns, of virtuous resolutions and relapses into vice, continued a long time ; but still Socrates was not discouraged by his levity, and always flattered himself with the hope of bringing him back to his duty. And hence certainly arose the strong mixture of good and evil which always appeared in his conduct ; the instructions which his master had given him sometimes prevailing, and at other times, the fire of his passions hurrying him, in a manner against his own will, into actions of a quite opposite nature.

This intimacy, which continued as long as they lived, did

not pass uncensured. But some persons of great learning pretend that these censures and suspicions, when duly examined, quite disappear; and that they ought to be considered as the effect of the malice of the enemies of both.* Plato, in one of his dialogues, gives us a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades, by which the genius and character of the latter may be known, who was thenceforward to have a very great share in the affairs of the republic of Athens. I shall make a very short extract from it in this place, which I hope will not displease my readers.

In this dialogue, Socrates is introduced conversing with Alcibiades, who at that time was under the guardianship of Pericles. He was then very young, and had been educated like the rest of the Athenians, that is, he had been taught polite literature, and to play on instruments, and had practised wrestling and other bodily exercises. It does not appear that Pericles had hitherto taken much pains in his education, a fault too common in the greatest men, since he had put him under the tutorage of Zopyrus, a Thracian, a man far advanced in years, and who, of all Pericles's slaves, both from his turn of mind and age, was the least qualified to educate this young Athenian. And indeed Socrates told Alcibiades that should he compare him with the youths of Lacedæmon, who displayed a spirit of valor, a greatness of soul, a strong desire of glory, a love of labor, attended with gentleness, modesty, temperance, and a perfect obedience to the laws and discipline of Sparta, he would seem a mere child to them. Nevertheless his high birth, his riches, the great families he was related to, and the authority of his guardian; all these things had conspired to make him exceedingly vain and haughty. He was full of esteem for himself, and of contempt for all others. He was preparing to enter upon the administration of public affairs, and promised himself no less than to eclipse entirely the glory of Pericles, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne. Socrates, seeing him about to mount the rostra, in order to give the people some advice relating to the public affairs, demonstrated to him by various questions, and by Alcibiades's answers, that he was quite ignorant of the affairs about which he was going to speak, as he had never studied them himself, nor been informed in them by others. After making Alcibiades confess this, he painted, in the strong-

* Abbé Fraguier justifies Socrates in one of his dissertations.—*Mem. of the Academy of Belles Lettres*, vol. iv. p. 372.

est colors, the absurdity of his conduct, and made him fully sensible of it. "What," said Socrates, "would Amestris, the mother of Artaxerxes, who then reigned in Persia, say, were she to hear that a man in Athens was meditating war against her son, and even intending to dethrone him? She doubtless would suppose him to be some veteran general, a man of intrepid courage, of great wisdom, and the most consummate experience; that he was able to raise a mighty army, and march it wherever he pleased; and, at the same time, that he had long before taken the proper measures for putting so vast a design in execution. But, were she to hear that there are none of these circumstances, and that the person in question was not twenty years old; that he was utterly ignorant of public affairs; had not the least knowledge of war, and no influence with the citizens or the allies; would it be possible for her to refrain from laughing at the folly and extravagance of such an enterprise? This nevertheless," said Socrates, directing himself to Alcibiades, "is your picture, and unhappily resembles most of those who thrust themselves into public employments." Socrates, however, excepts Pericles on this occasion; his solid merit and exalted reputation being acquired by his close study, during a long course of years, of every thing capable of forming his mind, and qualifying him for public employments. Alcibiades could not deny that this was his case; he was ashamed of his conduct, and, blushing to see himself so void of merit, he inquired how he should act for the attainment of it. Socrates, unwilling to discourage his pupil, answered him, that, as he was so young, these evils might be remedied, and afterwards continually gave him the wisest counsels. He had entire leisure to improve from them; as upwards of twenty years passed between this conversation and his engaging in public affairs.*

Alcibiades was of a versatile disposition, that would take any impression which the difference of times and circumstances might require, still turning either to good or evil, with the same facility and ardor; and shifting almost in an instant from one extreme to its opposite, so that people applied to him, what Homer observes of the land of Egypt, "that it produces a great number of very excellent medicinal drugs, and at the same time as many poisons." It might be said of Alcibiades, that he was not one single man, but, if so bold an expression might be used, a compound of several men; either serious or gay; austere or affable; an imperious

* Plut. in Alcib. pp. 132, 134.

master, or a grovelling slave; a friend to virtue and the virtuous, or abandoned to vice and vicious men; capable of supporting the most painful fatigues and toils, or insatiably desirous of voluptuous delights.*

His irregularities and dissolute conduct were become the talk of the whole city; and Alcibiades would very willingly have put a stop to these reports, but without changing his course of life, as appears from a saying of his. He had a very handsome dog, of a prodigious size, which had cost him seventy minæ, or three thousand five hundred French livres.† By this we find that a fondness for dogs was of great antiquity. Alcibiades caused his tail, which was the greatest beauty he had about him, to be cut off. His friends censured him very much on that account, and said that the whole city blamed him very much for spoiling the beauty of so handsome a creature. "This is the very thing I want," replied Alcibiades with a smile. "I would have the Athenians discourse about what I have done to my dog, that they may not entertain themselves with saying worse things of me."‡

Among the various passions that were discovered in him, the strongest and most prevailing was a haughty turn of mind, which would force all things to submit to it, and could not bear a superior or even an equal. Although his birth and uncommon talents smoothed the way to his attaining the highest employments in the republic; there was nothing, however, to which he was so fond of owing the influence and authority he wanted to gain over the people, as to the force of his eloquence, and the persuasive grace of his orations.§ To this his intimacy with Socrates might be of great service.

Alcibiades, with such a cast of mind as we have here described, was not born for repose, and had set every engine at work to traverse the treaty lately concluded between the two states; but not succeeding in his attempt, he endeavored to prevent its taking effect. He was disgusted at the Lacedæmonians, because they directed themselves only to Nicias, of whom they had a very high opinion; and, on the contrary, seemed to take no manner of notice of him, though his ancestors had enjoyed the rights of hospitality among them. ||

* *Quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos.*—Juvenal.

† Upwards of \$700.

‡ Plut. in Alcib. p. 195.

§ *Το φιλονεικόν και το φελρπρων.* Plut. in Alcib. pp. 195, 196.

|| A. M. 3584. Ant. J. C. 420. Thucyd. l. v. pp. 368-378. Plut. in Alcib. pp. 197, 198.

He therefore procured a violation of the peace by the following means, having been informed that the people of Argos only wanted an opportunity to break with the Spartans, whom they equally hated and feared; he encouraged their hostility, by secretly flattering them with hopes of aid from the Athenians, who were ready to break a peace which was no way advantageous to them.

And indeed the Lacedæmonians were not very careful to observe the several conditions of it religiously, having concluded an alliance with the Bœotians, in direct opposition to the design and tenor of the treaty; and having surrendered up the fort of Panacton to the Athenians, not fortified and in the condition it was in at the concluding of the treaty, as they had stipulated to do, but quite dismantled. Alcibiades observing the Athenians to be extremely exasperated at this breach of faith, did his utmost to widen the difference; and taking this opportunity to embarrass Nicias, he made him odious to the people, by causing them to entertain a suspicion of his being too strongly attached to the Lacedæmonians, and by charging him with crimes which were not altogether improbable, though they were absolutely false.

This new attack quite disconcerted Nicias; but happily for him there arrived, at that very instant, ambassadors from Lacedæmon, who were invested with full powers to put an end to all the divisions. Being introduced into the council or senate, they set forth their complaints, and made their demands, which every one of the members thought very just and reasonable. The people were to give them audience the next day. Alcibiades, who was afraid they would succeed with them, used his utmost endeavors to engage the ambassadors in a conference with him. He represented to them, that the council always behaved with the utmost moderation and humanity towards those who addressed them; but that the people were haughty and extravagant in their pretensions; that should the ambassadors mention full powers, they, the people, would not fail to take advantage of this circumstance, and oblige them to agree to whatever they should take it into their heads to ask. He concluded with assuring them, that he would assist them with all his influence in order to get Pylus restored to them; to prevent the alliance with the people of Argos, and to get that with them renewed; and he confirmed all these promises with an oath. The ambassadors were extremely well pleased with this conference, and greatly admired the profound policy

and vast abilities of Alcibiades, whom they looked upon as an extraordinary man ; and indeed they were not mistaken in their conjecture.

On the morrow, the people being assembled, the ambassadors were introduced. Alcibiades asked them, in the mildest terms, the subject of their embassy, and the purport of the powers with which they were invested. They immediately answered that they were come to propose an accommodation, but were not empowered to conclude any thing. These words were no sooner spoken than Alcibiades exclaimed against them ; declared them to be treacherous knaves ; called upon the council as witnesses to the speech they had made the night before ; and desired the people not to believe or hear men who so impudently advanced falsehoods, and spoke and prevaricated so unaccountably as to say one thing one day, and the very reverse the next.

Words could never express the surprise and confusion with which the ambassadors were seized, who, gazing wildly on one another, could not believe either their eyes or ears. Nicias, who did not know the treacherous stratagem of Alcibiades, could not conceive the motive of this change, and tortured his brain to no purpose to find out the reason of it. The people were that moment going to send for the ambassadors of Argos, in order to conclude the league with them, when a great earthquake came to the assistance of Nicias, and broke up the assembly. It was with the utmost difficulty he prevailed so far, in that of next day, as to have a stop put to the proceedings, till such time as ambassadors should be sent to Lacedæmon. Nicias was appointed to head them ; but they returned without having done the least good. The Athenians then repented very much their having delivered up, at his persuasion, the prisoners they had taken in the island, and who were related to the greatest families in Sparta. However, though the people were highly exasperated at Nicias, they did not proceed to any excesses against him, but only appointed Alcibiades their general, made a league with the inhabitants of Mantinea and Elis, who had quitted the party of the Lacedæmonians, in which the Argives were included, and sent troops to Pylus, to lay waste Laconia. In this manner they again involved themselves in the war which they were so lately desirous of avoiding.

Plutarch, after relating the intrigues of Alcibiades, adds, "No one can approve the methods he employed to succeed

in his design; however, it was a master-stroke, to disunite and shake almost every part of Peloponnesus in this manner, and raise up, in one day, so many enemies against the Lacedæmonians." In my opinion, this is too soft a censure of so knavish and perfidious an action, which, however successful it might have been, was notwithstanding horrid in itself and of a nature never to be sufficiently detested.*

There was in Athens a citizen, named Hyperbolus, a very wicked man whom the comic poets generally made the object of their raillery and invectives. He was hardened in evil, and become insensible to infamy, by renouncing all sentiments of honor, which could only be the effect of a soul abandoned entirely to vice. Hyperbolus was not agreeable to any one; and yet the people made use of him to humble those in high stations, and involve them in difficulties. Two citizens, Nicias and Alcibiades, engrossed at that time all the authority in Athens. The dissolute life of the latter shocked the Athenians, who, besides, dreaded his audacity and haughtiness. On the other side, Nicias, by always opposing, without the least reserve, their unjust desires, and by obliging them to take the most useful measures, had become very odious to them. One would have imagined that, as the people were thus alienated from both, they would not have failed to have put the ostracism in force against one of them. Of the two parties which prevailed at that time in the city, one, which consisted of the young men who were eager for war, the other of the old men who were desirous of peace; the former endeavored to procure the banishment of Nicias, and the latter of Alcibiades. Hyperbolus, whose only merit was in impudence, in hopes of succeeding if either of them should be removed, declared openly against them, and was eternally exasperating the people against both. However, the two factions being afterwards reconciled, he himself was banished, and by that, put an end to the ostracism, which seemed to have been demeaned, in being employed against a man of so base a character, for hitherto there was a kind of honor and dignity annexed to this punishment. Hyperbolus was therefore the last who was sentenced by the ostracism, as Hipparchus, a near relation of Pisistratus the tyrant, had been the first.*

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 198.

† Plut. in Alcib. pp. 196, 197. Plut. in Nic. 530, 531.

SECTION V.—ALCIBIADES ENGAGES THE ATHENIANS IN THE
WAR OF SICILY. SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH YEARS
OF THE WAR.

I pass over several inconsiderable events, to hasten to the relation of that of the greatest importance, the expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, to which they were especially excited by Alcibiades. This is the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war.*

Alcibiades had gained a surprising ascendancy over the minds of the people, though they were perfectly well acquainted with his character. For his great qualities were united with still greater vices, which he did not take the least pains to conceal. He passed his life in such an excess of luxury and voluptuousness, as was a scandal to that city. Nothing was seen in his house but festivals, rejoicings and parties of pleasure and debauchery. He showed very little regard to the customs of his country, and less to religion and the gods. All persons of sense and judgment, besides the strong aversion they had for his irregularities, dreaded exceedingly the consequences of his audacity, profusion, and utter contempt of the laws, which they considered as so many steps by which Alcibiades would rise to tyrannical power.†

Aristophanes, in one of his comedies, ‡ shows admirably well, in a single verse, the disposition of the people with regard to him: "They hate Alcibiades," says he, "and yet cannot do without him." And, indeed, the prodigious sums he squandered on the people; the pompous games and shows he exhibited to please them; the magnificent and almost incredible presents which he made the city; the grace and beauty of his whole person; his eloquence, his bodily strength, joined to his courage and experience; in a word, this assemblage of great qualities made the Athenians connive at his faults and bear them patiently, always endeavoring to lessen and screen them under soft and favorable names; for they called them sports, polite pastimes, and indications of his humanity and good nature.

Timon the man-hater, morose and savage as he was, formed a better judgment of this conduct of Alcibiades. Meeting him one day as he was coming out of the assembly, vastly pleased at his having been gratified in all his demands, and at seeing the greatest honors paid him by the

* A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416. Thucyd. l. viii. pp. 350-402.

† Plut. in Alcib. 198-200. Plut. in Nic. p. 531. ‡ The Frogs, Act 5, Scene 4.

people in general, who were attending him in crowds to his house; so far from shunning him as he did all other men, he, on the contrary, ran to meet him, and stretching out his hand to him in a friendly way: "Courage, my son," said he, "thou doest right in pushing thy fortune, for your advancement will be the ruin of all these people." The war of Sicily will show that Timon was not mistaken.

The Athenians, from the time of Pericles, had meditated the conquest of Sicily. However, that wise guide had always endeavored to check this ambitious and wild project. He used frequently to inculcate upon them, that by living in peace, by supporting their fleet, by contenting themselves with the conquests they had already gained, and by not engaging in hazardous enterprises, they would raise their city to a flourishing condition, and be always superior to their enemies. The authority he had at that time over the people, though it kept them from invading Sicily, could not suppress the desire they had to conquer it, and their eyes were continually upon that island. Some time after the death of Pericles, the Leontines being invaded by the Syracusans, had sent a deputation to Athens to demand aid. They were originally of Chalcis, an Athenian colony. The chief of the deputies was Gorgias, a famous rhetorician, who was reputed the most eloquent man of his times. His elegant and florid diction, heightened by shining figures, which he first employed, charmed the Athenians, who were prodigiously affected with the beauties and graces of eloquence. Accordingly the alliance was concluded, and they sent ships to Rhegium to the aid of the Leontines. The year following they sent a greater number. Two years after they sent a new fleet, something stronger than the former; but the Sicilians having put an end to all their divisions, by the advice of Hermocrates, the fleet was sent back; and the Athenians not being able to prevail with themselves to pardon their generals for not conquering Sicily, sent two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, into banishment and sentenced the third, Eurymedon, to pay a heavy fine; their prosperity having blinded them to such a degree, that they were persuaded no power was able to resist them. They made several attempts afterwards, and upon pretence of sending from time to time arms and soldiers to such cities as were unjustly treated or oppressed by the Syracusans, they by that means prepared to invade them with a greater force.*

* Diod. l. xii. p. 99.

But the person who most inflamed this ardor was Alcibiades, by his feeding the people with splendid hopes, with which he himself was for ever filled, or rather intoxicated. He was every night in his dreams taking Carthage, subduing Africa, crossing from thence into Italy, and possessing himself of all Peloponnesus, looking upon Sicily not as the scope and end of this war, but as the beginning and the first step of the exploits he revolved in his mind. All the citizens favored his views, and without inquiring seriously into matters, were enchanted with the mighty hopes he gave them. This expedition was the only topic of conversation. The young men in the places where the public exercises were performed, and the old men in their shops and elsewhere, were employed in nothing but in drawing the plan of Sicily; in discoursing on the nature and quality of the sea with which it is surrounded; on its good harbors, and flat shores towards Africa: for these people, infatuated by the speeches of Alcibiades, were, like him, persuaded that they should make Sicily only their military depot and arsenal, from whence they should set out for the conquest of Carthage, and make themselves masters of all Africa and the sea, as far as the pillars of Hercules.

It is related that neither Socrates, nor Meton the astronomer, believed that this enterprise would be successful; the former, being inspired, as he insinuated, by his familiar spirit, who had always warned him of the evils with which he was threatened; and the other, directed by his reason and good sense, which pointed out what he had to apprehend in respect to the future, induced him to act the madman on this occasion; and to demand, in consideration of the unhappy condition to which he was reduced, that the Athenians would not force away his son, and would dispense with his carrying arms.*

SECTION VI.—ACCOUNT OF THE SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO INHABITED SICILY.

Before I enter on the relation of the war in Sicily, it will not be improper to give a plan of the country, and of the nations who inhabited it: Thucydides begins in the same manner.

It was first inhabited by the Lestrygonæ and the Cyclopes, of whom we do not know any particulars, except what we are told by the poets. The most ancient after these were

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 199. In Nic. p. 532.

the Sicani, who called themselves the original inhabitants of this country, though they are thought to have come into it from the neighborhood of a river in Spain, called Sicanus, whose name they gave to the island, which before was called Trinacria: these people were afterwards confined to the western part of the island. Some Trojans, after the burning of their city, came and settled near them, and built Erix and Egesta,* who all assumed the name of Elymæi; and were afterwards joined by some inhabitants of Phocis, at their return from the siege of Troy. Those who are properly called Sicilians came from Italy in very great numbers: and having gained a considerable victory over the Sicani, confined them to a corner of their island about three hundred years before the arrival of the Greeks, and in the time of Thucydides they still inhabited the middle part of the island and the northern coast. From them the island was called Sicily. The Phœnicians also spread themselves along the coast, and in the little islands which bordered upon it, for the convenience of trade: but after the Greeks began to settle there, they retired into the country of the Elymæi, in order to be nearer Carthage, and abandoned the rest. It was in this manner the barbarians first settled in Sicily.†

With regard to the Greeks, the first of them who crossed into Sicily were the Chalcidians of Eubœa, under Theocles, who founded Naxos.‡ The year after, which, according to Dionysius Halicarnasseus, was the third of the seventeenth Olympiad, Archias the Corinthian laid the foundations of Syracuse. Seven years after, the Chalcidians founded Leontium and Catana, after having driven out the inhabitants of the country, who were Sicilians. Other Greeks, who came from Megara, a city of Achaia, about the same time, founded Megara, called Hyblæa, or simply Hybla, from Hyblon, a Sicilian king, by whose permission they had settled in his dominions. It is well known that the Hyblæan honey was very famous among the ancients. A hundred years after, the inhabitants of that city built Selinuntum. Gela, built on a river of the same name, forty-five years after the founding of Syracuse, founded Agrigentum about a hundred and eight years after. Zancle, called afterwards Messana or Messene, by Anaxilas tyrant of Rhegium, who was a native of Messene, a city of Peloponnesus, had several founders, and at

* It is called Segesta by the Romans.

† Thucyd. l. vi. pp. 410-413.

‡ A. M. 3294. Ant. J. C. 710.

different periods. The Zancleians built the city of Hymera: the Syracusans built Acre, Casmene, and Camarina. These are most of the nations, whether Greeks or barbarians, who settled in Sicily.

SECTION VII.—THE PEOPLE OF EGESTA IMPLORE AID OF THE
ATHENIANS, ETC.

Athens was in the disposition above related, when ambassadors arrived from the people of Egesta, who, in quality of allies, came to implore their aid against the inhabitants of Selinuntum, who were assisted by the Syracusans. It was the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. They represented, among other things, that should they be abandoned, the Syracusans, after seizing their city, as they had done that of Leontium, would possess themselves of all Sicily, and not fail to aid the Peloponnesians who were their founders; and that they might put them to as little charge as possible, they offered to pay the troops that should be sent to succor them. The Athenians, who had long waited for an opportunity to declare themselves, sent deputies to Egesta to inquire into the state of affairs, and to see whether there was money enough in the treasury to defray the expense of so great a war. The inhabitants of that city had been so artful as to borrow from the neighboring nations a great number of gold and silver vases, worth an immense sum of money, and of these they made a show when the Athenians arrived.*

The deputies returned with those of Egesta, who carried sixty talents in ingots, as a month's pay for the galleys which they demanded; and a promise of larger sums, which they said were ready both in the public treasury and in the temples. The people, struck with these fair appearances, the truth of which they did not give themselves time to examine, and seduced by the advantageous reports which their deputies made in the view of pleasing them, immediately granted the Egestans their demand, and appointed Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus, to command the fleet, with full power not only to succor Egesta, and restore the inhabitants of Leontium to their city, but also to regulate the affairs of Sicily, in such a manner as might best suit the interests of the republic.†

Nicias was appointed one of the generals, to his very

* A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416. Thucyd. l. vi. pp. 413-415. Diod. l. xii. pp. 129, 130. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200. In Nic. p. 531. † A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415.

great regret ; for, besides other motives which made him dread that command, he shunned it, because Alcibiades was to be his colleague. But the Athenians promised themselves greater success from this war, should they not resign the whole conduct of it to Alcibiades, but temper his ardor and audacity with the coolness and wisdom of Nicias.

Five days after, to hasten the execution of the decree, and make the necessary preparations, a second assembly was held. Nicias, who had time enough to reflect deliberately on the affair proposed, and was still better convinced of the difficulties and dangers which would ensue from it, thought himself obliged to speak with some vehemence against a project, the consequences of which he foresaw might be very fatal to the republic. He said “ that it was surprising so important an affair should have been determined almost as soon as it was taken into deliberation : that without once inquiring into matters, they had given credit to whatever was told them by foreigners, who were very lavish of their promises, and whose interest it was to offer mighty things, in order to extricate themselves from their imminent danger. After all, what advantage,” said he, “ can accrue from thence to the republic ? Have we so few enemies at our doors, that we need go in search of others at a distance from us ? Will you act wisely to hazard your present possessions, on the vain hopes of an uncertain advantage ? to meditate new conquests, before you have secured your ancient ones ? to study nothing but the aggrandizing of your state, and quite neglect your own safety ? Can you depend in any manner on a truce, which you yourselves know is very precarious ; which you are sensible has been infringed more than once ; and which the least defeat on our side may suddenly change into an open war ? You are not ignorant how the Lacedæmonians have always been and still continue disposed with regard to us. They detest our government as different from theirs ; it is with grief and disdain they see us possessed of the empire of Greece ; they consider our glory as their shame and confusion ; and there is nothing they would not attempt, to humble a power which excites their jealousy, and keeps them perpetually in fear. These are our real enemies, and these are they whom we ought to guard against. Will it be a proper time to make these reflections, when (after having divided our troops, and while our arms will be employed elsewhere, and we shall be unable to resist them) we shall be attacked at once

by all the forces of Peloponnesus? We are just beginning to breathe after the calamities in which war and the plague had plunged us; and we are now going to plunge ourselves into greater danger. If we are ambitious of carrying out arms into distant countries, would it not be more expedient to march and reduce the rebels of Thrace, and other nations who are still wavering, and unfixed in their allegiance, than to fly to the succor of the inhabitants of Eggesta, about whose welfare we ought to be very indifferent? And will it suit our interest, to attempt to avenge their injuries, at a time when we do not discover the least resentment for those we ourselves receive? Let us leave the Sicilians to themselves, and not engage in their quarrels, which it is their business to decide. As the inhabitants of Eggesta undertook the war without us, let them extricate themselves from it without our interference. Should any of our generals advise you to this enterprise, from an ambitious or self-interested view, merely to make a vain parade of his splendid equipages, or to raise money to support his extravagance, be not guilty of so much imprudence as to sacrifice the interest of the republic to his, or permit him to involve it in the same ruin with himself. An enterprise of so much importance ought not to be committed wholly to the conduct of a young man. Remember it is prudence, not prejudice and passion, that gives success to affairs." Nicias concluded with declaring it his opinion, that it would be proper to deliberate again on the affair, in order to prevent the fatal consequences with which their taking rash resolutions might be attended.*

It was plain he had Alcibiades in view, and that his enormous luxury was the object of his censure. And indeed he carried it to an incredible height, and lavished prodigious sums of money on horses, equipages, and moveables, not to mention the delicacy and sumptuousness of his table. He disputed the prize at the Olympic games with seven sets of chariot horses, which no private man had ever done before him; and he was crowned more than once on that occasion. Extraordinary resources were necessary for supporting such luxury; and as avarice often serves as a resource to ambition, there were some grounds to believe that Alcibiades was no-less solicitous for the conquest of Sicily and that of Carthage (which he pretended would immediately follow), to enrich his family, than to render it glorious.

* Thucyd. l. vi. pp. 415-428.

It is natural to suppose that Alcibiades did not let this speech of Nicias go unanswered.

"This," said Alcibiades, "is not the first time that merit has excited jealousy, and glory been made the object of envy. That very thing which is imputed to me for a crime, reflects, I will presume to say it, honor on my country, and ought to gain me applause. The splendor in which I live; the great sums which I expend, particularly in the public assemblies; besides their being just and lawful, at the same time give foreigners a greater idea of the glory of Athens; and show that it is not in such want of money as our enemies imagine. But this is not our present business. Let the world form a judgment of me, not from passion and prejudice, but from my actions. Was it an inconsiderable service I did the republic, in bringing over, in one day, to its alliance, the people of Elis, of Mantinea, and of Argos, that is, the chief strength of Peloponnesus? Make use, therefore, to aggrandize your empire, of the youth and folly of Alcibiades (since his enemies give it that name), as well as of the wisdom and experience of Nicias; and do not repent, from vain and idle fears, your engaging in an enterprise publicly resolved upon, and which may redound infinitely both to your glory and advantage. The cities of Sicily, weary of the unjust and cruel government of their princes, and still more of the tyrannical authority which Syracuse exercises over them, wait only for a favorable opportunity to declare themselves, and are ready to open their gates to any one who shall offer to break the yoke under which they have so long groaned. Though the citizens of Egesta, as being your allies, should not have a right to your protection; yet the glory of Athens ought to engage you to support them. States aggrandize themselves by succoring the oppressed, and not by continuing inactive. In the present state of your affairs, the only way to dissipate your enemies, and show that you are not afraid of them, will be to harass one nation, to check the progress of another, to keep them all employed, and carry your arms into distant countries. Athens was not formed for ease; and it was not by inactivity that your ancestors raised it to the height at which we now see it. For the rest, what hazards will you run by engaging in the enterprise in question? If it should be crowned with success, you will then possess yourselves of all Greece; and should it not answer your expectations, your fleet will give you an opportunity of retiring whenever

you please. The Lacedæmonians indeed may make an incursion into our country; but, besides that it would not be in our power to prevent it, though we should not invade Sicily, we still shall preserve the empire of the sea in spite of them; a circumstance which makes our enemies entirely despair of ever being able to conquer us. Be not therefore biassed by the arguments of Nicias. The only tendency of them is to sow the seeds of discord between the old and young men, who can do nothing without one another; since it is wisdom and courage, counsel and execution, that give success to all enterprises; and this in which we are going to embark, cannot but turn to your glory and advantage."

The Athenians, flattered and pleased with the speech of Alcibiades, persisted in their first opinion. Nicias, on the other side, did not depart from his; but at the same time did not dare to oppose Alcibiades any farther. Nicias was naturally of a soft and timid disposition. He was not, like Pericles, master of that lively and vehement eloquence, which, like a torrent, bears down every thing in its way. And indeed the latter, on several occasions, and at several times, had never failed to check the wild starts of the populace, who, even then, meditated the expedition into Sicily; because he was always inflexible, and never slackened the reins of that authority and kind of sovereignty which he had acquired over the people: whereas Nicias, both by acting and speaking in an easy, gentle manner, so far from winning over the people, suffered himself to be forcibly and involuntarily carried away; and accordingly he at last yielded to the people, and accepted the command in a war which he plainly foresaw would be attended with the most fatal consequences.*

Plutarch makes this reflection in his excellent treatise, where, speaking of the qualities requisite in a statesman, he shows how very necessary eloquence and inflexible constancy and perseverance are to him.

Nicias, not daring to oppose Alcibiades any longer openly, endeavored to do it indirectly, by starting a number of difficulties, drawn especially from the great expense of this expedition. He declared, that since they were resolved upon war, they ought to carry it on in such a manner as might suit the exalted reputation to which Athens had attained: that a fleet was not sufficient to oppose so formida-

* Plut. in Præc. de Ger. Rep. 802.

ble a power as that of the Syracusans and their allies: that they must raise an army, composed of good horse and foot, if they desired to act in a manner worthy of so grand a design: that besides their fleet, which was to make them masters at sea, they must have a great number of transports, to carry provisions perpetually to the army, which otherwise could not possibly subsist in an enemy's country: that they must carry vast sums of money with them, without waiting for that promised them by the citizens of Eggesta, who perhaps were ready in words only, and very probably might break their promise: that they ought to weigh and examine the disparity there was between themselves and their enemies with regard to the conveniences and wants of the army; the Syracusans being in their own country, in the midst of powerful allies, disposed by inclination, as well as engaged by interest, to assist them with men, arms, horses, and provisions; whereas the Athenians would carry on the war in a remote country possessed by their enemies, where, in the winter, news could not be brought them in less than four months' time; a country where all things would oppose the Athenians, and nothing be procured but by force of arms; that it would reflect the greatest ignominy on the Athenians, should they be forced to abandon their enterprise, and thereby become the scorn and contempt of their enemies, by their neglecting to take all the precautions which so important a design required: that as for himself, he was determined not to go, unless he was provided with all things necessary for the expedition, because the safety of the whole army depended on that circumstance; and he would not suffer it to depend upon the caprice, or the precarious engagements of the allies.

Nicias had flattered himself, that this speech would cool the ardor of the people, whereas it only inflamed it the more. Immediately, the generals had full powers given them to raise as many troops, and fit out as many galleys as they should think necessary; and the levies were accordingly carried on in Athens and other places, with inexpressible activity.*

SECTION VIII.—THE ATHENIANS PREPARE TO SET SAIL,
ETC., ETC.

When all things were ready for their departure, and they were preparing to sail, there happened several bad omens,

* Diod. l. xiii. p. 134.

which filled the minds of the people with trouble and disquietude. The women were at that time celebrating the festival of Adonis,* during which the whole city was in mourning, and full of images representing dead persons and funeral processions; and every part echoed with the cries and groans of the women who followed those statues with lamentations.† Whence it was feared that this gay and magnificent armament would soon lose all its splendor, and wither away like a flower. ‡

The general affliction was increased by another accident. The statues of Mercury, which stood at the entrance of private houses and temples, were all mutilated in one night, and particularly in the face; and although a great reward was promised to any person who should discover the authors of so audacious a crime, no one was detected. The citizens could not forbear considering this uncommon event, not only as an unlucky omen, but as a contrivance of some factious men, who harbored very ill designs. Some young people had already been accused of committing much the like crime in the midst of their cups; and particularly of having wantonly mimicked the ceremonies and mysteries of Ceres and Proserpine, with Alcibiades, who represented the high-priest, at their head. It highly concerns all those in exalted stations to be extremely careful of every step they take, and not to give the least opportunity to the most inveterate malice to censure them. They ought to call to mind, says Plutarch, that the eyes of all men are upon their conduct, and that they are ever eagle-eyed on these occasions; that not only their outward actions pass the most severe scrutiny, but that they penetrate to their most private apartments, and there take the strictest notice of their discourses, their diversions, and the most secret things transacted by them. It was this dread of the piercing eye of the people, that kept Themistocles and Pericles perpetually on their guard, and obliged them to refrain from most of those pleasures in which others indulged themselves. §

As for Alcibiades, he did not know what it was to lay himself under any restraints; and accordingly, as his char-

* This superstitious rite had extended even to God's people. "And behold, there sat women weeping for Tammuz." Ezek. viii. 14. N. B. The Latin version of the Bible, which Mr. Rollin follows, says, "weeping for Adonis;" which is the same as Tammuz, the Hebrews calling Adonis by that name.

† A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415. Thucyd. l. vi. p. 428. Plut. in Alcib. pp. 200, 201.

‡ The historian alludes to the plants and flowers that were carried in that ceremony, and which went by the name of the gardens of Adonis.

§ Plut. in Præc. de Rep. p. 800.

acter was so well known, people were persuaded that he very probably had been concerned in what had happened. His luxury, libertinism, and irreligion, gave an air of probability to this charge, and the accuser was not afraid of mentioning his name. This attack staggered the constancy and resolution of Alcibiades, but hearing the soldiers and sailors declare that they were induced to engage in this expedition by no other motive than their affection for Alcibiades, and that, should the least injury be done to him, they should all leave the service, he took courage, and appeared at his trial on the day appointed for that purpose. His enemies, upon pretence that it was necessary for the fleet to set sail, got the judgment suspended. It was to no purpose for Alcibiades to insist upon being tried, in case he was guilty, and not be ruined in his absence; and to represent that it would be the most shocking and barbarous injustice to oblige him to embark for so important an expedition, without first making due inquiry into the accusations and horrid slanders which were cast upon him, the bare thoughts of which would keep him in perpetual fear and anxiety. However, none of these remonstrances proved effectual, and the fleet was ordered to set out.

They accordingly prepared to set sail, after having appointed Coreyra as the rendezvous for most of the allies, and such ships as were to carry the provisions, etc. All the citizens, as well as foreigners in Athens, flocked by daybreak to the port of Piræus. The former attended their children, relations, friends or companions, with a joy overcast with a little sorrow, upon their bidding adieu to persons who were as dear to them as life, who were setting out on a far distant and very dangerous expedition, from which it was uncertain whether they ever would return, though they flattered themselves with the hopes that it would be successful. The foreigners came thither to gratify their eyes with a sight which was highly worthy their curiosity; for no single city in the world had ever fitted out so gallant a fleet. Those indeed which had been sent against Epidaurus and Potidæa, were as considerable with regard to the number of soldiers and ships; but they were not equipped with so much magnificence, neither was their voyage so long, nor their enterprise so important. Here were seen a land and naval army, provided with the utmost care, and at the expense of private individuals as well as of the public, with all things necessary on account of the length of the voyage, and the duration of

the war. The city furnished a hundred empty galleys, that is, sixty light ones, and forty to transport the soldiers heavily armed. Every mariner received daily a drachm, or ten pence French, for his pay, exclusively of what the captains of ships gave the rowers of the first bench.* Add to this, the pomp and magnificence that was displayed universally, every one striving to excel the rest, and each captain endeavoring to make his ship the lightest, and at the same time the gayest in the whole fleet. I shall not take notice of the choice of the soldiers and seamen, who were the flower of the Athenians; nor of their emulation with regard to the beauty and neatness of their arms and equipage: nor of their officers, who had laid out considerable sums merely to distinguish themselves, and to give foreigners an advantageous idea of their persons and circumstances; so that this sight had the air of a tournament, in which the utmost magnificence is displayed, rather than of a warlike expedition. But the boldness and greatness of the design still exceeded its expense and splendor.

When the ships were loaded, and the troops got on board, the trumpet sounded, and solemn prayers were offered up for the success of the expedition; gold and silver cups were filling every where with wine, and the accustomed libations were poured out: the people who lined the shore shouting at the same time, and lifting up their hands to heaven, to wish their fellow-citizens a good voyage and success. When the hymn was sung, and the ceremonies were ended, the ships sailed one after another out of the harbor; after which they strove to outsail one another, till the whole fleet met at Ægina. From thence it made for Corcyra, where the army of the allies was assembling with the rest of the fleet. †

SECTION IX.—SYRACUSE IS ALARMED. THE ATHENIAN FLEET ARRIVES IN SICILY.

Advice of this expedition coming to Syracuse from all quarters, it was thought so improbable, that at first nobody would believe it. But as it was more and more confirmed every day, the Syracusans began to think seriously of making the necessary preparations, and sent deputations to every part of the island to ask assistance of some, and send succors to others. They garrisoned all the castles and forts in the country; reviewed all the soldiers and horses; examined the

* They were called *σπῆραι*. They had longer oars than the rest, and consequently more trouble in rowing. † Thucyd. pp. 430-432. Diod. l. xiii. p. 135.

arms in the magazines; and settled and prepared all things, as if the enemy had been in their country.*

In the mean time the fleet sailed in three squadrons, each under the command of its particular general. It consisted of a hundred and thirty-six ships, one hundred of which belonged to Athens, and the rest to the allies. On board these ships were five thousand heavy-armed soldiers, two thousand two hundred of whom were Athenian citizens, viz.: fifteen hundred of those who had estates, and seven hundred who had none, but were equally citizens; † the rest consisted of allies. With regard to the light infantry, there were eighty archers of Crete, and four hundred of other countries; seven hundred Rhodian slingers, and one hundred and twenty exiles of Megara. There was but one company of horse, consisting of thirty troopers, who had embarked on board a vessel proper for transporting cavalry. Both the fleet and the land forces were afterwards increased considerably. Thirty vessels carried the provisions and cooks, with masons, carpenters, and their several tools; the whole followed by one hundred small vessels for the service, exclusive of merchant-ships, of which there were great numbers. All this fleet had sailed together for Corecra. Having met with but an indifferent reception from the people of Tarentum and Locris, they sailed with a favorable wind for Rhegium, where they made some stay. The Athenians were very urgent with the inhabitants of Rhegium to succor those of Leontium, who came originally from Chalcis as well as themselves: but these answered that they were determined to remain neutral, and to undertake nothing but in concert with the rest of Italy. Here they debated on the manner in which it was necessary to carry on the war, and waited for the coming up of those ships that had been sent out to make discoveries of a proper place for landing, and to inquire whether the citizens of Eggesta had got their money ready. Upon their return, they brought advice that they had but thirty talents in the treasury. This Nicias had foreseen, but no regard had been paid to his salutary counsels.

He did not fail, the instant this news was brought, to expatiate on the counsel he had given in Athens; to show the wrong step they had taken in engaging in this war; and to magnify the fatal consequences which might be expected from it; in all which he acted very imprudently. It was

* Thucyd. l. ii. pp. 432-445. Diod. l. xiii. pp. 135, 136. † These were called *ἀγῆτες*.

extremely judicious in Nicias to oppose it in the beginning, and to set every engine at work to crush, if possible, this ill-fated project. But as it was resolved, and he himself had accepted the command, he ought not to be perpetually looking backward, nor to have repeated incessantly, that this war had been undertaken in opposition to all the maxims of prudence; and, by that means, to cool the ardor of his two colleagues in the command, to dispirit the soldiers, and blunt that edge of confidence and ardor, which assure the success of great enterprises. The Athenians, on the contrary, ought to have advanced boldly towards the enemy; should have attacked them with vigor, and have spread a universal terror, by a sudden and unexpected descent.*

But Nicias acted in a quite different manner. His opinion, in the council of war, was, that they should sail for Selinuntum, which had been the first occasion of this expedition; and then if the citizens of Eggesta performed their promise, and gave a month's pay to the army, to proceed forward; or otherwise to oblige them to furnish provisions for the sixty galleys they had demanded, and continue in that road till they should have concluded a peace with the citizens of Selinuntum, either by force of arms or some other way. He said that they afterwards should return to Athens, after having thus made a parade of their forces, and the assistance they gave their allies; unless they should have an opportunity of making some attempt in favor of the Leontines, or of bringing over some city into their alliance.

Alcibiades answered that it would be inglorious, after their sailing out with so noble a fleet, to return without doing any thing; and that they should first endeavor to conclude an alliance with the Greeks and barbarians, in order to divide them from the Syracusans, and procure troops and provisions from them; and especially to send a deputation to Messina, which was a kind of key to Sicily, and its harbor capacious enough to hold all the fleet. He declared further, that after seeing who were their friends and who were their enemies, and strengthening themselves by the addition of a new reinforcement, they then should attack either Selinuntum or Syracuse, in case the one should refuse to conclude a peace with Eggesta, and the other not permit the Leontines to return to their city.

* Plut. in Nic. p. 532.

Lamachus offered a third opinion, which perhaps was the most prudent; that was, to sail directly for Syracuse, before its citizens had time to recover from their surprise, or prepare for their defence. He observed ~~that~~ the sudden arrival of an armed force always strikes the greatest terror; and that, when enemies are allowed time to reflect and make preparations, it also revives their courage; whereas, when they are suddenly attacked, and still in confusion, they are generally overcome; that, as they would be masters of the open country, they should not be in want of any thing, but, on the contrary, would oblige the Sicilians to declare for them; that at last they should settle in Megara, which was quite desert, and a near neighbor to Syracuse, and there lay up their fleet in safety. However, his counsel not being followed, he agreed to that of Alcibiades. Accordingly, they sailed for Sicily, where Alcibiades took Catana by surprise.

SECTION X.—ALCIBIADES RECALLED, ETC., ETC.

This was the only exploit performed by Alcibiades in this expedition, he being immediately recalled by the Athenians in order to be tried upon the accusation laid against him. For, since the departure of the fleet, his enemies, who had no regard to the welfare of their country, and who, upon the specious pretence of religion, which is often made a cloak to cover the darkest designs, meditated nothing but satiating their hatred and revenge, taking advantage of his absence, had preceded in the affair with greater rigor than ever. All those against whom informations were lodged were thrown into prison, without so much as being suffered to be heard, and that too on the evidence of the most profligate and abandoned citizens, as if, says Thucydides, it was not as great a crime to punish the innocent, as to suffer the guilty to escape. One of the informers was proved to be perjured by his own words, having declared that he saw and knew one of the accused by moonlight; whereas it appeared, that there was no moon at that time. But notwithstanding this manifest perjury, the populace were as furious as ever. The remembrance of the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ made them apprehensive of a similar attempt; and strongly possessed with this fear, they would not give ear to any thing.*

* Thucyd. l. vi. pp. 446-450. Plut. in Alcib. p. 202.

At last they sent out the Salaminian galley,* ordering the captain not to carry off Alcibiades by force, for fear of raising a tumult in the army; but only to order him to return to Athens, to pacify the people by his presence. Alcibiades obeyed the order, and went immediately on board his galley; but the instant he was arrived at Thurium, and had got on shore, he disappeared, and eluded the pursuit of those who sought after him. Being asked whether he would not rely on his country, with regard to the judgment it might pass on him: "I would not," said he, "rely on my mother, lest she should inadvertently mistake a black bean for a white one." † The galley of Salamin returned without the commander, who was ashamed of having suffered his prisoner to escape him in that manner. Alcibiades was sentenced to die for his contumacy. His whole estate was confiscated, and all priests and priestesses were commanded to curse him. Among the latter was one named Theano, who alone had the courage to oppose this decree, saying, "that she had been appointed priestess, not to curse but to bless." ‡ Some time after, news being brought him that the Athenians had condemned him to die, "I shall make them sensible," said he, "that I am alive."

Much about this time Diagoras the Melian was prosecuted at Athens. He had settled himself in that city, where he taught atheism, and was brought to trial for his poisonous doctrine. § Diagoras escaped the punishment which would have been inflicted on him, by flying from the city; but he could not wipe off the ignominy of the sentence which condemned him to death. The Athenians had so great an abhorrence for the impious principles inculcated by him, that they even set a price upon his head, and promised a reward of a talent to any man who should bring him, dead or alive. ||

About twenty years before, a similar circumstance had happened to Protagoras, for having only treated the same question by way of problem. He had said in the beginning of one of his books: "Whether the gods do or do not exist, is a question which I know not whether I ought to affirm or deny: for our understandings are too much clouded, and the life of man is too short, for the solution of so nice and

* This was a sacred vessel, appointed to bring criminals.

† The judges made use of beans in giving their suffrages, and the black bean denoted condemnation.

‡ Φάσκουσα εὐχῶν οὐ παταπὼν ἱέρειαν γεγενέσθαι.

§ Joseph. contr. App.

|| Diod. l. xiii. p. 137.

difficult a point." But the Athenians could not bear to have a subject of this nature made a matter of doubt; and for this reason they ordered proclamation to be made by the public crier, for all persons who had any copies of this book, to bring them to the magistrates: after which they were burnt as infamous and impious pieces, and the author was banished for ever from all the territories of the Athenians.*

Diagoras and Protagoras had been the disciples of Democritus, who first invented the philosophy of atoms. I shall speak of him in another place.

From the departure of Alcibiades, Nicias had possessed the whole authority: for Lamachus, his colleague, though a man of bravery and experience, was however in no credit, because of his extreme poverty, for which he was despised by the soldiers. But the Athenians were not always of this way of thinking; for we have seen that Aristides, poor as he was, was not less esteemed and respected on that account; but in this last expedition, the people in general had imbibed a passion for luxury and magnificence; the natural consequence of which is a love of riches. As Nicias, therefore, governed solely, all his actions were of the same cast with his disposition, that is, timid and dilatory: he suffered every thing to languish, sometimes either by lying still, and undertaking nothing, sometimes by only sailing along the coast, or losing time in consulting and deliberating; all which soon suppressed, on one side, the ardor and confidence the troops expressed at first; and on the other, the fear and terror with which the enemy had been seized at the sight of so formidable an armament. He besieged Hybla; and though it was but a small city, he was obliged to raise the siege some days after, which brought him into the highest contempt. He retired at last to Catana, after having performed but one exploit, viz.: the ruining of Hyccara, a small town inhabited by barbarians, from which place, it is said that Lais the courtesan, at that time very young, was sold with the rest of the captives, and carried to Peloponnesus.†

In the mean time, Alcibiades having left Thurium, arrived at Argos; and as he quite despaired of ever being recalled home, he sent a messenger to the Spartans, desiring leave to reside among them, under their guard and protection. He promised in the most solemn manner, that if they would

* Diog. Laër. in Protag. Joseph. contr. App. Cic. l. i. de Nat. Deo. n. 62.

† Thucyd. l. vi. pp. 452, 353. Plut. in Nic. p. 533.

consider him as their friend, he would perform greater service for their state, than he before had done injuries to it. The Spartans received him with open arms; and soon after his arrival in their city he gained the love and esteem of all its inhabitants. He charmed, and even enchanted them, by his conforming himself so readily to their way of living. Those who saw Alcibiades shave himself to the skin, bathe in cold water, eat of the coarse, heavy cakes, which were their usual food, and be so well satisfied with their black broth, could not persuade themselves, that a man who submitted so cheerfully to this kind of life, had ever kept cooks in his palace; had used essences and perfumes; had worn the rich stuffs of Miletus; in a word, that he had hitherto lived in the midst of voluptuousness and the profusion of all things. But flexibility was the characteristic that chiefly distinguished Alcibiades. Cameleon like, he would assume all shapes and colors, to win the favor of those among whom he resided. He immediately assumed their manners, and adapted himself to their taste, as if they had been natural to him; and though he inwardly had an aversion to them, he could however cover his disgust with an easy, simple and unconstrained air. With some, he had all the graces and vivacity of the gayest youth, and with others all the gravity of old age. In Sparta, he was laborious, frugal and austere; in Ionia, enjoyment, idleness, and pleasure, made up his whole life; in Thrace, he was always on horseback or carousing; and when he resided with Tissaphernes the satrap, he exceeded all the magnificence of the Persians in luxury and profusion.*

But he was not barely satisfied with gaining the esteem of the Lacedæmonians. He insinuated himself so far into the affection of Timæa, the wife of king Agis, that he had a son by her, who in public, went by the name of Leontychides; though his mother, in private, and among her women and female friends, did not blush to call him Alcibiades; so violent was her passion for that Athenian. Agis was informed of this intrigue, and therefore refused to own Leontychides for his son; for which reason he was afterwards excluded the throne.

SECTION XI.—DESCRIPTION OF SYRACUSE.

As the siege of Syracuse is one of the most considerable in the Grecian history, the particular circumstances of which I thought proper to relate, in order to give my readers an

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 230.

idea of the manner of besieging by the ancients, I therefore judge it necessary, before I enter into that detail, to give a description and plan of the city of Syracuse; in which will also be found the different fortifications, both of the Athenians and Syracusans, mentioned in this siege.

Syracuse stood on the eastern coast of Sicily. Its vast extent, its advantageous situation, the conveniency of its two harbors, its fortifications built with the utmost care and labor, and the multitude and wealth of its inhabitants, made it one of the greatest, the most beautiful and most powerful among the Grecian cities.* We are told its air was so pure and serene, that there was no day in the year, however cloudy it might be, in which the sun did not display its beams.†

It was built by Archias the Corinthian, a year after Naxos and Megara had been founded on the same coast.‡

When the Athenians besieged this city, it was divided into three parts, viz.: the Island, Achradina, and Tyche. Thucydides mentions only these three divisions. Two more, viz.: Neapolis and Epipolæ, were afterwards added.

The Island, situated to the south, was called *Nῆσος* (Nasos), signifying, in Greek, an island, but pronounced according to the Doric dialect; and Ortygia. It was joined to the continent by a bridge. It was in this that the Syracusans afterwards built the citadel, and the palace for their kings. The quarter or division of the city was of very great importance, because it might render those who possessed it, master of the two ports which surround it. It was for this reason the Romans, when they took Syracuse, would not suffer any Syracusans to inhabit the island.§

There was in this island a very famous spring, called Arethusa. The ancients,|| or rather the poets, from reasons which have not the least shadow of probability, supposed that Alpheus, a river of Elis in Peloponnesus, rolled its waters either through or under the waves of the sea, without ever mixing with them, as far as the spring or fountain of Arethusa. It was this fiction which gave occasion to the following lines of Virgil:

Extremum hunc, Arethusa, mihi concede laborem.—
Sic tibi, cum fluctus subter labere Sicanos,
Doris amara suam non intermisceat undam.

Virg. Eclog. 10.

* Cic. Verr. 6, n. 117-119.

† Urbem Syracusas elegerat, cujus hic situs atque hæc natura esse loci cœlique dicitur, ut nulla unquam dies tam magna turbulentaque tempestate fuerit, quin aliquo tempore solem ejus diei homines viderent.—Cic. Verr. 8, n. 26.

‡ A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709.—Strab. l. vi. p. 269.

§ Cic. Verr. 2, n. 97.

|| Strab. l. vi. p. 270. Senec. Nat. Quæst. l. iii. c. 26.

Thy sacred succor, Arethusa, bring,
To crown my labor: 'tis the last I sing.—
So may thy silver streams beneath the tide,
Unmix'd with briny seas, securely glide.

Dryden.

Achradina, situated entirely on the sea-side, towards the east, was the most spacious, the most beautiful, and best fortified quarter of the city.

Tyche, so called from the temple of fortune, *Τύχη* which embellished that part of the city, extended along Achradina westward from the north towards the south, and was thickly inhabited. It had a famous gate called Hexapylum, which led into the country, and was situated on the north of the city.

Epipolæ, was a hill outside of the city, which it commanded. It was situated between Hexapylum and the foot of Euryalus, towards the north and west. It was exceedingly steep in several places, and for that reason of very difficult access. At the time of the siege in question, it was not surrounded with walls; and the Syracusans defended it with a body of troops, against the attacks of the enemy: Euryalus was the pass of entrance which led to Epipolæ. On Epipolæ was a fort called Labdalon, or Labdalum.

It was not till long after (under Dionysius the tyrant) that Epipolæ was surrounded with walls, and enclosed within the city, of which it formed a fifth part, but was thinly inhabited. A fourth division had been added before, called Neapolis, that is, the New City, which covered Tyche.

The river Anapis ran at almost half a league distance from the city. The space between them was a large and beautiful plain, terminated by two marshes, the one called Syraco, whence the city was named, and the other Lysimelia. This river emptied itself into the great harbor. Near its mouth, southward, was a kind of castle called Olympia, from the temple of Jupiter Olympus standing there, and in which were great riches. It was five hundred paces from the city.*

Syracuse had two harbors, very near one another, and separated only by the island, viz.: the great harbor, and the small one, called otherwise Laccus. According to the description which the Roman orator gives of them, both were surrounded with the buildings of the city.†

The great harbor was a little more than five thousand

* Plut. in Dionys. Vit. p. 970.

† Portus habet prope in ædificatione aspectuque urbus inclusos.—Cic. Verr. 6, n. 117.

paces or two leagues in circumference.* It had a gulf called Dascon. The entrance of this port was but five hundred paces wide. It was formed on one side by the point of the island Ortygia, and on the other, by the little island and cape of Plemmyrium, which was commanded by a fort or castle of the same name.

Above Achradina was a third port, called the harbor of Trogilus.

SECTION XII.—NICIAS, AFTER SOME ENGAGEMENTS, BESIEGES SYRACUSE, ETC. EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

At the end of the summer, news was brought to Nicias that the Syracusans, having resumed courage, intended to march against him. Already their cavalry advanced with an air of insolence to attack him even in his camp; and asked, with a loud laugh, whether he was come into Sicily to settle in Catana. These severe reproaches roused him a little, so that he resolved to sail for Syracuse. The enterprise was bold and dangerous. Nicias could not, without running the utmost hazard, attempt to land in presence of an enemy who waited for him with the greatest resolution, and would not fail to charge him, the instant he should offer to make a descent. Nor was it safer for him to march his troops by land, because, as he had no cavalry, that of the Syracusans, which was very numerous, would, upon the first advice they should have of their march, fall upon him, and overpower him by the superiority of forces.

To extricate himself from this perplexity, and to be able to seize without opposition upon an advantageous post, which a Syracusan exile had discovered to him, Nicias had recourse to stratagem. He caused a false information to be given to the enemy, viz.: that by means of a conspiracy, which was to take place on a certain day, they might seize on his camp, and possess themselves of all the arms and baggage. The Syracusans, on this promise, marched towards Catana, and pitched their camp near Leontium. The moment the Athenians had advice of this, they embarked with all their troops and ammunition, and in the evening steered for Syracuse. They arrived by daybreak in the great harbor; landed near Olympia, in the place which had been pointed out to them, and there fortified themselves.

* According to Strabo, it is eighty stadia in circumference, which is twice its real extent; a plain proof that this passage of Strabo is incorrect.—Cluver. p. 167.

The enemy, finding themselves shamefully overreached, returned immediately to Syracuse; and, in the greatest rage, drew up in order of battle, some days after, before the walls of the city. Nicias marched out of the trenches, and a battle was fought. Victory was a long time doubtful, but a very heavy shower of rain, accompanied with thunder and lightning, falling unexpectedly, the Syracusans, who were unexperienced, and the greatest part of them having never carried arms before, were frightened at the tempest, while their enemies laughed at it, as the mere effect of the season, and regarded nothing but the enemy, who were much more to be dreaded than the storm. The Syracusans, after making a long and vigorous resistance, were forced to give way. The Athenians could not pursue them far, because their horse, which was still in a body, and had not been defeated, covered their retreat. The Syracusans retreated in good order into the city, after having thrown a body of troops into the temple of Olympia, to prevent its being plundered.*

This temple stood pretty near the camp of the Athenians, who were very desirous of taking it because it abounded with gold and silver offerings, which the piety of kings and nations had consecrated. Nicias having delayed sending troops to seize it, lost the opportunity, and gave the Syracusans time to throw into it, as was before observed, a detachment to defend it. It was thought he did this on purpose, and out of reverence to the gods; because, had the soldiers plundered this temple, the public would not have reaped any benefit by it, and himself only had been accused of the sacrilege.

After the battle, the Athenians, who were not yet in a condition to attack Syracuse, retired with their fleet to Naxos and Catana to winter there, with a design to return early in the next spring, and lay siege to the city. To do this, they wanted money, provisions, and particularly horse, of which they were absolutely destitute. The Athenians depended upon obtaining part of these succors from the people of Sicily, who, they supposed, would join them the instant they should hear of their victory; and at the same time they sent an express to Athens, to solicit the like aid. They also addressed the Carthaginians for their alliance; and sent deputies to some cities of Italy, situated on the

* Thueyd. l. vi. pp. 453-461. Plut. in Nic. pp. 533, 534. Diod. l. xiii. pp. 137, 138.

borders of the Tuscan sea, which had promised to assist them.

The Syracusans were far from desponding. Hermocrates, who, of all their leaders, was most distinguished for his valor, his judgment and experience, represented to them, in order to raise their hopes, that they had not been wanting in courage, but in conduct; that the enemy, though very brave, owed their victory to their good fortune rather than to their merit; that the command being equally divided among so many leaders (fifteen) tended inevitably to confusion and disobedience, and had been prejudicial to them; that it would be absolutely necessary for them to choose experienced generals, to keep the rest in their duty, and exercise their forces continually during the winter season. This advice being followed, Hermocrates and two more were elected generals; after which they sent deputies to Corinth and Lacedæmon to renew the alliance, and at the same time to engage them to make a diversion, in order to oblige, if possible, the Athenians to recall their troops out of Sicily, or at least to prevent their sending a reinforcement thither. The fortifying of Syracuse was the chief object of their care. They accordingly took into the city, by a wall, all the tract of land towards Epipolæ, from the northern extremity of Tyche descending westward towards the quarter or division of the city, called afterwards Neapolis, in order to remove the enemy to a greater distance, and to give them more trouble in making their contravallation, by obliging them to give a larger extent to it. This part, in all probability, had been neglected, because it seemed to be sufficiently defended by its rugged and steep situation. They also garrisoned Megara and Olympia, and drove stakes into all those parts of the sea shore, where the enemy might easily make a descent. Hearing afterwards that the Athenians were at Naxos, they went and burnt the camp of Catana, and retired, after laying waste the country adjacent to it.

The ambassadors of Syracuse, having arrived among the Corinthians, asked succor of them, as having been their founders, which was immediately granted; and at the same time they sent an embassy to the Lacedæmonians to invite them to declare in their favor. Alcibiades enforced their demand with all his credit and eloquence, which his resentment against Athens inflamed prodigiously. He advised and exhorted the Lacedæmonians to appoint Gylippus their general, and send him into Sicily, and at the same time to invade

the Athenians, in order to make a powerful diversion. In the third place, he counselled them to fortify Decelia in Attica, which quite completed the ruin of the city of Athens, it never being able to recover that blow ; for by this fort, the Lacedæmonians made themselves masters of the country, by which the Athenians were deprived of their silver mines of Laurium and of the revenues of their lands ; nor could they be succored by their neighbors, Decelia becoming the asylum of all the malcontents and partisans of Sparta.*

Nicias had received some succor from Athens. It consisted of about two hundred and fifty horsemen, whom the Athenians supposed would be furnished with horse in Sicily, the troops bringing only the furniture, and of forty horse archers, with three hundred talents, that is, three hundred thousand French crowns.† Nicias now began to prepare for action. He was accused of often letting slip opportunities, by his losing time in deliberating, arguing, and concerting measures ; however, when once he entered upon an action, he was as bold and vigorous in executing, as he before had been slow and timorous in undertaking, as he showed on the present occasion. ‡

The Syracusans, hearing that the Athenians had a reinforcement of cavalry, and would soon march and lay siege to their city ; and knowing that they could not possibly approach it, or make a contravallation, unless they should possess themselves of the hill of Epipolæ, which commanded Syracuse, they resolved to guard the avenue to it, which was the only pass by which the enemy could get up to it, every other part being rugged and inaccessible. Marching, therefore, down into the meadow or plain, bordered by the river Anapis, and reviewing their troops there, they appointed seven hundred foot, under the command of Diomilus, to guard that important post ; and commanded them to repair to it, at the first signal which should be given for that purpose. But Nicias conducted his design with so much prudence, expedition, and secrecy, that they had no time to do this. He sailed from Catana with all his fleet, without the enemy's having the least suspicion of his design. Having arrived at the port of Trogilus, near Leontium, which is but a quarter of a league, six or seven furlongs, from Epipolæ, he set his land forces on shore, after which he retired with his

* Thucyd. l. vi. pp. 471-482. Plut. in Alcib. p. 203. In Nic. pp. 534, 535. Diod. l. xiii. p. 138.

† Three hundred and thirty thousand dollars.

‡ A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414.

fleet to Thapsus, a small peninsula of Syracuse, the entrance to which he shut up with a stockade.

The land forces marched with the utmost expedition to seize on Epipolæ, by the pass of Euryalus, before the enemy, who were in the plains of Anapis, at about a league's distance, had the least notice of their arrival. At the first news of this, the seven hundred soldiers, under the command of Diomilus, advanced in confusion, but were easily defeated; and three hundred of them, with their leader, left dead on the field. The Athenians, after setting up a trophy, built a fort in Labdalon, on the summit of Epipolæ, in order to secure their baggage and most valuable effects in it, whenever they should be forced to fight, or work at the contravallation.

Soon after, the inhabitants of Egesta sent the Athenians three hundred horse, to which some of the Sicilian allies added a hundred more; that, with the two hundred and fifty sent before by the Athenians, and who had furnished themselves with horses in Sicily, made a body of six hundred and fifty horse.

The plan laid down by Nicias, in order for taking Syracuse, was, to surround all the city on the land side with a strong contravallation, in order to cut off all communication with the place from without, in hopes, no doubt, that his fleet would afterwards enable him to prevent the Syracusans from receiving any succors or provisions by sea.

Having left a garrison in Labdalon, he came down from the hill, advanced towards the northern extremity of Tyche, and halting there, he employed the whole army in throwing up a line of contravallation, to shut up their city northward from Tyche, as far as Trogilus, situated on the sea-side. This work was carried on with a rapidity that terrified the Syracusans. They thought it absolutely necessary to prevent the carrying on of the work, and accordingly made some sallies and attacks, but always with disadvantage, and even their cavalry was routed. The day after the action, the contravallation, northward, was continued by part of the army, during which the rest carried stones and other materials towards Trogilus, in order to finish it.

The besieged, by the advice of Hermocrates, thought it advisable not to venture a second battle with the Athenians, and only endeavored to put a stop to their works, or at least to render them useless, by running a line to cut that carried on by the Athenians. They imagined, that in case they

should be suffered to complete their wall, it would be impossible for the Athenians to make any further progress in their work; or that, should they endeavor to prevent it, it would suffice for the Syracusans to oppose them with a part of their forces, after having shut up such avenues as were most accessible, with strong palisades; and that the Athenians, on the contrary, would be obliged to send for all their forces, and entirely abandon their works.

They accordingly came out of their city, and working with inexpressible ardor, they began to raise a wall; and, in order to carry it on with less molestation, they covered it with strong palisades, and flanked it with wooden towers, at proper distances to defend it. The Athenians suffered the Syracusans to carry on their works undisturbed, because, had they marched only part of their troops against them, they would have been too weak; and if they had brought them all, they then must have been obliged to discontinue their works, which they were resolved not to do. The work being completed, the Syracusans left a body of troops to defend the palisade and guard the wall, and then returned into the city.

In the mean time the Athenians cut off the canals by which water was conveyed into the city; and observing the Syracusan soldiers who had been left to guard the wall very negligent in their duty; some returning at noon either into the city or their tents, and the rest not keeping a proper guard, they detached three hundred chosen soldiers, and some light infantry, to attack this post; during which the rest of the army marched towards the city, to prevent any succors from coming out of it. Accordingly the three hundred soldiers having forced the palisade, pursued those who guarded it as far as the part of the city wall which covered Temenites; where, pouring in indiscriminately with them, they were repulsed by the inhabitants with loss. The whole army afterwards demolished the wall, and pulled up the palisades of the entrenchments, and carried them off.

After this success, whereby the Athenians were masters of the northern parts, they began the very next day a still more important work, and which would quite finish their enclosure of the city; viz. : to carry a wall from the hills of Epipolæ westward, through the plain and the marshes as far as the great harbor. To prevent this, the besieged, beginning the same kind of work as they had carried on on the other side, ran a trench, lined with palisades, from the city

through the marshes, to prevent the Athenians from carrying their contravallations as far as the sea. But the latter, after finishing the first part of the wall on the hills of Epipolæ, resolved to attack this new work. For this purpose, they ordered their fleet to sail from Thapsus to the great harbor of Syracuse, it having continued in that road hitherto; and the besieged had always the sea open to them, by which the besiegers were obliged to get their provisions from Thapsus by land. The Athenians came down therefore from Epipolæ into the plain, before daybreak; when throwing planks and beams into that part where the marshes was only slimy and more firm than in other places, they immediately carried the greatest part of the fosse lined with palisades, and then the rest, after having beaten the Syracusans, who gave way and retired; such as were on the right towards the city, and the rest towards the river. Three hundred chosen Athenians having attempted to cut off the retreat of the latter, flew towards the bridge; but the enemy's cavalry, the greatest part of which were drawn up in battle, repulsed them; and afterwards charged the right wing of the Athenians, and threw the first battalion into disorder. Lamachus, perceiving this from the left wing, where he commanded, ran thither with the Argives and some archers; but having passed a trench, and being abandoned by his soldiers, he was killed, with five or six who followed him. The enemy immediately passed the river, and seeing the rest of the army come up, they retired.

At the same time their right wing, which had returned towards the city, resumed courage from this success, and drew up in order of battle before the Athenians; after having detached some troops to attack the fort on the hills of Epipolæ, which served as a magazine to the enemy, and was thought to be unguarded. They forced an entrenchment that covered the fort, but Nicias saved it. He was sick in this fort, and at that time in his bed, with only his domestics about him. Animated by the danger, and the presence of the enemy, he struggled with his indisposition, rose up and commanded his servants immediately to set fire to all the timber lying between the intrenchment and the fort for the military engines, and to the engines themselves. The unexpected conflagration stopped the Syracusans, saved Nicias, the fort and all the rich effects of the Athenians, who made haste to the relief of that general. At the same time, the fleet was seen sailing into the great harbor according to the

orders given for that purpose. The Syracusans having perceived this from the hill, and fearing that they should be attacked from behind, and overpowered by the land forces, retired and returned to the city with all their force ; now no longer expecting, after having lost their fosse lined with palisades, that it would be possible for them to prevent the enemy from carrying on the contravallation as far as the sea.

In the mean time the Athenians, who had contented themselves with building a single wall on the hills of Epipolæ, and through such places as were craggy, and of difficult access, being come down into the plain, began to build, at the foot of the hills, a double wall, intending to carry it as far as the sea ; viz. : a wall of contravallation against the besieged, and another of circumvallation against those Syracusan troops which were out of the city, and such allies as might come to its aid.

From thenceforth Nicias, who was now sole general, conceived great hopes, for several cities of Sicily, which hitherto had not declared for either side, came and joined him ; and there arrived from all quarters vessels laden with provisions for his army, all parties being eager to go over to him, because he had acquired the superiority, and been exceedingly successful in all his undertakings. The Syracusans, seeing themselves blocked up both by sea and land, and losing all hopes of being able to defend their city any longer, already proposed an accommodation. Gylippus, who was coming from Lacedæmon to their assistance, having heard, in his passage, the extremity to which they were reduced, and looking upon the whole island as lost, sailed forward nevertheless ; not in the view of defending Sicily, but only to preserve to the nations of Italy such cities as were subject to them in that island, if it were not too late, and if this could be done. For fame had declared, in all places, that the Athenians had already possessed themselves of the whole island ; and were headed by a general, whose wisdom and good fortune rendered him invincible. Nicias himself now, contrary to his natural disposition, confiding in his own strength, and elated with his success, persuaded also by the secret advices which were brought him daily from Syracuse, and the messengers who were sent to him, that the city would immediately capitulate, did not regard the approach of Gylippus, and in consequence took no precautions to prevent his landing, especially when he heard that he brought but very few vessels ; terming him a trifling pirate, not worthy, in any

manner, his notice. But a general ought to be extremely careful not to abate his cares and vigilance upon account of success, because the least negligence may ruin every thing. Had Nicias sent the smallest detachment to oppose the landing of Gylippus, he would have taken Syracuse, and the whole affair would have been ended.

SECTION XIII.—THE SYRACUSANS RESOLVE TO CAPITULATE, BUT THE ARRIVAL OF GYLIPPUS CHANGES THE FACE OF AFFAIRS, ETC. NINETEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

The fortifications of the Athenians were now almost completed; and they had drawn a double wall, near half a league in length, along the plain and marshes towards the great port, and had almost reached it. There now remained, on the side towards Trogilus, only a small part of the wall to be finished. The Syracusans were therefore on the brink of ruin, and had no hopes left, as they were no longer able to defend themselves; and did not expect any succors. For this reason they resolved to surrender. Accordingly a council was held to settle articles of capitulation, in order to present them to Nicias; and several were of opinion that it would be proper to capitulate soon, before the city should be entirely invested.*

It was at that very instant, and at the most critical juncture, that an officer, Gongyles by name, arrived from Corinth on board a ship with three benches of oars. At his arrival, all the citizens flocked round him. He informed them, that Gylippus would be with them immediately, and was followed by a great many other galleys, which came to their aid. The Syracusans astonished, or rather stupefied, as it were, with this news, could scarcely believe what they heard. While they were thus fluctuating and in doubt, a courier arrived from Gylippus to inform them of his approach, and order them to march out all their troops to meet him. He himself, after having taken a fort in his way, marched in order of battle directly for Epipolæ; and ascending by Euryalus, as the Athenians had done, he prepared to attack them from without, while the Syracusans should charge them, on their side with the Syracusan and his own forces.† The Athenians, exceedingly surprised by his arrival, drew up hastily, and without order, under the walls. With regard to himself, laying down his arms when he approached, he sent word by a herald, that he would allow the Athenians

* A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. vii. pp. 485-489. Plut. in Nic. pp. 535, 536. Diod. l. xiii. pp. 138, 139.

† Jeges.

five days to leave Sicily. Nicias did not condescend to make the least answer to this proposal; and some of the soldiers, bursting into a laugh, asked the herald, "whether the presence of a Lacedæmonian privateer, and a trifling wand, could make any change in the present state of the city?" Both sides therefore prepared for battle.

Gylippus stormed the fort of Labdalon, and cut to pieces all who were found in it. The same day an Athenian galley was taken, as it sailed into the harbor. The besieged afterwards drew a wall from the city, towards Epipolæ, in order to cut, about the extremity of it, the single wall of the Athenians, and to deprive them of all communication with the troops, posted in the intrenchments which surrounded the city, on the north side towards Tyche and Trogilus. The Athenians, after having finished the wall, which extended as far as the sea towards the great harbor, returned to the hills. Gylippus perceiving, in the single wall which the Athenians had built on the hills of Epipolæ, a part that was weaker and lower than the rest, marched thither in the night with his troops; but being discovered by the Athenians, who were encamped without, he was forced to retire upon seeing them advance directly towards him. They raised the wall higher, and themselves undertook the guard of it; after having fixed their allies in the several posts of the remainder of the intrenchment.

Nicias, on the other side, thought proper to fortify the cape of Plemmyrium, which, by its running into the sea, straitened the mouth of the great harbor; and his design thereby was to procure provisions, and all other things he might want, the more easily; because the Athenians, by possessing themselves of that post, drew near the little port, wherein lay the chief naval force of the Syracusans, and were the better able to observe their various motions; and that besides, by having the sea open, they would not be forced to have all their provisions from the bottom of the great harbor, as they must have been, should the enemy, by seizing on the mouth of it, oblige them to keep close in the harbor, in the manner they then did. For Nicias, from the arrival of Gylippus, had no hopes left, but from the side next the sea. Sending therefore his fleet, and part of his troops thither, he built three forts, by which the ships were enabled to lie at anchor; he also secured there a great part of the baggage and ammunition. It was then that the troops on board the fleet suffered very much; for, as they

were obliged to go a great way to fetch wood and water, they were surrounded by the enemy's horse, the third part of which were posted at Olympia, to prevent the garrison of Plemmyrium from sallying, and were masters of the open country. Advice being brought to Nicias, that the Corinthian fleet was advancing, he sent two galleys against it; ordering them to observe the enemy towards Locris, Rhegium, and the rest of the avenues of Sicily.

In the mean time Gylippus, employing those very stones which the Athenians had got together for their use, went on with the wall which the Syracusans had begun to carry through Epipolæ, and drew up daily in order of battle before it, as did the Athenians. When he saw it was a proper time for engaging, he began the battle in the space between the two walls. The narrowness of it having rendered his cavalry and archers useless, he came off with loss, and the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus, to reanimate his soldiers, by doing them justice, had the courage to reproach himself for the ill success they had met with, and to declare publicly that he, not they, had occasioned the late defeat; because he had made them fight in too narrow a spot of ground. However, he promised soon to give them an opportunity of recovering both their honor and his, and accordingly, the very next day, he led them against the enemy, after having exhorted them, in the strongest terms, to behave in a manner worthy of their ancient glory. Nicias perceiving that though he should not desire to come to a battle, it would however be absolutely necessary for him to prevent the enemy from extending their line beyond the contravallation, to which they were already very near, because otherwise this would be granting them a certain victory, therefore marched against the Syracusans. Gylippus brought up his troops beyond that place where the walls terminated on both sides, in order that he might leave the more room to extend his battle: when, charging the enemy's left wing with his horse, he put it to flight, and soon after defeated the right. We have here an instance of what the experience and abilities of a great captain are capable of producing; for Gylippus, with the same men, the same arms, the same horses, and the same ground, by only changing his order of battle, defeated the Athenians, and beat them quite to their camp. The following night, the victors carried on their wall beyond the contravallation of the Athenians, and thereby deprived them of all hopes of being ever able to surround them.

After this success, the Syracusans, to whose aid the Corinthian fleet had arrived, unperceived by that of the Athenians, resumed courage, armed several galleys, and marching into the plains with their cavalry and other forces, took a great number of prisoners. They sent deputies to Lacedæmon, and Corinth, to desire a reinforcement; Gylippus went in person to all the cities in Sicily, to solicit them to join him, and brought over the greatest part of them, who accordingly sent him powerful succors. Nicias, finding his troops diminish and those of the enemy increase daily, began to be discouraged; and not only sent expresses to the Athenians, to acquaint them with the situation of affairs, but likewise wrote to them in the strongest terms. I repeat his whole letter, both as it gives a clear and exact account of the state of things at that time in Syracuse, and may serve as a model for such kind of relations.*

“Athenians, I have already informed you, by several expresses, of what passed here: but it is necessary you should know the present situation of affairs, that you may resolve accordingly. After we had been victorious in several engagements, and almost completed our contravallation, Gylippus arrived in Syracuse with a body of Lacedæmonian and Sicilian troops; and having been defeated the first time, he was victorious the second, by means of his cavalry and archers. We are in consequence shut up in our intrenchments, without daring to make any attempt, or complete our works, through the superiority of the enemy's forces; for part of our soldiers are employed in guarding our forts, and consequently we have not an opportunity of employing all our forces in battle. Besides, as the Syracusans have cut our lines by a wall, in that part where they were not complete, it will no longer be possible for us to invest the city, unless we should force their intrenchments; so that, instead of besieging, we ourselves are besieged, and dare not stir out for fear of their horse.

“Not content with these advantages, they are bringing new succors from Peloponnesus, and have sent Gylippus to force all the neutral cities of Sicily to declare for them; and the rest to furnish them with men and ships, to attack us both by sea and land: I say by sea, which, though very surprising, is, however, but too true. For our fleet, which before was considerable from the good condition of the galleys and mariners, is now very deficient in those very circumstances, and extremely weakened.

* Thucyd. l. vii. pp. 490-491. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 139.

“Our galleys leak every where ; because we cannot draw them on shore to careen them, lest those of the enemy, which are more numerous, and in better condition than ours, should attack us on a sudden, which they seem to threaten every moment. Besides, we are under a necessity of sending many backwards and forwards to guard the convoys which we are forced to fetch from a great distance, and bring along in sight of the enemy ; so that should we be ever so little negligent in this point, our army would be starved.

“With regard to the ships’ crews, they decrease sensibly every day ; for as great numbers disperse to maraud, or to fetch wood and water, they are often cut to pieces by the enemy’s horse. Our slaves, allured by the neighborhood of the enemy’s camp, desert very fast to it. The foreigners, which we forced into the service, diminish daily ; and such as have been raised with money, who came for plunder rather than fighting, finding themselves disappointed, go over to the enemy, who are so near us, or else hide themselves in Sicily, which they may easily do in so large an island. A great number of citizens, though long used to, and well skilled in working of ships, by bribing the captains, put others in their room, who are wholly inexperienced and incapable of serving, and by that means have quite subverted all discipline. I am now writing to men perfectly well versed in naval affairs ; and who are very sensible that, when order is neglected, every thing grows worse and worse, and the fleet must inevitably be ruined.

“But the most unhappy circumstance is that, though I am generalissimo, I cannot put a stop to these disorders. For, Athenians, you are very sensible, that such is your disposition that you do not easily brook restraint ; besides, I do not know where to furnish myself with seamen, whereas the enemy get numbers from all quarters. It is not in the power of our Sicilian allies to aid us ; and should the cities of Italy, from whence we have our provisions, hearing the extremity to which we are reduced, and your not taking the least care to send us any succor, join the Syracusans, we are undone, and the enemy will have no occasion to fight us.

“I could write of things which would be more agreeable, but of none that could be more advantageous to you, nor which could give you a more just idea of the subjects on which you are to deliberate. I am sensible that you love to have such advices only sent you as are pleasing ; but I know, on the other side, that when affairs turn out other-

wise than you expected and hoped for, you accuse those who deceived you ; which induced me to give you a sincere and genuine account of things, without concealing a single circumstance. By the way, I am to inform you that no complaints can be justly made either against the officers or common soldiers, both having done their duty very well.

“But now that the Sicilians join all their forces against us, and expect a new army from Peloponnesus, you may lay this down as the foundation for your deliberations, that your present troops are not sufficient ; and, therefore, we either must be recalled, or else a land and naval force equal to the first must be sent to us, with money in proportion. You must also think of appointing a person to succeed me, it being impossible for me, through my nephritic disorder, to sustain any longer the weight of the command. I imagine that I deserve this favor at your hands on account of the services I have done you in the several commands conferred upon me, so long as my health would permit me to act.

“To conclude, whatever resolution you may come to, the request I have to make is that you would execute it speedily, and very early in the spring. The succors which our enemies meet with in Sicily are all ready ; but those which they expect from Peloponnesus may be longer in coming. However, fix this in your minds, that if you do not exert yourselves, the Lacedæmonians will not fail, as they have already done, to be beforehand with you.”

The Athenians were strongly affected with this letter, which made as great an impression on them as Nicias expected. However, they did not think proper to appoint him a successor ; and only nominated two officers who were under him, viz. : Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him till other generals should be sent. Eurymedon and Demosthenes were chosen to succeed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former set out immediately with ten galleys and some money,* about the winter solstice, to assure Nicias that a speedy succor should be sent him ; during which the latter was raising troops and contributions, in order to set sail early in the spring.

The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, being supported by the Corinthians, were very industrious in preparing reinforcements to send into Sicily, and to enter Attica, in order to keep the Athenian fleet from sailing to that island.

* One hundred and twenty talents

Accordingly they entered Attica early, under the command of king Agis; and after having laid waste the country, they fortified Decelia, having divided the work among all the forces, to make the greater despatch. This post is about a hundred and twenty furlongs from Athens, that is, about six French leagues, and the same distance from Bœotia. Alcibiades was perpetually soliciting the Lacedæmonians, and could not be easy till he had prevailed with them to begin that work. This annoyed the Athenians most of all, for hitherto the enemy retiring, after they had laid waste the Athenian territories, the latter were unmolested all the rest of the year; but from the fortifying of Decelia, the garrison left in it were continually making incursions, and alarming the Athenians, Athens being now become a kind of frontier town; for, in the day-time, a guard was mounted at all the gates, and in the night all the citizens were either on the walls or under arms. Such vessels as brought provisions from the island of Eubœa, and which before had a much shorter passage by Decelia, were forced to go round about, in order to double the cape of Sunium, by which means provisions, as well as goods imported, grew much dearer. To heighten the calamity, upwards of twenty thousand slaves, the greater part of whom were artificers, went over to the enemy, to fly from the extreme misery with which the city was afflicted. The cattle of all kinds died. Most of the horses were lamed, being continually upon guard or upon parties. Everything being laid waste in this manner, and the Athenians enjoying no longer the revenues which arose from the produce of their lands, there was a great scarcity of money, so that they were forced to take the twentieth part of all the imports to supply their usual subsidies.*

In the mean time Gylippus, who had made the tour of Sicily, returned with as many men as he could raise in the whole island, and prevailed with the Syracusans to fit out the strongest fleet in their power, and to hazard a battle at sea, upon the presumption that the success would answer the greatness of the enterprise. This advice was strongly enforced by Hermocrates, who exhorted the Syracusans not to abandon to their enemies the empire of the seas. He observed that the Athenians themselves had not received it from their ancestors, nor been always possessed of it; that

* A. M. 2591. Ant. J. C. 423. Thucyd. l. vi. pp. 494-496, et 502-504. Diod. l. xiii. p. 140.

the Persian war had in a manner forced them into the knowledge of naval affairs, notwithstanding two great obstacles, their disposition, and the situation of the city, which stood at a considerable distance from the sea; that they had made themselves formidable to other nations, not so much by their real strength, as by their courage and intrepidity; that they ought to copy them; and since they had to do with enemies who were so enterprising, it was fit they should be equally daring.*

This advice was approved, and accordingly a large fleet was equipped. Gylippus led out all his land forces in the night-time, to attack the forts of Plemmyrium. Thirty-five galleys of Syracuse, which were in the great harbor, and forty-five in the lesser, where was an arsenal for ships, were ordered to advance towards Plemmyrium, to surprise the Athenians, who would see themselves attacked both by sea and land at the same time. The Athenians, at this news, went on board also, and with twenty-five ships sailed to fight the thirty-five Syracusan vessels which were sailing out against them from the great harbor; and opposed thirty-five more to the forty-five of the enemy which were come out of the little port. A sharp engagement was fought at the mouth of the great harbor, one party endeavoring to force their way into it, and the other to keep them out.

Those who defended the forts of Plemmyrium having flocked to the shore to view the battle, Gylippus attacked the forts unexpectedly by daybreak; and, having carried the greatest of them by storm, the soldiers who defended the other two were so terrified that they abandoned them in a moment. After this advantage, the Syracusans sustained a considerable loss; for such of their vessels as fought at the entrance of the harbor, after having forced the Athenians, bulged furiously, one against the other, as they entered it in disorder, and by this means shifted the victory to their enemies, who were not contented with pursuing, but also gave chase to those who were victorious in the great harbor. Eleven Syracusan galleys were sunk, and great numbers of the sailors in them killed. Three were taken; but the Athenians likewise lost three; and after towing off those of the enemy, they raised a trophy in a little island lying before Plemmyrium, and retired to the centre of their camp.

The Syracusans also raised three trophies for the capture of the three forts; and after razing one of the smaller, they

* Thucyd. l. vii. pp. 497, 500. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. p. 140.

repaired the fortifications of the other two, and put garrisons into them. Several Athenians had been either killed or made prisoners there; and great sums of money were taken, the property of the public, as well as of merchants and captains of galleys, besides a large quantity of ammunition; this being a kind of magazine for the whole army. They likewise lost the stores and rigging of forty galleys, with three ships that lay in the dock. But a more considerable circumstance was, Gylippus thereby prevented Nicias from getting provisions and ammunition so easily; for, while the latter was possessed of Plemmyrium, they procured these securely and expeditiously; whereas, after their being dispossessed of it, it was equally difficult and hazardous, because they could not bring in any thing without fighting, the enemy lying at anchor just off their fort. Thus the Athenians could have no provisions but from the point of their swords; which dispirited the soldiers very much, and threw the whole army into a great consternation.

There was afterwards a little skirmish in defending a stockade, which the inhabitants had made in the sea, at the entrance of the old harbor, to secure the shipping. The Athenians, having raised towers and parapets on a large ship, advanced it as near as possible to the stockade, in order that it might serve as a bulwark to some ships which carried military engines, with which they drew up stakes by the help of pulleys and ropes, exclusive of those which the divers sawed in two, the besieged defending themselves with their harbor, and the enemies with their tower. Such stakes as had been driven in, level with the surface of the water, in order to strand those vessels that should come near them, were the hardest to force away. The divers also bribed the enemy, and most of the stakes were torn up; but then others were immediately driven in their places. The utmost efforts were used on both sides, in the attack as well as the defence.*

One circumstance which the besieged considered of the greatest importance was to attempt a second engagement both by sea and land before the fleet, and other succors sent by the Athenians, should arrive. They had concerted fresh measures for a battle at sea by improving from the errors they had committed in the last engagement. The change made in the galleys was, their prows were now shorter and at the same time stronger and more solid than before. For

* Thucyd. l. vii. pp. 500, 501.

this purpose they fixed great pieces of timber, projecting forward, on each side of the prows; and to these pieces they joined beams by way of props. These beams extended to the length of six cubits on each side of the vessel, both within and without. By this they hoped to gain the advantage over the galleys of the Athenians, which did not dare, because of the weakness of their prows, to attack an enemy in front, but only in flank; not to mention that, should the battle be fought in the harbor, they would not have room to spread themselves, nor to pass between two galleys, in which lay their greatest art; nor to tack about after they should have been repulsed, in order to return to the charge; whereas the Syracusans, by their being masters of the whole extent of the harbor, would have all these advantages, and might reciprocally assist one another. On these circumstances the latter founded their hopes of victory.*

Gylippus, therefore, first drew all the infantry out of the camp, and advancing towards that part of the contravallation of the Athenians which faced the city, while the troops of Olympia marched towards the other, and their galleys set sail.

Nicias did not care to venture a second battle, saying, as he expected a fresh fleet every moment, and a great reinforcement under Demosthenes, it would betray the greatest want of judgment should he, as his troops were inferior in number to those of the enemy, and already fatigued, hazard a battle without being forced to it. On the contrary, Menander and Euthydemus, who had just before been appointed to share the command of Nicias till the arrival of Demosthenes, fired with ambition, and jealous of those generals, were eager to perform some great exploit, to bereave the one of his glory, and, if possible, eclipse that of the other. The pretence they alleged on this occasion was the fame and reputation of Athens, and they asserted with so much vehemence that it would be entirely destroyed should they shun the battle, as the Syracusans offered it them, that they at last forced Nicias to a compliance. The Athenians had seventy-five galleys, and the Syracusans eighty.

The first day the fleets continued in sight of each other, in the great harbor, without engaging, and only a few skirmishes passed, after which both parties retired, and it was just the same with the land forces. The Syracusans did not make the least motion the second day. Nicias, taking

* Thucyd. l. vii. pp. 509-513. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. pp. 140, 141.

advantage of this inactivity, caused the transports to draw up in a line, at some distance from one another, in order that his galleys might retire behind them in safety, in case he should be defeated. On the morrow the Syracusans came up sooner than usual, when a great part of the day was spent in skirmishing, after which they retired. The Athenians did not suppose they would return, but imagined that fear had made them fly; but, having refreshed themselves with great diligence, and returning on board their galleys, they attacked the Athenians, who were far from expecting them. The latter, being now forced to return immediately on board their ships, entered them in great disorder, so that they had not time to draw them up in line of battle, and most of the sailors were fasting. Victory did not long continue in suspense. The Athenians, after making a short and slight resistance, retired behind their line of transport ships. The enemy pursued them thither, and were stopped by the sail-yards of those ships, to which were fixed dolphins of lead,* which, being very heavy, had they fallen on the enemy's galleys, would have sunk them at once. The Athenians lost seven galleys in this engagement, and a great number of soldiers were either killed or taken prisoners.

This loss threw Nicias into the utmost consternation. All the misfortunes he had met with ever since the time he had first enjoyed the supreme command came into his mind, and he was now involved in greater than any of them by his complying with the advice of his colleagues. While he was revolving these gloomy ideas, Demosthenes's fleet was seen coming forward in great pomp, and with such air as should fill the enemy with dread; it was now the day after the battle. This fleet consisted of seventy-three galleys, on board of which were five thousand fighting men, and about three thousand archers, slingers, and bowmen. All these galleys were richly trimmed, their prows being adorned with shining streamers, manned with stout rowers, commanded by good officers, and echoing with the sounds of clarions and trumpets, Demosthenes having affected an air of pomp and triumph, purposely to strike terror into the enemy.†

This gallant sight alarmed them indeed beyond expression. They did not see any end, or even the least suspension of their calamities; all they had hitherto done or suffered was as nothing, and their work was to begin again.

* This engine, so violent was its motion, broke through a galley from the deck to the hold.

† Thucyd. l. vii. pp. 513-518. Plut. in Nic. p. 537. Dioid. pp. 141, 142.

What hopes could they entertain of being able to weary out the patience of the Athenians, since, though they had a camp intrenched in the middle of Attica, they were however able to send a second army into Sicily as considerable as the former; and that their power, as well as their courage, seemed, notwithstanding all their losses, instead of diminishing, to increase daily!

Demosthenes, having made an exact inquiry into the state of things, imagined that it would not be proper for him to lose time as Nicias had done; who, having spread a universal terror at his first arrival, became afterwards the object of contempt, for his having wintered in Catana, instead of going directly to Syracuse; and had afterwards given Gylippus an opportunity of throwing troops into it. He flattered himself with the hopes that he should be able to carry the city at the first attack, by taking advantage of the alarm which the news of his arrival would spread in every part of it, and by that means should immediately put an end to the war; otherwise, he intended to raise the siege, and no longer harass and lessen the troops by fighting undecisive battles; nor quite exhaust the city of Athens by employing its treasures in needless expenses.

Nicias, terrified by this bold and precipitate resolution of Demosthenes, conjured him not to be hasty, but to take time to weigh things deliberately, that he might have no cause to repent of what he should do. He observed to him that the enemy would be ruined by delays; that their provisions as well as money were entirely exhausted; that their allies were on the point of abandoning them; that they must soon be reduced to such extremity, for want of provisions, as would force them to surrender as they had before resolved: for there were certain persons in Syracuse who held a secret correspondence with Nicias, and exhorted him not to be impatient, because the Syracusans were tired with the war and with Gylippus; and that, should the necessity to which they were reduced be ever so little increased, they would surrender at discretion.

As Nicias did not explain himself clearly, and would not declare in express terms that sure and certain advices were sent him of whatever was transacted in the city, his remonstrances were considered as an effect of the timidity and slowness with which he had always been reproached. "Such," said they, "are his usual protraction, delays, distrusts and fearful precaution, whereby he has deadened all

the vivacity, and extinguished all the ardor of the troops, in not marching them immediately against the enemy ; but, on the contrary, by deferring to attack them till his own forces were weakened and despised." This made the rest of the generals and all the officers come over to the opinion of Demosthenes, and Nicias himself was at last forced to acquiesce in it.

Demosthenes, after having attacked to no purpose the wall which cut the contravallation of the besiegers, confined himself to the attack of Epipolæ, from a supposition that, should he once be master of it, the wall would be quite undefended. He therefore took provisions for five days, with workmen, implements, and every thing necessary for him to defend that post after he should possess himself of it. As there was no going up to it in the daytime undiscovered, he marched thither in the night with all his forces, followed by Eurymedon and Menander ; Nicias staying behind to guard the camp. They went up by the way of Euryalus, as before, unperceived by the sentinels ; attacked the first intrenchment and stormed it, after killing part of those who defended it. Demosthenes, not satisfied with this advantage, to prevent the ardor of his soldiers from cooling, and not delay the execution of his design, marched forward. During this interval, the forces of the city, sustained by Gylippus, marched under arms out of the intrenchments. Being seized with astonishment, which the darkness of the night increased, they were immediately repulsed and put to flight. But as the Athenians advanced in disorder, to force whatever might resist their arms, lest the enemy might rally again, should time be allowed them to breathe and recover from their surprise, they were stopped on a sudden by the Bœotians, who made a vigorous stand, and marching against the Athenians with their pikes presented, they repulsed them with great shouts, and made a dreadful slaughter. This spread a universal terror through the rest of the army. Those who fled, either forced along such as were advancing to their assistance, or else, mistaking them for enemies, turned their arms against them. They now were all mixed indiscriminately, it being impossible to discover objects in the horrors of a night, which was not so gloomy as entirely to make objects imperceptible, nor yet light enough to distinguish those which were seen. The Athenians sought for one another to no purpose ; and from their often asking the *word*, by which only they were able to know one another, a strange confusion of sounds was heard, which

occasioned no little disorder; not to mention that they, by this means, divulged the word to the enemy, and could not learn theirs; because, by their being together, and in a body, they had no occasion to repeat it. In the mean time, those who were pursued, threw themselves from the top of the rocks, and many were dashed to pieces by the fall; and as most of those who escaped, straggled from one another up and down the fields and woods, they were cut to pieces the next day by the enemy's horse who pursued them. Two thousand Athenians were slain in this engagement, and a great number of arms were taken; those who fled having thrown them away, that they might be the better able to escape over the precipices.

SECTION XIV.—THE ATHENIANS AGAIN HAZARD A SEA-FIGHT, AND ARE DEFEATED. NICIAS AND DEMOSTHENES SENTENCED TO DIE, AND EXECUTED.

The Athenian generals, after sustaining so great a loss, were in a great dilemma, and did not know how to act in the present discouragement and despair of the troops, who died daily, either by the diseases of the autumn, or by the bad air of the fens near which they were encamped. Demosthenes was of opinion that it would be proper for them to leave the country immediately, since they had been unsuccessful in so important an enterprise; especially as the season was not too far advanced for sailing; and that they had ships enough to force a passage, in case the enemy should dispute it with them. He declared, that it would be of much greater advantage to oblige the enemy to raise the blockade of Athens, than for them to continue that of Syracuse, by which they exhausted themselves to no purpose; that he was certain they would not be reinforced by a new army; and that they could not hope to overcome the enemy with the weak one under their command.*

Nicias was sensible that the arguments his colleague used were very just, and he himself was of his opinion; but at the same time he was afraid, lest so public a confession of the weak condition to which they were reduced, and their resolution to leave Sicily, the report of which would certainly reach the enemy, should complete the ruin of their affairs, and perhaps make them unable to execute their resolution when they should attempt it. Besides, they had some little hopes left that the besieged, being themselves reduced

* Thueyd. l. vii. pp. 531-520. Plut. in Nic. pp. 538-542. Diød. l. xiii. p. 142.

to great extremity by their absolute want of provisions and money, would at last be inclined to surrender upon honorable terms. Thus, although he was in reality uncertain and wavering, he insinuated that he did not care to quit Sicily till the Athenians should have first sent orders for that purpose: and that otherwise they would be highly displeased; that as those who were to judge them had not been eye-witnesses of the state of things, they would be of a different opinion, and, at the instigation of some orator, certainly condemn them: that most of those men, who now exclaimed with the greatest vehemence against the difficulties they labored under, would then change their note, and accuse them of having been bribed to raise the siege; that knowing so well as he did the disposition and character of the Athenians, he chose to die gloriously by the enemy's sword, rather than be ignominiously condemned by his fellow-citizens.

These reasons, though they appeared very strong, were not yet able to convince Demosthenes; and it was still his opinion that the only proper choice they could make would be to retire. However, as he had been unsuccessful in his former opinion, he was afraid of insisting upon this; and he was the more inclined to come into that of Nicias, from imagining, with many others, that this general might have some secret resource, as he was so firmly resolved to stay.

Gylippus, after having made the tour of Sicily, had brought a great body of troops with him. This new reinforcement terrified the Athenians exceedingly, whose army diminished daily by sickness; and they now began to repent their not having raised the siege, especially as the besieged were preparing to attack them both by sea and land. Besides, Nicias no longer opposed this resolution, and only desired to have it kept secret. Orders were therefore given, as privately as possible, for the fleet to prepare for setting sail with the utmost expedition.*

When all things were ready, the moment they were going to set sail, wholly unsuspected by the enemy, who were far from surmising they would leave Sicily so soon, the moon was suddenly eclipsed in the middle of the night, and lost all its splendor; which terrified Nicias and the whole army, who, from ignorance and superstition, were astonished at so sudden a change, the causes of which they did not know, and therefore dreaded the consequences of it. They

* Thucyd. l. vii. pp. 521-548. Plut. in Nic. p. 538. Diod. l. xiii. p. 142.

then consulted the soothsayers, who, being equally unacquainted with the reasons of this phenomenon, only augmented their consternation. It was the custom, after such accidents had happened, to suspend their enterprises but for three days. The soothsayers pronounced that he must not sail till three times nine days were past; these are the words of Thucydides, which, doubtless, was a mysterious number in the opinion of the people. Nicias, scrupulous to a fault, and full of mistaken veneration for these blind interpreters of the will of the gods, declared that he would wait a whole revolution of the moon; and not return till the same day of the next month; as if he had not seen the planet very clearly the instant it had emerged from that part which was darkened by the intervention of the earth's body.

But he was not allowed time for this. The news of the intended departure of the Athenians being soon spread over the city, a resolution was taken to attack the besiegers both by sea and land. The Syracusans began the first day by attacking the intrenchments, and gained a slight advantage over the enemy. On the morrow they made a second attack; and at the same time sailed with seventy-six galleys, against eighty-six of the Athenians. Eurymedon, who commanded the right of the Athenian fleet, having spread along the shore to surround them, this movement proved fatal to him: for, as he was detached from the body of the fleet, the Syracusans, after forcing the main battle, which was in the centre attacked him; drove him vigorously into the gulf called Dascon, and there defeated him entirely. Eurymedon lost his life in the engagement. They afterwards gave chase to the rest of the galleys, and run them against the shore. Gylippus, who commanded the land-army, seeing the Athenian galleys were forced aground, and not able to return into their stockade, landed with part of his troops, in order to charge the soldiers, in case they should be forced to run ashore; and to give his friends the more room to tow such galleys as they might have taken. However, he was repulsed by the Tyrrhenians, who were posted on that side, and obliged by the Athenians, who flew to sustain them, to retire with some loss as far as the moor called Lysimelia, which lay near it. The latter saved most of their ships, eighteen excepted, which were taken by the Syracusans, and their crews cut to pieces by them. After this, resolving to burn the rest, they filled an old vessel with combustible materials, and having set fire to it, they drove it by the help

of the wind against the Athenians, who nevertheless extinguished the fire, and drove off that ship.

Each side erected trophies; the Syracusans for the defeat of Eurymedon, and the advantage they had gained the day before; and the Athenians, for their having driven part of the enemy into the moor, and put the other part to flight. But the minds of the two nations were very differently disposed. The Syracusans, who had been thrown into the utmost consternation at the arrival of Demosthenes with his fleet, seeing themselves victorious in a naval engagement, resumed fresh hope, and assured themselves of a complete victory over their enemies. The Athenians, on the contrary, frustrated of their only resource, and overcome by sea, so contrary to their expectations, entirely lost courage, and had no thoughts but of retiring.

The enemy, to deprive them of all resource, and prevent their escaping, shut the mouth of the great harbor, which was about five hundred paces wide, with galleys placed cross-wise, and other vessels fixed with anchors and iron chains; and at the same time made the requisite preparations for the battle, in case they should have courage to engage again. When the Athenians saw themselves thus hemmed in, the generals and principal officers assembled, in order to deliberate on the present state of affairs. They were in absolute want of provisions, which was owing to their having forbid the people of Catana to bring any, from the hopes they entertained of their being able to retire; and they could not procure any from other places, unless they were masters of the sea. This made them resolve to venture a sea-fight. In this view, they were determined to leave their old camp, and to intrench themselves on the shore, near their ships, in the smallest compass possible. Their design was to leave some forces in that place to guard their baggage and the sick; and to fight with the rest on board all the ships they should have saved. They intended to retire into Catana, in case they should be victorious; otherwise, to set fire to their ships, and to march by land to the nearest city belonging to their allies.

This resolution being taken, Nicias immediately filled a hundred and ten galleys, the others having lost their oars, with the flower of his infantry; and drew up the rest of the forces, particularly the bowmen, in order of battle on the shore. As the Athenians dreaded very much the beaks of the Syracusan galleys, Nicias had provided harping-irons

to grapple them, in order to break the force of the blow, and to come immediately to close fight as on shore. But the enemy perceiving this, covered the prows and upper part of their galleys with leather to prevent their being so easily laid hold of. The commanders on both sides had employed all their eloquence to animate their men; and none could ever have been prompted from stronger motives; for the battle which was about to be fought, was to determine not only their lives and liberties, but also the fate of their country.

The battle was very obstinate and bloody. The Athenians being arrived at the mouth of the port, easily took those ships which defended the entrance of it: but, when they attempted to break the chain of the rest, to widen the passage, the enemy came up from all quarters. As near two hundred galleys came rushing on each side, in a narrow place, there must necessarily have been a very great confusion; and the vessels could not easily advance or retire, nor turn about to renew the attack. The beaks of the galleys, for this reason, did very little execution; but there were very furious and frequent discharges. The Athenians were overwhelmed by a shower of stones, which always did execution from whatever place they were thrown; whereas they defended themselves only by shooting darts and arrows, which, by the motion of the ships from the agitation of the sea, did not carry true, and by that means the greatest part of them did very little execution. Ariston the pilot had given the Syracusans this counsel. These discharges being over, the soldiers, heavily armed, attempted to enter the enemy's ships, in order to fight hand to hand: and it often happened, that while they were climbing up one side, their own ships were entered on the other; and two or three ships would be grappled to one, which occasioned a great perplexity and confusion. Further, the noise of the ships that dashed one against the other, the different cries of the victors and vanquished, prevented the orders of the officers from being heard. The Athenians wanted to force a passage, whatever might be the consequence, to secure their return into their own country; and this the enemy endeavored their utmost to prevent, in order that they might gain a more complete and more glorious victory. The two land-armies, which were drawn up on the highest part of the shore, and the inhabitants of the city who were there, ran to the walls, while the rest, kneeling in the temples, were imploring Heaven to give success to their

citizens. All these saw clearly, because of their little distance from the fleets, every thing that passed ; and contemplated the battle as from an amphitheatre, but not without great anxiety and terror. Attentive to, and shuddering at every movement, at the several changes which happened, they discovered the concern they had in the battle, their fears, their hopes, their grief, their joy, by different cries and different gestures ; stretching out their hands, sometimes towards the combatants to animate them, and at other times toward heaven, to implore the succor and protection of the gods. At last the Athenian fleet, after sustaining a long battle, and a vigorous resistance, was put to flight, and driven against the shore. The Syracusans, who were spectators of this victory, conveyed to the whole city, by an universal shout, the news of this victory. The victors, now masters of the sea, and sailing with a favorable wind towards Syracuse, erected a trophy ; while the Athenians, who were quite dejected and overpowered, did not so much as request that their dead soldiers might be delivered to them, in order to pay the last sad duty to their remains.

There now remained but two methods for them to choose ; either to attempt the passage a second time, for which they had ships and soldiers sufficient, or to abandon their fleet to the enemy, and retire by land. Demosthenes proposed the former ; but the sailors, in the deepest affliction, refused to obey, fully persuaded that it would be impossible for them to sustain a second engagement. The second method was therefore resolved upon, and accordingly they prepared to set out in the night, to conceal the march of their army from the enemy.

But Hermocrates, who suspected their design, was very sensible that it was of the utmost importance not to suffer so great a body of forces to escape ; since they otherwise might fortify themselves in some corner of the island, and renew the war. The Syracusans were at that time in the midst of their festivity and rejoicings, and meditating nothing but how they might best divert themselves, after the toils they had sustained in fight. They were then solemnizing the festival of Hercules. To desire the Syracusans to take up arms again, in order to pursue the enemy, and to attempt to draw them from their diversions either by force or persuasion, would have been to no purpose ; for which reason another expedient was employed. Hermocrates sent out a few horsemen, who were to pass for friends of the

Athenians, and ordered them to cry aloud, "Tell Nicias not to retire till daylight; for the Syracusans lie in ambush for him, and have seized on the passes." This false advice stopped Nicias at once; and he did not even set out the next day, in order that the soldiers might have more time to prepare for their departure, and carry off whatever might be necessary for their subsistence, and abandon the rest.

The enemy had time enough for seizing the avenues. The next morning early, they possessed themselves of the most difficult passes, fortified those places where the river was fordable, broke down the bridges, and spread detachments of horse up and down the plain; so that there was not one place through which the Athenians could pass without fighting. They set out upon their march the third day after the battle, with design to retire to Catana. The whole army was in an inexpressible consternation, to see such great numbers of men, either dead or dying, some of whom were left exposed to wild beasts, and the rest to the cruelty of the enemy. Those who were sick and wounded conjured them with tears, to take them along with the army, and held by their clothes when they were going; or dragging themselves after them, followed them as far as their strength would permit: and when this failed, they had recourse to tears, sighs, and imprecations; and sending up towards heaven plaintive and dying groans, they called upon the gods as well as men to avenge their cruelty, while every place echoed with lamentations.

The whole army was in as deplorable a condition. All men were seized with the deepest melancholy. They were inwardly tortured with rage and anguish, when they represented to themselves the greatness from which they were fallen, the extreme misery to which they were reduced, and the still greater evils from which they foresaw it would be impossible for them to escape. They could not bear the comparison for ever present in their thoughts, of the triumphant state in which they had left Athens, in the midst of the good wishes and acclamations of the people, with the ignominy of their retreat, aggravated by the cries and imprecations of their relations and fellow-citizens.

But the most melancholy part of the spectacle, and that which most deserved compassion, was Nicias. Dejected and worn out by a tedious illness; deprived of the most necessary things, at a time when his age and infirmities required them most; pierced, not only with his private grief,

but with that of others, all which preyed upon his heart ; this great man, superior to all his evils, thought of nothing, but how he might best comfort his soldiers, and revive their courage. He ran up and down in all places, crying aloud, that matters were not yet desperate, and that other armies had escaped from greater dangers ; that they ought not to accuse themselves, or grieve too immoderately, for misfortunes which they had not occasioned ; that if they had offended some god, his vengeance must be satiated by this time ; that fortune, after having so long favored the enemy, would at last be tired of persecuting them ; that their bravery and their numbers made them still formidable, being still near forty thousand strong ; that no city in Sicily would be able to withstand them, nor prevent their settling wherever they might think proper ; that they had no more to do, but to take care severally of themselves, and march in good order ; that by a prudent and courageous retreat, which was now become their only resource, they would not only save themselves, but also their country, and enable it to recover its former grandeur.

The army marched in two bodies, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx ; the first being commanded by Nicias, and the second by Demosthenes, with the baggage in the centre. Being come to the river Anapis, they forced the passage, and afterwards were charged by all the enemy's cavalry, as well as archers, who discharged perpetually upon them. They were annoyed in this manner during several days' march ; every one of the passes being guarded, and the Athenians being obliged to dispute every inch of their way. The enemy did not care to hazard a battle against an army, which despair alone might render invincible ; and the instant the Athenians offered the Syracusans battle, the latter retired ; but whenever the former would proceed in their march, they advanced and charged them in their retreat.

Demosthenes and Nicias, seeing the miserable condition to which the troops were reduced, being in extreme want of provisions, and great numbers of them wounded, judged it advisable to return towards the sea, by a quite contrary way from that in which they then marched, and to make directly for Camarina and Gela, instead of proceeding to Catana, as they first intended. They set out in the night, after lighting a great number of fires. The retreat was made in great confusion and disorder, as generally happens to great armies in the gloomy horrors of the night, especially when

the enemy is not far off. However, the vanguard, commanded by Nicias, retired in good order; but above half the rear-guard, with Demosthenes at their head, separated from the main body, and lost their way. On the next day the Syracusans, who, on the report of their retreat, had marched with the utmost diligence, came up with him about noon; and having surrounded him with their horse, they drove him into a narrow place enclosed with a wall, where his soldiers fought like lions. Perceiving at the close of the day, that they were oppressed with fatigue, and covered with wounds, they gave the islanders leave to retire, which some of them accepted; and afterwards spared the lives of the rest, who surrendered at discretion with Demosthenes, after having stipulated, that they should not be put to death, nor sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. About six thousand soldiers surrendered on these conditions.

Nicias arrived the same evening at the river Erineus, and passing it, encamped on a mountain, where the enemy came up with him the next day, and summoned him to surrender at discretion, as Demosthenes had done. Nicias could not persuade himself at first, that what they told him concerning that general was true, and therefore desired leave to send some horse for information. Upon their returning with the news that Demosthenes had really surrendered in that manner, Nicias offered to pay the expenses of the war, upon condition that they would permit him to leave the country with his forces, and to give as many Athenians for hostages as they should be obliged to pay talents. But the enemy rejected this proposal with disdain and insolence, and renewed the attack. Nicias, though in absolute want of all things, yet sustained the charge the whole night, and marched towards the river Asinarus. When they were got to the banks of it, the Syracusans advancing up to them, threw most of them into the stream; the rest having already plunged voluntarily into it to quench their thirst. Here, the greatest and most bloody havoc was made, the poor wretches being butchered without the least pity as they were drinking. Nicias, finding all lost, and unable to bear this dismal spectacle, surrendered at discretion; upon condition that Gylippus should discontinue the fight, and spare the rest of the army. A great number were killed, and more taken prisoners, so that all Sicily was filled with them. The Athenians seemed to have been displeased with their general for surrendering in this manner at discretion; and for

this reason, his name was omitted in a public monument, on which were engraved the names of those commanders who had lost their lives in fighting for their country.*

The victors adorned, with the arms taken from the prisoners, the finest and largest trees they could find on the banks of the rivers, and made trophies of these trees; when crowning themselves with chaplets of flowers, dressing their horses in the richest caparisons, and cropping those of their enemies, they entered triumphantly into Syracuse, after having happily terminated the most considerable war in which they had ever been engaged with the Greeks, and won, by their strength and valor, a most signal and most complete victory. The next day a council was held, to deliberate on what was to be done with the prisoners. Diocles, one of the leaders of the greatest authority among the people, proposed that all the Athenians who were born of free parents, and all such Sicilians as had joined with them, should be imprisoned, and only two measures of flour, and one of water, given them daily; that the slaves and all the allies should be publicly sold; and that the two Athenian generals should be first scourged with rods, and afterwards put to death.

This last article was exceedingly disliked by all the wise and compassionate Syracusans. Hermocrates, who was very famous for his probity and justice, attempted to make some remonstrances to the people, but they would not hear him, and the shouts which echoed on all sides prevented him from continuing his speech. At that instant an old man, named Nicolaus, venerable for his great age and gravity, who in this war had lost two sons, the only heirs to his name and estate, made his servants carry him to the tribunal for harangues; and the instant he appeared, a profound silence was maintained. "You here behold," said he, "an unfortunate father, who has felt more than any other Syracusan, the fatal effects of this war, by the death of two sons, who formed all the consolation and were the only supports of my old age. I cannot indeed forbear admiring their courage and felicity, in sacrificing, to their country's welfare, a life of which they would one day have been deprived by the common course of nature; but then I cannot but be strongly affected with the cruel wound which their death has made in my heart, nor forbear hating and detesting the Athenians, the authors of this unhappy war, as the murderers of my children. But, however, I cannot conceal one cir-

* Pausan. l. i. p. 56.

circumstance, which is that I am less sensible to my private affliction, than to the honor of my country: and I see it exposed to eternal infamy, by the barbarous advice which is now given you. The Athenians indeed merit the worst treatment, and every kind of punishment that could be inflicted on them, for so unjustly declaring war against us; but have not the gods, the just avengers of crimes, punished them and avenged us sufficiently? When their generals laid down their arms, and surrendered, did they not do this in the hopes of having their lives spared? And, if we put them to death, will it be possible for us to avoid the just reproach of our having violated the law of nations, and dishonored our victory by an unheard-of cruelty? How! Will you suffer your glory to be thus sullied in the face of the whole world, and have it said, that a nation, who first dedicated a temple in their city to clemency, had not found any in yours? Surely victories and triumphs do not give immortal glory to a city; but the exercising mercy towards a vanquished enemy, the using moderation in the greatest prosperity, and fearing to offend the gods by a haughty and insolent pride. You doubtless have not forgot, that this Nicias, whose fate you are going to pronounce, was the very man who pleaded your cause in the assembly of the Athenians; and employed all his influence, and the whole power of his eloquence, to dissuade his country from embarking in this war. Should you therefore pronounce sentence of death on this worthy general, would it be a just reward for the zeal he showed for your interest? With regard to myself, death would be less grievous to me, than the sight of so horrid an injustice, committed by my countrymen and fellow-citizens.”*

The people seemed moved to compassion at this speech, especially as, when this venerable old man first rose up, they expected to hear him cry aloud for vengeance on those who had brought all his calamities upon him, instead of suing for their pardon. But the enemies of the Athenians having expatiated, with vehemence, on the unheard-of cruelties which their republic had exercised on several cities belonging to their enemies, and even to their ancient allies, the inveteracy which their commanders had shown against Syracuse, and the evils they would have made it suffer, had they been victorious; the afflictions and groans of infinite numbers of Syracusans, who bewailed the death of their children and near relations, whose manes could be appeased

no other way than by the blood of their murderers: on these representations, the people returned to their sanguinary resolution, and followed the advice of Diocles in every respect. Gylippus used his utmost endeavors, but in vain, to have Nicias and Demosthenes given up to him, especially as he had taken them, in order to carry them to Lacedæmon. But his demand was rejected with a haughty scorn, and the two generals were put to death.

All wise and compassionate men could not forbear shedding tears, for the tragical fate of two such illustrious personages, and particularly for Nicias, who, of all men of his time, seemed least to merit so ignominious and untimely an end. When people recollected the speeches and remonstrances he had made, to prevent this war; and, on the other side, when they considered how high a regard he had always retained for things relating to religion; the greater part of them were tempted to exclaim against Providence, in seeing that the man, who had ever shown the highest reverence for the gods, and had always exerted himself to the utmost for their honor and worship, should be so ill rewarded by them, and meet with no better fate than the most abandoned wretches. But it is no wonder that the calamities of good men should inspire the heathens with such thoughts, and make them murmur and despond; since they did not know the holiness of the Divine Being, nor the corruption of human nature.

The prisoners were shut up in the mines, "prisons of Syracuse," where, crowded one upon the other, they suffered incredible torments for eight months. Here they were for ever exposed to the inclemencies of the weather; scorched in the daytime by the burning rays of the sun, or frozen in the night by the colds of autumn; poisoned by the stench of their own excrements, by the carcasses of those who died of their wounds and sickness: in fine, worn out by hunger and thirst, for the daily allowance to each was but a small measure of water, and two of meal. Those who were taken out of this place two months after, in order to be sold as slaves, many of whom were citizens who had concealed their condition, found a less rigorous fate. Their wisdom, their patience, and a certain air of probity and modesty, were of great advantage to them, for they were soon restored to their liberty, or met with the kindest and most generous treatment from their masters. Several of them even owed the good usage they met with to Euripides,

the finest scenes of whose tragedies they repeated to the Sicilians, who were extremely fond of them ; so that when they returned to their own country, they went and saluted that poet as their deliverer, and informed him of the admirable effects wrought in their favor by his verses.

The news of the defeat being carried to Athens, the citizens would not believe it at first ; and were so far from giving credit to it, that they sentenced that man to death who had first published it. But when it was confirmed, all the Athenians were seized with the utmost consternation ; and, as if themselves had not decreed the war, they vented their rage and resentment against the orators who had promoted the enterprise, as well as against the soothsayers, who by their oracles, or supposed prodigies, had flattered them with the hopes of success. They had never been reduced to so deplorable a condition as now ; having neither horse, foot, money, galleys, nor mariners ; in a word, they were in the deepest despair, expecting every moment that the enemy, elate with so great a victory, and strengthened by the revolt of the allies, would come and invade Athens, both by sea and land, with all the forces of Peloponessus.* Cicero had reason to observe, speaking of the battles in the harbor of Syracuse, that it was there the troops of Athens, as well as their galleys, were ruined and sunk ; and that, in this harbor, the power and glory of the Athenians were miserably shipwrecked.†

The Athenians, however, did not suffer themselves to be wholly dejected, but resumed courage. They now resolved to raise money on all sides, and to import timber for building of ships, in order to awe the allies, and particularly the inhabitants of the island of Eubœa. They retrenched all superfluous expenses, and established a new council of aged men, who were to weigh and examine all affairs before they should be proposed to the people. In fine, they omitted nothing which might be of service in the present conjuncture ; the alarm which they were in, and their common danger, obliging every individual to be attentive to the necessities of the state, and submissive to all advice that might promote its interest.

The defeat of the army under Nicias was followed by the taking of Athens, of which the ancient form of government was entirely changed by Lysander.

* Thucyd. l. viii. pp. 551-553. Plut. de Garrulit. p. 509.

† Hic primum opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depressæque sunt ; in hoc portu, Atheniensium nobilitatis imperii, gloriæ naufragium factum existimatur.—Cic. Verr. 7, n. 97,

CHAPTER II.

THIS chapter is the sequel of the preceding book, and contains the last eight years of the Peloponessian war, during as many years of the reign of Darius Nothus.

SECTION I.—CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY, ETC.

The defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse gave occasion for great movements throughout all Greece. The people, who had not yet joined either side, and waited to be determined by the event, resolved to declare against them. The allies of the Lacedæmonians believed, that the time was come to deliver them for ever from the expenses of war, which lay very heavy upon them, by the speedy and final ruin of Athens. Those of Athens, who followed them only out of constraint, seeing no appearance of any future resource for that republic, after the dreadful blow it had received, thought it best to take the advantage of so favorable a conjuncture, for throwing off the yoke of dependence, and resuming their liberty. Dispositions of this kind inspired the Lacedæmonians with great views, which were supported by the hopes they had conceived that their Sicilian allies would join them in the spring, with a naval force, augmented by the ruins of the Athenian fleet.*

In fact the people of Eubœa, Chio, and Lesbos, with several others, gave the Lacedæmonians to understand, that they were ready to quit the party of the Athenians, if they would take them under their protection. At the same time came deputies from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. The first was governor of Lydia and Ionia, the latter of the Hellespont. These viceroys of Darius wanted neither application nor zeal for the interest of their master. Tissaphernes, promising the Lacedæmonians all the necessary expenses for

* A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. vii. p. 553.

their troops, pressed them to arm directly, and to join him; because the Athenian fleet prevented him from levying the usual contributions in his province, and had put it out of his power to remit those of preceding years to the king. He hoped besides, with that powerful aid, to get into his hands, with more ease, a certain nobleman who had revolted, and whom he had the king's orders to send to him dead or alive. This was Amorges, the bastard of Pisuthnes. Pharnabazus, at the same time, demanded ships to reduce the cities of the Hellespont from their subjection to the Athenians, who also prevented him from levying the tributes of his government.*

The Lacedæmonians thought it proper to begin by satisfying Tissaphernes; and the influence of Alcibiades contributed very much to the taking that resolution. He embarked with Calcidæus for Chio, which took arms upon their arrival, and declared for the Lacedæmonians. Upon the news of this revolt, the Athenians resolved to take the thousand talents † out of the treasury, which had been deposited there from the beginning of the war, after having repealed the decree which prohibited it. Miletus also revolted soon after. Tissaphernes, having joined his troops with those of Sparta, attacked and took the city of Iasus, in which Amorges had shut himself up, who was taken alive and sent into Persia. ‡ That governor gave a month's pay to the whole army, at a drachm, or tenpence a day to each soldier, observing that he had orders to give them only half that sum for the future.

Calcidæus then made a treaty with Tissaphernes, in the name of the Lacedæmonians, one of the principal articles of which was, that all the country which had been subject to the king or his predecessors, should remain in his hands. It was renewed some time after by Theramenes, another general of the Lacedæmonians, with some small alterations. But, when this treaty came to be examined at Sparta, it was found that too great concessions had been made to the king of Persia, in giving up all the places held by himself or his ancestors, which was to make him master of the greatest part of Greece, Thessaly, Locris, and the whole country as far as Bœotia, without mentioning the islands; from whence the Lacedæmonians would appear rather to have enslaved Greece, than re-established its liberty. It was therefore

* Thucyd. l. viii. pp. 555-558.

† About five hundred and sixty two thousand dollars.

‡ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 568.

necessary to make farther alterations in it, with which Tissaphernes and the other governors made great difficulties to comply. A new treaty was, however, concluded, as we shall see in the sequel.*

In the mean time, several cities of Ionia declared for Lacedæmon, to which Alcibiades contributed very much. Agis, who was already his enemy on account of the injury he had done him, could not suffer the glory he acquired: for nothing was done without the advice of Alcibiades, and it was generally said, that the success of all enterprises was owing to him. The most powerful and ambitious of the Spartans, from the same sentiments of jealousy, looked upon him with an evil eye, and at length, by their intrigues, obliged the principal magistrates to send orders into Ionia for putting him to death. Alcibiades, being secretly apprised of this order, did not discontinue his services to the Lacedæmonians, but kept himself so well upon his guard, that he avoided all the snares which were laid for him.†

For his better security he threw himself into the protection of Tissaphernes, the great king's governor at Sardis, and was not long without seeing himself in the highest degree of influence and authority in the court of the barbarian. For the Persian, who was full of fraud and artifice, a great friend to knaves and bad men, and set no value upon simplicity and integrity, infinitely admired the smooth address of Alcibiades, the ease with which he assumed all kinds of manners and characters, and his great ability in the conduct of affairs. And indeed there was no heart so hard, nor temper so untractable, as to hold out against the graces and charms of his conversation and intimacy. Even those who feared and envied him most, enchanted in a manner by his affable air and engaging behavior, could not dissemble the infinite satisfaction they felt in seeing and conversing with him.‡

Tissaphernes, therefore, though otherwise very haughty and brutal, and who of all the Persians hated the Greeks most, was so taken with the complacency and insinuations of Alcibiades, that he gave himself wholly up to him, and flattered him more than he was flattered by him: insomuch that he gave the name of Alcibiades to the finest and most delightful of his gardens, as well from the abundance of its fountains and canals, and the verdure of its groves, as the

* Thucyd. l. viii. pp. 561-571, 572-576.

† Idem. pp. 577-579. Plut. in Alcib. pp. 164, 165.

‡ A. M. 3593. Ant. J. C. 411.

surprising beauty of its retreats and solitudes, which art and nature seemed to vie in embellishing, and wherein a more than royal magnificence was displayed.

Alcibiades, who found there was no longer any safety for him in the party of the Spartans, and who always apprehended the resentment of Agis, began to do them ill offices with Tissaphernes, to prevent his aiding them with all his forces, and ruining the Athenians entirely. He had no difficulty in bringing the Persians into his views, which were conformable to his master's interests, and to the orders he had received from him. For after the famous treaty concluded under Cimon, the kings of Persia, not daring to attack the Greeks with open force, took other measures to ruin them. They endeavored secretly to excite divisions among them, and to foment troubles by considerable sums of money, which they found means to convey sometimes to Athens, and sometimes to Sparta. They applied themselves so successfully to keep up a balance of power between those two republics, that the one could never entirely reduce the other. They granted them only slight aids, that could effect nothing decisive, in order to undermine them insensibly, and exhaust both parties gradually, by weakening them upon one another.

It is in this kind of conduct, that policy makes the ability of ministers consist; who, from the recess of their cabinets, without noise or emotion, without any great expenses, or setting numerous armies on foot, effect the reduction of the states whose power gives them umbrage, either by sowing domestic divisions among them, or by promoting the jealousy of their neighbors, in order to set them at variance with each other.

We must confess, however, that this kind of policy gives us no very favorable idea of the kings of Persia. To reduce themselves, powerful as they were, to such mean, obscure, and indirect measures, was to confess their weakness, and how unable they believed themselves to attack their enemies with open force, and to reduce them by honorable means. Besides, does it consist with justice to employ such methods in regard to people, against whom there is no foundation of complaint, who live in peace under the faith of treaties, and whose sole crime is the apprehension of their being one day in a condition to do injury? And is it lawful by secret corruptions to ensnare the fidelity of subjects, and to be the accomplice of their treasons, by putting arms into their hands against their native country?

What glory and renown would not the kings of Persia have acquired, if, content with the vast and rich dominions which Providence had given them, they had applied their good offices, power, and even treasures, to conciliate the neighboring people with each other, to remove their jealousies, to prevent injustice and oppression; and if feared and honored by them all, they had made themselves the mediators of their differences, the security of their peace, and the guarantee of their treaties? Can any conquest, however great, be compared with such glory?

Tissaphernes acted upon other principles, and had no thought but of preventing the Greeks from being in a condition to attack the Persians, their common enemy. He entered freely therefore into the views of Alcibiades, and at the same time that he declared himself openly for the Lacedæmonians, did not fail to assist the Athenians privately, and by a thousand secret methods; such as deferring the payment of the Lacedæmonian fleet, and retarding the arrival of the Phœnician ships, of which he had long kept them in hopes. He omitted no occasion of giving Alcibiades new marks of his friendship and esteem, which rendered that general equally considerable to both parties. The Athenians, who had sadly experienced the effects of having drawn his anger upon them, were not now to repent their passing sentence of condemnation upon him. Alcibiades also, on his side, who was extremely sorry to see the Athenians in so mournful a situation, began to fear that the city of Athens being entirely ruined, he might fall into the hands of the Spartans, who mortally hated him.

SECTION II. — ALCIBIADES RETURNS TO ATHENS. TISSAPHERNES CONCLUDES A NEW TREATY WITH THE LACEDÆMONIANS.

The Athenians were intent upon nothing so much as Samos, where they had all their forces.* From thence, with their fleet they brought back to their obedience, all the cities that had abandoned them, kept the rest in their duty, and found themselves still in a condition to make head against their enemies, over whom they had obtained several advantages.† But they were afraid of Tissaphernes and the hundred and fifty Phœnician ships which he hourly expected; and rightly perceived, that if so powerful a fleet should join the enemy, there was no longer any safety for

* Thueyd. l. viii. pp. 579-587.

† Plut. in Alcib. pp. 204, 205.

their city. Alcibiades, who was well informed of all that passed among the Athenians, sent directly to the principal of them at Samos, to sound their sentiments, and to let them know, that he was not averse to returning to Athens, provided the administration of the republic were put into the hands of the great and powerful, and not left to the populace, who had expelled him. Some of the principal officers went from Samos, in order to concert with him on the proper measures for the success of that undertaking. He promised to procure the Athenians not only the favor of Tissaphernes, but of the king himself, upon condition that they would abolish the democracy or popular government; because the king would place more confidence in the engagements of the nobility, than upon those of the inconstant and capricious multitude.

The deputies lent a willing ear to these proposals, and conceived great hopes of discharging themselves from part of the public impositions, because, being the richest of the people, the burthen lay heaviest upon them, and of making their country triumph after having possessed themselves of the government.

At their return, they began by bringing over such as were most proper to share in their design: after which they caused a report to be spread among the troops, that the king was inclined to declare in favor of the Athenians, upon condition that Alcibiades should be reinstated, and the popular government abolished. That proposal surprised the soldiers, and was generally rejected at first; but the charm of gain, and the hope of a change to their advantage, soon softened what was harsh and shocking in it, and even made them ardently desire the recall of Alcibiades.

Phrynicus, one of their generals, rightly judging that Alcibiades affected an oligarchy no more than he did the democracy, and that in decrying the people's conduct, he had no other view than to acquire the favor and confidence of the nobility for his own re-establishment, had the boldness to oppose their resolutions which were about to take place. He represented, that the change they meditated might very probably excite a civil war, to the ruin of the state; that it was very unlikely that the king of Persia would prefer the alliance of the Athenians to that of the Spartans, so much more advantageous to him; that this change would not retain the allies in their duty, nor bring over those who had renounced it, who would persist in pre-

ferring their liberty; that the government of a small number of rich and powerful persons would not be more favorable to either the citizens or allies, than that of the people, because ambition was the great cause of all misfortunes in a republic, and the rich were the sole promoters of all troubles for the aggrandizing of themselves; that a state suffered more oppressions and violences under the rule of the nobility than that of the people, whose authority kept the former within due bounds, and was the asylum of such as they desired to oppress; that the allies were too well acquainted with these truths from their own experience, to want any lessons upon the subject.

These remonstrances, wise as they were, had no effect. Pisander was sent to Athens with some of the same faction, to propose the return of Alcibiades, the alliance of Tissaphernes, and the abolition of the democracy. They represented, that by changing the government, and recalling Alcibiades, Athens might obtain a powerful aid from the king of Persia, and by that means to triumph over Sparta. Upon this proposal great numbers exclaimed against it, and especially the enemies of Alcibiades. They alleged, among other reasons, the imprecations pronounced by the priests and all orders of religion, against him, and even against such as should propose to recall him. But Pisander, advancing into the midst of the assembly, demanded, whether they knew any other means to save the republic in the deplorable condition to which it was reduced: and as there appeared none, he added, that the preservation of the state was the question, and not the authority of the laws, which might be provided for in the sequel; but at present there was no other method for the attainment of the king's friendship, and that of Tissaphernes. Though this change was very offensive to the people, they gave their consent to it at length, with the hope of re-establishing the democracy in time, as Pisander had promised; and they decreed that he should go with ten more deputies to treat with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, and that in the mean time Phrynicius should be recalled, and another general appointed to command the fleet in his stead.

The deputies did not find Tissaphernes in so good a disposition as they had been made to hope. He was afraid of the Lacedæmonians, but did not wish to render the Athenians too powerful. It was his policy, by the advice of Alcibiades, to leave the two parties always at war, in order

to weaken and consume them by each other. He therefore made great difficulties. He demanded at first, that the Athenians should abandon all Ionia to him, and afterwards insisted upon their adding the neighboring islands. Those demands being complied with, he further required, in a third interview, permission to fit out a fleet, and to cruise in the Grecian seas; which had been expressly provided against in the celebrated treaty concluded with Artaxerxes. The deputies thereupon broke up the conference with indignation, and perceived that Alcibiades had imposed upon them.

Tissaphernes, without loss of time, concluded a new treaty with the Lacedæmonians, in which what had displeased in the two preceding treaties was retrenched. The article which yielded to Persia the countries in general that had been in the actual possession of the reigning king Darius, or his predecessors, was limited to the provinces of Asia. The king engaged to defray all expenses of the Lacedæmonian fleet, in the condition it then was, till the arrival of that of Persia; after which they were to support it themselves; unless they should choose that the king should pay it, to be reimbursed after the conclusion of the war. It was further agreed, that they should unite their forces, and continue the war, or make peace, by common consent. Tissaphernes, to keep his promise, sent for the fleet of Phœnicia. This treaty was made in the eleventh year of Darius, and the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war.

SECTION III.—ALTERATION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS.

ALCIBIADES RECALLED, AND AFTERWARDS APPOINTED GENERALISSIMO.

Pisander, at his return to Athens, found the change he had proposed at his setting out, much forwarded, to which he put the last hand soon after. To give a form to his new government, he caused ten commissioners, with absolute power, to be appointed, who were, however, at a certain time, to give the people an account of what they had done. At the expiration of that term, the general assembly was summoned, wherein their first resolution was, that every one should be admitted to make such proposals as he thought fit, without being liable to any accusation of infringing the law, or consequential penalty. It was afterwards decreed, that a new council should be formed, with full power to administer the public affairs, and to elect new magistrates. For

this purpose, five presidents were established, who nominated a hundred persons, including themselves. Each of these chose and associated three more at his own pleasure, which made in all four hundred, in whom an absolute power was lodged. But to amuse the people, and to console them with a shadow of popular government, while they instituted a real oligarchy, it was said that the four hundred should call a council of five thousand citizens, to assist them when they should judge it necessary. The council and assemblies of the people were held as usual; nothing was done, however, but by order of the four hundred. The people of Athens were deprived in this manner of their liberty, which they had enjoyed almost a hundred years, after having abolished the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ.*

This decree being passed without opposition, after the separation of the assembly, the four hundred, armed with daggers, and attended by a hundred and twenty young men, whom they made use of when any execution required it, entered the senate, and compelled the senators to retire, after having paid them the arrears due upon their appointments. They elected new magistrates out of their own body, observing the usual ceremonies upon such occasions. They did not think proper to recall those who were banished, lest they should authorize the return of Alcibiades, whose uncontrollable spirit they apprehended, and who would soon have made himself master of the people. Abusing their power in a tyrannical manner, some they put to death, others they banished, confiscating their estates with impunity. All who ventured to oppose this change, or even to complain of it, were butchered upon false pretexts; and those would have met with a bad reception, who demanded justice of the murderers. The four hundred, soon after their establishment, sent ten deputies to Samos for the army's concurrence with it.

All that had passed at Athens was already known there, and the news had enraged the soldiers to the highest degree. They deposed immediately several of their chiefs, whom they suspected, and put others into their places, of whom Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus were the principal, and in highest credit. Alcibiades was recalled, and chosen generalissimo by the whole army, which desired to sail directly for Piræus, to attack the tyrants. But he opposed it, representing that it was necessary he should first have an interview with Tissa-

* Thucyd. l. viii. pp. 590-594. Plut. in Alcib. p. 165.

phernes, and that, as they had chosen him general, they might rely upon him for the care of the war. He set out immediately for Miletus. His principal design was to show himself to that governor, in all the power he had been invested with, and to let him see that he was in a condition to do him much good, or much harm. The consequence of which was, that as he had kept the Athenians in awe by Tissaphernes, he now awed Tissaphernes no less by the Athenians; and we shall see in the sequel that this interview was not unnecessary.*

Alcibiades, upon his return to Samos, found the army more inflamed than at first. The deputies of the four hundred arrived there during his absence, and had endeavored in vain to justify, to the soldiery, the alteration made at Athens. Their discourses, which were often interrupted by tumultuous cries, served only to exasperate them more, and they earnestly demanded to be led against the tyrants directly. Alcibiades did not act on this occasion, as everybody else would have done, in consequence of having been raised to so high a dignity by the favor of the people; for he did not think himself obliged to an absolute and implicit compliance with them in every thing, though, from an exile and fugitive, they had made him general of so great a fleet, and so numerous and formidable an army; but, as a statesman and great politician, he believed it his duty to oppose the blind fury that hurried them on into evident danger, and to prevent them from committing a fault, which must have been attended with their utter ruin. This wise steadiness preserved the city of Athens. For had they sailed thither at first, the enemy would have made themselves masters of Ionia, the Hellespont, and all the islands, without resistance; while the Athenians, by carrying the war into their own city, would have exhausted their whole forces against one another. He prevented the deputies from being ill-treated, and dismissed them, saying, that he did not object to the five thousand citizens having the supreme authority in the republic, but it was necessary to depose the four hundred, and to re-establish the senate.

During this time, the Phœnician fleet, which the Lacedæmonians impatiently expected, approached, and news came that it was arrived at Aspendus, a city of Pamphylia. Tissaphernes went to meet it; nobody being able to divine the cause of that journey. He had sent for that fleet at

* Thueyd. l. viii. pp. 595-604. Plut. in Alcib. p. 205. Diod. l. xiii. p. 165.

first to flatter the Lacedæmonians with the hopes of a powerful aid, and to put a stop to their progress, by making them wait its arrival. It was believed that his journey had the same motive; to prevent their doing any thing in his absence, and that their soldiers and mariners might disband for want of pay. However it was, he did not bring the fleet with him, from the view, no doubt, of keeping the balance equal, which was the king of Persia's interest, and to exhaust both parties by the length of the war. For it had been very easy to have put an end to it by the assistance of this additional fleet, as the Lacedæmonians alone were already as strong at sea as the Athenians. His frivolous excuse, of its not being complete, for not bringing it with him, sufficiently shows that he had other reasons for his conduct.*

The return of the deputies without success, who had been sent to Samos, and the answer of Alcibiades, excited new troubles in the city, and gave a mortal wound to the authority of the four hundred. The tumult increased exceedingly, when news was brought that the enemy, after having beaten the fleet sent by the four hundred to the aid of Eubœa, had made themselves masters of the island. Athens was in the greatest terror and consternation upon this account. For neither the defeat of Sicily, nor any other preceding it, were so considerable as the loss of this island, from whence the city received considerable supplies, and almost all its provisions. If, in the confusion in which Athens was at that time, between two factions, the victorious fleet had fallen upon the port, as it might have done, the army of Samos would have been indispensably obliged to have flown to the defence of their country; and then the republic would have had only the city of Athens remaining of all its dominions. For the Hellespont, Ionia, and all the islands, seeing themselves abandoned, would have been reduced to declare themselves, and go over to the Peloponnesians. But the enemy were not capable of such great designs; and this was not the first time the Lacedæmonians had been observed to have lost their advantages by the slowness and protraction natural to them.†

Athens without delay deposed the four hundred, as authors of all the troubles and divisions under which they groaned. Alcibiades was recalled by unanimous consent,

* Thueyd. l. viii. pp. 604-608.

† Idem. pp. 607-614. Plut. in Alcib. pp. 206-210. Diod. pp. 171, 172, et 175-177, et 189-192.

and earnestly solicited to make all possible haste to the assistance of the city. But judging, that if he returned immediately to Athens, he should owe his recall to the compassion and favor of the people, he resolved to render his return glorious and triumphant, and to deserve it by some considerable exploit. For this purpose, leaving Samos with a small number of ships, he cruised about the islands of Cos and Cnidos; and having learned that Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, had sailed to the Hellespont with his whole fleet, and that the Athenians were in pursuit of him, he steered that way with the utmost diligence to support them, and arrived happily with his eighteen vessels, at the time the fleets were engaged near Abydos in a battle, which lasted till night, without any advantage on either side. His arrival gave the Spartans new courage at first, who believed him still their friend, and dispirited the Athenians. But Alcibiades, hanging out the Athenian flag in the admiral's galley, fell upon the Lacedæmonians, who were strongest, and were pursuing the Athenians, put them to flight, drove them ashore, and, animated by his success, sunk their vessels, and made a great slaughter of the soldiers, who had thrown themselves into the sea to save themselves by swimming: though Pharnabazus spared no pains to assist them, and had advanced at the head of his troops to the coast, to favor their flight, and to save their ships. The Athenians, after having taken thirty of their galleys, and retaken those they had lost, erected a trophy.*

Alcibiades, vain of his success, had the ambition to desire to appear before Tissaphernes in this triumphant equipage, and to make him rich presents, as well in his own, as in the name of the people of Athens. He went to him, therefore, with a magnificent retinue, worthy of the general of Athens. But he did not meet with the favorable reception he expected. For Tissaphernes, who knew he was accused by the Lacedæmonians, and feared that the king would punish him at length for not having executed his orders found Alcibiades presenting himself very opportunely, and caused him to be seized and sent prisoner to Sardis; to shelter himself by that injustice against the representations of the Lacedæmonians.

Thirty days after, Alcibiades, having found means to get a horse, escaped from his guards, and fled to Clazomene, where to revenge himself on Tissaphernes, he gave out that

he had him set at liberty. From Clazomene he repaired to the Athenian fleet, where he was joined by Theramenes with twenty ships from Macedonia, and by Thrasybulus with twenty more than Thasos. He sailed from thence to Parium in the Propontis. All those ships, to the number of eighty-six, being come thither, he left that place in the night, and arrived the next morning at Proconnesus, a small isle near Cyzicum. He heard there, that Mindarus was at Cyzicum with Pharnabazus and his land army. He rested that whole day at Proconnesus. On the morrow he harangued his soldiers, and represented to them the necessity there was for attacking the enemy by sea and land, and making themselves masters of Cyzicum; demonstrating, at the same time, that without a complete and absolute victory, they could have neither provisions nor money. He had taken great care that the enemy should not be apprised of his approach. By good fortune for him, a great storm of rain and thunder, followed by a thick gloom, helped him to conceal his enterprise so successfully, that not only the enemy were prevented from perceiving that he advanced, but the Athenians themselves, whom he had caused to embark with precipitation, did not know that he had weighed anchor and put to sea.

When the gloom was dispersed, the Lacedæmonian fleet appeared, exercising at some distance before the port. Alcibiades, who apprehended that the enemy, upon the sight of so great a number of ships, would make the harbor, ordered the captains to keep back a little, and to follow him at a good distance; and taking only forty vessels, he advanced towards the enemy, to offer them battle. The enemy, deceived by this stratagem, and despising this small number, advanced against him, and began the fight. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian fleet come up, they immediately lost courage, and fled. Alcibiades, with the twenty of his best ships, pursued them to the shore, landed, and killed a great number of them in the flight. Mindarus and Pharnabazus opposed his efforts in vain; the first, who fought with astonishing valor, he killed, and put the other to flight.

The Athenians, by this victory, which made them masters of the slain, the arms, spoils, and whole fleet of the enemy, besides the taking of Cyzicum, not only possessed themselves of the Hellespont, but drove the Spartans entirely out of that sea. Letters were intercepted in which the latter, with a conciseness truly laconic, advised the

ephorî of the blow they had received, in terms to this effect : “ The flower of your army is cut off ; Mindarus is dead ; the rest of the troops are dying with hunger ; and we neither know what to do, nor what will become of us.”

The news of this victory occasioned no less joy to the Athenians than consternation to the Spartans. They despatched ambassadors immediately, to demand that an end should be put to the war, equally destructive to both people, and that a peace should be concluded upon reasonable conditions, for the re-establishment of their ancient concord and amity, the salutary effects of which they had for many years experienced.* The wisest and most judicious of the citizens of Athens were unanimously of opinion, that it was proper to take the advantage of so favorable a conjuncture for the concluding of a treaty, which might put an end to all jealousies, appease all animosities, and remove all distrusts. But those who found their advantage in the troubles of the state prevented the good effects of that disposition. Cleophon, among others, the most reputed orator at that time, animated the people from the tribunal of harangues, by a violent and seditious discourse, insinuating, that their interest were betrayed by a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, which aimed at depriving them of all the advantages of the important victory they had gained, and at making them lose for ever the opportunity of being fully avenged for all the wrongs and misfortunes Sparta had caused them to suffer.†

This Cleophon was an inconsiderable fellow, a musical instrument maker. It was reported also that he had been a slave, and had got himself fraudulently enrolled in the register of the citizens. He carried his audacity and fury so far, as to threaten to plunge his dagger into the throat of any one who should talk of peace. The Athenians, puffed up with their present prosperity, forgetting their past misfortunes, and promising themselves all things from the valor and good fortune of Alcibiades, rejected all proposals of accommodation, without reflecting, that there is nothing so fluctuating and precarious as the success of war. The ambassadors retired without being able to effect any thing. Such infatuation and irrational pride are generally the fore-runners of some great misfortune.

Alcibiades knew well how to make use of the victory he had gained, and presently after besieged Chalcedonia, which

* Diod. l. iii. pp. 177-179.

Æsch. in Orat. de Fals. Legat.

had revolted from the Athenians, and received a Lacedæmonian garrison. During this siege, he took another town, called Selymbria. Pharnabazus, terrified by the rapidity of his conquests, made a treaty with the Athenians to this effect: "That Pharnabazus should pay them a certain sum of money; that the Chalcedonians should return to their obedience, depend upon the Athenians, and pay them tribute; and that the Athenians should commit no hostilities in the province of Pharnabazus, who engaged for the safe conduct of their ambassadors to the great king." Byzantium and several other cities submitted to the Athenians.

Alcibiades, who desired with the utmost passion to see his country again, or rather to be seen by his country, after so many victories over their enemies, set out for Athens. The sides of his ships were covered with bucklers and all sorts of spoils, in form of trophies; and causing a great number of vessels to be towed after him by way of triumph, he displayed also the ensigns and ornaments of those he had burned, which were more than the others; the whole amounting to about two hundred ships. It is said, that reflecting on what had been done against him, upon approaching the fort, he was struck with some terror, and was afraid to quit his vessel, till he saw from the deck a great number of his friends and relations, who were come to the shore to receive him, and earnestly entreated him to land.*

The people came out of the city in a body to meet him, and at his appearance set up incredible shouts of joy. In the midst of an infinite number of officers and soldiers, all eyes were fixed solely on him, whom they considered as victory itself, descended from the skies; all around him passionately caressing, blessing and crowning him, in emulation of each other. Those who could not approach him were never tired with contemplating him at a distance, while the old men showed him to their children. They repeated with the highest praises all the good actions he had done for his country; nor could they refuse their admiration even to those he had done against it during his banishment, of which they imputed the fault to themselves alone. This public joy was mingled with tears and regret, from the remembrance of past misfortunes, which they could not avoid comparing with their present felicity. "We could not have failed," said they, "of the conquest of Sicily; our other hopes could never have proved abortive, if we had referred all our affairs

and forces to the disposal of Alcibiades alone. In what a condition was Athens when he took upon him our protection and defence! We had not only almost entirely lost our power at sea, but were scarcely possessed of the suburbs of our city, and to add to our misfortunes, were torn in pieces by a horrid civil war. He, notwithstanding, has raised the republic from its ruins; and not content with having reinstated it in the possession of the sovereignty of the sea, has rendered it universally victorious by land; as if the fate of Athens had been in his hands alone, either to ruin or preserve it, and victory was annexed to his person, and obeyed his orders."

This favorable reception of Alcibiades did not prevent his demanding an assembly of the people, in order to his justification before them; well knowing how necessary it was for his safety to be absolved in form. He appeared, therefore, and after having deplored his misfortunes, which he imputed very little to the people, and entirely ascribed to his ill-fortune, and some demon envious of his prosperity, he represented to them the designs of the enemy, and exhorted them not to conceive any other than great hopes. The Athenians, transported with hearing him speak, decreed him crowns of gold, appointed him general by sea and land with unlimited power, restored him all his fortunes, and ordered the Eumolpides and Ceryces * to absolve him from the curses they had pronounced against him by the order of the people; doing their utmost to make him amends for the injury and shame of his banishment, by the glory of his recall, and to efface the remembrance of the anathemas themselves had decreed, by the vows and prayers which they made in his favor. While all the Eumolpides and Ceryces were employed in revoking those imprecations, Theodorus, the principal of them, had the courage to say, "But for me, I have not cursed him, if he has done no evil to his country;" insinuating by that bold expression, that the maledictions, being conditional, could not fall upon the head of the innocent, nor be averted from the guilty.

In the midst of this glory and brilliant prosperity of Alcibiades, the majority of the people could not help being concerned, when they considered the time of his return. For it happened precisely upon the day when the Athenians

* The Eumolpides and Ceryces were two families at Athens who had different functions in the mysteries of Ceres. They took their names from Eumolpus and Ceryx, the first who had exercised these offices. Perhaps the employment of the latter had some relation to that of a herald.

celebrated the feast in honor of Minerva, worshipped under the name of Agraulis. The priests took off all the ornaments from the statue of the goddess to wash it, from whence that feast was called *Πλουτήρια*, and afterwards covered it; and that day was accounted one of the most ominous and unfortunate. It was the twenty-fifth of the month Thargelion, which answers to the second of July. This circumstance displeased that superstitious people, because it seemed to imply, that the goddess, patroness, and protectress of Athens, did not receive Alcibiades agreeably, and with a benign aspect, since she covered and concealed herself, as if she would keep him off and remove him from her.

All things having, however, succeeded according to his wish, and the hundred ships he was to command being ready, he deferred his departure out of a laudable ambition to celebrate the great mysteries; for from the time the Lacedæmonians had fortified Decelia, and taken possession of all the ways from Athens to Eleusina, the feast had not been solemnized in all its pomp, and the procession had been obliged to go by sea.* The particular ceremonies of this solemnity may be seen in book x. chap. iii.

Alcibiades believed it would be a most glorious action, and attract the blessings of the gods, and the praises of men, if he restored all its lustre and solemnity to this feast, in making the procession go by land under the convoy of his troops, to defend it against the attacks of the enemy. For either Agis would suffer it to pass quietly, notwithstanding the numerous troops he had at Decelia, which would considerably lessen the reputation of that king, and be a blot in his glory; or, if he should choose to attack it, and oppose the march, he should then have the satisfaction to fight a sacred battle; a battle grateful to the gods, for the greatest and most venerable of all their mysteries, in the sight of his country and citizens, who would be witnesses of his valor and regard for religion. It is very likely, that by this public and ostentatious act of piety, which struck the people's view in so sensible a manner, and was so extremely to his taste, the principal design of Alcibiades was to efface entirely from their minds the suspicions of impiety, to which the mutilation of statues, and profanation of mysteries, had given birth.

Having taken the resolution, he gave notice to the Eumolpides and Ceryces to hold themselves in readiness, posted

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 210.

sentinels upon the hills, sent out runners at the break of day, and taking with him the priests, the initiated, and the probationers, with those who initiated them, he covered them with his army, and disposed the whole pomp with wonderful order and profound silence. "Never was show," says Plutarch, "more august, nor more worthy, the majesty of the gods, than this warlike procession and religious expedition; in which even those who envied the glory of Alcibiades were obliged to own, that he was no less happy in discharging the functions of a high-priest than those of a general. No enemy dared to appear to disturb that pompous march, and Alcibiades re-conducted the sacred troops to Athens with entire safety. This success gave him new courage, and raised the valor and boldness of his army to such a degree, that they looked upon themselves as invincible while he commanded them."

He acquired the affection of the poor and the lower sort of people to such a degree, that they most ardently desired to have him for their king. Many of them openly declared themselves to that effect; and there were some who addressed themselves to him, and exhorted him to set himself above envy, and not to trouble himself about laws, degrees or suffrages; to put down those wordy impertinents that disturbed the state with their vain harangues, to make himself master of affairs, and to govern with entire authority, without fearing accusers. For him, what his thoughts of the tyranny and his designs were, are unknown; but the most powerful citizens, apprehending the breaking out of a fire, of which they already saw the sparks, pressed him to depart without delay; granting whatever he demanded, and giving him for colleagues the generals most agreeable to him. He set sail accordingly with one hundred ships, and steered for the island of Andros, which had revolted. His high reputation and the good fortune which had attended him in all his enterprises caused the citizens to expect nothing from him but what was great and extraordinary.

SECTION IV.—THE LACEDÆMONIANS APPOINT LYSANDER ADMIRAL. HE BEATS THE ATHENIAN FLEET NEAR EPHEBUS. LYSANDER IS SUCCEEDED IN THE COMMAND BY CALLICRATIDAS.

The Lacedæmonians, justly alarmed at the return and success of Alcibiades, conceived that such an enemy made it necessary to oppose him with an able general, capable of

making head against him. For this reason they made choice of Lysander, and gave him the command of the fleet. When he arrived at Ephesus, he found the city very well disposed in his favor, and well affected to Sparta; but otherwise in a very unhappy situation. For it was in danger of becoming barbarous by assuming the manners and customs of the Persians, who had great commerce with it, as well from the neighborhood of Lydia, as because the king's generals commonly took up their winter-quarters there. An idle and voluptuous life, filled up with luxury and empty show, could not fail of disgusting infinitely a man like Lysander, who had been bred from his birth in the simplicity, poverty, and severe discipline of Sparta. Having brought his army to Ephesus, he gave orders for assembling ships of burden there from all parts, erected an arsenal for building galleys, made the ports free for merchants, gave the public places to artificers, put all arts in motion, and held them in honor; and by these means filled the city with riches, and laid the foundations of that grandeur and magnificence to which it afterwards attained. So great a change can the application and ability of a single person occasion in a state.*

While he was making these dispositions, he received advice, that Cyrus, the king's youngest son, had arrived at Sardis. That prince could not be above sixteen years old at that time, being born after his father's accession to the crown, in the seventeenth year of his reign. Parysatis, his mother, loved him to idolatry, and had the entire ascendant over her husband. It was she that occasioned his having the supreme government of all the provinces of Asia Minor given to him; a command that subjected all the provincial governors of the most important part of the empire to his authority. The view of Parysatis was, without doubt, to put the young prince into a condition to dispute the throne with his brother, after the king's death; as we shall see he does to some effect. One of the principal instructions given him by his father, upon sending him to his government, was to give effectual aid to the Lacedæmonians against Athens, an order very contrary to the measures observed till then by Tissaphernes, and the other governors of those provinces. It had always been their maxim, sometimes to assist one party, sometimes the other, in order to hold their power in such a balance, that the one might never be able to crush the other entirely;

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. xi. pp. 440-442. Plut. in Lysand. pp. 434, 435. Diod. l. xiii. pp. 192-197.

from whence it followed, that both parties were kept weak by the war, and neither in condition to form any enterprises against the Persian empire.

Upon Lysander's being apprised therefore of the arrival of Cyrus at Sardis, he set out from Ephesus to make him a visit and to complain of the delays and breach of faith of Tissaphernes, who, notwithstanding the orders he had received to support the Lacedæmonians, and to drive the Athenians out of the sea, had always covertly favored the latter, out of regard for Alcibiades, to whom he was entirely devoted, and had been the sole cause of the loss of the fleet, by not supplying it with the necessary quantity of provisions. This discourse pleased Cyrus, who looked upon Tissaphernes as a very bad man, and his particular enemy; and he answered, that the king had given him orders to support the Lacedæmonians powerfully, and that he had received five hundred talents* for that purpose. Lysander, contrary to the common character of the Spartans, was submissive and condescending, full of complacency for the grandees, always ready to pay court to them, and supporting, for the good of the service, all the weight of their haughtiness and vanity with incredible patience; in which behavior some people make the whole address and merit of a courtier consist.

He did not forget himself on this occasion, and setting at work all that the industry and art of a complete courtier could suggest of flattery and insinuation, he perfectly gained the young prince's favor and good opinion. After having praised his generosity, magnificence and zeal for the Lacedæmonians, he desired him to give each soldier and mariner a drachm† per day: in order to debauch those of the enemy by that means, and thereby terminate the war the sooner. Cyrus very much approved the project; but said, that he could make no change in the king's order, and that the treaty with them expressly settled one half a talent‡ to be paid monthly for each galley. The prince, however, at the end of a banquet, which he gave them before his departure, drinking to his health, and pressing him to ask something of him, Lysander desired that an obolus§ a day might be added to seamen's pay. This was granted,

* About five hundred thousand dollars.

† Tenpence, French.

‡ Nearly 500 dollars.

§ The drachm was six oboli, or tenpence, French: each obolus being three halfpence; so that the four oboli were sixpence halfpenny a day, instead of fivepence, or three oboli.

and he gave them four oboli, instead of three which they received before, and paid them all the arrears due to them, with a month's advance; giving Lysander ten thousand darics* for that purpose, that is, a hundred thousand livres, or upwards of twenty thousand dollars.

This largess filled the whole fleet with ardor and alacrity, and almost unmanned the enemy's galleys; the greatest part of the mariners deserting to the party where the pay was best. The Athenians, in despair upon receiving this news, endeavored to conciliate Cyrus, by the interposition of Tissaphernes; but he would not hearken to them, notwithstanding the satrap represented, that it was not for the king's interest to aggrandize the Lacedæmonians, but to balance the power of one side with that of the other, in order to perpetuate the war, and to ruin both by their own divisions.

Though Lysander had considerably weakened the enemy by augmenting the mariner's pay, and thereby very much hurt their naval power, he dared not, however, hazard a battle with them, particularly apprehending Alcibiades, who was a man of execution, had the greater number of ships, and had never been overthrown in any battle either by sea or land. But after Alcibiades had left Samos to go into Phocæa and Ionia, to raise money, of which he was in want for the payment of his troops, and had given the command of his fleet to Antiochus, with express orders not to fight or attack the enemy in his absence; the new commander, to make show of his courage and to brave Lysander, entered the port of Ephesus with two galleys, and after having made a great noise, retired with loud laughter, and an air of contempt and insult. Lysander, enraged at that affront, immediately detached some galleys, and went himself in pursuit of him. But as the Athenians advanced to support Antiochus, he ordered other galleys of his side to come on, till the whole fleet arrived, and the engagement became general on both sides. Lysander gained the victory, and having taken fifteen of the Athenian galleys, he erected a trophy. Alcibiades, on his return to Samos, sailed even into the port to offer him battle; but Lysander was contented with his victory, and did not think proper to accept it; so he retired without doing any thing.

Thrasybulus at the same time, the most dangerous enemy he had in his army, left the camp, and went to Athens to

* A Daric is about \$1.87½.

accuse him. To inflame his enemies in the city the more, he told the people in a full assembly, that Alcibiades had entirely ruined their affairs, and the navy, by the licentiousness he had introduced; that he had given himself up to the most notorious debauchees and drunkards,* who from common seamen were the only persons in repute about him; that he abandoned his whole authority to them, to be at leisure to enrich himself in the provinces, and there to plunge himself into intemperance and all other infamous excesses, to the disgrace of Athens, while his fleet was left neglected in the face of the enemy.†

Another article of accusation against him was taken from the forts he had built near the city of Byzantium, for an asylum and retreat for him, as neither being able nor willing to return any more to his country. The Athenians, a capricious, inconstant people, gave credit to these impeachments. The loss of the last battle, and his little success since his departure from Athens, instead of the great and wonderful actions expected from him, entirely sunk him in their opinion; and his own glory and reputation may be said to have occasioned his ruin. For he was suspected of not desiring to do what was not done, which they could not believe out of his power, because they were fully persuaded that nothing he desired to do was impossible to him. They made it a crime in Alcibiades, that the rapidity of his conquests did not answer to that of their imaginations; not considering, that he made war without money upon a people who had the great king for their treasurer, and that he was often obliged to quit his camp, to go in quest of what was necessary for the payment and subsistence of his troops. However it was, Alcibiades was deposed, and ten generals nominated in his stead, which coming to his knowledge, he retired in his galley to some castles he had in the Thracian Chersonesus.

About this time died Plistonax, one of the kings of Lacedæmon, and was succeeded by Pausanias, who reigned fourteen years.‡ The latter made a fine answer to one who asked, why it was not permitted to change any thing in the ancient customs of Sparta: "Because," said he, "at Sparta the laws command men, and not men the laws."§

Lysander, who intended to establish the government of the nobility in all the cities dependent upon Sparta, that the

* Antiochus is pointed at in this place, a mean debauched man, who had acquired the favor of Alcibiades, by catching a quail for him, which he had let fly.

† A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 416.

‡ Diod. l. xiii. p. 196.

§ Plut. in Apoph. p. 230.

governors of his choosing might always be at his disposal, from his having rendered them independent of their people, caused such persons of the principal cities to come to Ephesus, as he knew to be the boldest, and most enterprising and ambitious. Those he placed at the head of affairs, promoted to the greatest honors, and raised to the first employments in the army, thereby rendering himself, says Plutarch, the accomplice of all the crimes and oppressions they committed to advance and enrich themselves. For this reason they were always extremely attached to him, and regretted him infinitely when Callicratidas came to succeed him, and took upon him the command of the fleet. He was not inferior to Lysander either in valor or military knowledge, and was infinitely above him in point of moral virtue. Alike severe to himself and others, inaccessible to flattery and sloth, the declared enemy of luxury, he retained the modesty, temperance, and austerity of the ancient Spartans; virtues that began to distinguish him particularly, as they were not too common in his time. His probity and justice were proof against all things; his simplicity and integrity abhorred all falsehood and fraud, to which were joined a truly Spartan nobleness and grandeur of soul. The great and powerful could not hinder themselves from admiring his virtues; but they were better pleased with the facility and condescension of his predecessor, who was blind to the injustice and violence of their actions.*

It was not without mortification and jealousy that Lysander saw him arrive at Ephesus to take upon him the command, and out of a criminal baseness and treachery, not uncommon with those who hearken more to their private ambition than the good of the public, he did him all the injury in his power. Of the ten thousand darics, which Cyrus had given him for the augmentation of the mariners' pay, he returned the remainder to that prince: telling Callicratidas, that he might apply to the king for the money, and that it depended on him to find means for the subsistence of his army. This conduct gave him great trouble and distressed him exceedingly; for he had brought no money with him from Sparta, and could not resolve to extort any from the citizens, as he found them sufficiently rifled already.

In this urgent necessity, a person having offered him fifty talents, that is to say, fifty thousand crowns, to obtain a fa-

* Xen. Hellen. l. i. pp. 442-444. Plut. in Lysand. pp. 433-436. Diod. l. xiii. pp. 197, 198.

vor he could not grant with justice, he refused them. Upon which Cleander, one of his officers, said, "I would accept them were I in your place." "And so would I," replied the general, "were I in yours." *

He had no other resource therefore than to go, as Lysander had done, to ask money at the gates of the king's general and lieutenants, for which he was the least proper of all mankind. Nurtured and educated in the love of liberty, full of great and noble sentiments, and infinitely remote from all flattery and baseness, he was convinced at heart, that it was less evil and dishonor for Greeks to be overcome by Greeks, than infamously to make their court, and beg at the gates of barbarians, whose only merit consisted in their gold and silver. The whole nation was indeed disgraced by so mean a prostitution.

Cicero, in his offices, draws two very different characters of persons employed in the administration of government, and makes the application of them to the two generals of whom we speak. The one, says he, zealous lovers of the truth, and declared enemies of all fraud, piqued themselves upon their simplicity and candor, and do not believe that it can ever consist with honor to lay snares, or use artifice. The others, prepared to do or suffer any thing, are not ashamed of the meanest actions and prostitutions, provided, from those unworthy means, they have reason to expect the success of their designs. Cicero places Callicratidas among the former, and Lysander among the latter, to whom he gives two epitaphs not much to his honor, and hardly consistent with the Spartan character, when he calls him "very artful and very patient," or rather "very complaisant." †

Callicratidas, however, forced by necessity, went to Lydia, and repaired immediately to the palace of Cyrus, where he desired that prince might be told that the admiral of the Grecian fleet was come to speak with him. He was answered, that Cyrus was then at the table, engaged in a party of pleasure; ‡ to which he replied with a modest tone and air, that he was in no haste, and would wait till the prince came forth. The guards set up a laugh, wondering at the honest

* Plut. in Apoph. p. 222.

† Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti; qui nihil ex occulto, nihil ex insidiis agendum putant; veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici: itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuius deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur. Quo in genere versatissimum et patientissimum Lacedæmonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidem. Offic. l. i. n. 109.

‡ The Greek says literally that he was drinking, *nivet*. The Persians valued themselves upon drinking a great deal, as an instance of their merit, as we shall see in Cyrus's letter to the Lacedæmonians.

stranger's simplicity, which had so little the air of the world in it; and he was obliged to retire. He came thither a second time and was again denied admittance. Upon which he returned to Ephesus, loading those with curses and imprecations who had first made their court to barbarians, and by their flattery and submissions had taught them to make their riches a title and pretence for insulting the rest of mankind. Addressing himself at the same time to those about him, he swore, that as soon as he returned to Sparta, he would use his utmost endeavors to reconcile the Greeks among themselves, that for the future they might become formidable to the barbarians and have no farther occasion for their aid to invade and ruin each other. But that generous Spartan, whose thoughts were so noble, and so worthy the Lacedæmonian name, and whose justice, magnanimity, and valor, might rank him with all that Greece had ever produced of the most excellent and most consummate, had not the good fortune to return to his country, nor to apply himself to a work so great and so worthy of him.

SECTION V.—CALLICRATIDAS IS DEFEATED BY THE ATHENIANS. SENTENCE OF DEATH PASSED ON SOME ATHENIAN GENERALS. SOCRATES ALONE OPPOSES THIS SENTENCE.

Callicratidas, after having gained several victories over the Athenians, had at last pursued Conon, one of their generals, into the port of Mitylene, where he kept him blocked up. This was in the twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian war. Conon seeing himself besieged by sea and land, without hope of aid, and in want of provisions, found means to apprise Athens of the extreme danger he was in. Extraordinary efforts were made to relieve him, and in less than a month's time a fleet of one hundred and ten sail were fitted out, on board of which were embarked all who were capable of bearing arms, as well slaves as freemen, with some horse. At Samos they were joined by the allies with forty galleys, and steered for the Arginusæ, islands situated between Cuma and Mitylene. Callicratidas, being informed of their course, left Eteonicus to continue the siege with fifty ships, and put to sea with a hundred and twenty sail, with design to face the enemy, and prevent their relieving Conon. The right wing of the Athenians was commanded by Protomachus and Thrasyllus, who had each fifteen galleys. They were sup-

ported by a second line with a like number of ships, commanded by Lysias and Aristogenes. The left wing, like the other, drawn up in two lines, was under Aristocrates and Diomedon, supported by Erasinidas and Pericles, son of the great Pericles. The main body, consisting of near thirty galleys, among which were the three Athenian admirals, was disposed in one line. They had strengthened each of their wings with a second line; because their galleys were neither so swift, nor so easy to manage as those of the enemy; so that there was reason to fear their getting between two, and being charged on both sides at the same time. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, who perceived that they were inferior in number to the enemy, contented themselves with drawing up in one line, in order to equal their front, and for the greater facility of running between the Athenian galleys, and turning nimbly round them. Callieratidas's pilot, daunted at the inequality, advised him not to hazard the battle, and to retire: but he replied that he could not fly without shame; and that his death was of small importance to the republic. "Sparta," said he, "does not depend upon one man." He commanded the right wing, and Thrasonδας, the Theban, the left.*

It was terrible to behold the sea covered with three hundred galleys ready to engage. Never had more numerous naval armies of the Greeks joined battle before. The ability, experience and valor of the generals who commanded, left nothing to desire; so that there was reason to believe this battle would decide the fate of both people, and put an end to a war that had endured so long. When the signals were given, the two armies raised great shouts, and began the fight. Callieratidas, who, from the answer of the augurs, expected to fall in the battle, performed amazing acts of valor. He attacked the enemy with incredible courage and boldness, sunk some of their ships, disabled others by breaking their oars, and piercing their sides with the prow or beak of his galley. At length he attacked that of Pericles, and made a thousand holes in it; but the latter having hooked him fast with a grappling-iron, he found it impossible to disengage himself, and was surrounded in an instant by several of the Athenian vessels. His own was immediately filled with the enemy, and after a dreadful slaughter, he fell dead, rather overwhelmed by their numbers than vanquished. The right wing, which he commanded, having lost its admiral, was

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. pp. 444-452. Diod. l. xiii. pp. 198, et 206, 217-223.

put to flight. The left, composed of Bœotians and Eubœans, still made a long and vigorous resistance, actuated by a fear of falling into the hands of the Athenians, against whom they had revolted; but they were at length obliged to give way, and retire in disorder. The Athenians erected a trophy in the Arginusæ. They lost twenty-five galleys in this battle, and the enemy more than seventy, of which number were nine of the ten furnished by the Lacedæmonians.

Plutarch equals Callicratidas, the Lacedæmonian general, for his justice, valor and magnanimity, with all who had ever rendered themselves most worthy of admiration among the Greeks.*

He blames him, however, exceedingly for hazarding the battle at the Arginusæ, and observes, that to avoid the reproach of having retired out of fear, he had, through a mistaken sense of honor, failed in the essential duty of his function. "For," says Plutarch, "if, to use the comparison of Iphicrates,† the light armed infantry resemble the hands, the horse the feet, the main body the breast, and the general the head; the general, who abandons himself rashly to the impetuosity of his valor, does not so much neglect or expose his own life, as the lives of those whose safety depends upon his. Our Lacedæmonian chief was therefore in the wrong," continues Plutarch, "to answer the pilot, who advised him to retire, 'Sparta does not depend upon one man.'‡ For though it be true that Callicratidas, fighting under the orders of another by sea or land, was no more than one man; yet, commanding an army, all who obeyed his orders were collected in his person; and he, in whom so many thousands might be lost, was no longer one man. Cicero had passed the same judgment upon him before Plutarch. After having said that there were many persons to be found, who were ready to sacrifice their fortunes, and even their lives, for their country, but who, out of false delicacy in point of glory, would not hazard their reputation for it in the least; he cites the example of Callicratidas, who answered those who advised him to retreat from the Arginusæ, 'That Sparta could fit out another fleet if this were lost; but for himself, he could not fly before the enemy without shame and infamy.'§

* Plut. in Lysand. p. 436.

† He was a famous general of the Athenians.

‡ Plut. in Pelop. p. 278.

§ *Inventi multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed vitam etiam, profundero pro patria parati essent, iidem gloria jacturam ne minimam quidem facere velent, ne republica quidem postulante: ut Callicratidas, qui, cum, Lacedæmoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello, multaue fecisset egregie, veritatem ad ex*

I return to the sequel of the battle near the Arginusæ. The Athenian generals ordered Theramenes, Thrasybulus, and some other officers, to return with about fifty galleys, to take up the wrecks and dead bodies, in order to inter them, while they rowed on with the rest against Eteonicius, who kept Conon besieged before Mitylene. But a violent tempest came on suddenly, and prevented the execution of this order. Eteonicius having received news of the defeat, and fearing that it might occasion alarm and terror among the troops, sent back those who brought it, with orders to return with wreaths of flowers upon their heads, and to give out that Callicratidas had gained the victory, and destroyed the whole Athenian fleet. Upon their return, he offered sacrifices of thanksgiving, and having made his troops take some refreshment, he sent the galleys away directly, the wind being fair, and marched off the land army to Methymna, after having burned the camp. Conon being delivered in this manner from the blockade, joined the victorious fleet, which returned forthwith to Samos. But when it was known at Athens that the dead bodies had been left without interment, the people were highly enraged, and laid the whole weight of their resentment upon those whom they believed guilty of that crime. The ancients held it a great one not to provide sepulture for the dead; and we may observe, that after all their battles, the first care of the conquered, notwithstanding the sense of their misfortune and their great affliction for a bloody defeat, was to demand a suspension of arms from the victor, in order to pay their last duties to those who had fallen in battle, on which they believed their happiness in another life depended. Although the pagans had but confused ideas of the future state of the body, yet, the concern of the soul for the body after death, the religious regard paid to it and the zeal of their solemn obsequies, seem to argue that tradition had universally impressed upon the minds of all men some indistinct notions of a resurrection.

Hence arose the fury of the people of Athens. They immediately nominated new generals, retaining only Conon and appointing Adimantes and Philocles his colleagues. Eight days after which, two of them absconded, and only six returned to Athens. Theramenes, the tenth general, who returned before the rest of the fleet, accused the other

tremum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam, nec cum Atheniensibus demicandum putabant. Quibus ille respondit, Lacedæmonios, classe illa amissa, aliam parare posse; se fugere sine suo decore non posse.—*Offic. l. i. n. 48.*

chiefs before the people, making them responsible for not bringing off the dead after the battle; and to clear himself, read the letter they had written to the senate and people, wherein they excused themselves by the violence of the storm, without charging any body. That calumny was detestably vile, being an abuse of their reserve in not mentioning him in their letter, and in not laying a fault to his charge, of which he might have appeared the most guilty. The generals, at their return, not being able to obtain a reasonable time for making their defence, contented themselves with representing in few words the state of the affair, and appealed for the truth of what they said to the pilots, and all present when it happened. The people seemed to receive their excuse favorably, and several persons offered themselves for their sureties; but night coming on, it was thought proper to adjourn the assembly, and it being the people's custom to give their suffrages by lifting up of hands, their resolution could not be known; besides which, the council were first to give their opinion upon the question to be proposed to the people.

The feast of Apaturia unexpectedly coming on, in which it was the custom to assemble by families, the relations of Theramenes posted several persons in mourning habits and shaved, in proper places, who said they were the kindred of those who had been slain in the battle, and obliged Callixenes to accuse the generals in the senate. It was decreed in consequence, that as the accusation and defence had been heard in the last assembly, the people by their respective tribes should give their voices, and if the accused were found guilty, they should be punished with death, their estates confiscated, and the tenth part consecrated to the goddess Minerva. Some senators opposed this decree as unjust and contrary to the laws: but as the people, at the instigation of Callixenes, threatened to include the opposers in the same cause and crime with the generals, they were so mean as to desist from their opposition, and to sacrifice the innocent generals to their own safety, by consenting to the decree. Socrates, the celebrated philosopher, was the only one of the senators who stood firm, and persisted obstinately in opposing a decree so notoriously unjust, and so contrary to all laws. The orator, who mounted the tribunal in defence of the generals, showed "that they had failed in nothing of their duty, as they had given orders that the dead bodies should be taken up: that if any one were guilty, it was he, who being

charged with these orders, had neglected to put them in execution ; but that he accused nobody ; and that the tempest which came on unexpectedly at the very instant, was an unanswerable apology, and entirely discharged the accused from all guilt. He demanded that a whole day should be given them for their defence, a favor not denied to the most criminal, and that they should be tried separately. He represented that they were not in the least obliged to precipitate a sentence, wherein the lives of the most illustrious of the citizens were concerned ; that it was in some measure attacking the gods to make men responsible for the winds and weather ;* that they could not, without the most flagrant ingratitude and injustice, put the conquerors to death, to whom they ought to decree crowns and honors, or give up the defenders of their country to the rage of those who envied them ; that, if they did so, their unjust judgment would be followed with a sudden, but vain repentance which would leave behind it the sharpest remorse, and cover them with eternal shame and infamy." The people seemed at first to be moved with these reasons ; but animated by the accusers, they pronounced sentence of death against eight of their generals ; and six of them who were present were seized, in order to their being carried to the place of execution. One of them, Diomedon, a person of great reputation for his valor and probity, demanded to be heard. "Athenians," said he, "I wish the sentence you have passed upon us may not prove the misfortune of the republic ; but I have one favor to ask of you in behalf of my colleagues and myself, which is, to acquit us before the gods of the vows we made to them for you and ourselves, as we are not in a condition to discharge them ; for it is to their protection, invoked before the battle, we acknowledge that we are indebted for the victory gained by us over the enemy." There was not one good citizen that did not melt into tears at this discourse, so full of goodness and religion, and admire with surprise the moderation of a person, who, seeing himself unjustly condemned, did not however vent the least resentment or even complaint against his judges, but was solely intent, in favor of an ungrateful country which had doomed them to perish, upon what it owed the gods in common with them, for the victory they had lately obtained.

The execution of the six generals was scarcely over,

* *Quem adeo iniquum, ut sceleris assignet, quod venti et fluctus deliquerint ?*
—Tacit. *Annal.* l. xiv. c. 2.

when the people opened their eyes, and perceived all the horror of that sentence; but their repentance could not restore the dead to life. Calixenes, the orator, was put in prison, and was refused to be heard. Having found means to make his escape, he fled to Decelia, to the enemy, from whence he returned some time after to Athens, where he died of hunger, universally detested and abhorred by all the world, as all false accusers and slanderers should be. Diodorus remarks that the people themselves were justly punished for their crime by the gods, who abandoned them soon after, not to a single master, but to thirty tyrants, who treated them with the utmost rigor and cruelty.

The disposition of a people is very naturally depicted in this account; and Plato, upon the same event, draws in few words their character with much spirit and resemblance. "The commonalty," says he, "is an inconstant, ungrateful, cruel, suspicious animal, incapable of submitting to the government of reason; which is no wonder," adds he, "as it is commonly composed of the dregs of a city, and is a monstrous assemblage, without form or order, of all that is worst in it." *

The same relation shows what effect fear can have upon the minds of men, even upon those who pass for the wisest, and how few there are who are capable of supporting inflexibly the view of present danger and disgrace. Though the justness of the general's cause was perfectly known in the senate, at least by the major part of it, as soon as the people's rage was mentioned, and the terrible menaces they murmured, those grave senators, most of whom had commanded armies, and who all of them had frequently exposed themselves to the greatest dangers of war, instantly changed sides, and came over to the most notorious calumny, and crying injustice that ever took place: an evident proof that there is a courage, though very rare, which infinitely transcends the valor that induces so many thousands of men, every day, to confront the most terrible dangers in battle.

Among all the judges, only one truly worthy of his reputation, the great Socrates, stood firm and immovable in this general treason and perfidy; and though he knew that his suffrage and unaided voice would be of little or no consequence to the accused, he thought them a just homage to oppressed innocence, and that it was unworthy an honest man to govern himself by the fury of a blind and frantic

* Plut. in Apioch. pp. 368, 369.

people.* We see, in this instance, how far the cause of justice may be abandoned. We may conclude that it was not better defended before the people. Of more than three thousand citizens, who composed the assembly, two only took upon them the defence of their generals, Euriptodemus and Axiochus. Plato has preserved their names, and given that of the latter to the dialogue, from whence part of these reflections are taken.

The same year the battle of the Arginusæ was fought, Dionysius possessed himself of the tyranny in Sicily.† I shall defer speaking of him till Book IX., in which I shall give the history of Syracuse at large.

SECTION VI.—LYSANDER COMMANDS THE LACEDÆMONIAN FLEET. HIS CELEBRATED VICTORY OVER THE ATHENIANS.

After the defeat at the Arginusæ, the affairs of the Peloponnesians declining, the allies, supported by the influence of Cyrus, sent an embassy to Sparta, to require that the command of the fleet should be again given to Lysander, with the promise of serving with more affection and courage if their request were granted. As it was contrary to the laws of Sparta that the same person should be twice admiral, the Lacedæmonians, to satisfy the allies, gave the title of admiral to one Aracus, and sent Lysander with him, whom in appearance they commissioned only as vice-admiral, though in effect with all the authority of supreme command. ‡

All those who had the greatest share in the government of the cities, and were of most authority in them, saw him arrive with supreme joy; promising themselves, from his influence, the final subversion of the democratic power. His character of complacency for his friends, and indulgence to all their faults, suited much better with their ambitious and injurious views than the austere equity of Callicratidas. For Lysander was a man of the most corrupt heart, and gloried in having no principles in point of virtue or the most sacred duties. He made no scruple to employ artifice and deceit upon all occasions, and esteemed justice only as far as it served his measures. When it did not promote them, he never failed to prefer the useful, which with him was

* Ὅν γὰρ εἰδείν μοι σεμνὸν δῆμῳ μαινομένῳ σπενξάριον.

† A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 406.

‡ A. M. 3599. Ant. J. C. 405. Zenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 45. Plut. in Lys. l. ix. pp. 436, 437. Diod. l. xiii. p. 223.

alone laudable and excellent ; from a persuasion that truth had in its own nature no advantage over falsehood, and that the value of both one and the other was to be determined by the convenience resulting from them. And for those who represented to him that it was unworthy the descendants of Hercules to make use of fraud and treachery, he laughed at them, "For," said he, "where the lion's skin is not long enough, it is necessary to tack the fox's tail to it."

An expression ascribed to him, sufficiently denotes how small an account he made of perjury. He used to say, "Children are amused with baubles, and men with oaths ;" * showing by so professed a want of religion, that the gods were more inconsiderable with him than his enemies. For he who deceives with a false oath, plainly declares in so doing that he fears his enemies, but that he despises God.

Here ends the twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian war.† It was in this year that young Cyrus, dazzled with the unusual splendor of supreme authority, and jealous of the least omission in point of ceremonial homage, discovered, by a remarkable action, the secret of his heart. Brought up from his infancy in the reigning house, nurtured under the shade of the throne, amid the submissions and protestations of the courtiers, entertained for a long time by the discourses of an ambitious mother who idolized him, in the desire and hope of empire, he began already to affect the rights of sovereignty, and to exact the honors paid to it with surprising haughtiness and rigor. Two Persians of the royal family, his cousin-germans by their mother, the sister of Darius his father, had omitted to cover their hands with their sleeves in his presence, according to a ceremony observed only to the kings of Persia. Cyrus, resenting that neglect as a capital crime, condemned them both to die, and caused them to be executed at Sardis without mercy. Darius, at whose feet their relations threw themselves to demand justice, was very much affected with the tragical end of his two nephews, and looked upon this action of his son as an attempt upon himself, to whom alone that honor was due. He resolved therefore to take his government from him, and ordered him to court upon the pretext of being sick, and having a desire to see him.

Cyrus, before his departure, sent for Lysander to Sardis,

* The Greek text admits of another sense, which is perhaps no less good: children may use art, and cheat one another in their games, and men in their oaths. *Εκέλευε τοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἀστραγάλους, τοὺς δ' ἄνδρας ὀρκοῖς ἐξαπατᾶν*

† Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 454.

and put into his hands great sums of money for the payment of the fleet, promising him still more for the future. And with the ostentation of a young man, to let him see how much he desired to oblige him, he assured him that, though the king his father should cease to afford him any supplies, he would furnish him the more willingly out of his own coffers; and that rather than he should want the necessary provisions, he would even cause the throne of massy gold and silver, upon which he sat in judgment, to be melted down. At length, when he was upon the point of setting out, he empowered him to receive the tributes and revenues of the cities, confided the government of his provinces to him, and conjured him with embraces not to give battle in his absence, unless superior in force; because the king neither wanted the will nor the power to give him that superiority to the enemy; promising at the same time, with the strongest assurances of affection, to bring him a great number of ships from Phœnicia and Cilicia.

After that prince's departure, Lysander sailed towards the Hellespont, and laid seige to Lampsacus.* Torax, having marched thither with his land forces at the same time, assaulted the city on his side. The place was carried by storm, and given up by Lysander to the mercy of the soldiers. The Athenians, who followed him close, came to anchor in the port of Eleontum in the Chersonesus, with one hundred and eighty galleys. But upon the news of the taking of Lampsacus, they immediately steered for Setis, and after having taken in provisions, they stood away from thence, sailing along the coast to a place called Ægospotamos,† where they came to, opposite to the enemy, who were then at anchor before Lampsacus. The Hellespont in this part is not above two thousand paces broad. The two armies, seeing themselves so near each other, expected only to rest that day, and were in hopes of coming to a battle on the next. ‡

But Lysander had another design in view. He commanded the seamen and pilots to go on board their galleys, as if they were in reality to fight the next morning at break of day, to hold themselves in readiness, and to wait his orders with profound silence. He ordered the land army in like manner to draw up in order of battle upon the coast, and to wait the day without any noise. On the morrow, as

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. pp. 455-458.

† The river of the Goat.

‡ Plut. in Lys. p. 437, et 440. Idem. in Alcib. p. 212. Diod. l. xiii. pp. 225.

soon as the sun was risen, the Athenians began to row towards them with their whole fleet, in one line, and to bid them defiance. Lysander, though his ships were ranged in order of battle, with their heads towards the enemy, lay still without making any movement. In the evening, when the Athenians withdrew, he did not suffer his soldiers to go ashore, till two or three galleys which he had sent out to observe them were returned, with advice that they had seen the enemy land. The next day passed in the same manner, as did the third and fourth. Such a conduct, which argued reserve and apprehension, extremely augmented the security and boldness of the Athenians, and inspired them with an extreme contempt for an army, which, in their opinion, was prevented by fear from showing themselves, and attempting any thing.

While this passed, Alcibiades, who was near the fleet, took horse, and came to the Athenian generals, to whom he represented that they kept on a very disadvantageous coast, where there were neither ports nor cities in the neighborhood; that they were obliged to bring their provisions from Sestos with great danger and difficulty; and that they were very much in the wrong to suffer the soldiers and mariners of the fleet, as soon as they were ashore, to straggle and disperse themselves at their own pleasure, while the enemy's fleet faced them in view, accustomed to execute the orders of their general with instant obedience, and upon the slightest signal. He offered also to attack the enemy by land with a strong body of Thracian troops, and to force them to a battle. The generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, jealous of their command, did not content themselves with refusing his offers, from the opinion that if the event proved unfortunate, the whole blame would fall on them, and if favorable, that Alcibiades would engross the honor of it; but rejected also with insult his wise and salutary counsel, as if a man in disgrace lost his sense and abilities, together with the favor of the commonwealth. Alcibiades withdrew.

The fifth day, the Athenians presented themselves again, and offered him battle; retiring in the evening as usual, in a more insulting manner than the day before. Lysander again detached some galleys to observe them, with orders to return with the utmost diligence, when they saw the Athenians landed, and to put a brazen buckler at the head of each ship, as soon as they reached the middle of the channel. Himself in the mean time passed through the whole

line in his galley, exhorting the pilots and officers to hold the seamen and soldiers in readiness to row and fight on the first signal.

As soon as the bucklers were put up in the ships' heads, and the admiral's galley had given the signal by the sound of trumpet, the whole fleet advanced in good order. The land army at the same time made all possible haste to the top of the promontory, to see the battle. The strait that separates the two continents, is, in this place, about fifteen stadia, or three quarters of a league* in breadth, which space was soon cleared through the activity and diligence of the rowers. Conon, the Athenian general, was the first who perceived, from shore, the enemy's fleet advancing in good order to attack him; upon which he immediately called out for the troops to embark. In the utmost distress and perplexity, he in vain endeavored, by calling to them by name, by entreaty, by force, to get his men on board the galleys, they being dispersed in every direction. For they were no sooner on shore, than some ran to the suttlers, some to walk in the country, some to sleep in their tents, and others began to dress their suppers. This proceeded from the want of vigilance and experience in their generals, who, not suspecting the least danger, indulged themselves in taking their repose, and gave the soldiers the same liberty.

The enemy had already fallen on with loud cries and a great noise of their oars, when Conon, disengaging himself with nine galleys, of which number was the sacred ship called the Paralian, stood away for Cyprus, where he took refuge with Evagoras. The Peloponnesians, falling upon the rest of the fleet, immediately took the galleys which were empty, and disabled and destroyed such as began to fill with men. The soldiers, who ran without order or arms to their relief, were either killed in the endeavor to get on board, or flying on shore, were cut to pieces by the enemy, who landed in pursuit of them. Lysander took three thousand prisoners, with all the generals, and the whole fleet. After having plundered the camp, and fastened the enemy's galleys to the sterns of his own, he returned to Lampsacus, amid the sounds of flutes and songs of triumph. It was his glory to have achieved one of the greatest military exploits recorded in history, with little or no loss, and to have terminated a war in the small space of an hour, which had already lasted twenty-seven years, and which perhaps, without him, had

* French measure.

been of much longer continuance. Lysander immediately sent despatches with this agreeable news to Sparta.

The three thousand prisoners, taken in this battle, having been condemned to die, Lysander called upon Philoclos, one of the Athenian generals, who had caused all the prisoners taken in two galleys, the one of Andros, the other of Corinth, to be thrown from the top of a precipice, and had formerly persuaded the people of Athens to make a decree for cutting off the thumb of the right hand of all the prisoners of war, in order to disable them from handling the pike, and that they might be fit to serve only at the oar, and asked him what sentence he would pass upon himself, for having induced his city to pass that cruel decree. Philoclos, without departing from his haughtiness in the least, notwithstanding the extreme danger he was in, made answer, "Accuse not people of crimes who have no judges; but as you are victor, use your right, and do by us as we had done by you, if we had conquered." At the same instant he went into a bath, afterwards put on a magnificent robe, and marched foremost to the execution. All the prisoners were put to the sword, except Adimantes, who had opposed the decree.

After this expedition, Lysander went with his fleet to all the maritime cities, and gave orders for all Athenians in them to withdraw as soon as possible to Athens, without permitting them to take any other refuge; declaring, that after a certain time fixed, all should be punished with death, who should be found out of Athens. This he did as an able politician, to reduce the city by famine the more easily, and to render it incapable of sustaining a long siege. He afterwards applied himself in subverting the democratic, and all other forms of government throughout the cities; leaving in each of them a Lacedæmonian governor, called *harmostes*, and ten archons or magistrates, whom he chose out of the societies he had established in them. He thereby, in some measure, secured to himself universal authority, and a kind of sovereignty over all Greece; putting none in power but such as were entirely devoted to his service.

SECTION VII.—LYSANDER BESIEGES ATHENS. FORM OF GOVERNMENT CHANGED. DEATH OF DARIUS NOTHUS.

When the news of the entire defeat of the army came to Athens by a ship, which arrived in the night at the Piræus,

the city was in universal consternation. Nothing was heard but cries of sorrow and despair in every part of it. They imagined the enemy already at their gates. They represented to themselves the miseries of a long siege, a cruel famine, the ruin and burning of their city, the insolence of a proud victor, and the shameful slavery they were upon the point of experiencing, more afflicting and insupportable to them than the most severe punishments and death itself. The next day the assembly was summoned, wherein it was resolved to close all the gates, except one; to repair the breaches in the walls, and mount guard to prepare against a siege.*

Agis and Pausanias, the two kings of Sparta, did in fact advance towards Athens with all their troops. Lysander soon after arrived at the Piræus with a hundred and fifty sail, and prevented all ships from going in or coming out. The Athenians, besieged by sea and land, without provisions, ships, hope of relief, or any resource, reinstated all persons attainted by any decree, without however speaking the least word of a capitulation, though many already died of famine. But when their corn was entirely consumed, they sent deputies to Agis, to propose a treaty with Sparta, upon condition of abandoning all their possessions, the city and port only excepted. He referred the deputies to Lacedæmon, as not being empowered to treat with them. When they arrived at Salasia, upon the frontier of Sparta, and had made known their commission to the ephori, they were ordered to retire, and to come with other proposals if they expected peace. The ephori had demanded, that twelve hundred paces of the wall on each side of the Piræus should be demolished: but an Athenian, for venturing to advise a compliance, was sent to prison, and prohibition made against proposing any thing of that kind for the future.

In this deplorable condition, Theramenes declared in the assembly, that if he were sent to Lysander, he would learn whether the proposal made by the Lacedæmonians for dismantling the city was intended to facilitate its ruin, or to prevent a revolt. The Athenians having deputed him accordingly, he was more than three months absent; detained no doubt with the view of reducing them by famine to accept any conditions that should be offered. On his return he told them, that Lysander had detained him all that time,

* A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. Xenoph. Hellen. 1. ii. pp. 458-462. Plut. in Lysand. pp. 440, 441.

and that at last he had been given to understand, that he might apply to the ephori. He was therefore sent back with nine others to Sparta, with full powers to conclude a treaty. When they arrived there, the ephori gave them audience in the general assembly, where the Corinthians and several other allies, especially the Thebans, insisted that it was absolutely necessary to destroy the city, without listening any farther to a treaty. But the Lacedæmonians, preferring the glory and safety of Greece to their own grandeur, made answer, that they would never be reproached with having destroyed a city that had rendered such great services to Greece; the remembrance of which ought to have much greater weight with the allies, than the resentment of private injuries received from it. The peace was therefore concluded under these conditions; "that the fortifications of the Piræus, with the long wall that joined that port to the city, should be demolished; that the Athenians should deliver up all their galleys, except twelve; that they should abandon all the cities they had seized, and content themselves with their own lands and country; that they should recall their exiles, and make a league offensive and defensive with the Lacedæmonians, under whom they should march wherever they thought fit to lead them."

The deputies on their return were surrounded with an innumerable throng of people, who apprehended that nothing had been concluded, for they were not able to hold out any longer, such multitudes dying every day of famine. The next day they reported the success of their negotiation; the treaty was ratified, notwithstanding the opposition of some persons; and Lysander, followed by the exiles, entered the port. It was upon the very day the Athenians had formerly gained the famous naval battle of Salamin. He caused the walls to be demolished to the sound of flutes and trumpets, and with all the exterior marks of triumph and rejoicing, as if all Greece had that day regained its liberty. Thus ended the Peloponnesian war, after having lasted for the space of twenty-seven years.

Lysander, without giving the Athenians time to look about them, changed the form of their government entirely, established thirty archons, or rather tyrants, over the city, put a good garrison into the citadel, and left the Spartan Callibius as harmostes, or governor. Agis disbanded his troops. Lysander, before he disbanded his, advanced

against Samos, which he pressed so warmly, that it was at last obliged to capitulate. After having established its ancient inhabitants in it, he proposed to return to Sparta with the Lacedæmonian galleys, those of the Piræus, and the beaks of those he had taken.

He had sent Gylippus, who had commanded the army in Sicily, before him to carry the money and spoils, which were the fruit of his glorious campaigns, to Lacedæmon. The money, without reckoning the innumerable crowns of gold given him by the cities, amounting to fifteen hundred talents, that is to say, fifteen hundred thousand crowns.* Gylippus, who carried this considerable sum, could not resist the temptation of converting some part of it to his own use. The bags were sealed up carefully, and did not seem to leave any room for theft. He unsewed them at the bottom; and after having taken out of each of them what money he thought fit, to the amount of three hundred talents, he sewed them up again very neatly, and thought himself perfectly safe. But when he arrived at Sparta, the accounts, which had been put up in each bag, discovered him. To avoid punishment, he banished himself from his country, carrying along with him in all places the disgrace of having sullied, by so base and sordid an avarice, the glory of all his great actions.

From this unhappy example, the wisest and most distinguished of the Spartans, apprehending the all-powerful effects of money, which enslaved not only the vulgar, but even the greatest of men, extremely blamed Lysander for having acted so contradictorily to the fundamental laws of Sparta, and warmly represented to the ephori, how incumbent it was upon them to banish all that gold and silver from the republic, and to lay the heaviest of curses and imprecations upon it, as the fatal bane of all other states, introduced only to corrupt the wholesome constitution of the Spartan government, which had supported itself for so many ages with vigor and prosperity. The ephori immediately passed a decree to proscribe that money, and ordained that none should be current, except the useful pieces of iron. But Lysander's friends opposed this decree; and sparing no pains to retain the gold and silver in Sparta, the affair was referred for farther deliberation. There naturally seemed only two methods to be considered; which were, either to

* About \$1,650,000.

make the gold and silver species current, or to cry them down, and prohibit them absolutely. The men of address and policy found out a third expedient, which, in their sense, reconciled both the others with great success; this was making a proper choice between the vicious extremes of too much rigor and too much neglect. It was therefore resolved, that the new coin of gold and silver should be solely employed by the public treasury; that it should only pass in the occasions and uses of the state; and that every private person, in whose possession it should be found, should be immediately put to death.

“A strange expedient!” says Plutarch: “as if Lyeurgus had feared gold and silver themselves, and not the avarice they occasioned; an avarice more likely to be inflamed by permitting the state to amass and make use of it for the public service, than to be suppressed by prohibiting the possession of it to private persons. For it was impossible while that money was in honor and esteem with the public, that it should be despised in private as useless, and that people should look upon that as of no value in their domestic affairs, which the city prized, and was so much concerned to have for its occasions; bad usages, authorized by the practice and example of the public, being a thousand times more dangerous to individuals, than the vices of individuals to the public. The Lacedæmonians therefore,” continues Plutarch, “in punishing those with death who should make use of the new money in private, were so blind and imprudent as to imagine, that the placing of the law, and the terror of punishment, as a guard at the door, was sufficient to prevent gold and silver from entering the house: they left the hearts of their citizens open to the desire and admiration of riches, and introduced themselves to a violent passion for amassing treasure, in causing it to be deemed a great and honorable thing to become rich.”

It was about the end of the Peloponnesian war, that Darius Nothus, king of Persia, died, after a reign of nineteen years. Cyrus had arrived at the court before his death, and Parysatis, his mother, whose idol he was, not contented with having made his peace, notwithstanding the faults he had committed in his government, pressed the old king to declare him his successor also, after the example of Darius the First, who gave Xerxes the preference before all his brothers, because born, as Cyrus was, after his father's

accession to the throne. But Darius did not carry his complaisance for her so far. He gave the crown to Arsaces, his eldest son by Parysatis also, whom Plutarch call Arsicas, and bequeathed to Cyrus only the provinces he already had.*

* A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 464.

BOOK NINTH.

THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIANS AND GRECIANS. CONTINUED DURING THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE REIGN OF ARTAXERXES MNEMON.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter contains the domestic troubles of the court of Persia, the death of Alcibiades, the re-establishment of the liberty of Athens, and Lysander's secret design to make himself king.

SECTION I.—CORONATION OF ARTAXERXES MNEMON. CYRUS ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE HIS BROTHER. REVENGE OF STATIRA. DEATH AND CHARACTER OF ALCIBIADES.

Arsaces, upon ascending the throne, assumed the name of Artaxerxes, to whom the Greeks also gave the surname of Mnemon,* from his very retentive memory. Being near his father's bed when he was dying, he asked him,† a few moments before he expired, what had been the rule of his conduct during so long and happy a reign as his, that he might make it his example. "It has been," replied he, "to do always what justice and religion required of men." Words of deep import and well worthy of being set up in letters of gold in the palaces of kings, to keep them perpetually in mind of what ought to be the guide and rule of all their actions. It is not uncommon for princes to give excellent instructions to their children on their death-beds, which would be more efficacious if preceded by their own

* Which word signifies in the Greek, one of a good memory.

† A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. Athen. l. xii. p. 458.

example and conduct : without which they are as weak and impotent as the sick man who gives them, and seldom survive him long.

Soon after the death of Darius, the new king set out from his capital for Pāsargada, a city of Persia, built by Cyrus the Great, in order to be crowned according to custom, by the priests of Persia. There was in that city a temple of the goddess who presided in war, in which the coronation was solemnized. It was attended with very singular ceremonies, which no doubt had some mysterious sense, though Plutarch does not explain it. The prince, at his consecration, took off his robe in the temple, and put on that worn by the ancient Cyrus, before he came to the throne, which was preserved in that place with great veneration. After that, he eat a dry fig, chewed some leaves of the turpentine tree, and drank a draught composed of milk and vinegar. This might signify, that the sweets of sovereign power are mingled with the sours of care and disquiet ; and that, if the throne be surrounded with pleasures and honors, it is also attended with pains and anxieties. It seems sufficiently evident, that the design in putting the robes of Cyrus upon the new king, was to make him understand, that he should also clothe his mind with the great qualities and exalted virtues of that prince.*

Young Cyrus, whose soul was all ambition, was in despair on being for ever prevented from ascending a throne which his mother had given him, and on seeing the sceptre, which he thought his right, transferred into the hands of his brother. The blackest crimes cost the ambitious nothing. Cyrus resolved to assassinate Artaxerxes in the temple itself, and in the presence of the whole court, just when he took off his own, to put on the robe of Cyrus the Great. Artaxerxes was apprised of this design by the priest himself, who had educated his brother, and to whom he had imparted it. Cyrus was seized, and condemned to die, when his mother Parysatis, almost out of her senses, flew to the place, clasped him in her arms, bound herself to him with the tresses of her hair, fastened herself upon his neck, and by her shrieks, and tears, and prayers, prevailed so far as to obtain his pardon, and that he should be sent back to his government of the maritime provinces. He carried thither with him an ambition no less ardent than before, was animated besides with resentment for the check he had received, and the warm desire of revenge, and armed with an almost unbounded

* Plut. Artax. pp. 10-12.

power. Artaxerxes upon this occasion acted contrary to the most common rules of policy, which do not admit the cherishing and inflaming, by extraordinary honors, the pride and haughtiness of a bold and enterprising young prince like Cyrus, who had carried his personal enmity to his brother so far as to have resolved to assassinate him with his own hand, and whose ambition for empire was so great as to employ the most criminal methods for the attainment of its end.*

Artaxerxes had espoused Statira. Scarcely had her husband ascended the throne, when she employed the power her beauty gave her over him, to avenge the death of her brother Teriteuchmes. History does not record a more tragical scene, nor a more monstrous complication of adultery, incest, and murder; which, after having occasioned great disorders in the royal family, terminated at length in the most fatal manner to all who had any share in it. But it is necessary to give the reader a knowledge of the fact, to trace it from the beginning.†

Hidarnes, Statira's father, a Persian of very great quality, was governor of one of the principal provinces of the empire. Statira was a lady of extraordinary beauty, which induced Artaxerxes to marry her, who was then called Arsaces. At the same time Teriteuchmes, Statira's brother, married Hamestris, sister of Arsaces, one of the daughters of Darius and Parysatis; in consequence of which marriage, Teriteuchmes, upon his father's death, had his government given him. There was also another sister in this family, no less beautiful than Statira, and who besides excelled in the arts of shooting with the bow, and throwing the dart. Teriteuchmes her brother conceived a criminal passion for her, and to gratify it, resolved to set himself at liberty by killing Hamestris, whom he had espoused. Darius having been informed of this design, by the force of presents and promises, engaged Udiastes, the intimate friend and confidant of Teriteuchmes, to prevent it, by assassinating him. He obeyed, and received for his reward the government of him he had put to death with his own hands.

Among the guards of Teriteuchmes, was a son of Udiastes, called Mithridates, very much attached to his master. The young gentleman, upon hearing that his father had committed this murder in person, uttered all manner of im-

* Ne quis mobiles adolescentium animos præmaturis honoribus ad superbiam extolleret.—Tacit. *Annal.* l. iv. c. 17.

† Ctes. c. li. lv.

precations against him ; and full of horror for so infamous and vile an action seized on the city of Zaris, and openly revolting, declared for the establishment of Teriteuchmes's son. But that young man could not hold out long against Darius. He was shut up in the place with the son of Teriteuchmes, whom he had with him ; and all the rest of the family of Hidarnes were put in prison, and delivered to Parysatis, to do with them as she, exasperated to the highest degree by the treatment either done or intended against her daughter Hamestris, should think fit. That cruel princess began by causing Roxana, whose beauty had been the occasion of this evil, to be sawed in two, and ordered all the rest to be put to death, except Statira, whose life she granted to the tears, and the most tender and ardent solicitations of Arsaces, whose love for his wife made him spare no pains for her preservation, though Darius, his father, believed it necessary, even for his own good, that she should share the same fate with the rest of her family. Such was the state of the affair at the death of Darius.

Statira, as soon as her husband was upon the throne, caused Udiastes to be delivered into her hands. She ordered his tongue to be torn out, and made him die in the most exquisite torments she could invent, to punish the crime which had occasioned the ruin of her family. She gave his government to Mithridates, in recompense for his attachment to the interests of her family. Parysatis, on her side, took her revenge on the son of Teriteuchmes, whom she caused to be poisoned ; and we shall see that Statira's turn was not very remote.

We see here the terrible effects of female revenge, and in general of what excesses they are capable who find themselves above all laws, and have no other rule for their actions than their will and passions.

Cyrus, having resolved to dethrone his brother, employed Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian general, to raise a body of Grecian troops, under pretence of war, which that Spartan was to carry into Thrace. I shall defer speaking of this famous expedition, and also of the death of Socrates, which happened about the same time, intending to treat of those two great events as fully as they deserve. It was without doubt with the same view, that Cyrus presented Lysander a galley of two cubits in length, made of ivory and gold, to congratulate him upon his naval victory. That galley was consecrated to Apollo in the temple of Delphos. Lysander

went soon after to Sardis, charged with magnificent presents for Cyrus from the allies.

It was upon that occasion that Cyrus had the celebrated conversation with Lysander, related by Xenophon, and which Cicero after him has applied so beautifully.* That young prince, who prided himself more upon his integrity and politeness than nobility and grandeur, pleased himself with conducting in person so illustrious a guest through his gardens, and to make him observe the various beauties of them. Lysander, struck with so fine a prospect, admired the manner in which the several parts were laid out; the height and projection of the trees; the neatness and disposition of the walks; the abundance of fruits, planted with an art which had known how to unite the useful with the agreeable; the beauty of the parterres, and the glowing variety of flowers, exhaling odors throughout the delightful scene. "Everything in this place charms and transports me," said Lysander, addressing himself to Cyrus; "but what strikes me most, is the exquisite taste and elegant industry of the person who drew the plan of the several parts of this garden, and gave it the fine order, wonderful disposition and happiness of symmetry which I cannot sufficiently admire." Cyrus, infinitely pleased with this discourse, replied, "It was I that drew the plan, and entirely marked it out; and not only that, many of the trees which you see were planted by my own hands." "What," replied Lysander, regarding him from head to foot, "is it possible, with these purple robes and splendid vestments, those strings of jewels and bracelets of gold, those buskins so richly embroidered, that you could act the gardener, and employ your royal hands in planting trees?" "Does that surprise you?" said Cyrus; "I swear by the god Mithras,† that when my health admits I never sit down to table without having made myself sweat with some fatigue or other, either in military exer-

* Narrat Socrates in eo libro, Cyrum minorem, regem Persarum, præstantem ingenio atque imperii gloria, cum Lysander Lacedæmonius, vir summæ virtutis, venisset ad eam, Sardes, eique dona a sociis attulisset, et ceteris in rebus comem erga Lysandrum atque humanum fuisse, et ei quemdam conceptum agrum diligenter constitum ostendisse. Cum autem admiraretur Lysander et proceritates arborum, et directos in quincuncem ordines, et humum sabactam atque puram, et suavitatem odorum qui efflarentur e floribus; tum eum dixisse mirari se non modo diligentiam, sed etiam solertiam ejus, a quo essent illa dimensa atque descripta. Et ei Cyrum respondisse: atqui ego ista sum dimensus, mei sunt ordines, mea descriptio, multa etiam istarum arborum mea manu sunt satæ. Tum Lysandrum, intuentem ejus purpuram et nitorem corporis, ornatumque Persicum multo auro multique gemmis dixisse: recte vere, te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tua fortuna conjuncta est.—Cic. de Senect. n. 39.

† The Persians adored the sun under that name, who was their principal god.

cise, rural labor, or some other toilsome employment, to which I apply with pleasure, and without sparing myself." Lysander was amazed at his discourse, and pressing him by the hand, "Cyrus," said he, "you are truly happy, and deserve your high fortune, because you unite it with virtue."*

Alcibiades was at no small pains to discover the mystery of the levies laid by Cyrus, and went into the province of Pharnabazus, with design to proceed to the court of Persia, and to apprise Artaxerxes of the scheme laid against him. Had he arrived there, a discovery of such importance would have infallibly procured him the favor of that prince, and the assistance he wanted for the re-establishment of his country. But the Lacedæmonian partisans at Athens, that is to say, the thirty tyrants, apprehended the intrigues of so superior a genius as his, and represented to their masters that they were inevitably ruined if they did not find means to rid themselves of Alcibiades. The Lacedæmonians thereupon wrote to Pharnabazus, and with an abject meanness not to be excused, and which showed how much Sparta had degenerated from her ancient manners, strongly pressed him to deliver them at any rate from so formidable an enemy. The satrap complied with their wish. Alcibiades was then in a small town of Phrygia, where he lived with his concubine Timandra.† Those who were sent to kill him, not daring to enter his house, contented themselves with surrounding and setting it on fire. Alcibiades having quitted it through the flames, sword in hand, the barbarians were afraid to remain to come to blows with him, but flying and retreating as he advanced, they poured their darts and arrows upon him, and he fell dead upon the spot. Timandra took up his body, and having adorned and covered it with the finest robes she had, she made as magnificent a funeral for it as her condition would admit.

Such was the end of Alcibiades, whose great virtues were stifled and suppressed by still greater vices. It is not easy to say whether his good or bad qualities were most pernicious to his country, for with one he deceived, and with the other he oppressed it.‡ In him, distinguished valor was

* Δικαίως, ὃ Κῦρε, εὐδαιμονίς ἀγαθὸς γὰρ οὐ εὐδαιμονεῖς. Which Cicero translates: recte vero, te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tua fortuna conjuncta est.

† It was said that Lais, the famous courtesan, called the Corinthian, was the daughter of this Timandra.

‡ Cujus nescio utrum bona an vitia patriæ perniciosiora fuerint; illis enim cives suos decepit, his afflixit.—Val. Max. l. iii. c. 1.

united with nobility of blood. His person was beautiful and finely made ; he was eloquent, of great ability in business, insinuating, and formed for charming all mankind. He loved glory, but without prejudice to his inclination for pleasure ; nor was he so fond of pleasure as to neglect his glory for it. He knew how to yield, or abstract himself from it according to the situation of his affairs. Never was there ductility of genius equal to his. He metamorphosed himself with incredible facility, like a Proteus, into the most contrary forms, and supported them with as much ease and grace as if each had been natural to him.

This versatility of character, according to occasions, the customs of countries, and his own interests, discover a heart void of principle, without either truth or justice. He did not confine himself either to religion, virtue, laws, duties, or his country. His sole rule of action was his private ambition, to which he reduced everything. His aim was to please, to dazzle, and be beloved, but at the same time to subject those he soothed. He favored them only as they served his purposes ; and made his correspondence and society a means for engrossing everything to himself.

His life was a perpetual mixture of good and evil. His studies for virtue were ill sustained, and quickly degenerated into vices and crimes, very little to the honor of the instructions of that great philosopher, who took no small pains to cultivate him into a man of worth. His actions were glorious, but without rule or principle. His character was elevated and grand, but without connection and consistence. He was successively the support and terror of the Lacedæmonians and Persians. He was either the misfortune or refuge of his own country, according to his declaring for or against it. In fine, he was the author of a general and destructive war in Greece, from the sole motive of commanding, by inducing the Athenians to besiege Syracuse, much less from the hope of conquering Sicily, and afterwards Africa, than with the design of keeping Athens in dependence upon himself ; convinced that having to deal with an inconstant, suspicious, ungrateful, jealous people, averse to those that governed, it was necessary to engage them continually in some great affair, in order to make his services always necessary to them, and that they might not be at leisure to examine, censure, and condemn his conduct.

He had the fate generally experienced by persons of his character, and of which they cannot reasonably complain.

He never loved any one, self being his sole motive; nor ever found a friend. He made it his merit and glory to amuse all men; and nobody confided in, or adhered to him. His sole view was to live with splendor, and to lord it universally; and he perished miserably, abandoned by the whole world, and obliged at his death to the feeble services and impotent zeal of a single woman, for the last honors rendered to his remains.

About this time died Democritus the philosopher, of whom more will be said elsewhere.

SECTION II.—THE THIRTY EXERCISE HORRID CRUELITIES AT ATHENS, THEY PUT THERAMENES TO DEATH. THRASYBULUS ATTACKS THE TYRANTS, IS MASTER OF ATHENS, AND RESTORES ITS LIBERTIES.

The council of thirty, established at Athens by Lysander, committed the most incredible cruelties. Upon pretence of restraining the multitude within their duty, and to prevent seditions, they had caused guards to be assigned them, had armed three thousand of the citizens for that service, and at the same time disarmed all the rest. The whole city was in the utmost terror and dismay. Whoever opposed their injustice and violence, became the victims of them. Riches were a crime that never failed of drawing a sentence upon their owners, always followed with death, and the confiscation of estates; which the thirty tyrants divided among themselves. They put more people to death, says Xenophon, in eight months of peace, than their enemies had done in a war of thirty years.*

The two most considerable persons of the thirty were Critias and Theramenes, who at first lived in great union, and always acted in concert with each other. The latter had some honor, and loved his country. When he saw with what excess of violence and cruelty his colleagues behaved, he declared openly against them, and thereby drew their resentment upon him. Critias became his most mortal enemy, and acted as informer against him before the senate, accusing him of disturbing the tranquillity of the state, and of designing to subvert the present government. As he perceived that the defence of Theramenes was heard with silence and approbation, he was afraid that if the affair was left to the decision of the senate, they would acquit him. Having therefore caused a band of young men whom he had armed

* Xenoph. Hist. l. ii. pp. 462, et 479. Diod. l. xiv. pp. 235-238. Justin. l. v. c. 8, 10.

with poniards, to advance to the bar, he said that he thought it the duty of a supreme magistrate to prevent justice from being abused, and that he should act conformably upon this occasion. "But," continued he, "as the law does not admit that any of the three thousand should be put to death without the consent of the senate, I exclude Theramenes from that number, and condemn him to die in virtue of my own and my colleagues' authority." Theramenes upon these words leaped upon the altar; "I demand," said he, "Athenians, that I may be tried according to the laws; which cannot be refused me without manifest injustice. Not that I imagine that the goodness of my cause will avail me any thing, or the sanctity of altars protect me; but I would show at least, that my enemies respect neither the gods nor men. What most astonishes me is, that persons of your wisdom do not see that your own names may as easily be struck out of the list of the citizens, as that of Theramenes." Critias upon this ordered the officers of justice to pull him down from the altar. A universal silence and terror ensued upon the sight of the armed soldiers, that surrounded the senate. Of all the senators, only Socrates, whose disciple Theramenes had been, took upon him his defence, and opposed the officers of justice. But his weak endeavors could not deliver Theramenes, who was led to the place of execution, notwithstanding all he could do, through crowds of the citizens, who saw with tears, in the fate of a man equally distinguished for his love of liberty and the great services he had done his country, what they had to fear for themselves. When they presented him the hemlock, that is, the poison, which was the manner of putting the citizens of Athens to death, he took it with an intrepid air, and after having drunk it, he poured the remainder upon the table, after the usual manner observed in feasts or public rejoicings, saying, "This for the noble Critias." Xenophon relates this circumstance, unimportant in itself, to show, says he, the tranquillity of Theramenes in his last moments.

The tyrants, delivered from a colleague whose presence alone was a continual reproach to them, no longer observed any measures. Nothing passed throughout the city but imprisonments and murders. Every body trembled for themselves or their friends.* The general desolation had no

* *Poteratne civitas illa conquiescere, in qua tot tyranni erant, quot satellites essent? Ne spes quidem ella recipiendæ libertatis animis poterat offerri, nec ulli remedio locus apparebat contra tantam vim malorum. Unde enim misera civitati tot Harmodios? Socrates tamen in medio erat, et lugentes patres con-*

remedy, nor was there any hope of regaining their liberty. Where had they then as many Harmodiuses as they had tyrants? * Terror had taken entire possession of their minds, while the whole city deplored in secret the loss of liberty, without having one among them generous enough to attempt the breaking of their chains. The Athenian people seemed to have lost that valor, which till then had made them awful and terrible to their neighbors and enemies. They seemed to have lost the very use of speech; not daring to utter the least complaint, lest it should be made a capital crime in them. Socrates only continued intrepid. He consoled the afflicted senate, animated the desponding citizens, and set all men an admirable example of courage and resolution; preserving his liberty, and sustaining his integrity in the midst of thirty tyrants, who made all else tremble, but could never shake the constancy of Socrates by their menaces.

Critias, who had been his pupil, was the first to declare most openly against him, taking offence at the free and bold discourses which he held against the government of the thirty. He went so far as to prohibit his instructing youth; but Socrates, who neither acknowledged his authority, nor feared the violent effects of it, paid no regard to so unjust an order. †

All the citizens of any consideration in Athens, and who retained the love of liberty, quitted a place reduced to so hard and shameful a slavery, and sought elsewhere an asylum and retreat, where they might live in safety. At the head of these was Thrasybulus, a person of extraordinary merit, who beheld with the most lively affliction the miseries of his country. The Lacedæmonians had the inhumanity to endeavor to deprive those unhappy fugitives of this last resource. They published an edict to prohibit the cities of Greece from giving them refuge, decreed that they should be delivered up to the thirty tyrants, and condemned all such as should contravene the execution of this edict, to pay a fine of five talents. Only two cities rejected with disdain so unjust an ordinance, Megara and Thebes; the latter of which made a decree to punish all persons whatever, who should see an Athenian attacked by his enemies without doing his utmost to assist him. Lysias, an orator of Syra-

solebatur, et desperantes de republica exhortabantur et imitare volentibus magnum circumfererebatur exemplar, cum inter triginta dominos liber incederet.—Senec. de Tranquil. Anim. c. 3.

* Harmodius formed a conspiracy for the deliverance of Athens from the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ.

† Xenoph. Memorab. l. i. pp. 716, 717.

cuse who had been banished by the thirty, raised five hundred soldiers at his own expense, and sent them to the aid of the common country of eloquence.*

Thrasylbulus lost no time. After having taken Phyla, a small fort in Attica, he marched to the Piræus, of which he made himself master. The thirty flew thither with their troops; and a sharp battle ensued. But as the soldiers on one side fought with valor and vigor for their liberty, and on the other with indolence and neglect for the power of others, victory was not long doubtful, but favored the better cause. The tyrants were overthrown. Critias was killed upon the spot. And as the rest of the army were beginning to fly, Thrasylbulus cried out, "wherefore do you fly from me as your victor, rather than assist me as the avenger of your liberty? We are not enemies, but fellow-citizens; nor have we declared war against the city, but against the thirty tyrants." He called to their remembrance that they had the same origin, country, laws, and religion; he exhorted them to compassionate their exiled brethren, to restore their country to them, and resume their liberty themselves. These words had the desired effect. The army, upon their return to Athens, expelled the thirty, and substituted ten persons to govern in their room, whose conduct proved no better than theirs.

It is a matter of surprise, that so sudden, so universal, so tenacious, and so uniform a conspiracy against the public good, should always actuate the several bodies of persons established in the administration of this government. This we have seen in the four hundred formerly chosen by Athens; again in the thirty; and now in the ten. And what increases our wonder is, that this passion for tyranny should so strongly actuate republicans, born in the bosom of liberty, accustomed to an equality of condition, on which it is founded, and formed from their earliest infancy to an abhorrence of all subjection and dependency. There must be on the one side, in power and authority, some violent impulse, to actuate in this manner so many persons, many of whom, no doubt, were not without sentiments of virtue and honor; and to banish so suddenly the principles and manners so natural to them; and on the other an excessive propensity in the mind of man to subject his equals, to rule over them imperiously, to carry him on to the last extremes of oppression and cru-

* *Quingentos milites, stipendio suo instructos, in auxilium patriæ communis eloquentiæ missit.*—Justin. l. v. c. 9.

elty, and to make him forget at once, all laws, nature, and religion.*

The thirty being fallen from their power and hopes, sent deputies to Lacedæmon to demand aid. It was not Lysander's fault, who was sent to them with troops, that the tyrants were not re-established. But king Pausanias, moved with compassion for the deplorable condition to which a city, once so flourishing, was reduced, had the generosity to favor the Athenians in secret, and at length obtained a peace for them. It was sealed with the blood of the tyrants, who, having taken arms to reinstate themselves in the government, and being present at a parley for that purpose, were all put to the sword, and left Athens in the full possession of its liberty. All the exiles were recalled. Thrasybulus at that time proposed the celebrated amnesty, by which the citizens engaged upon oath, that all past transactions should be buried in oblivion. The government was re-established upon its ancient footing, the laws restored to their pristine vigor, and magistrates elected with the usual forms.

I cannot forbear observing in this place the wisdom and moderation of Thrasybulus, so salutary and essential after so long a continuance of domestic troubles. This is one of the finest events in ancient history, worthy the Athenian lenity and benevolence, and has served as a model to successive ages in good governments.

Never had tyranny been more cruel and bloody than that which the Athenians had lately thrown off. Every house was in mourning; every family bewailed the loss of some relation. It had been a series of public robbery and rapine, in which license and impunity had authorized all manner of crimes. The people seemed to have a right to demand the blood of all accomplices, in such notorious malversations, and even the interest of the state seemed to authorize such a claim, that by exemplary severities such enormous crimes might be prevented for the future. But Thrasybulus, rising above those sentiments, from the superiority of his more extensive genius, and the views of a more discerning and profound policy, foresaw, that by consenting to the punishment of the guilty, eternal seeds of discord and enmity would remain, to weaken the republic by domestic divisions, which it was necessary to unite against the common enemy, and occasion the loss to the state of a great number of citizens, who might render it important

* *VI dominationis convulsus*.—Tacit.

services even from the desire of making amends for past misbehavior.

Such conduct, after great troubles in a state, has always seemed, with the ablest politicians, the most certain and ready means to restore the public peace and tranquillity. Cicero, when Rome was divided into two factions, upon the occasion of Cæsar's death, who had been killed by the conspirators, calling to mind this celebrated amnesty, proposed, after the example of the Athenians, to bury all that had passed in eternal oblivion,* Cardinal Mazarin observed to Don Louis de Haro, prime minister of Spain, that this gentle and humane conduct in France had prevented the troubles and revolts of that kingdom from having any fatal consequences, and "that the king had not, to this day, lost a foot of land by them;" whereas the inflexible severity of the Spaniards "was the occasion, that the subjects of that monarchy, whenever they threw off the mask, never returned to their obedience but by the force of arms; which sufficiently appears," says he, "in the example of the Hollanders, who are in the peaceable possession of many provinces, that not a century ago were the patrimony of the king of Spain." †

Diodorus Siculus takes occasion, from the thirty tyrants of Athens, whose immoderate ambition induced them to treat their country with the most excessive cruelties, to observe how unfortunate it is for persons in power to want a sense of honor, and to disregard either the present opinion, or the judgment of posterity on their conduct. For, from the contempt of reputation, the transition is too common to that of virtue itself. ‡ They may perhaps, by the awe of their power, suppress for some time the public voice, and impose a forced silence upon censure; but the more constraint they lay upon it during their lives, the more liberal will it be after their deaths, of complaints and reproaches, and the more infamy and imputation will be affixed

* In ædem Telluris convocati sumus; in quo templo, quantum in me fuit, feci fundamentum pacis; Atheniensiumque renovavi vetus exemplum. Græcum etiam verbum (some believe that the word was ἀμνηστία; but as it is not found in the historians who have treated this fact, it is more likely that it was μὴ μνηστικακῆσαι, which has the same sense, and is used by them all), usurpavi, quod tum in sedandis discordiis usurpaverat civitas illa; atque omnem memoriam discordiarum oblivione sempiterna delendam censei.—Philip. i. n. 1.

† Let. XV. of Card. Mazarin.

‡ Cætera principibus statim adesse: unum insatiabiliter parandum, prosperam sui memoriam; nam contempta fama, contemni virtutes.—Quo magis discordiarum eorum irasci libet, qui præsentis potentia credunt extingui posse etiam sequentis ævi memoriam—suum cuique decus posteritas rependit.—Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 36, et 35.

to their memories. The power of the thirty was of very short duration; their guilt immortal, which will be remembered with abhorrence throughout all ages; while their names will be recorded in history only to render them odious and to make their crimes detestable. He applies the same reflection to the Lacedæmonians, who, after having made themselves masters of Greece by a wise and moderate conduct, fell from that glory, through the severity, haughtiness, and injustice, with which they treated their allies. There is doubtless no reader, whom their abject and cruel jealousy in regard to Athens, enslaved and humbled, has not prejudiced against them; nor is there any resemblance in such behavior, to the greatness of mind and noble generosity of ancient Sparta; so much power has the lust of dominion and prosperity over even virtuous men. Diodorus concludes his reflection with a maxim, very true, though very little known; "the greatness and majesty of princes," says he (and the same may be said of all persons in high authority), "can be supported only by humanity and justice with regard to their subjects; as, on the contrary, they are ruined and destroyed by a cruel and oppressive government, which never fails to draw upon them the hatred of their people."

SECTION III.—LYSANDER ABUSES HIS POWER IN AN EXTRAORDINARY MANNER. HE IS RECALLED TO SPARTA.

As Lysander had the greatest share in the celebrated exploits which had raised the glory of the Lacedæmonians to so high a pitch, so he had acquired a degree of power and authority, of which there was no example before in Sparta; but he suffered himself to be carried away by a presumption and vanity still greater than his power. He permitted the Grecian cities to dedicate altars to him as to a god, and to offer sacrifices, and sing hymns and songs in honor of him. The Samians ordained a public decree, that the feasts celebrated in honor of Juno, and which bore the name of that goddess, should be called "the feast of Lysander." He had always a crowd of poets about him (who are often a tribe of venal flatterers), who emulated each other in singing his great exploits, for which they were magnificently paid. Praise is undoubtedly due to noble deeds, but diminishes their lustre when either forged or excessive.*

This sort of vanity or ambition, had he stopped there,

* Plut. in Lys. pp. 443-445.

would have hurt only himself, by exposing him to envy and contempt ; but a natural consequence of it was, that through his arrogance and pride, in conjunction with the incessant flatteries of those around him, he carried the spirit of command and authority to an insupportable excess, and observed no longer any measures either in rewarding or punishing. The absolute government of cities with tyrannic power were the fruits of his friendship, and the ties of hospitality with him ; and only the death of those he hated could put an end to his resentment and displeasure, without its being possible to escape his vengeance. What Sylla caused to be inscribed upon his tomb, might with equal propriety have been engraved upon Lysander's : "That no man had ever surpassed him in doing good to his friends, or evil to his enemies."

Treachery and perjury cost him nothing, whenever they promoted his designs ; nor was he less cruel than revengeful, a sufficient proof of which is shown in his conduct at Miletus. Apprehending that those who were at the head of the people would escape him, he swore not to do them any harm. Those unfortunate men relied on his oath, but no sooner appeared in public, than they were put to the sword, with his consent, by the nobility, who killed them all, to the number of eight hundred. The number of those in the party of the people, whom he caused to be massacred in the other cities, is incredible ; for he did not only destroy to satiate his own resentments, but to serve in all places the enmity, malice, and avarice of his friends, whom he supported in gratifying their passions by the death of their enemies.

There was no kind of injustice and violence which the people did not suffer under the government of Lysander ; while the Lacedæmonians, who were sufficiently informed of his conduct, gave themselves no trouble to prevent its effects. It is too common for those in power to be little affected with the vexations and oppressions laid upon persons of low condition and credit, and to be deaf to their just complaints, though authority is principally confided in them for the defence of the weak and poor, who have no other protectors. But if such remonstrances are made by a great or powerful person, from whom they may have any thing to hope or fear, the same authority that was dilatory and indifferent, becomes immediately active and interested ; a certain proof that it is not the love of justice that actuates it. This appears in the conduct of the Lacedæmonian magistrates. Pharnabazus, weary of Lysander's repeated injustices,

who ravaged and pillaged the provinces under his command, having sent ambassadors to Sparta, to complain of the wrongs he had received from that general, the ephori recalled him. Lysander was at that time in the Hellespont. The letter of the ephori threw him into great consternation. As he principally feared the complaints and accusations of Pharnabazus, he made all the haste he could to come to an explanation with him, from the hope of softening him and making his peace. He went for that purpose to him, and desired that he would write another letter to the ephori, intimating a satisfaction in his conduct. "But Lysander," says Plutarch, "in such an application to Pharnabazus, forgot the proverb.* The satrap promised all he desired; and accordingly wrote such a letter in Lysander's presence as he had asked of him, but prepared another to a quite different effect. When he was to seal it, as both letters were of the same size and form, he dexterously put that he had wrote in secret into the place of the other, without being observed, which he sealed and gave him."

Lysander departed well satisfied; and having arrived at Sparta, alighted at the place where the senate was assembled, and delivered the letter of Pharnabazus to the ephori. But he was strangely surprised when he heard the contents, and withdrew in extreme confusion and disorder. Some days after he returned to the senate, and told the ephori that he was obliged to go to the temple of Ammon, to acquit himself of the sacrifices he had vowed to that god before his battles. That pilgrimage was no more than a pretence to cover the pain it gave him to live as a private person in Sparta, and submit to the yoke of obeying; he who till then had always governed. Accustomed long to commanding armies, and to the flattering distinctions of a kind of sovereignty exercised by him in Asia, he could not endure the mortifying equality with the multitude, nor restrain himself to the simplicity of a private life. Having obtained permission, not without great difficulty, he embarked.

As soon as he was gone, the kings, reflecting that he held all the cities dependent on him by means of the governors and magistrates established therein by him, to whom they were also indebted for their unlimited authority, and that he was thereby effectually lord and master of all Greece, applied themselves vigorously to restore the government of the

* The Greek proverb is, Cretan against Cretan—from the people of Crete, who passed for the greatest cheats and liars in the world.

people, and to depose all his creatures and friends from any participation in it. This alteration occasioned great tumults at first. About the same time Lysander, being apprised of the design of Thrasybulus to establish the liberty of his country, returned with the utmost diligence to Sparta, and endeavored to engage the Lacedæmonians to support the party of the nobility at Athens. We have before observed that Pausanias, from a more noble spirit of equity and generosity, gave peace to Athens, and by that means, according to Plutarch, checked the ambition of Lysander.

CHAPTER II.

YOUNG CYRUS, WITH THE AID OF THE GRECIAN TROOPS, ENDEAVORS TO DETHRONE HIS BROTHER ARTAXERXES. HE IS KILLED. FAMOUS RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND.

ANTIQUITY has few events so memorable as those I am about to relate in this place. We see on one side a young prince, abounding otherwise with excellent qualities, abandoned to his violent ambition, carry the war from far against his brother and sovereign, and go to attack him almost in his own palace, with a view of depriving him at once of his crown and life. We see him fall dead in the battle at the feet of that brother, and terminate, by so unhappy a fate, an enterprise equally bold and criminal. On the other hand, the Greeks who follow him, destitute of all succor after the loss of their chiefs, without allies, provisions, money, horse, or archers, reduced to no more than ten thousand men, with no resource but in their own persons and valor, supported only by the warm desire of preserving their liberty, and of returning to their native countries; these Greeks, with bold and intrepid resolution, make their retreat before a victorious army of a million of men, traverse five or six hundred leagues, notwithstanding vast rivers and innumerable passes, and arrive at last in their own country through a thousand fierce and barbarous nations, victorious over all obstacles in their way, and over all the dangers which either concealed fraud or open force compel them to undergo.*

This retreat, in the opinion of the best judges, and most

* *Post mortem Cyri, neque armis a tanto exercitu vinci, neque dolo capi potuerunt; revertentesque intesot indomitas nationes et barbaras gentes, per tanta itineris spatia, virtute se usque terminos patriæ defenderunt.*—Justin. l. v. c. 11.

experienced in the art of war, is the boldest and best conducted exploit to be found in ancient history, and is deemed a perfect model in its kind. Happily for us, it is described to the most minute circumstance by a historian, who was not only an eye-witness of the facts he relates, but the director, the soul of this great enterprise. I shall only abridge it, and abstract its most material circumstances; but I cannot omit advising young persons, who make arms their profession, to consult the original, of which there is a good translation extant in French, though far short of the admirable text. It is very difficult to meet with a more able master than Xenophon in the art of war, to whom may be well applied here, what Homer says of Phœnix, the governor of Achilles, "that he was equally capable of forming his pupil for eloquence or arms." *

SECTION I.—CÝRUS RAISES TROOPS AGAINST HIS BROTHER ARTAXERXES.

We have already said that young Cyrus, son of Darius Nothus and Parysatis, saw with pain his elder brother Artaxerxes upon the throne, and that at the very time the latter was taking possession of it, he had attempted to deprive him of his crown and life together.† Artaxerxes was not sensible of what he had to fear from a brother of his enterprising and ambitious spirit, but could not refuse pardoning him to the prayers and tears of his mother Parysatis, who doted upon this youngest son. He removed him therefore into Asia to his government; confiding to him, contrary to all the rules of policy, an absolute authority over the provinces left him by the will of the king, his father.

As soon as he arrived there, his thoughts were solely intent upon revenging the supposed affront he had received from his brother, and to dethrone him.‡ He received all who came from the court with great favor and affability, to induce them insensibly to quit the king's party, and adhere to him. He gained, also, the hearts of the barbarians under his government: familiarizing himself with them, and mingling with the common soldiery, though without forgetting the dignity of their general; these he formed by various exercises for the duties of war. He applied particularly in secret to raise from several parts, and upon different pre-

* *Iliad*. x. ver. 443.

† *A. M.* 3691. *Ant. J. C.* 491. *Diod.* l. xiv. pp. 248-249, 252. *Justin.* l. v. c. 11. *Xenoph.* de *Cyr. Exped.* l. i. pp. 243-248. ‡ *A. M.* 3691. *Ant. J. C.* 493.

texts, a body of Grecian troops, upon whom he relied much more than upon those of the barbarians. Clearchus retired to his court after having been banished from Sparta, and was of great service to him, being an able, experienced, and valiant captain. At the same time, several cities in the provinces of Tissaphernes revolted from their obedience in favor of Cyrus. This incident, which was not an effect of chance, but of the secret practices of that prince, gave birth to a war between them. Cyrus, under the pretence of arming against Tissaphernes, assembled troops openly; and to amuse the court more speciously, sent grievous complaints to the king against that governor, demanding his protection and aid in the most submissive manner. Artaxerxes was deceived by these appearances, and believed that all the preparations by Cyrus only related to Tissaphernes, and continued quiet, from the assurance of having nothing to apprehend for himself.*

Cyrus knew well how to improve the imprudent security and indolence of his brother, which some people conceived the effect of his goodness and humanity. And indeed, in the beginning of his reign, he seemed to imitate the virtues of the first Artaxerxes, whose name he bore: for he demeaned himself with great mildness and affability to such as approached him; he honored and rewarded magnificently all those whose services had merited favor; when he passed sentence to punish, it was without either outrage or insult; and when he made presents, it was with a gracious air, and such obliging circumstances as infinitely exalted their value, and implied that he was never better pleased than when he had an opportunity of doing good to his subjects. To all these excellent qualities it had been very necessary for him to have added one no less royal, and which would have put him upon his guard against the enterprises of a brother, whose character he ought to have known; I mean a wise foresight, that penetrates the future, and renders a prince attentive to prevent or frustrate whatever may disturb the tranquillity of the state.†

The emissaries of Cyrus at the court were perpetually dispersing reports and opinions among the people, to prepare their minds for the intended change and revolt. They said that the state required a king of Cyrus's character; a king, magnificent, liberal, who loved war, and showered his favors upon those who served him; and that it was neces-

* A. M. 3602, Ant. J. C. 402.

† Plut. in Artax. p. 1014.

sary for the grandeur of the empire to have a prince upon the throne, fired with ambition and valor for the support and augmentation of its glory.

The young prince lost no time on his side, and hastened the execution of his great design. He was then not more than twenty-three years old. After the important services which he had rendered the Lacedæmonians, without which they could never have obtained the victories that had made them masters of Greece, he thought he might safely open himself to them. He therefore imparted to them the present situation of his affairs, and the end he had in view; convinced that such a confidence could not but incline them the more in his favor.*

In the letter he wrote them, he spoke of himself in very magnificent terms. He told them he had a greater and more loyal heart than his brother: that he was better versed in philosophy and the knowledge of the magi:† and that he could drink more wine than he, without being disordered in his senses; a very meritorious quality among the barbarians, but not proper to recommend him to the opinions of those he wrote to. The Lacedæmonians sent orders to their fleet to join that of the prince immediately, and to obey the commands of Tamos his admiral, in all things, but without the least mention of Artaxerxes, or seeming in any manner privy to his design. They thought that precaution necessary for their justification with Artaxerxes, in case affairs should happen to terminate in his favor.‡

The troops of Cyrus, according to the review afterwards made, consisted of thirteen thousand Greeks, which were the flower and chief force of his army, and of a hundred thousand regular men of the barbarous nations. Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian, commanded all the Peloponnesian troops, except the Achæans, who were led by Socrates of Achaia. The Bœotians were under Proxenes the Theban, and the Thessalians under Menon. The barbarians were commanded by Persian generals, the chief of whom was Ariæus. The fleet consisted of thirty-five ships under Pythagoras the Lacedæmonian, and of twenty-five commanded by Tamos, the Egyptian, admiral of the whole fleet. It followed the land-army, coasting along the shore.§

* A. M. 3603. Ant. J. C. 401.

† By the knowledge of the magi, among the Persians, was meant the science of religion and government.

‡ Quærentes apud Cyrum gratiam; et apud Artaxerxem, si vicisset, veniæ patrociniâ, cum nihil adventus eum aperte decrevissent.—Justin. l. v. c. 11.

§ Xenoph. Cyri. Exped. l. i. p. 252.

Cyrus had opened his design only to Clearchus of all the Greeks, rightly foreseeing that the length and boldness of the enterprise could not fail of discouraging and disgusting the officers as well as soldiers. He made it his sole application to gain their affections during the march, by treating them with kindness and humanity, conversing freely with them, and giving strict orders that they should want for nothing. Proxenes, between whose family and Xenophon's an ancient friendship subsisted, presented that young Athenian to Cyrus who received him very favorably, and gave him an employment in his army among the Greeks.* He at length set out for Sardis, and marched towards the upper provinces of Asia. The troops knew neither the occasion of the war, nor into what countries they were going. Cyrus had only caused it to be given out that he should act against the Pisidians, who had infested his province by their incursions.

Tissaphernes, rightly judging that all these preparations were too great for an enterprise destined only against Pisidia, had hastened from Miletus, to give the king an account of them. This news occasioned great trouble at court. Parysatis, the mother of Artaxerxes and Cyrus, was looked upon as the principal cause of this war; and all persons in her service and interest were suspected of holding intelligence with Cyrus. Statira, especially, the reigning queen, reproached her incessantly in the most violent terms. "Where is now," said she to her, "that faith you have so often engaged for your son's behavior? Where those ardent prayers you employed to preserve from death that conspirator against his king and brother? It is your unhappy fondness that has kindled this war, and plunged us into an abyss of misfortunes." The antipathy and hatred of the two queens for each other was already very great, and much inflamed by such warm reproaches. We shall hereafter see their consequences. Artaxerxes assembled a numerous army to receive his brother.†

Cyrus advanced continually by great marches. What troubled him most on the way was the pass of Cilicia, which was a narrow defile between very high and steep mountains, that would admit no more than one carriage to pass at a time. Syennesis, king of the country, prepared to dispute this passage with him, and would infallibly have succeeded, but for the diversion made by Tamos with his fleet, in con-

* Xenoph. 1. i. pp. 48-291.

† Plut. in Artax. p. 1014

junction with that of the Lacedæmonians. To defend the coasts against the insults of the fleet, Syennesis abandoned that important post, which a small body of troops might have maintained against the greatest army.*

When they arrived at Tarsus, the Greeks refused to march any farther, rightly suspecting that they were intended against the king, and loudly exclaiming that they had not entered into the service upon that condition. Clearchus, who commanded them, had occasion for all his address and ability to stifle this commotion in its birth. At first he made use of authority and force, but with very ill success, and desisted therefore from an open opposition to their sentiments; he even affected to enter into their views, and to support them with his approbation and credit. He declared publicly that he would not separate himself from them, and advised them to depute persons to the prince, to know from his own mouth against whom they were to be led, that they might follow him voluntarily if they approved his measures; if not, that they might demand his permission to withdraw. By this artful evasion he appeased the tumult, and pacified them; and they chose him and some other officers for their deputies. Cyrus, whom he had secretly apprised of every thing, made answer that he was going to attack Abrocomas his enemy, at twelve days' march from thence upon the Euphrates.† When this answer was repeated to them, though they plainly saw against whom they were marching they resolved to proceed, and only demanded an augmentation of their pay. Cyrus, instead of one daric a month to each soldier, promised to give them one and a half.‡

Some time after, Cyrus was informed that two of the principal officers, upon account of a private quarrel with Clearchus, had deserted with part of their equipage on board a merchant ship. Many were of opinion that it was proper to send two galleys after them, which might be done with great ease; and that when they were brought back, they should be made an example, by suffering death in the sight of the whole army. Cyrus, convinced that favor§ was the most certain means to the attainment of affection, and that punishments, like violent remedies, ought never to be used

* Xenoph. 1. 1, pp. 248-261.

† It is not said where he commanded. It appears to have been upon the Euphrates. He marched with three hundred thousand men to join the king's army, but did not arrive till after the battle.

‡ The daric was worth \$1.87½.

§ Beneficiis potius quam remediis ingenia experiri placuit.—Plin. in Traj.

but in extreme necessity, declared publicly that he would not suffer it to be said that he had detained any one in his service by force; and added, that he would send them their wives and children, whom they had left as hostages in his hands. An answer of so much wisdom and generosity had a surprising effect: and even made those his firm adherents, who were before inclined to retire. This is an excellent lesson for all who govern. There is in the mind of man a fund of natural generosity, which it is necessary to know and apply. Threats exasperate them, and chastisement makes them revolt, when endeavors are used to force them to do their duty against their will. They desire a certain degree of confidence in their honor, and that the glory of acquitting themselves of it out of choice be left in their power. To show that you believe men faithful, is often the best means to make them so.*

Cyrus soon after declared that he marched against Artaxerxes. Upon which some murmuring was heard at first; but it soon gave place to the expressions of joy and satisfaction, occasioned by that prince's magnificent promises to the army.

As Cyrus advanced by long marches, he was informed from all parts, that the king did not intend to come directly to a battle, but had resolved to wait in the remote parts of Persia, till all his forces were assembled; and that to stop his enemies, he had ordered an intrenchment to be thrown up in the plains of Babylon, with a fosse five fathoms broad, and three deep, extending the distance of twelve parasangas† or leagues, from the Euphrates to the wall of Media. Between the Euphrates and the fosse a way had been left of twenty feet in breadth, by which Cyrus passed with his whole army, having reviewed it the day before. The king had neglected to dispute this pass with him, and suffered him to continue his march towards Babylon. It was Tiresias who determined him not to fly in such a manner before an enemy, against whom he had infinite advantages, as well from the number of his troops, as the valor of his generals. He resolved therefore to advance against the enemy. ‡

* Nescio an plus moribus conferat princeps, qui bonos esse patitur, quam qui cogit.—Plin. Traj.

Plerumque habita fides ipsam obligat fidem.—Liv.

† The parasanga is a measure peculiar to the Persians. It was commonly thirty stadia. Some were from twenty to sixty stadia. In the march of Cyrus's army, I suppose the parasanga only twenty stadia for reasons I shall give hereafter.

‡ Plut. in Artax. p. 1014. Xenoph. l. i. pp. 261-266.

SECTION II.—THE BATTLE OF CUNAXA. CYRUS IS KILLED.

The place where the battle was fought, was called Cunaxa, about twenty-five leagues from Babylon.* The army of Cyrus consisted of thirteen thousand Greeks, a hundred thousand barbarians, and twenty chariots armed with scythes. The enemy in horse and foot, might amount to about twelve hundred thousand, under four generals, Tissaphernes, Gobryas, Arbaces, and Abrocomas, without including six thousand chosen horse, that fought where the king was present, and never quitted his person. But Abrocomas, who had the command of three hundred thousand men, did not arrive till five days after the battle. In the king's army were only a hundred and fifty chariots armed with scythes.†

Cyrus believed, from the enemy's not having defended the pass at the fosse, that there would be no battle; so that the next day the army marched with great negligence. But on the third, Cyrus being in his chariot, with a few soldiers in their ranks before him, and the rest marching without any order, or having their arms carried for them, a horseman came in full speed, crying out as he passed, that the enemy approached in order of battle. Upon this, great confusion ensued, from the apprehension that they should not have time to draw up the army. Cyrus, leaping from his chariot, put on his arms immediately, and getting on horseback with his javelin in his hand, gave orders to the troops to stand to their arms, and fall into their ranks; which was executed with so much expedition, that the troops had not time to refresh themselves.

Cyrus posted upon his right a thousand Paphlagonian horse, supported by the Euprates, and the light-armed infantry of the Greeks; and next them, Clearchus, Proxenes, and the rest of the general officers after Menon, at the head of their several corps. The left wing, composed of Lydians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic nations, were commanded by Ariæus, who had a thousand horse. Cyrus placed himself in the centre, where the chosen troops of the Persians and other barbarians were posted. He had round him six hundred horsemen, armed at all points, as were their horses, with head and breast pieces. The prince's head was uncovered, as were those of all the Persians, whose custom it was to give battle in that manner. The arms of all his people were red, and those of Artaxerxes were white.

* Five hundred stadia.

† Xenoph. in exped. Cyr. l. i. pp. 263-266. Diod. l. xiv. pp. 253, 254. Plut. pp. 1014-1017.

A little before the onset, Clearchus advised Cyrus not to charge in person, but to cover himself in the rear of the Grecian battalions. "What is it you say?" replied Cyrus; "at the time I am endeavoring to make myself king, would you have me show myself unworthy of being so?" That wise and generous answer proves that he knew the duty of a general, especially in a day of battle. Had he withdrawn, when his presence was most necessary, it would have argued his want of courage, and intimidated others. It is necessary, always preserving the due distinction between the leader and the troops, that their danger should be common, and no one exempted from it, lest the latter should be alarmed by a different conduct. Courage in an army depends upon example, upon the desire of being distinguished, the fear of dishonor, the incapacity of doing otherwise than the rest, and equality of danger. The retiring of Cyrus would have either ruined, or greatly weakened all these potent motives, by discouraging both the officers and soldiers of his army. He thought that, being their general, it was incumbent on him to discharge all the functions of that office, and to show himself worthy to be the leader and soul of such a number of valiant men, ready to shed their blood for his service.

It was now noon; and the enemy did not yet appear. But about three o'clock a great dust like a white cloud arose, followed soon after by a darkness that overshadowed the whole plain, after which was seen the glittering of armor, lances, and standards. Tissaphernes commanded the left, which consisted of cavalry armed with white cuirasses, and of light-armed infantry; in the centre was the heavy-armed foot, a great part of which had bucklers made of wood, which covered the soldier entirely: these were Egyptians. The rest of the light-armed infantry and of the horse formed the right wing. The foot; were drawn up by nations, with as much depth as front and in that order formed square battalions. The king had posted himself in the main body, with the flower of the whole army, and had six thousand horse for his guard, commanded by Artagerses. Though he was in the centre, he was beyond the left wing of the army of Cyrus; so much did the front of his own exceed that of the enemy in extent. A hundred and fifty chariots armed with scythes were placed in front of the army, at some distance from one another. The scythes were fixed to the axle downwards and aslant, so as to cut down and overthrow all before them.

As Cyrus relied very much on the valor and experience of the Greeks, he ordered Clearchus, as soon as he had beat the enemies in his front, to take care to incline to his left, and fall upon the centre where the king was posted; the success of the battle depending upon that attack. But Clearchus, finding it very difficult to make his way through so great a body of troops, replied that he need not be concerned but that he would take care to do what was necessary.

The enemy in the mean time advanced slowly in good order; Cyrus marching in the space between the two armies, the nearest to his own, and considered both of them with great attention. Xenophon perceiving him, rode directly up to him, to know whether he had any farther orders to give. He called out to him that the sacrifices were favorable, and that he should tell the troops so. He then hastened through the ranks to give his orders, and showed himself to the soldiers with such a joy and serenity in his countenance, as inspired them with new courage, and at the same time with an air of kindness and familiarity that excited their zeal and affection. It is not easy to comprehend what great effects a word, a kind manner, or a look from a general, will have upon a day of action; and with what ardor a common man will rush into danger, when he believes himself not unknown to his general, and thinks his valor will oblige him.

Artaxerxes moved on continually, though with a slow pace, and without noise and confusion. That good order and exact discipline extremely surprised the Greeks, who expected to see much hurry and tumult in so great a multitude, and to hear confused cries, as Cyrus had foretold them.

The armies were not distant from each other more than four or five hundred paces, when the Greeks began to sing the hymn of battle, and to march on, slowly at first, and with silence. When they came near the enemy, they set up great cries, striking their darts upon their shields to frighten their horse; and then moving all together, they rushed forwards upon the barbarians with all their force, who did not wait their charge, but turned their backs and fled universally, except Tissaphernes, who stood his ground with a small part of his troops.

Cyrus saw with pleasure the enemy routed by the Greeks, and was proclaimed king by those around him. But he did not give himself up to a vain joy, nor as yet reckon himself

victor. He perceived that Artaxerxes was wheeling his right to attack him in flank, and marched directly against him with his six hundred horse. He, with his own hand, killed Artagerses, who commanded the king's guards of six thousand horse and put the whole body to flight. Discovering his brother, he cried out with his eyes sparkling with rage, "I see him," and spurred against him, followed only by his principal officers; for his troops had quitted their ranks to pursue the fugitives, which was an essential fault.

The battle then became a single combat in some measure between Artaxerxes and Cyrus; and the two brothers were seen, transported with rage and fury, endeavoring, like Eteocles and Polynices, to plunge their swords into each other's hearts, and to assure themselves of the throne by the death of their rival.*

Cyrus having opened his way through those who were drawn up in battle before Artaxerxes reached him, and killed his horse, that fell with him to the ground. He rose and was remounted upon another; when Cyrus attacked him again, gave him a second wound, and was preparing to give him a third, in hopes that it would prove his last. The king, like a lion wounded by the hunters, was only the more furious from the smart, and sprung forwards, impetuously pushing his horse against Cyrus, who, running headlong and without regard to his person, threw himself into the midst of a volley of darts, aimed at him from all sides, and received a wound from the king's javelin; at that instant all the rest discharged upon him. Cyrus fell dead; some say by the wound given him by the king; others affirm that he was wounded by a Carian soldier. Mithridates, a young Persian nobleman, asserted that he had given him the mortal stroke with a javelin, which entered his temple, and pierced his head quite through. The greatest persons of his court, resolving not to survive so good a master, were all killed around his body; a certain proof, says Xenophon, that he well knew how to choose his friends, and that he was truly beloved by them. Ariæus, who ought to have been the firmest of all his adherents, fled with the left wing as soon as he heard of his death.

Artaxerxes, after having caused the head and right hand of his brother to be cut off by the eunuch Mesabates, pursued the enemy into their camp. Ariæus had not stopped there; but having passed through it, continued his retreat

to the place where the army had encamped the day before, which was about four leagues distant.

Tissaphernes, after the defeat of the greatest part of his left wing by the Greeks, led on the rest against them, and by the side of the river, passed through the light-armed infantry of the Greeks, who opened to give him passage, and charged him as he passed, without losing a man. They were commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, who was esteemed an able captain. Tissaphernes kept on without returning to the charge, because he perceived he was too weak, and went forward to the camp of Cyrus, where he found the king, who was plundering it; but had not been able to force the quarter defended by the Greeks left to guard it, who saved their baggage.

The Greeks on their side, and Artaxerxes on his, who did not know what had passed elsewhere, each believed that they had gained the victory; the first because they had put the enemy to flight, and pursued them; and the king, because he had killed his brother, beat the troops he had fought, and plundered their camp. The event was soon cleared up on both sides. Tissaphernes, upon his arrival at the camp, informed the king that the Greeks had defeated his left wing, and pursued it with great vigor; and the Greeks on their side learned that the king, in pursuing Cyrus's left, had penetrated into the camp. Upon this advice the king rallied his troops, and marched in quest of the enemy; and Clearchus being returned from pursuing the Persians, advanced to support the camp.

The two armies were soon very near each other, when by a movement made by the king, he seemed to intend to charge the Greeks by their left, who, fearing to be surrounded on all sides, wheeled about, and halted with the river in their rear to prevent their being attacked in that direction. On seeing which, the king changed his form of battle also, drew up his army in front of them, and marched on to the attack. As soon as the Greeks saw him approach, they began to sing the hymn of battle, and advanced against the enemy even with more ardor than in the first action.

The barbarians again retired farther than before, and were pursued to a village at the foot of a hill, upon which their horse halted. The king's standard was observed to be there, which was a golden eagle upon the top of a pike, having its wings displayed. The Greeks preparing to pursue them, they abandoned also the hill, fled precipitately, with

their troops entirely broken, and in the utmost disorder and confusion. Clearchus, having drawn up the Greeks at the bottom of the hill, ordered Lysias the Syracusan and another to go up to it, and observe what passed in the slain. They returned with an account that the enemies fled on all sides, and their whole army was routed.

As it was almost night, the Greeks laid down their arms to rest themselves, much surprised, that neither Cyrus nor any one from him appeared; and imagining that he was either engaged in the pursuit of the enemy, or was making haste to possess himself of some important place, for they were still ignorant of his death, and the defeat of the rest of his army; they determined therefore to return to their camp, and found the greatest part of the baggage taken, with all the provisions, and four hundred wagons laden with corn and wine, which Cyrus had expressly caused to be carried along with the army, for the Greeks, in case of any pressing necessity. They passed the night in the camp, the greatest part of them, without any refreshment, concluding that Cyrus was alive and victorious.

The success of this battle shows the superiority of valor and military knowledge over a multitude without them. The small army of the Greeks did not amount to more than twelve or thirteen thousand men; but they were veteran and disciplined troops, inured to fatigues, accustomed to confront dangers, sensible to glory, and who, during the long Peloponnesian war, had not wanted either time or means to acquire and complete themselves in the art of war, and the different orders of battle. The army of Artaxerxes was computed at a million of men; but they were soldiers only in name, without force, courage, discipline, experience, or any sense of honor. Hence it was, that as soon as the Greeks appeared, terror and disorder ensued among the enemy; and in the second action, Artaxerxes himself did not dare to wait their attack, but shamefully betook himself to flight.

Plutarch here greatly blames Clearchus, the general of the Greeks, and imputes to him as an unpardonable neglect, his not having followed Cyrus's order, who recommended to him above all things to incline, and charge Artaxerxes in person. This reproach seems groundless. It is not easy to conceive how it was possible for that captain, who was posted on the right wing, to attack Artaxerxes immediately, who, in the centre of his own army, lay beyond the utmost

extent of the enemy's left, as has been said before. It seems that Cyrus, depending as he did with great reason upon the valor of the Greeks, and desiring they should charge Artaxerxes in his post, ought to have placed them in the left wing, which was directly opposite where the king was posted; that is, to the main body, and not in the right, which was very remote from it.

Clearchus may indeed be reproached with having followed the pursuit too warmly and too long. If, after having thrown the left wing, which opposed him, into disorder, he had charged the rest of the enemy in flank, and had opened his way to the centre, where Artaxerxes was, it is highly probable that he had gained a complete victory, and placed Cyrus upon the throne. The six hundred horse of that prince's guard committed the same fault; and by pursuing the body of troops they had put to flight too eagerly, left their master almost alone, and abandoned to the mercy of the enemy; without considering that they were chosen from the whole army for the immediate guard of his person, and for no other purpose whatever. Too much ardor is often prejudicial in a battle; and it is the duty of an able general to know how to restrain and direct it.

Cyrus himself erred highly in this respect, and abandoned himself too much to his blind passion for glory and revenge. In running headlong to attack his brother, he forgot that there is a wide difference between a general and a private soldier. He ought not to have exposed himself, but as it was consistent with a prince; as the head, not the hand; as the person who was to give orders, and not as those who were to execute them.

I speak in this manner after judges in the art of war; and would not choose to advance my own opinion upon things out of my sphere.

SECTION III.—EULOGY OF CYRUS.

Xenophon gives us a magnificent character of Cyrus; and that, not upon the credit of others, but from what he saw and knew of him in his own person. "He was," says he, "in the opinion of all who were acquainted with him, after Cyrus the Great, a prince the most worthy of the supreme authority, and had the most noble and most truly royal soul. From his infancy he surpassed all of his own age in every exercise, whether it were in managing the

horse, drawing the bow, throwing the dart, or in the chase, in which he distinguished himself once by fighting and killing a bear that attacked him. Those advantages were exalted in him by the nobleness of his air and engaging aspect, and by all the graces of nature that conduce to commend merit.*

When his father had made him satrap of Lydia, and the neighboring provinces, Great Phrygia and Cappadocia, his chief care was to make the people sensible that he had nothing so much at heart as to keep his word inviolably, not only with regard to public treaties, but the most minute of his promises; a quality very rare among princes, but which however is the basis of all good government, and the source of their own, as well as their people's happiness. Not only the places under his authority, but the enemy themselves, reposed an entire confidence in him.

Whether good or ill were done him, he always desired to return it double, and that he might live no longer, as he said himself, than till he surpassed his friends in benefits, and his enemies in vengeance. (It had been more glorious for him to have overcome the latter by the force of favor and benevolence.) Nor was there ever a prince that his people were more afraid to offend, nor for whose sake they were more ready to hazard their possessions, lives, and fortunes.

Less intent upon being feared than beloved, his study was to make his greatness appear only where it was useful and beneficial, and to extinguish all sentiments, except those which flow from gratitude and affection. He was industrious to do good upon all occasions, to confer his favors with judgment and in season and to show that he thought himself rich, powerful, and happy, only as he made others sensible of his being so, by his benevolence and liberality. But he took care not to exhaust the means by an imprudent profusion. He did not lavish, but distributed his favors.† He chose rather to make his liberalities the rewards of merit, than mere donations; and that they should be subservient in promoting virtue, and not in supporting the soft and abject sloth of vice.

He was particularly pleased with conferring his favors upon valiant men; and governments and rewards were only bestowed on those who had distinguished themselves by

* De Exped. l. i. pp. 266, 267.

† Habebat sinum facilem non perforatum: ex quo multa exeunt, nihil excidat.—Senec. de Vit. Beat. 133.

their actions. He never granted any honor or dignity to favor, intrigue, or faction, but to merit only; upon which depends not only the glory, but the prosperity of governments. By these means he soon made virtue estimable, and the pursuit of men, and rendered vice contemptible and horrid. The provinces, animated with a noble emulation to deserve, furnished him, in a very short time, with a considerable number of excellent subjects of every kind, who under a different government would have remained unknown, obscure and useless.

Never did any one know how to oblige with a better grace, or to win the hearts of those who could serve him with more engaging behavior. As he was fully sensible that he stood in need of the assistance of others for the execution of his designs, he thought justice and gratitude required that he should render his adherents all the services in his power. All the presents made him, whether of splendid arms or rich apparel, he distributed among his friends, according to their several tastes or occasions: and used to say that the brightest ornament and most exalted riches of a prince consisted in adorning and enriching those who served him well. "In fact," says Xenophon, "to do good to one's friends, and to excel them in liberality, does not seem so admirable in so high a fortune; but to transcend them in goodness of heart and sentiments of friendship and affection, and to take more pleasure in conferring than receiving obligations; in this I find Cyrus truly worthy of esteem and admiration. The first of these advantages he derives from his rank; and the other from himself, and his intrinsic merit."

By these extraordinary qualities he acquired the universal esteem and affection, as well of the Greeks as barbarians. A great proof of what Xenophon here says, is, that none ever quitted the service of Cyrus for the king's; whereas great numbers went over daily to him from the king's party after the war was declared; and even of such as had most influence at the court, because they were all convinced that Cyrus knew best how to distinguish and reward their services.

It is most certain that young Cyrus did not want great virtues; and a superior merit; but I am surprised that Xenophon, in drawing his character, has described only the most beautiful features, and such as are proper to excite our admiration of him, without saying the least word of his

defects, and especially of that immoderate ambition that was the soul of all his actions, and which at length put arms into his hands against his elder brother and king. It is allowable in a historian, whose chief duty it is to paint virtue and vice in their proper colors, to relate at large an enterprise of such a nature, without intimating the least dislike or imputation against it? But with the pagans, ambition was so far from being considered as a vice, that it often passed for a virtue

SECTION IV.—THE KING IS FOR COMPELLING THE GREEKS
TO DELIVER UP THEIR ARMS.

The Greeks having learned, the day after the battle, that Cyrus was dead, sent deputies to Ariæus, the general of the barbarians, who had retired with his troops to the place from whence they had marched the day before the action, to offer him, as victor, the crown of Persia in the room of Cyrus. At the same time arrived Persian heralds at arms from the king, to summon them to deliver up their arms; to whom they answered with a haughty air, that they used a strange language to conquerors; that if the king would have their arms, he might come and take them if he could; but that they would die before they would part with them; that if he would receive them into the number of his allies, they would serve him with fidelity and valor; but if he imagined to reduce them into slavery as conquered, he might know they had wherewithal to defend themselves, and were determined to lose their lives and liberty together.* The heralds added that they had orders to tell them that, if they continued in the place where they were, they would be allowed a suspension of arms; but that if they advanced or retired, they would be treated as enemies. The Greeks, after having consulted among themselves, were asked by the heralds what answer they should report. "Peace in continuing here, or war in marching," replied Clearchus, without explaining himself farther; from the view of keeping the king always in suspense and uncertainty.†

The answer of Ariæus to the Grecian deputies was that there were many Persians more considerable than himself. who would not suffer him upon the throne, and that he should set out early the next day to return to Ionia; that

* *Sin ut victis servitium indiceretur, esse sibi ferrum et juventutem, et promptum liberati aut ad mortem animum.*—Tacit. *Annal.* l. iv. c. 46.

† Xenoph. in *Exped. Cyr.* l. ii. pp. 272–292. Diod. l. xiv. pp. 255–257.

if they would march thither with him, they might join him in the night. Clearchus, with the advice of the officers, prepared to depart. He commanded from thenceforth, as being the sole person of sufficient capacity; for he had not been actually elected general in chief.

The same night, Miltiocytes the Thracian, who commanded forty horse, and about three hundred foot of his own country, went and surrendered himself to the king; the rest of the Greeks began their march under the conduct of Clearchus, and arrived about midnight at the camp of Ariæus. After they had drawn up in battle, the principal officers waited on him at his tent, where they swore alliance with him; and the barbarian engaged to conduct the army without fraud. In confirmation of the treaty, they sacrificed a wolf, a ram, a boar, and a bull; the Greeks dipped their swords, and the barbarians the points of their javelins, in the blood of the victims.

Ariæus did not think proper to return by the same rout they came; because, having found nothing for their subsistence the last seventeen days of their march, they must have suffered much more had they taken the same way back again. He therefore took another; exhorting them only to make long marches at first, in order to evade the king's pursuit; which they could not otherwise effect. Towards evening, when they were not far from some villages where they proposed to halt, the scouts came in with advice that they had seen several equipages and convoys, which made it reasonable to suppose that the enemy were not far off: upon which they stood their ground, and waited their coming up; and the next day before sunrise, drew up in the same order as in the preceding battle. So bold an appearance terrified the king, who sent heralds, not to demand as before the surrender of their arms, but to propose peace and a treaty. Clearchus, who was informed of their arrival while he was busy in drawing up his troops, gave orders to bid them wait, and to tell them that he was not yet at leisure to hear them. He assumed purposely an air of haughtiness and grandeur, to denote his intrepidity, and at the same time to show the fine appearance and good condition of his phalanx. When he advanced with the most showy of his officers, expressly chosen for the occasion, and had heard what the heralds had to propose, he made answer, that they must begin with giving battle, because the army, being in want of provisions, had no time to lose. The heralds, having carried back this

answer to their master, returned immediately ; which showed that the king, or whoever spoke in his name, was not very distant. They said they had orders to conduct them to villages, where they should find provisions in abundance, and conducted them thither accordingly.

The army stayed there three days, during which Tissaphernes arrived from the king with the queen's brother, and three other Persian grandees, attended by a great number of officers and domestics. After having saluted the generals, who advanced to receive him, he told them by his interpreter, that being a neighbor of Greece, and seeing them engaged in dangers out of which it would be difficult to extricate themselves, he had used his good offices with the king to obtain permission to reconduct them into their own country ; being convinced, that neither themselves nor their cities would ever be unmindful of that favor ; that the king, without having declared himself positively upon that head, had commanded him to come to them, to know for what cause they had taken arms against him ; and he advised them to make the king such an answer as might not give any offence, and might enable him to do them service. " We call the gods to witness," replied Clearchus, " that we did not enlist ourselves to make war with the king, or to march against him. Cyrus, concealing his true motives under different pretexts, brought us almost hither without explaining himself, the better to surprise you. And when we saw him surrounded with dangers, we thought it infamous to abandon him, after the favors we had received from him. But as he is dead, we are released from our engagement, and neither desire to contest the crown with Artaxerxes, nor to ravage his country, provided he does not oppose our return. However, if we are attacked, we shall endeavor, with the assistance of the gods, to make a good defence ; and shall not be ungrateful in regard to those who render us any service." Tissaphernes replied, that he would let the king know what they said, and return with his answer. But his not coming the next day gave the Greeks some anxiety : he however arrived on the third, and told them, that after much controversy, he had at length obtained the king's grace for them : for that it had been represented to the king, that he ought not to suffer people to return with impunity into their own country, who had been so insolent as to come thither to make war upon him. " In fine," said he, " you may now assure yourselves of not finding any

obstacles to your return, and of being supplied with provisions, or suffered to buy them : and you may judge that you are to pass without committing any disorders in your march, and that you are to take only what is necessary, provided you are not furnished with it." These conditions were sworn to on both sides. Tissaphernes and the queen's brother gave their hands to the colonels and captains, in token of amity. After which Tissaphernes withdrew, to dispose his affairs ; promising to return as soon as they would admit, in order to go back with them into his government.

The Greeks waited for him above twenty days, continuing encamped near Ariæus, who received frequent visits from his brothers and other relations, as did the officers of his army from the Persians of the different party ; who assured them from the king of an entire oblivion of the past ; so that the friendship of Ariæus for the Greeks appeared to cool every day more and more. This change gave them cause of uneasiness. Several of the officers went to Clearchus and the other generals, and said to them, " What do we here any longer ? Are we not sensible that the king desires to see us all perish, that others may be terrified by our example ? Perhaps he keeps us waiting here, till he re-assembles his dispersed troops, or sends to seize the passes in our way ; for he will never suffer us to return into Greece, to divulge our own glory and his shame." Clearchus made answer to this discourse, that to depart without consulting the king, was to break with him, and declare war by violating the treaty ; that they should remain without a conductor in a country where nobody would supply them with provisions ; that Ariæus would abandon them ; and that even their friends would become their enemies ; that he did not know but there might be other rivers to pass ; and that, though the Euphrates were the only one, they would not get over it, were the passage ever so little disputed : that if it were necessary to come to a battle, they should find themselves without cavalry against an enemy that had a very numerous and excellent body of horse ; so that if they gained the victory, they could make no great advantage of it, and if they were overcome, they were utterly and irretrievably lost. " Besides, why should the king, who has so many other means to destroy us, engage his word only to violate it, and thereby render himself execrable in the sight of gods and men ? "

Tissaphernes, however, arrived with his troops, in order to return into his government; and they set forward all together under the conduct of that satrap, who supplied them with provisions. Ariæus, with his troops, encamped with the barbarians, and the Greeks separately at some distance, which kept up a continual distrust among them. Besides which there happened frequent quarrels for wood or forage, that augmented their aversion for each other. After three days march, they arrived at the wall of Media, which is one hundred feet high, twenty broad, and twenty leagues * in extent, all built of bricks, cemented with bitumen, like the walls of Babylon, from which it was not very distant at one of its extremities. When they had passed it, they marched eight leagues in two days, and came to the river Tigris, after having crossed two of its canals, cut expressly for watering the country. They then passed the Tigris upon a bridge of twenty-seven boats near Sitacum, a very great and populous city.† After four days march they arrived at another city, very powerful also, called Opis. They found there a bastard brother of Artaxerxes with a very considerable body of troops, which he was bringing from Susa and Ecbatana to his aid. He admired the fine order of the Greeks. From thence, having passed the deserts of Media, they came, after a march of six days, to a place called the lands of Parysatis; the revenues of which appertained to that princess. Tissaphernes, to insult the memory of her son Cyrus, so dearly beloved by her, gave the villages to be plundered by the Greeks. Continuing their march through the desert on the side of the Tigris, which they had on their left, they arrived at Cænæ, a very great and rich city, and from thence at the river Zabates.

The occasions of distrust increased every day between the Greeks and barbarians. Clearchus thought it incumbent on him to come to a final explanation with Tissaphernes. He began by observing the sacred and inviolable nature of the treaties subsisting between them. "Can a man," said he, "conscious of the guilt of perjury, be capable of living at ease? How would he shun the wrath of the gods, the witnesses of treaties, and escape their vengeance, whose power is universal?" He added afterwards many things to

* Twenty parasangas.

† The march of the Greeks, and the rest of the army, from the day after the battle till the passing of the Tigris, abounds in the text of Xenophon with very great obscurities, to explain which fully, requires a long dissertation. My plan does not permit me to enter into such discussions, which I must therefore refer to those who are more able than I am.

prove, that the Greeks were obliged by their own interest to continue faithful to him, and that by renouncing his alliance, they must first inevitably renounce, not only all religion, but reason and common sense. Tissaphernes seemed to relish this discourse, and spoke to him with all the appearance of the most perfect sincerity; insinuating at the same time, that some person had done him bad offices with him. "If you will bring your officers hither," said he, "I will show you those who have wronged you in their representations." He kept him to supper, and professed more friendship for him than ever.

The next day, Clearchus proposed, in the assembly, to go with the several commanders of the troops to Tissaphernes. He suspected Menon in particular, whom he knew to have had a secret conference with the satrap in the presence of Ariæus; besides which, they had already differed several times with each other. Some objected that it was not proper that all the generals should go to Tissaphernes, and that it did not consist with prudence to rely implicitly upon the professions of a barbarian. But Clearchus continued to insist upon what he had moved, till it was agreed, that the four other commanders, with twenty captains, and about two hundred soldiers, under the pretext of buying provisions in the Persian camp, where there was a market, should be sent along with him. When they came to the tent of Tissaphernes, the five commanders, Clearchus, Menon, Proxenes, Agias, and Socrates, were suffered to enter; but the captains remained without the door. Immediately, on a certain signal before agreed on, those within were seized and the others put to the sword. Some Persian horse afterwards scoured the country, and killed all the Greeks they met, whether freemen or slaves. Clearchus and the other generals were sent to the king, who ordered their heads to be struck off. Xenophon describes with sufficient extent the characters of these officers.

Clearchus was valiant, bold, intrepid, and of a capacity for forming great enterprises. His courage was not rash, but directed by prudence, and retained all the coolness of his temper and presence of mind in the midst of the greatest dangers. He loved the troops, and let them want for nothing. He knew how to make them obey him, but out of fear. His mein was awful and severe; his language rough, his punishment instant and rigorous: he gave way sometimes to passion, but presently came to himself, and always

chastised with justice. His great maxim was, that nothing could be done in an army without a severe discipline; and from him came the saying, that a soldier ought to fear his general more than the enemy. The troops esteemed his valor, and did justice to his merit; but they were afraid of his humor, and did not love to serve under him.* “In a word,” says Xenophon, “the soldiers feared him as scholars do a severe pedagogue.” We may say of him with Tacitus, that by an access of severity, he made what had otherwise been well done by him, unamiable; “Cupidine severitatis, in his etiam quæ rite faceret, acerbus.” †

Proxenes was of Bœotia. From his infancy he aspired to great objects, and was industrious to make himself capable of them. He spared no means for the attainment of instruction, and was the disciple of Georgias the Leontine, a celebrated rhetorician, who sold his lectures at a very high price. When he found himself capable of commanding, and of doing good to his friends, as well as of being served by them, he entered into the service of Cyrus with the view of advancing himself. He did not want ambition, but would take no other path to glory than that of virtue. He would have been a perfect captain, if he had had to act with none but brave and disciplined men, and it had been only necessary to be beloved. He was more apprehensive of being in the displeasure of his soldiers, than his soldiers in his. He thought it sufficient for a commander to praise good actions, without punishing bad ones; for which reason, he was beloved by the worthy; but those of a different character abused his gentleness. He died at thirty years of age.

Could the two great persons we have here drawn, after Xenophon, have been moulded into one, something perfect might have been made of them; retrenching their several defects, and retaining only their virtues; ‡ but it rarely happens, that the same man, as Tacitus says of Agricola, behaves, according to the exigency of times and circumstances, sometimes with gentleness, and sometimes with severity, without lessening his authority by the former, or the affection of the people by the latter.§

Menon was a Thessalian, avaricious and ambitious, but

* *Manebat admiratio viri et fama; sed oderunt.*—Tacit. Hist. l. ii. c. 68.

† Tacit. Annal. c. lxxv.

‡ *Egregium principatus temperamentum, si, demptis utriusque vitiis, solæ virtutes miscerentur.*—Tacit. Hist. l. ii. c. 5.

§ *Pro variis temporibus ac negotiis severus et comis nec illi, quod est rarissimum, aut facilitas auctoritatem aut severitas amorem, diminuit.*—Tacit. in Agric. c. ix.

ambitious only from the motive of avarice, pursuing honor and estimation for the mere lucre of money. He courted the friendship of the great, and persons in authority, that he might have it in his power to commit injustice and oppression with impunity. To obtain his ends, all means with him were virtue; falsehood, fraud, perjury; while sincerity and integrity of heart were by him esteemed weakness and stupidity. He loved nobody; and if he professed friendship, it was only to deceive. As others made their glory consist in religion, probity, and honor, he valued himself upon injustice, deceit, and treachery. He gained the favor of the great by false reports, whispering with calumny; and that of the soldiery by licence and impunity. In fine, he endeavored to render himself terrible by the mischief it was in his power to do, and imagined he favored those to whom he did none.

I had thought to have retrenched these characters, which interrupt the thread of the history, but as they are a lively image of the manners of men, which in all times are the same, I thought retaining them would neither be useless nor disagreeable to the reader.

SECTION V.—RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS FROM THE PROVINCE OF BABYLON TO TREBISOND.

The generals of the Greeks having been seized, and the officers who attended them massacred, the troops were in great consternation. They were five or six hundred leagues from Greece, surrounded with great rivers and hostile nations, without any supplies of provisions. In this state of general dejection, they could not think of taking either nourishment or repose. In the middle of the night, Xenophon, a young Athenian, but of prudence and capacity superior to his years, went to some of the officers, and represented to them, that they had no time to lose; that it was of the last importance to prevent the bad designs of the enemy; that however small their number, they would render themselves formidable, if they behaved with boldness and resolution; that valor and not multitude determines the success of arms; and that it was necessary above all things to nominate generals immediately: because an army without commanders is like a body without a soul. A council was immediately held, at which a hundred officers were present, and Xenophon being desired to speak, deduced the reasons at large which he had first but lightly touched upon; and by his advice com-

manders were appointed. They were, Timasion for Clearchus, Zanthicles for Socrates, Cleanor for Agias, Philesius for Menon, and Xenophon for Proxenes.*

Before the break of day, they assembled the army. The generals made speeches to animate the troops, and Xenophon among the rest. "Fellow-soldiers," said he, "the loss of so many brave men by vile treachery, and the being abandoned by our friends, is very deplorable; but we must not sink under our misfortunes, and, if we cannot conquer, let us choose rather to perish gloriously than to fall into the hands of barbarians who would inflict upon us the greatest miseries. Let us call to mind the glorious battles of Plataeæ, Thermopylæ, Salamin, and the many others wherein our ancestors, though with a small number, have fought and defeated the innumerable armies of the Persians, and thereby rendered the name alone of Greek forever formidable. It is to their invincible valor we owe the honor we possess of acknowledging no masters upon earth but the gods, nor any happiness but what consists with liberty. Those gods, the avengers of perjury, and witnesses of the enemy's treason, will be favorable to us; and as they are attacked in the violation of treaties, and take pleasure in humbling the proud and exalting the low, they will also follow us to battle, and combat for us. For the rest, fellow-soldiers, as we have no refuge but in victory, which must be our hope, and will make us ample amends for whatever it costs to attain it; I should believe, if it were your opinion, that for making a more ready and less difficult retreat, it would be very proper to rid ourselves of all the useless baggage, and to keep only what is absolutely necessary in our march." All the soldiers that moment lifted up their hands, to signify their approbation and consent to all that had been said, and without loss of time set fire to their tents and carriages; such of them as had too much equipage giving it to others who had too little, and destroying the rest.

It was resolved to march the army without tumult or violence, if their return was not opposed, but otherwise, to force themselves a passage through the enemy. They began their march in the form of a great hollow square, with the baggage in the centre. Chirisophus, the Lacedæmonian, had the vanguard; two of the oldest captains the right and left; and Timasion with Xenophon were posted in the rear, as the youngest officers. The first day was difficult; because,

* Xenoph. in *Exped. Cyr.* l. iii. et iv.

having neither horse nor slingers, they were extremely harassed by a detachment sent against them: but they provided against that inconvenience by following Xenophon's advice. They chose two hundred men out of the Rhodians in the army, whom they armed with slings, and augmented their pay for their encouragement. They could throw as far again as the Persians, because they discharged balls of lead, and the others made use of large flints. They mounted also a squadron of fifty men upon the horses intended for the baggage, and supplied their places with other beasts of burden. By the means of this supply, a second detachment of the enemy were very severely handled.

After some days march, Tissaphernes appeared with all his forces. He contented himself with harassing the Greeks, who moved on continually. The latter, observing the difficulty of retreating in a hollow square, in the face of the enemy, from the unevenness of ground, hedges, and other obstacles, which might oblige them to break it, changed their order of battle, and marched in two columns, with the little baggage they had in the space between them. They formed a body of reserve of six hundred chosen men, whom they divided into six companies, and sub-divided by fifties and tens, to facilitate their motions according to occasion. When the columns came close to each other, they either remained in the rear or filed off upon the flanks on both sides, to avoid disorder; and when they opened, they fell into the void space in the rear between the columns. Upon any occasion of attack they immediately ran where it was necessary. The Greeks stood several charges, but they were neither considerable nor attended with much loss.

They arrived at the river Tigris. As its depth would not admit them to pass it without boats, they were obliged to cross the Carducian mountains, because there was no other way, and the prisoners reported that from thence they would enter Armenia, where they might pass the Tigris at its source, and afterwards the Euphrates, not very distant from it. To gain these defiles before the enemy could seize them, it was thought proper to set forward in the night, in order to arrive at the foot of the mountains by the break of day, which was done accordingly. Chirisophus continued at the head of the advanced guard, with the troops armed with missive weapons, besides his ordinary corps, and Xenophon in the rear, with only the heavy-armed soldiers, because at that time there was nothing to fear on that side.

The inhabitants of the country had taken possession of several of the heights, from whence it was necessary to drive them, which could not be done without great danger and difficulty.

The officers, having held a council of war, were of opinion that it was proper to leave behind them all the beasts of burden not absolutely necessary, with all the slaves lately taken, because they would retard their march too much in the great defiles they had to pass, besides which, it required a greater quantity of provisions to support them, and those who had the care of the beasts were useless in flight. That regulation was executed without delay, and they continued their march, sometimes fighting, and sometimes halting. The passing of the mountains, which took up seven days, fatigued the troops exceedingly, and occasioned some loss, but at length they arrived at villages where they found provisions in abundance, and rested some days to recover the severe fatigues the army had suffered, in comparison with which all they had undergone in Persia was trivial.

They found themselves soon after exposed to new danger. Almost at the foot of the mountains they came to a river, two hundred feet in breadth, called Centrites, which stopped their march. They had to defend themselves against the enemy, who pursued them in the rear, and the Armenians, the soldiers of the country, who defended the opposite side of the river. They attempted in vain to pass it in a place where the water came up to their arm-pits, and were carried away by the rapidity of the current, which the weight of their arms made them unable to resist. By good fortune they discovered another place not so deep, where some soldiers had seen the people of the country pass. It required abundance of address, diligence, and valor, to keep off the enemy on both sides of them. The army, however, passed the river at length without much loss.

They marched afterwards with less interruption, passed the source of the Tigris, and arrived at the little river Teleboa, which is very beautiful, and has many villages on its banks. Here began the western Armenia, which was governed by Tiribasus, a satrap much beloved by the king, and who had the honor to help him to mount on horseback when at the court : * he offered to let the army pass, and to suffer the soldiers to take all they wanted, upon condition that

* The French translator of Xenophon says, "he held the king's stirrup when he got on horseback," without considering that the ancients used none.

they should commit no ravages in their march, which proposal was accepted and ratified on each side. Tiribasis kept always a flying camp at a small distance from the army. There fell a great quantity of snow, which gave the troops some inconvenience, and they learned from a prisoner that Tiribasis had a design to attack the Greeks at a pass of the mountains, in a defile through which they must necessarily march. They prevented him by seizing that post, after having put the enemy to flight. After some days' march through deserts, they passed the Euphrates near its source, not having the water above their middles.

They suffered exceedingly afterwards from north wind, which blew in their faces, and prevented respiration, so that it was thought necessary to sacrifice to the wind, upon which it seemed to abate. They marched on in snow five or six feet deep, which killed several servants and beasts of burden, besides thirty soldiers. They made fires during the night, for they found plenty of wood. All the next day, they continued their march through the snow; when many of them, from the excess of hunger, followed with languor or fainting, continued lying upon the ground, through weakness and want of spirits. When something had been given them to eat, they found themselves relieved, and continued their march.

The enemy still pursued them; many of whom, overtaken by the night, remained on the way without fire or provisions, so that several died of their hardships, and the enemy who followed them took some baggage. Some soldiers were also left behind, who had lost their sight, and others their toes, by the snow. Against the first evil it was good to wear something black before the eyes: and against the other, to keep the legs always in motion, and to bare the feet at night. Arriving in a more commodious place, they dispersed themselves into the neighboring villages, to recover and repose after their fatigues. The houses were built under ground, with an opening at top, like a well, through which the descent was by a ladder; but there was another entrance for cattle. They found there, sheep, cows, goats, and poultry; with wheat, barley, and pulse; and for drink, there was beer, which was very strong, when not mingled with water, but was agreeable to those who were used to it. They drank this with a reed out of the vessels that held the beer, upon which they saw the barley swim. The master of the house where Xenophon lay, re-

ceived him very kindly, and even showed him where he had concealed some wine ; besides which, he made him a present of several horses. He taught him also to fasten a kind of hurdles to their feet, and to do the same to the other beasts of burden, to prevent their sinking in the snow ; without which, they would have been up to the girth in it at every step. The army, after having rested seven days in these villages, resumed their route.

After a march of seven days, they arrived at the river Araxes, called also the Phasus, which is about one hundred feet in breadth. Two days after, they discovered the Phasians, the Chalybes, and the Toachians, who kept the pass of the mountains, to prevent their descending into the plain. They saw it was impossible to avoid coming to a battle with them, and resolved to give it the same day. Xenophon, who had observed that the enemy defended only the ordinary passage, and that the mountain was three leagues in extent, proposed sending a detachment to take possession of the heights that commanded the enemy ; which would not be difficult, as they might prevent all suspicion of their design by a march in the night, and by making a false attack by the main road, to amuse the barbarians. This was accordingly executed, the enemy put to flight, and the pass cleared.

They crossed the country of the Chalybes, who were the most valiant of all the barbarians in those parts. When they killed an enemy, they cut off his head, and carried it about in triumph, singing and dancing. They kept themselves close shut up in their cities ; and when the army marched, fell suddenly upon the rear, after having carried every thing of value in the country into places of safety. After twelve or fifteen days' march, they arrived at a very high mountain, called Tecqua, from whence they descried the sea. The first who perceived it, raised great shouts of joy for a considerable time, which caused Xenophon to imagine that the vanguard was attacked, and go up with all haste to support it. As he approached nearer, the cry of "the sea ! the sea !" was heard distinctly, and the alarm changed into joy and gayety ; and when they came to the top, nothing was heard but a confused noise of the whole army crying out together, "the sea ! the sea !" while they could not refrain from tears, nor from embracing their generals and officers. And then, without waiting for orders, they heaped up a pile of stones, and erected a trophy with broken bucklers and other arms.

From thence they advanced to the mountains of Colchis, one of which was higher than the rest ; and of that the people of the country had possessed themselves. The Greeks drew up in order of battle at the bottom of it to ascend, for the access was not impracticable. Xenophon did not judge it proper to march in line of battle, but by files ; because the soldiers could not keep their ranks from the inequality of the ground, being in some places easy, and in others difficult to climb, which might discourage them. That advice was approved, and the army formed according to it. The heavy armed troops amounted to eighty files, each consisting of about one hundred men, with eighteen hundred light-armed soldiers, divided into three bodies, one of which was posted on the right, another on the left, and a third in the centre. After having encouraged his troops, by representing to them that this was the last obstacle they had to surmount, and implored the assistance of the gods, the army began to ascend the hill. The enemy were not able to support their charge, and dispersed. They passed the mountain and encamped in villages, where they found provisions in abundance.

A very strange accident happened there to the army, which threw them into great consternation. For the soldiers finding abundance of bee hives in that place, and eating the honey, they were taken with violent vomitings and fluxes, attended with raving fits : so that those who were least ill, seemed like drunken men, and the rest either furiously mad or dying. The earth was strewn with their bodies as after a defeat : however, none of them died, and the distemper ceased the next day about the same hour it had taken them. The third or fourth day the soldiers got up, but in the condition people are in after having taken a violent medicine.

Two days after, the army arrived near Trebisonde, a Greek colony of Sinopians, situated upon the Euxine or Black Sea, in the province of Colchis. Here they lay encamped for thirty days, and acquitted themselves of the vows they had made to Jupiter, Hercules, and the other deities, to obtain a happy return into their own country. They also celebrated the games of the horse and foot races, wrestling, boxing, and the pancratium ; the whole attended with the greatest joy and solemnity.

SECTION VI.—THE GREEKS ARRIVE UPON THE SEA COAST OPPOSITE TO BYZANTIUM. XENOPHON JOINS THIMBRON.

After having offered sacrifices to the several divinities.

and celebrated the games, they deliberated upon the proper measures for their return into Greece.* They concluded on going thither by sea; and for that purpose Chirisophus offered to go to Anaxibius, the admiral of Sparta, who was his friend, to obtain ships from him. He set out directly; and Xenophon regulated the order it was necessary to observe, and the precautions to be taken for the security of the camp, provisions, and forage. He believed it also proper to make sure of some vessels besides those that were expected, and made some expeditions against the neighboring people.

As Chirisophus did not return so soon as was expected, and provisions began to be wanting, it was resolved to proceed by land; because there was not a sufficient number of ships to transport the whole army, and those which the precaution of Xenophon had procured, were allotted to carry the women, the old and sick men, with all the unnecessary baggage. The army continued its march, and lay ten days at Cerasus,† where there was a general review of the troops, who were found to amount to eight thousand six hundred men, out of about ten thousand; the rest having died in the retreat, of their wounds, fatigues, or diseases.

During the short time the Greeks remained in these parts, several disputes arose with the inhabitants of the country as well as with some of the officers, who were jealous of Xenophon's authority, and endeavored to render him odious to the army. But his wisdom and moderation put a stop to these disorders; having made the soldiers sensible that their safety depended upon preserving union and a good understanding among themselves, and obedience to their generals.

From Cerasus they went to Cotyora, which is at no great distance from it. They there deliberated again upon the proper measures for their return. The inhabitants of the country represented the almost insuperable difficulties of going by land, from the defiles and rivers they had to pass, and offered to supply the Greeks with ships. This seemed the best expedient; and the army embarked accordingly. They arrived the next day at Sinope, a city of Paphlagonia, and a colony of the Milesians. Chirisophus repaired thither with galleys, but without money, though the troops expected

* Xenoph. l. iii.

† The city of Cerasus became famous on account of the cherry-trees, which Lucullus first brought into Italy, and which from thence have been dispersed all over the western world.

to receive some. He assured them that the army should be paid, as soon as they were out of the Euxine sea; and that their retreat was universally celebrated, and the subject of the discourse and admiration of all Greece.

The soldiers, finding themselves near enough to Greece, desired to make some booty before they arrived there, and with that view resolved to nominate a general with full authority; whereas, till then, all affairs were determined in the council of war by the plurality of voices. They cast their eyes upon Xenophon, and caused him to be desired to accept that office. He was not insensible of the honor of commanding in chief; but he foresaw the consequences, and desired time to consider. After having expressed the highest sense of gratitude for an offer so much to his honor, he represented, that to avoid jealousy and division, the success of affairs, and the interest of the army, seemed to require that they should choose a Lacedæmonian for their general; and that the Spartan state, which at that time actually governed Greece, would, in consideration of that choice, be disposed to support them. This argument did not please them; and they objected to it, that they were far from intending a servile dependence upon Sparta, or to submit to regulate their enterprises by the pleasure or dislike of that state; and pressed him again to accept the command. He was then obliged to explain himself sincerely, and without evasion; and declared, that having consulted the gods by sacrifice, upon the offer they made him, they had manifested their will by evident signs, from which it appeared that they did not approve their choice. It was surprising to see the impression which the sole mention of the gods made upon the soldiers, otherwise very warm and tenacious; and who besides are commonly but little affected with motives of religion. Their great ardor abated immediately; and without making any reply, they proceeded to elect Chirisophus, though a Lacedæmonian, for their general.

His authority was of no long continuance. Discord, as Xenophon had foreseen, arose among the troops, who were angry that their general prevented their plundering the Grecian cities, by which they passed. This disturbance was principally excited by the Peloponnesians, who composed one half of the army, and could not see Xenophon, an Athenian, in authority without pain. Different measures were proposed; but nothing being decided on, the troops

divided themselves into three bodies, of which the Achaians and Arcadians, that is, the Peloponnesians, were the principal, amounting to four thousand five hundred heavy armed foot, with Lycon and Callimachus for their generals. Chirisophus commanded another party of about fourteen hundred men, besides seven hundred light armed infantry. Xenophon had the third, almost equal in number, of which three hundred were light armed soldiers, with about forty horses, which were all the cavalry of the army. The first having obtained ships from the people of Heraclea, a city of Pontus, to whom they had sent to demand them, set out before the rest to obtain some booty, and make a descent in the port of Calpe. Chirisophus, who was sick, marched by land; but without quitting the coast, Xenophon landed at Heraclea, and entered into the heart of the country.

New divisions arose. The imprudence of the troops and their leaders had involved them in difficulties, not without loss; from whence the address of Xenophon extricated them more than once. Being all re-united, after various success, they arrived by land at Chrysopolis in Caledonia, opposite to Byzantium, whither they repaired some days after, having passed the small arm of the sea which separates the two continents. They were on the point of plundering that rich and powerful city, to revenge a fraud and injury which had been done them, and from the hope of enriching themselves at once, when Xenophon made all possible haste thither. He admitted the justness of their revenge; but he made them sensible of the fatal consequences which would attend it. "After your plundering this city, and destroying the Lacedæmonians established in it, you will be deemed the mortal enemies of their republic and of all their allies. Athens, my country, that had four hundred galleys at sea and in the arsenals, when it took up arms against them, great sums of money in its treasury, a revenue of a thousand talents, and was in possession of all the isles of Greece, and of many cities in Europe and Asia, of which this was one, has nevertheless been reduced to yield to their power, and submit to their sway. And do you, who are but a handful of men, hope, without generals, provisions, allies, or any resource, either from Tissaphernes, who has betrayed you, or the king of Persia, whom you have attempted to dethrone, can you hope, I say, in such a condition, to make head against the Lacedæmonians? Let us demand satisfaction from the Byzantines, and not avenge their fault by a

much greater of our own, which must draw upon us inevitable ruin." He was believed, and the affair accommodated.

From thence he led them to Salmydessa, to serve Seuthes, prince of Thrace, who had before solicited him by his envoys to bring troops to his aid, in order to re-establish him in his father's dominions, of which his enemies had deprived him.* He had made Xenophon great promises for himself and his troops; but when they had done him the service he wanted, he was so far from keeping his word, that he did not give them the pay agreed upon. Xenophon reproached him exceedingly with this breach of faith, imputing his perfidy to his minister, Heraclides, who thought to make his court to his master, by saving him a sum of money, at the expense of justice, faith and honesty; qualities which ought to be dearer than all others to a prince, as they contribute the most to his reputation, as well as to the success of affairs and the security of a state. But that treacherous minister, who looked upon honor, probity and justice, as mere chimeras, and that there was nothing real but the possession of much money, had no thought beyond that of enriching himself by any means whatever, and first robbed his master with impunity, and then all his subjects. "However," continued Xenophon, "every wise man, especially when in authority and command, ought to regard justice, probity, and the faith of engagements, as the most precious treasure he can possess, and as an assured resource, and an infallible support, in all the events that can happen." Heraclides was the more in the wrong for acting in this manner with regard to the troops, as he was a native of Greece, and not a Thracian; but avarice had extinguished all sense of honor in him.

While the dispute between Seuthes and Xenophon was warmest, Charminus and Polynices arrived, as ambassadors from Lacedæmon, and brought advice that the republic had declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; that Thimbron had already embarked with the troops, and promised a daric per month to every soldier, two to each officer, and four to the colonels, who should engage in the service. Xenophon accepted the offer; and having obtained from Seuthes, by the mediation of the ambassadors, part of the pay due to him, he went by sea to Lampsacus with the army, which amounted at that time to almost six thousand men.

* Xenoph. l. vii.

From thence he advanced to Pergamus, a city in the province of Troas. Having met near Parthenia, where ended the expedition of the Greeks, a great nobleman returning into Persia, he took him, his wife and children, with all his equipage, and by that means found himself in a condition to bestow great liberalities among the soldiers, and to make them satisfactory amends for all the losses they had sustained. Thimbron at length arrived, who took upon him the command of the troops, and having joined them with his own, marched against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.

Such was the event of the expedition of Cyrus.* Xenophon reckons from the first setting out of the army of that prince from the city of Ephesus, to their arrival where the battle was fought, five hundred and thirty parasangas or leagues, and ninety-three days' march; and in their return from the place of battle to Cotyora, a city upon the coast of the Euxine or Black Sea, six hundred and twenty parasangas or leagues, and a hundred and twenty days' march.† And adding both together, he says, the way, going and coming, was eleven hundred and fifty-five ‡ parasangas or leagues, and two hundred and fifteen days' march; and that the whole time occupied by the army in performing that journey, including the days of rest, was fifteen months. §

It appears by this calculation, that the army of Cyrus marched daily, on an average, almost six parasangas or leagues in going, and only five in their return. || It was natural that Cyrus, who desired to surprise his brother, should use all possible diligence for that purpose.

This retreat of the ten thousand Greeks has always been esteemed among judges in the art of war, as I have already observed, a perfect model in its kind, and without a parallel. Indeed no enterprise could be formed with more valor and bravery, conducted with more prudence, nor executed with

* Xenoph. de Exped. Cyr. l. ii. p. 276.

† Ibid. l. iii. p. 355.

‡ I add five, which are left out in the text, to make the total agree with the two parts.

§ Xenoph. de Exped. Cyr. l. vii. p. 427.

|| The parasanga is a measure peculiar to the Persians, and consists of three stadia. The stadium is equal with the Greek, and contains, according to the most received opinion, one hundred and twenty-five geometrical paces; twenty of which in consequence are required to the common French league. And this has been my rule heretofore; according to which the parasanga is a league and a half.

I observe here a great difficulty. In this calculation we find the ordinary day's marches of Cyrus, with an army of more than one hundred thousand men, would have been, one day with another, nine leagues, during so long a time, which, according to judges in military affairs, is absolutely impossible. This is what has determined me to compute the parasanga at no more than a league. Several authors have remarked, and indeed it is not to be doubted, that the stadium, and all the other measures of length of the ancients, have differed widely according to times and places, as they still do among us.

more success. Ten thousand men, five or six hundred leagues from their own country, who had lost their generals and best officers, and find themselves in the heart of the enemy's vast empire, undertake, in the sight of a victorious and numerous army, with their king at the head of them, to retire through the seat of his empire, and in a manner from the gates of his palace; to traverse a vast extent of unknown countries, almost all in arms against them, without being dismayed by the prospect of the innumerable obstacles and dangers to which they were every moment exposed; passes of rivers, of mountains and defiles; open attacks; secret ambuscades from the people upon their route; famine, almost inevitable in vast and desert regions; and, above all, the treachery they had to fear from the troops who seemed to be employed in escorting them, but who in reality had orders to destroy them. For, Artaxerxes, who was sensible how greatly the return of those Greeks into their country would disgrace him, and tarnish the glory of the empire in the sight of all nations, had left nothing undone to prevent it; and he desired their destruction, says Plutarch, more passionately than to conquer Cyrus himself, or to preserve the sovereignty of his estates. Those ten thousand men, however, notwithstanding so many obstacles, carried their point, and arrived, through a thousand dangers, victorious and triumphant, in their own country. Antony long after, when pursued by the Parthians almost in the same country, finding himself in like danger, cried out in admiration of their invincible valor, "Oh! the retreat of the ten thousand!" *

It was the success of this famous retreat which filled the people of Greece with contempt for Artaxerxes, by demonstrating to them, that gold, silver, luxury, voluptuousness, and a numerous seraglio of women, were the only merit of the grand monarch; but that, as to the rest, his opulence and all his boasted power, were only pride and vain ostentation. It was this prejudice, more general than ever in Greece, after this celebrated expedition, that gave birth to those bold enterprises of the Greeks, of which we shall soon treat, that made Artaxerxes tremble upon his throne, and brought the Persian empire to the very brink of destruction.

SECTION VII.—CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF CYRUS.
CRUELTY OF PARYSATIS. STATIRA POISONED.

I return to what passed after the battle of Cunaxa, in the

* Plut. in Anton. p. 937.

court of Artaxerxes.* As he believed that he killed Cyrus with his own hand, and looked upon that action as the most glorious of his life, he desired that all the world should think the same ; and it was wounding him in the most tender point to dispute that honor, or endeavor to divide it with him. The Carian soldier, whom we mentioned before, not contented with the great presents the king had made him upon a different pretext, perpetually declared to all that would hear him, that none but himself had killed Cyrus, and that the king did him great injustice in depriving him of the glory due to him. The prince, upon being informed of that insolence, conceived a jealousy equally base and cruel, and had the weakness to cause him to be delivered to Parysatis, who had sworn the destruction of all who had any share in the death of her son. Animated by her barbarous revenge, she commanded the executioners to take the unfortunate wretch, and to make him suffer the most exquisite tortures during ten days ; then, after they had torn out his eyes, to pour melted brass into his ears, till he expired in that cruel misery ; which was accordingly executed.

Mithridates, also, having boasted in an entertainment where he had become heated with wine, that it was he who gave Cyrus his mortal wound, paid very dear for that sottish and imprudent vanity ; he was condemned to suffer the punishments of the troughs,† one of the most cruel that was ever invented ; and after having languished in torment during seventeen days, died at last in excruciating misery.

There only remained for the final execution of her project, and fully to satiate her vengeance, the punishment of the king's eunuch, Mesabates, who, by his master's order, had cut off the head and hand of Cyrus. But as there was nothing to take hold of in his conduct, Parysatis laid the following snare for him. She was a woman of great address, had abundance of wit, and excelled in playing at a certain game with dice. After the war, she was reconciled with the king, played often with him, was of all his parties, had an unbounded complaisance for him, and far from contradicting him in any thing, prevented his desires, did not blush at indulging his passions, and even at supplying him with the means of gratifying them. But she took a special care never to lose sight of him, and to leave Statira as little alone with him as she could, desiring to gain an absolute ascendancy over her son.

* Plut. in Artax. pp. 1018-1021.

† See the description of this torture in page 160 of this volume.

One day seeing the king entirely unemployed, and with no thoughts but of diverting himself, she proposed playing at dice with him for a thousand darics,* to which he readily consented. She suffered him to win, and paid down the money. But affecting regret and vexation, she pressed him to begin again, and to play with her for an eunuch. The king, who suspected nothing, complied, and they agreed to except five of the favorite eunuchs on each side, that the winner should take their choice out of the rest, and the loser be bound to deliver him. Having made these conditions, they sat down to play. The queen was all attention to the game, and made use of all her skill and address in it; besides which, the dice favored her. She won, and chose Mesabates, for he was not one of the excepted. As soon as she got him into her hands, and before the king could have the least suspicion of the revenge she meditated, she delivered him to the executioners, and commanded them to flay him alive, to lay him afterwards upon three cross bars,† and to stretch his skin at large before his eyes upon two stakes prepared for that purpose, which was performed accordingly. When the king knew this, he was very sorry for it, and violently angry with his mother. But without giving herself any farther trouble about it, she told him with a smile, and in a jesting way, “really you are a great loser, and must be highly in the right, to be so much out of humor for a decrepit wretch of a eunuch, when I, who lost a thousand good darics, and paid them down upon the spot, do not say a word, and am satisfied.”

All these cruelties seem to have been only essays and preparations for a greater crime, which Parysatis meditated. She had retained at heart a violent hatred for queen Statira, which she had suffered to escape her upon many occasions. She perceived plainly that her influence with the king, her son, was only the effect of his respect and consideration for her as his mother; whereas that for Statira was founded in love and confidence, the best security of credit with him. What is the jealousy of an ambitious woman incapable of? She resolved to rid herself, whatever it might cost her, of so formidable a rival.

For the more certain attainment of her ends, she feigned a reconciliation with the daughter-in-law, and treated her with all the exterior marks of sincere friendship and real

* The daric was worth one dollar eightv-seven and a half cents.

† Plutarch explains this circumstance no farther.

confidence. The two queens appearing therefore to have forgot their former suspicions and differences, lived well together, saw one another as before, and ate at each other's apartments. But as both of them knew how much the friendships and caresses of the court were to be relied upon, especially among the women, they were neither of them deceived in the other; and the same fears always subsisting, they kept upon their guard, and never ate but of the same dishes and pieces. Could one believe it possible to deceive so attentive and cautious a vigilance? Parysatis one day, when her daughter-in-law was at table with her, took an exquisitely delicious bird, that had been served up, cut it in two parts, gave one half to Statira, and ate the other herself. Statira soon after was seized with sharp pains, and having quitted the table, died in the most dreadful convulsions, not without inspiring the king with the most violent suspicions of his mother, of whose cruelty and implacable and revengeful spirit, he was sufficiently sensible before. He made the strictest inquiry into the crime. All his mother's officers and domestics were seized and put to the question; when Gygis, one of the women and confidants of Parysatis, confessed the whole. She had caused one side of a knife to be rubbed with poison; so that Parysatis having cut the bird in two, put the sound part into her own mouth directly, and gave Statira the other that was poisoned. Gygis was put to death after the manner in which the Persians punished poisoners, which was to lay their heads upon a great and very broad stone, and beat upon it with another till they were entirely crushed, and had no remains of their former figure. As for Parysatis, the king contented himself with confining her to Babylon, where she demanded to retire, and told her that he would never set his foot within it while she was there.

CHAPTER III.

THE principal contents of this chapter are, the enterprises of the Lacedæmonians in Asia Minor, their defeat at Cnidos, the re-establishment of the walls and power of Athens, the famous peace of Antalcides prescribed to the Greeks by Artexerxes Mnemon, the wars of that prince against Evagoras, king of Cyprus, and the Cadusians. The

persons who are most conspicuous in this interval are, Ly-sander and Agesilaus, on the side of the Lacedæmonians, and Conon on that of the Athenians.

SECTION I.—GRECIAN CITIES OF IONIA IMPORE AID OF LACEDÆMON. AGESILAUS ELECTED KING. HIS CHARACTER.

The cities of Ionia, that had taken part with Cyrus, apprehending the resentment of Tissaphernes, had applied to the Lacedæmonians as the deliverers of Greece, for their support in the possession of the liberty they enjoyed, and to prevent their country from being ravaged. We have already said that Thimbron was sent thither, to whose troops Xenophon had joined his, after their return from Persia.* Thimbron was soon recalled upon some discontent, and had for his successor Dercyllidas, surnamed Sisyphus, from his industry in finding resources, and his capacity in inventing warlike machines. He took upon him the command of the army at Ephesus. When he arrived there, he was apprised that there was a difference between the two satraps who commanded in the country.†

The provinces of the Persian monarchy, many of which, situated at the extremity of the empire, requiring too much application to be governed immediately by the prince, were confided to the care of the great lords, commonly called satraps. They had each of them in their government an almost sovereign authority, and were, properly speaking, not unlike the viceroys we see in our days in some neighboring states. They were supplied with a number of troops sufficient for the defence of the country. They appointed all officers, disposed of the governments of cities, and were charged with levying and remitting the tributes to the prince. They had power to raise troops, to treat with neighboring states, and even with the generals of the enemy; in a word, to do every thing necessary to the good order and tranquillity of their governments. They were independent of one another; and though they served the same master, and it was their duty to concur to the same ends, yet each being more desirous of the particular advantage of his own province, than the general good of the empire, they often differed among themselves, formed opposite designs, refused aid to their colleagues in necessity, and sometimes acted directly against them. The remoteness of the court, and the absence of the

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. pp. 479-487.

† A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 390.

prince, gave room for these dissensions; and perhaps a secret policy contributed to keep them up, to elude or prevent conspiracies, which too good an understanding among the governors might have excited.

Dercyllidas having heard, therefore, that Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were at variance, made a truce with the former; that he might not have them both upon his hands at the same time, he entered the province of Pharnabazus, and advanced as far as *Æolia*.

Zenis, the Dardanian, had governed that province under the satrap's authority; and as after his death it was to have been given to another, Mania, his widow, went to Pharnabazus with troops and presents, and told him, that having been the wife of a man who had rendered him great services, she desired him not to deprive her of her husband's reward; that she should serve him with the same zeal and fidelity; and that if she failed in either, he was always at liberty to take her government from her. She was continued in it by this means, and acquitted herself with all the judgment and ability that could have been expected from the most consummate person in the art of governing. To the ordinary tributes which her husband had paid, she added presents of an extraordinary magnificence; and when Pharnabazus came into her province, she entertained him more splendidly than any of the other governors. She was not contented with the conservation of the cities committed to her care; she made new conquests, and took from the Lydians and Pisidians, Larissa, Amaxita, and Colona.

Hence we may observe, that prudence, good sense, and courage, belong to both sexes. She was present in all expeditions in a chariot, and in person decreed rewards and punishments. None of the neighboring provinces had a finer army than hers, in which she had a great number of Greek soldiers in her pay. She even attended Pharnabazus in all his enterprises, and was of no common support to him. So that the satrap, who knew all the value of so extraordinary a merit, did more honor to this lady than to all the other governors. He even admitted her into his council, and treated her with a distinction that might have excited jealousy, if the modesty and affability of that lady had not prevented bad effects, by throwing, in a manner, a veil over all her perfections, which softened their lustre, and let them appear only as objects of admiration.

She had no enemies but in her own family. Midias, her

son-in-law, stung with the reproach of suffering a man to command in his place, and abusing the entire confidence she reposed in him, which gave him access to her at all times, strangled her, with her son. After her death, he seized two fortresses, wherein she had secured her treasures; the other cities declared against him. He did not long enjoy the fruits of his crime. Dercyllidas happily arrived at this juncture. All the fortresses of *Æolia*, either voluntarily or by force, surrendered to him; and *Midias* was deprived of the possessions he had so unjustly acquired. The Lacedæmonian general having granted *Pharnabasus* a truce, took up his winter-quarters in *Bithynia*, to avoid being chargeable to his allies.

The next year, being continued in the command, he marched into *Thrace*, and arrived at the *Chersonesus*.* He knew that the deputies of the country had been at *Sparta* to represent the necessity of fortifying the isthmus with a good wall against the frequent incursions of the barbarians, which prevented the cultivation of the lands. Having measured the space, which is more than a league in breadth, he distributed the work among the soldiers, and the wall was finished in the autumn of the same year. Within this space were enclosed eleven cities, several ports, a great number of arable lands and plantations, with pastures of all kinds. The work being finished, he returned into *Asia*, after having reviewed the cities, and found them all in a good condition.

Conon the Athenian, after losing the battle of *Ægospotamos*, having condemned himself to a voluntary banishment, continued in the isle of *Cyprus* with king *Evagoras*, not only for the safety of his person, but in expectation of a change in affairs; "like one," says *Plutarch*, "who waits the return of the tide before he embarks." He had always in view the re-establishment of the Athenian power, to which his defeat had given a mortal wound; and full of fidelity and zeal for his country, though little favorable to him, perpetually meditated the means to raise it from its ruins, and restore it to its ancient splendor.†

The Athenian general, knowing that the success of his views required a powerful support, wrote to *Artaxerxes* to explain his projects to him, and ordered the person who carried his letter to apply himself to *Ctesias*, who would give it to the king. It was accordingly delivered to that physician, who, it is said, though he did not approve the contents of it,

* A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 398. Xenoph. pp. 487, 488.

† Plut. in Artax. p. 1021.

added to what Conon had wrote, "that he desired the king would send Ctesias to him, being a person very capable of his service, especially in maritime affairs." Pharnabazus, in concert with Conon, had gone to court to complain against the conduct of Tissaphernes, as too much in favor of the Lacedæmonians. Upon the warm instances of Pharnabazus, the king ordered five hundred talents * to be paid him for the equipment of a fleet, with instructions to give Conon the command of it. He sent Ctesias into Greece, who, after having visited Cnidos, his native country, went to Sparta.†

This Ctesias was at first in the service of Cyrus, whom he had followed in his expedition. He was taken prisoner in the battle wherein Cyrus was killed, and was called on to dress the wounds which Artaxerxes had received, in which he acquitted himself so well, that the king retained him in his service, and made him his first physician. He passed several years in his service in that capacity. While he was there, the Greeks, upon all their occasions at the court, applied themselves to him; as Conon did on this. His long residence in Persia, and at the court, had given him the necessary time and means for his information in the history of the country, which he wrote in twenty-three books. The first contained the history of the Assyrians and Babylonians, from Ninus and Semiramis down to Cyrus. The other seventeen treated of the Persian affairs, from the beginning of the reign of Cyrus to the third year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, which agrees with the three hundred and ninety-eighth before JESUS CHRIST. He wrote also a history of India. Photius has given us several extracts of both his histories, which are all that remain of Ctesias. He often contradicts Herodotus, and differs sometimes also from Xenophon. He was in no great estimation with the ancients, who spoke of him as a very vain man, whose veracity was not to be relied on, and who has inserted fables, and sometimes even lies, in his history. ‡

Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, though secretly each other's enemies, had upon the king's orders united their troops, to oppose the enterprises of Dercyllidas, who had marched into Caria. They had reduced him to post himself so disadvantageously, that he must inevitably have perished had they charged him immediately, without giving him time to look about him. Pharnabazus was of this opinion :

* Five hundred thousand dollars. † Diod. l. xiv. p. 267. Justin. l. vi. c. 1.

‡ Strab. l. xiv. p. 656. Plut. in Artax. pp. 1014-1017-1020. Diod. l. xiv. p. 273. Arist. de Hist. Anim. l. viii. c. 28. Phot. Cod. lxii.

but Tissaphernes, apprehending the valor of the Greeks, who had been in the army of Cyrus, which he had experienced, and which he conceived would be equalled by the rest, proposed an interview, which was accepted. Dercyllidas having demanded that the Grecian cities should continue free, and Tissaphernes, that the army and generals of Lacedæmon should retire; they made a truce, till the answers of their respective masters should be known.*

While these things passed in Asia, the Lacedæmonians resolved to chastise the insolence of the people of Elis, who, not content with having entered into an alliance with their enemies in the Peloponnesian war, prevented their disputing the prizes in the Olympic games. Upon pretence of the non-payment of a fine by Sparta, they had insulted their citizens during the games, and hindered Agis from sacrificing in the temple of Jupiter Olympus. That king was charged with this expedition, which did not terminate till the third year after. He could not have taken their city Olympia, which had no works, but contented himself with plundering the suburbs, and the places for the exercises, which were very fine. They demanded peace, which was granted, and were suffered to retain the superintendency of the temple of Jupiter Olympus, to which they had not much right, but were more worthy of that honor than those who disputed it with them.†

Agis on his return fell sick, and died on his arrival at Sparta. Almost divine honors were paid to his memory, and after the expiration of some days, according to the custom, Leontychides and Agesilaus, the former son and the latter brother of the deceased, disputed the crown.‡ The latter maintained that his competitor was not the son of Agis, and supported his assertion by the confession of the queen herself, who knew best, and who had often, as well as her husband, acknowledged as much. In fact, there was a current report that he was the son of Alcibiades, § as has been related in its place, and that the Athenian general had corrupted her by a present of a thousand darics. || Agis protested the contrary at his death. Leontychides having thrown himself at his feet, all bathed in tears, he could not refuse the grace he implored of him, and owned him for his son before all that were present.

* A. M. 3607. Ant. J. C. 397. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. pp. 489, 490. Diocl. l. xiv. p. 267.

† Diocl. l. xiv. p. 292.

‡ Xenoph. l. iii. p. 493. Plut. in Lys. p. 445. In Agesil. p. 597.

§ Athen. l. xii. p. 534. || More than one thousand eight hundred dollars.

Most of the Spartans, charmed with the virtue and great merit of Agesilaus, and deeming it an extraordinary advantage to have a person for their king who had been educated among them, and passed, like them, through all the rigor of the Spartan education, supported him with their whole power. An ancient oracle, that advised Sparta to beware of "a lame reign," was urged against him. Lysander only made a jest of it, and turned its sense against Leontychides himself; endeavoring to prove, that as a bastard, he was the lame king the oracle intended to caution them against. Agesilaus, as well by his own great qualities, as the powerful support of Lysander, carried it against his nephew, and was declared king.

As by the laws, the kingdom had devolved to Agis, his brother Agesilaus, who seemed to be destined to pass his life as a private person, was educated like other children in the Spartan discipline, which was a very rough manner of life, and full of laborious exercise, but brought up youth to perfect obedience.* The law dispensed with this education only to such children as were designed for the throne. Agesilaus therefore had this peculiar advantage, that he did not arrive at commanding, till he had first learned perfectly well how to obey. From thence it was, that of all the kings of Sparta he best knew how to make his subjects love and esteem him, because, to the great qualities with which nature had endowed him for command and sovereignty, he had united by his education the advantage of being humane and popular.

It is surprising that Sparta, a city so renowned in point of education and policy, should conceive it proper to abate any thing of its severity and discipline in favor of the princes who were to reign; they having the most need of being early habituated to obedience, in order to qualify them the better for command.

Plutarch observes, that from his infancy, Agesilaus was remarkable for uniting qualities in himself, which are generally incompatible; a vivacity of spirit, a vehemence, an invincible resolution in appearance, an ardent passion for being first and surpassing all others, with a gentleness, submission, and docility, that complied instantly, and made him infinitely sensible of the slightest reprimand; so that every thing might

* Hence it was, that the poet Simonides called Sparta, "the tamer of men," *δαμασίμβροτον*, as the only one of the Grecian cities, which rendered its inhabitants by good habits the most active and vigorous, and at the same time the most obedient to the laws, of all mankind, *ὡς μάλιστα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν τοὺς πολίτας τοῖς νόμοις πεποιημένους καὶ χειροῖθις ποιοῦσαν.*

be obtained of him from motives of honor, but nothing by fear of violence.*

He was lame; but that defect was covered by the gracefulness of his person, and still more by the gayety with which he supported and rallied it himself. It may even be said, that the infirmity of his body set his valor and passion for glory in a stronger light; there being no labor nor enterprise, however difficult, that he would refuse on account of that inconvenience.

Praise, without an air of truth and sincerity, was so far from giving him pleasure, that it offended him, and was never received by him as such, but when it came from the mouths of those, who upon other occasions, had represented his failings to him with freedom.† He would never suffer his picture to be drawn during his life, and even when dying, expressly forbade any image to be made of him, either in colors or *relievo*. His reason was, that his great actions, if he had done any, would supply the place of monuments; without which, all the statues in the world would do him no manner of honor.‡ We only know that he was of small stature, which the Spartans did not like in their kings; and Theophrastus affirms, that the ephori laid a fine upon their king Archidamus, the father of Agesilaus, for having espoused a very small woman. "For," said they, "she will give us puppets instead of kings."

It has been remarked, that Agesilaus, in his way of living with the Spartans, behaved better with regard to his enemies than his friends; for he never did the least wrong to the former, and often violated justice in favor of the latter. He would have been ashamed not to have honored and rewarded his enemies, when their actions deserved it; and was not able to reprove his friends when they committed faults.§ He would even support them when they were in the wrong, and upon such occasions, looked upon the zeal for justice as a vain pretence to cover the refusal of serving them. In proof of this, a short letter is cited, written by him to a judge, in recommendation of a friend; in which he says: "If Nicias be not guilty, acquit him for his innocence; if he be, acquit him for my sake; but however it be, acquit him."||

It argues a very imperfect knowledge of the duties and privileges of friendship, to make it, in this manner, subservient to crime and a protection to bad actions. The funda-

* In Agesil. p. 596.

† Plut. in Moral. p. 55.

‡ Ibid. p. 191.

§ Plut. in Agesil. p. 590.

|| Idem. p. 603.

mental law of friendship, says Cicero, is never to ask of, or to grant any thing to friends, that does not consist with justice and honor: "*Hæc prima lex in amicitia sancitur, ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati.*" *

Agesilaus was not so scrupulous on this point, at least in the beginning, and omitted no opportunity of gratifying his friends, and even his enemies. By this officious and obliging conduct, supported by his extraordinary merit, he acquired great influence and almost absolute power in the city, which ran so high as to render him suspected by his country. The ephori, to prevent its effects, and give a check to his ambition, laid a fine upon him, alleging as their sole reason, that he attached the hearts of the citizens to himself alone, which were the right of the republic, and ought not to be possessed but in common.

When he was declared king, he was put in possession of the whole estate of his brother Agis, of which Leontychides was deprived as a bastard. But seeing that the relations of that prince, on the side of his mother Lampito, were all very poor, he divided the whole inheritance among them, and by that act of generosity acquired great reputation, and the good will of all the world, instead of the envy and hatred he might have drawn upon himself by keeping the inheritance. These sorts of sacrifices are glorious, though uncommon, and can never be sufficiently esteemed.

Never was a king of Sparta so powerful as Agesilaus; "and it was only," as Xenophon says, "by obeying his country in every thing that he acquired so great an authority;" which seems a kind of paradox, and is thus explained by Plutarch. The greatest power was vested at that time in the ephori and senate. The office of the ephori subsisted only one year; they were instituted to limit the too great power of the kings, and to serve as a barrier against it, as we have observed elsewhere. For this reason the kings of Sparta, from their establishment, had always retained a kind of hereditary aversion for them, and continually opposed their measures. Agesilaus, adopted a quite contrary method. Instead of being perpetually at war with them, and clashing upon all occasions with their measures, he made it his business to cultivate their good opinion, treated them always with the utmost deference and regard, never entered upon the least enterprise without having first communicated it to them, and upon their summons quitted every thing, and re-

paired to the senate with the utmost promptitude and resignation. Whenever he sat upon his throne to administer justice, if the ephori entered, he never failed to rise up to do them honor. By all these instances of respect, he seemed to add new dignity to their office, while in reality he augmented his own power without its being observed, and added to the sovereignty a grandeur the more solid and permanent, as it was the effect of the good will and esteem of the people for him. The greatest of the Roman emperors, as Augustus, Trajan, and Marcus Antoninus, were convinced, that the utmost a prince could do to honor and exalt the principal magistrates, was only adding to his own power, and strengthening his authority, which neither should nor can be founded in any thing but justice.

Such was Agesilaus, of whom much will be said hereafter, and with whose character it was therefore necessary to begin.

SECTION II.—AGESILAUS GOES TO ASIA. LYSANDER FALLS OUT WITH HIM.

Agesilaus had scarcely ascended the throne, when accounts came from Asia that the king of Persia was fitting out a great fleet with intent to deprive the Lacedæmonians of their empire at sea. The letters of Conon, seconded by the remonstrances of Pharnabazus, who had in concert represented to Artaxerxes the power of Sparta as formidable, had made a strong impression upon that prince. From that time he had it seriously in contemplation to humble that proud republic, by raising up its rival, and by that means re-establish the ancient balance between them, which alone could assure his safety, by keeping them perpetually employed against each other, and thereby prevented from uniting their forces against him.*

Lysander, who desired to be sent into Asia, in order to re-establish his dependants and friends in the government of the cities, from which Sparta had removed them, strongly disposed Agesilaus to take upon himself the charge of the war, and to prevent the barbarian king, by attacking him remote from Greece, before he should have finished his preparations. The republic having made this proposal to him, he could not refuse it, and charged himself with the expedition against Artaxerxes, upon condition that thirty Spar-

* A. M. 3608. Ant. J. C. 396. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. pp. 495, 496. Idem. de Agesil. p. 652. Plut. in Agesil. p. 598. In Lysand. p. 446.

tan captains should be granted him, to assist him and compose his council, with two thousand new citizens, to be chosen out of the helots who had lately been made freemen, and six thousand troops of the allies; which was immediately resolved. Lysander was placed at the head of the thirty Spartans, not only on account of his great reputation, and the authority he had acquired, but for the particular friendship between him and Agesilaus, who was indebted to him for the throne, as well as the honor which had been lately conferred upon him, of being elected generalissimo.

The glorious return of the Greeks who had followed Cyrus, and whom the whole power of Persia was not able to prevent from retreating into their own country, had inspired all Greece with a wonderful confidence in their forces, and a supreme contempt for the barbarians. In this disposition of the people, the Lacedæmonians conceived it would reproach them to neglect so favorable a conjuncture for delivering the Greeks in Asia from their subjection to those barbarians, and for putting an end to the outrages and violences with which they were continually oppressing them. They had already attempted this by their generals, Thimbron and Dercyllidas; but all their endeavors having hitherto proved ineffectual, they referred the conduct of this war to the care of Agesilaus. He promised them either to conclude a glorious peace with the Persians, or to employ them so effectually as should leave them neither leisure or inclination to carry the war into Greece. The king had great views and thought of nothing less than attacking Artaxerxes in, Persia itself.

When he arrived at Ephesus, Tissaphernes sent to demand for what purpose he had come into Asia, and why he had taken up arms. He replied, that he came to aid the Greeks who inhabited there, and to re-establish them in their ancient liberty. The satrap, who was not yet prepared, preferred art to force, and assured him, that his master would give the Grecian cities of Asia their liberty, provided he committed no acts of hostility till the return of the couriers. Agesilaus agreed; and the truce was sworn to on both sides. Tissaphernes, who laid no great stress upon an oath, took advantage of this delay to assemble troops on all sides. The Lacedæmonian general was apprised of it, but kept his word; being convinced, that in affairs of state, the breach of faith can have but a very short and precarious success; whereas a reputation established upon inviolable fidelity in

the observances of engagements, which the perfidy itself of other contracting parties has not power to alter, will establish a credit and confidence equally useful and glorious. In fact, Xenophon remarks, that this religious observation of treaties gained him the universal esteem and opinion of the cities; while the different conduct of Tissaphernes entirely lost him their favor.*

Agésilas employed this interval in acquiring an exact knowledge of the state of the cities, and in making suitable regulations.† He found great disorder everywhere, their government being neither democratical, as under the Athenians, nor aristocratical, as Lysander had established it.

The people of the country had no communication with Agésilas, nor had ever known him; for which reason they paid no respect to him, conceiving that he had the title of general for form's sake only, and that the whole power was really vested in Lysander. As no governor had ever done so much good to his friends, or harm to his enemies, as Lysander, it is not to be wondered at, that he was so much beloved by the one, and feared by the other. All therefore were eager to pay their homage to him, were every day in crowds at his door, and made his train very numerous when he went abroad; while Agésilas remained almost alone. Such a conduct could not fail of offending a general and king, extremely sensible and delicate in what regarded his authority; though otherwise not jealous of any one's merit, but, on the contrary, much inclined to distinguish it with his favor. He did not dissemble his disgust. He paid no regard to Lysander's recommendations, and ceased to employ him himself. Lysander presently perceived this alteration in regard to him. He discontinued his applications for his friends to the king, desired them not to visit him any more, nor attach themselves to him, but to address themselves directly to the king, and to cultivate the favor of those who in the present times had power to serve and advance their creatures. The greater part of them ceased to importune him with their affairs, but did not refrain from paying their respect to him. On the contrary, they were only more assiduous than ever about his person, attended him in throngs when he took the air abroad, and regularly assisted at all his exercises. Lysander, naturally vain, and long accustomed to the homage and submission that attended absolute power, did not take sufficient care to remove the busy crowd

* Xenoph. p. 496, et 652.

† A. M. 3609. Ant. J. C. 395.

from his person, that continually made their addresses to him with more application than ever.*

This ridiculous affectation of authority and grandeur grew still more and more offensive to Agesilaus, and seemed intended to insult him. He resented it so highly, that, having given the most considerable commands and best governments to inferior officers, he appointed Lysander commissary of the stores, and distributor of provisions; and afterwards, to insult and deride the Ionians, he told them, "that they might now go and consult his master butcher."

Lysander thought it then incumbent upon him to speak, and to come to an explanation with him. Their conversation was brief and laconic. "Certainly, my lord," said Lysander, "you very well know how to depress your friends." "Yes, when they would set themselves above me; but when they are studious of my dignity, I know also how to let them share in it." "But perhaps, my lord," replied Lysander, "I have been injured by false reports; and things I never did have been imputed to me. I must beg, therefore, if it be only upon account of the strangers, who have all of them their eyes upon us, that you would give me an employment in your army, wherein you shall think me least capable of displeasing, and best qualified for serving you effectually."

In consequence of this conversation, Agesilaus conferred on him the lieutenancy of the Hellespont; in which employment he retained all his resentment without however neglecting any part of his duty, or of what conduced to the success of affairs. Some short time after, he returned to Sparta, without any marks of honor or distinction, extremely incensed against Agesilaus, and with the hope of making him perfectly sensible of it.

It must be allowed that Lysander's conduct, as we have here represented it, denotes a vanity and narrowness of mind on his side, very unworthy of his reputation. Perhaps Agesilaus carried his sensibility and delicacy too far in point of honor, and he was a little too severe upon a friend and benefactor, who might have been reclaimed to his duty by secret reproofs, attended with openness of heart and expressions of kindness. But however great Lysander's merit, and however considerable the services he had rendered Agesilaus might be, still they could not give him a right even to an equality with his king and general, far less to the

* Plut. in Agesil. pp. 599, 600. In Lysand. p. 447.

superiority he affected, which in some measure tended to make the other insignificant. He should have remembered, that it is never allowable for an inferior to forget himself and to exceed the bounds of a just subordination.

Upon his return to Sparta, he had it seriously in mind to execute a project which he had many years revolved within himself. At Sparta there were only two families, or rather branches, of the posterity of Hercules, who had a right to the throne. When Lysander had attained to that degree of power which his great actions had acquired him, he began to feel pain at beholding a city, whose glory had been so much augmented by his exploits, under the government of princes, to whom he yielded neither in valor nor birth; for he was descended, as well as themselves, from Hercules. He therefore sought means to deprive those two houses of the sole succession to the crown, and to extend that right to all the other branches of the Heraclides, and even, according to some, to all the natives of Sparta; flattering himself, that if his design succeeded, no Spartan could be capable of disputing that honor with him, and that he should have the preference to all others.*

This ambitious project of Lysander shows, that the greatest captains are often those from whom a republic has most to apprehend. Those haughty, violent spirits, accustomed to absolute power in armies, bring back with victory a daring loftiness of mind, always to be dreaded in a free state. Sparta, in giving Lysander unlimited power, and leaving it for so many years in his hands, did not sufficiently consider, that nothing is more dangerous than to confide in persons of superior merit and abilities, employments of supreme authority, which naturally exposes them to the temptation of rendering themselves independent, and absolute masters of power. Lysander was not proof against it, and practised secretly to open himself a way to the throne.

The undertaking was bold and required long preparations. He thought it impossible to succeed without first making use of the fear of the divinity, and the terrors of superstition, to amaze and subdue the citizens into a more easy disposition to receive what he wanted to have them understand; for he knew that at Sparta, as well as throughout all Greece, nothing of the least importance was determined, without the oracles being previously consulted. He tempted with great presents the priests and priestesses of

* Plut. in Lysand. pp. 447, 448. Dioc. l. xix. pp. 244, 245.

Delphos, Dodona, and Ammon, though ineffectually the first time; and the latter even sent ambassadors to Sparta, to accuse him of impiety and sacrilege; but he extricated himself from that affair by his influence and address.

It was necessary to set other engines at work. A woman in the kingdom of Pontus, affirming that she was with child by Apollo, had been delivered some years before of a son, to whom the name of Silenus was given; and the greatest persons of that nation had disputed the honor of nursing and educating him. Lysander embraced this circumstance for the promotion of his designs, by procuring a number of persons of sufficient note to give it an air of credibility, to circulate the report of this miraculous birth. After which information was brought from Delphos to Sparta, and industriously circulated, that the priests of the temple had in their custody some books of very ancient oracles, which they kept concealed from all the world, a knowledge of which was not permitted either to them, or any other person whatever; and that only a son of Apollo, who was to come in process of time, after having given undoubted proofs of his birth to those who had charge of the books, was to take and carry them away.

All this being premised, Silenus was to present himself to the priests, and demand those oracles as the son of Apollo; and the priests who were in the secret, as actors well prepared and fully instructed in their parts, were on their side to make the most exact and circumstantial inquiry into every thing, not without affecting great difficulty, and asking many questions for the full proof of his birth. At length, as if absolutely convinced that this Silenus was the real son of Apollo, they were to produce the books, and deliver them to him; after which this son of Apollo was to read the prophecies contained in them, in the presence of all; and particularly that for which the whole fraud had been contrived. It imported, "that it was more expedient and advantageous for the Spartans to elect no king for the future, but the most worthy of their citizens." Lysander, in consequence, was to mount the tribunal, to harangue the citizens, and induce them to make this alteration. Cleon of Halicarnassus, a celebrated rhetorician, had composed a very eloquent discourse for him upon this subject, which he had committed to memory.

Silenus grew up, and repaired to Greece in order to play his part; when Lysander had the mortification to see his

piece miscarry, by the timidity and desertion of one of his principal actors, who broke his word, and disappeared at the very instant it was to have been performed. Though this intrigue had been carried on a while, it was transacted with so much secrecy as to the time it was to have made its appearance, that nothing of it was known during the life of Lysander. How it came to light after his death, we shall soon relate; but must at present return to Tissaphernes.

SECTION III.—EXPEDITION OF AGESILAUS IN ASIA.

When Tissaphernes had received the troops assigned him by the king, and drawn together all his forces, he sent to command Agesilaus to retire out of Asia, and declared war against him in case of a refusal. His officers were alarmed, not believing him in a condition to oppose the great army of the Persian king. For himself, he heard the heralds of Tissaphernes with a gay and easy countenance, and bade them tell their master, that he was under a very great obligation to him “for having made the gods, by his perjury, the enemies of Persia, and the friends of Greece.” He promised himself great things from this expedition, and would have thought it an exceeding disgrace for him, that ten thousand Greeks, under the command of Xenophon, should have passed through the heart of Asia, to the Grecian sea, and defeated the king of Persia as often as he appeared against them; and that he, who commanded the Lacedæmonians, whose empire extended all over Greece by sea and land, should not execute some exploit worthy of glory and remembrance.*

At first, therefore, to revenge the perfidy of Tissaphernes by a just and allowable deceit, he made feint of marching his army into Caria, the residence of that satrap; and as soon as the barbarian had caused his troops to march that way, he turned short and fell upon Phrygia, where he took many towns, and amassed immense treasures, which he distributed among the officers and soldiers; “letting his friends see,” says Plutarch, “that to break a treaty, and violate an oath, is to despise the gods themselves; and that, on the contrary, to deceive an enemy by the stratagems of war, is not only just and glorious, but a sensible delight attended by the greatest advantages.”

* Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iii. pp. 497-502. *Idem.* de Agesil. pp. 652-656. Plut. in Agesil. p. 600.

In the spring he assembled all his forces at Ephesus ; and to exercise his soldiers, he proposed prizes both for the horse and foot. This small inducement set every thing in motion. The place for exercises was constantly filled with all kinds of troops ; and the city of Ephesus seemed only a palestra, and a school of war. The whole market-place was filled with horses and arms, and the shops with different kinds of military equipage. Agesilaus was seen returning from the exercises, followed by a crowd of officers and soldiers, all of them crowned with wreaths, which they were proceeding to deposit in the temple of Diana, to the great admiration and delight of all the world. "For," says Xenophon, "where piety and discipline are seen to flourish, the best hopes must be entertained."

To give his soldiers new valor from a contempt for their enemies he made use of this contrivance. He ordered the commissaries who had the charge of the booty, to strip the prisoners and expose them to sale. There were very many to purchase their clothes ; but, for themselves, their bodies were so soft, white, and delicate, having been nurtured and brought up in the shade, that they were laughed at, as of neither service nor value. Agesilaus took this occasion to approach and say to his soldiers, pointing to them, "See there against whom ye fight ;" and showing them their rich spoils, "and there for what you fight."

When the season for taking the field returned, Agesilaus gave out that he would march into Lydia. Tissaphernes, who had not forgot the first stratagem he had used in regard to him, and was not willing to be deceived a second time, caused his troops to march immediately for Caria, not doubting that Agesilaus would, on this occasion, turn his arms in that direction ; more especially as it was natural for him, being in want of cavalry to endeavor to make a rough and difficult country the seat of war, so as to render the horse of an enemy useless and unserviceable. But he deceived himself : Agesilaus entered Lydia, and approached Sardis. Tissaphernes hastened thither with his horse, with intent to relieve the place. Agesilaus, knowing that his infantry had not had time to arrive, thought proper to take advantage of so favorable an opportunity. He drew up his army in two lines ; the first he formed of his squadrons, whose intervals he filled up with platoons of the light-armed foot, and ordered them to begin the charge, while he followed with the second line, composed of his heavy-armed infantry.

The barbarians did not sustain the first shock, but fled immediately. The Greeks pursued them, and forced their camp, where they made a great slaughter, and a still greater booty.

After this battle the troops of Agesilaus were at entire liberty to plunder and ravage the whole country of the Persians, and at the same time had the satisfaction to see that prince inflict an exemplary punishment upon Tissaphernes, who was a very wicked man, and the most dangerous enemy of the Greeks.* The king had already received numerous complaints against his conduct. Upon this occasion he was accused of treason, as not having done his duty in the battle. Queen Parysatis, always actuated by her hatred and revenge against those who had any share in the death of her son Cyrus, did not a little contribute to the death of Tissaphernes, by aggravating with all her power, the charges against him; for she had been entirely restored to favor by the king her son.†

As Tissaphernes had great authority in Asia, the king was afraid to attack him openly, but thought it necessary to take suitable precautions, in seizing so powerful an officer, who might have proved a dangerous enemy. He charged Tithraustes with that important commission; and gave him two letters at the same time. The first was for Tissaphernes, and contained the king's orders in regard to the war with the Greeks, with full power to act as was requisite. The second was addressed to Ariæus, governor of Larissa; by which the king commanded him to assist Tithraustes with his counsel, and all his forces, in seizing Tissaphernes. He lost no time, and sent to desire Tissaphernes to come to him, that they might confer together upon the operations of the ensuing campaign. Tissaphernes, who suspected nothing, went to him with only a guard of three hundred men. While he was in a bath, without sabre or other arms, he was seized and put into the hands of Tithraustes, who caused his head to be struck off, and sent it immediately to Persia. The king gave it to Parysatis: an agreeable present to a princess of her violent and vindictive temper. Though this conduct of Artaxerxes seems little worthy of a king, nobody lamented the death of that satrap, who had no veneration for the gods, nor any regard for men; who looked upon probity and honor as empty names;

* Xenoph. p. 501, et 657. Plut. in Artax. p. 1022. In Agesil. p. 631.

† Diod. l. xiv. 299. Polyæn. Stratag. l. vii.

who made a jest of the most sacred oaths, and believed that the whole ability and policy of a statesman consisted in knowing how to deceive others by hypocrisy, fraud, perfidy, and perjury.

Tithraustes had a third writing from the king, whereby he was appointed to command the armies in the room of Tissaphernes. After having executed his commission, he sent great presents to Agesilaus, to induce him to enter more readily into his views and interest; and ordered him to be told that the cause of the war being removed, and the author of all differences put to death, nothing opposed an accommodation; that the king of Persia consented that the cities of Asia should enjoy their liberty, paying him the customary tribute, provided he would withdraw his troops, and return into Greece. Agesilaus replied that he would conclude nothing without the orders of Sparta, upon whom alone depended the peace; that as for him, he was better pleased with enriching his soldiers than himself; that the Greeks besides thought it more glorious and honorable to take spoils from their enemies, than to accept their presents. However, as he was not unwilling to satisfy Tithraustes by removing out of his province, and to express his gratitude to him for having punished the common enemy of the Greeks, he marched into Phrygia, which was the province of Pharnabazus. Tithraustes had himself proposed that expedition to him, and paid him thirty talents for the charges of his journey.*

Upon his march, he received a letter from the magistrates of Sparta, with orders to take upon him the command of the naval army, and power to depute whom he thought fit in his stead. By these new powers, he saw himself absolute commander of all the troops of that state in Asia, both by sea and land. This resolution was taken, in order that all operations being directed by one and the same head, and the two armies acting in concert, the plans for the service might be executed with more uniformity, and every thing conspire to the same end. Sparta till then had never done the honor to any of her generals, to confide to him at the same time the command of the armies by sea and land; so that all the world agreed, that he was the greatest personage of his time, and best sustained the high reputation he enjoyed. But he was a man, and had his failings.

The first thing he did, was to appoint Pisander his lieu-

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iil. p. 501. Plut. in Agesil. p. 601.

tenant in the fleet ; in which he seemed to have committed a considerable fault ; because, having about him many older and more experienced captains, without regard to the service of the public, to do honor to an ally, and to please his wife, who was the sister of Pisander, he intrusted him with the command of the fleet ; that employment being much above his abilities, though he was not without merit.

This is the common temptation of persons in power, who believe they possess it only for themselves and their families : as if the advantage of being related to them was a sufficient title and qualification for posts which require great abilities. They do not reflect, that they not only expose the affairs of a state to ruin by their private views, but sacrifice besides the interests of their own glory, which cannot be maintained but by successes which it would be vain to expect from instruments so ill chosen.

Agesilaus continued with his army in Phrygia, upon the territories of Pharnabazus where he lived in the midst of plenty, and amassed great sums of money. From thence advancing as far as Paphlagonia, he made an alliance with king Cotis, who passionately desired his amity, from the opinion which he entertained of his faith in the observance of treaties, and his other virtues. The same motive had already induced Spithridates, one of the king's principal officers, to quit the service of Pharnabazus, and to go over to Agesilaus, to whom, since his revolt, he had rendered great service ; for he had a great body of troops and was very brave. This officer, having entered Phrygia, had laid waste the whole country under Pharnabazus, who never dared to appear in the field against him, nor even to rely upon his fortresses : but carrying away whatever was most valuable and dear to him, he kept flying continually before him, and retired from one place to another, changing his camp every day. Spithridates at length taking with him some Spartan troops, with Herippidas, the chief of the council of thirty sent by the republic to Agesilaus the second year, watched him one day so closely, and attacked him so successfully, that he made himself master of his camp, and of all the rich spoils with which it abounded. But Herippidas injudiciously setting himself up as an inexorable controller, was for bringing the booty that had been sunk to an account ; forced even the soldiers of Spithridates to restore what they had taken ; and visiting their tents, and searching them with an unreasonable exactitude and severity, affronted

Spithridates to such a degree, that he withdrew directly to Sardis with his Paphlagonians.*

It is said, that in his whole expedition, nothing so sensibly affected Agesilaus as the retreat of Spithridates: for, besides his great regret for the loss of so good an officer, and such good troops, he apprehended being reproached with mean and sordid avarice: a vice equally dishonorable to himself and his country, and of which he had taken pains to avoid the slightest suspicion during his whole life. He did not think it consistent with the duty of his office to shut his eyes, through slothful ease and indolence, against all the malversations that were committed under him; but he knew, at the same time, that there is an exactitude and severity, that by being carried too far, degenerates into minuteness and petulancy, and which through an extreme affectation of virtue becomes a real and dangerous vice.

Some time after, Pharnabazus, who saw his country ravaged, demanded an interview with Agesilaus, which was negotiated by a common friend of them both. Agesilaus arrived first with his friends at the place agreed on, and sat down, in expectation of Pharnabazus, upon the turf under the shade of a tree. When Pharnabazus arrived, his people spread skins upon the ground of exceeding softness, from the length of their hair, with rich carpets of various colors, and magnificent cushions. But when he saw Agesilaus sitting simply upon the ground, without any preparation, he was ashamed of his effeminacy, and sat down also upon the grass. On this occasion the Persian pride was seen to pay homage to the Spartan modesty and simplicity. †

After reciprocal salutation, Pharnabazus spoke to this effect: that he had served the Lacedæmonians in the Peloponnesian war to the utmost of his power, fought several battles for them, and supported their naval army without giving any room to reproach him with fraud or treachery, as Tissaphernes had done: that he was surprised at their coming to attack him in his government; burning the towns, cutting down trees, and laying waste the whole country: that if it were the custom of the Greeks who made profession of honor and virtue, to treat their friends and benefactors in such a manner, he did not know what they might mean by just and equitable. These complaints were

* A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. pp. 507-510.

† Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. n. 510-512. Plut. in Agesil. p. 602.

not entirely without foundation, and were uttered with a modest but pathetic air and tone of voice. The Spartans, who attended Agesilaus, not seeing how they could be answered, cast down their eyes, and kept a profound silence. Agesilaus, who observed it, replied almost in these terms: "Lord Pharnabazus, you are not ignorant that war often arms the best friends against each other for the defence of their country. While we were such to the king, your master, we treated him as a friend; but as we are become his enemies we make open war against him, as it is just we should, and endeavor to injure him by what we do against you. However, from the instant you shall think fit to throw off the yoke of bondage, and prefer being called the friend and ally of the Greeks, before the name of the king of Persia's slave, you may reckon that all the troops you now behold, our arms, our ships, our persons, to the last man of us, are here only to defend your possessions, and secure your liberty, which, of all blessings, is the most precious and desirable."

Pharnabazus answered, that if the king sent another general in his place, and subjected him to his successor, he should very willingly accept his offer; that otherwise he would not depart from the faith he had sworn to him, nor quit his service. Agesilus then taking him by the hand and rising with him, replied, "that it were the pleasure of the gods, Lord Pharnabazus, with such noble sentiments, that you were rather our friend than our enemy!" He promised to withdraw from his government, and never return into it while he could subsist elsewhere.

SECTION IV.—AGESILAUS RECALLED BY THE EPHORI TO DEFEND HIS COUNTRY.

Agesilaus had been two years at the head of the army, and had already made the most remote provinces of Asia tremble at his name, and resound with the fame of his great wisdom, disinterestedness, moderation, intrepid valor in the greatest dangers, and invincible patience in supporting the greatest fatigues. Of the many thousand soldiers under his command, not one was worse provided, or lay harder than himself. He was so indifferent as to heat or cold, that he seemed formed only to support the most rigorous seasons, and such as it pleased God to send: which are Plutarch's express words.*

* A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394. Plut. in Agesil. pp. 603, 604. Xenoph in Agesil. p. 657.

The most agreeable of all sights to the Greeks settled in Asia, was to see the lieutenants of the great king, his satraps and other great lords, who were formerly so haughty and untractable, relinquish their pride in the presence of a man meanly clad, and at his single word, however short and laconic, change their language and conduct, and in a manner transform themselves into different creatures. Deputies from all parts were sent by the people to form alliances with him, and his army increased every day by the troops of the barbarians that came to join him.

All Asia was already in motion, and most of the provinces ready to revolt. Agesilaus had already restored order and tranquillity in all the cities, had reinstated them in the possession of their liberty under reasonable modifications, not only without shedding of blood, but without even banishing a single person. Not content with such a progress, he had formed the design of attacking the king of Persia in the heart of his dominions, to put him in fear of his own person and the tranquillity which he enjoyed in Ecbatana and Susa, and to keep him so much employed, as to make it impracticable for him to embroil all Greece from his cabinet, by corrupting the orators and persons of the greatest authority in its cities with his presents.

Tithraustes, who commanded for the king in Asia, seeing the tendency of the designs of Agesilaus, and desiring to prevent their effects, had sent Timocrates of Rhodes into Greece, with great sums of money, to corrupt the principal persons in the cities, and by their means occasion revolts against Sparta. He knew that the haughtiness of the Lacedæmonians (for all their generals did not resemble Agesilaus, and the imperious manner in which they treated their neighbors and allies, especially since they considered themselves the masters of Greece) had universally disgusted the people, and excited a jealousy that waited only an occasion to break out against them. This severity of governing had a natural cause in their education. Accustomed from their infancy to obey without delay or reply, first their tutors, afterwards their magistrates, they exacted a like submission from the cities in their dependence, were easily incensed by the least opposition, and by this excessive severity rendered themselves insupportable.*

Tithraustes therefore did not find it difficult to draw off the allies from their party. Thebes, Argos, Corinth, en-

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. pp. 502-508. Plut. in Lysand. pp. 449, 451.

tered into his measures : the deputy did not go to Athens. These three cities, influenced by those who governed them, made a league against the Lacedæmonians, who on their side prepared vigorously for the war. The Thebans at the same time sent deputies to the Athenians, to implore their aid, and that they would enter into the alliance. The deputies, after having slightly passed over their ancient divisions, insisted strongly upon the considerable service they had rendered Athens, in refusing to join its enemies, when they attempted its final destruction. They represented to them the favorable opportunity that offered for reinstating themselves in their ancient power, and to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the empire of Greece : that all the allies of Sparta, either in Greece or elsewhere, were weary of their severe and unjust sway, and waited only the signal to revolt : that the moment the Athenians should declare themselves, all the cities would rouse up in arms ; and the king of Persia, who had sworn the ruin of Sparta, would aid them with all his forces both by sea and land.

Thrasylulus, whom the Thebans had supplied with arms and money when he undertook the re-establishment of the Athenian liberty, seconded their demand with great vigor, and the aid was unanimously resolved. The Lacedæmonians on their side took the field without loss of time, and entered Phocis. Lysander wrote to Pausanias, who commanded one of the two armies, to give him notice to march early the next day to Haliartus, which he designed to besiege, and that he should be there himself by sunrise. This letter was intercepted. Lysander, after having waited his coming up a great while, was obliged to engage, and was killed in the battle. Pausanias received this bad news on his way. He, however, continued his march to Haliartus, and called a council of war to deliberate on a second battle. He did not think it consistent with prudence to hazard it, and contented himself with making a truce, to remove the bodies of those who had fallen in the former fight. Upon his return to Sparta, he was cited to give an account of his conduct, and, refusing to appear, was condemned to die. But he avoided the execution of that sentence by flight, and retired to Tegeum, where he passed the remainder of his life, under the shelter and protection of Minerva, to whom he had rendered himself a suppliant, and died of disease.

Lysander's poverty having been discovered after his death, did great honor to his memory, when it was known

that of all the gold and riches that had passed through his hands, of a power so extensive as his had been, of so many cities under his government, and which made their court to him, in a word, of that kind of dominion and sovereignty always exercised by him, he had made no manner of advantage for the advancement and enriching of his family.

Some days before his death two of the principal citizens of Sparta had contracted themselves to his two daughters, but, when they knew in what condition he left his affairs, they refused to marry them. The republic did not suffer so sordid a baseness to go unpunished, nor Lysander's poverty, which was the strongest proof of his justice and virtue, to be treated as an obstacle to an alliance into his family. They were fined in a great sum, publicly disgraced, and exposed to the contempt of all persons of honor. For at Sparta there were penalties established, not only for such as refused to marry, or married too late, but also for those who married amiss; and those especially were reckoned of this number who, instead of marrying into houses of virtue, and with their own relations, had no motive but wealth and lucre in marriage; an admirable law, and highly tending to perpetuate probity and honor in families, which an impure mixture of blood and manners seldom fails to alter and efface.

It must be owned that a generous disinterestedness in the midst of all that could inflame and gratify the desire of gain is very uncommon, and well worthy of admiration; but in Lysander it was attended with great defects, which entirely obscure its lustre. Without speaking of his imprudence in introducing gold and silver into Sparta, which he despised himself, though he rendered it estimable to his country, and thereby occasioned its ruin, what opinion can we have of a man who, though brave, well read in men, skilful in affairs, and of great ability in arts of government and what is commonly called policy, yet regards probity and justice as nothing; to whom falsehood, fraud, and perfidy, appear legal methods for the attainment of his ends; who does not fear, for the advancement of his friends and the augmenting of his creatures, to commit the most flagrant injustice and oppressions, and is not ashamed to profane whatever is most sacred in religion, even to the corrupting of priests, and forging of oracles, to satiate the empty ambition of being equal to a king, and of ascending the throne.

When Agesilaus was on the point of leading his troops

into Persia, Epicydidas, the Spartan, arrived to let him know that Sparta was threatened with a furious war; that the ephori recalled him, and ordered him to return immediately, for the defence of his country.* Agesilaus did not deliberate a moment, but returned this answer immediately to the ephori, which Plutarch has transmitted to us: "Agesilaus to the ephori, greeting. We have reduced part of Asia, put the barbarians to flight, and made great preparations for war in Ionia; but, as you order me to return, I am not far behind this letter, and should arrive before it if possible. I received not the command for myself, but my country and its allies. I know that a general does not deserve or possess that name really but as he submits to the laws and the ephori, and obeys the magistrates."†

This ready obedience of Agesilaus has been much admired and applauded, and not without reason. Hannibal, though depressed with misfortunes, and driven almost entirely out of Italy, obeyed his citizens with great reluctance, when they recalled him to deliver Carthage from the dangers that threatened it. Here a victorious prince, ready to enter the enemy's country, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne, almost assured of the success of his arms, on the first order of the ephori, renounces the most soothing hopes, and the most exalted expectations. He demonstrates the truth of what was said, "That at Sparta the laws ruled men, and not men the laws."

On his departure, he said, "that thirty thousand of the king's archers drove him out of Asia;" alluding to a species of Persian coin, which had on one side the figure of an archer, thirty thousand of which pieces of money had been dispersed in Greece, to corrupt the orators and persons of greatest power in the cities.

Agesilaus, in quitting Asia, where he was regretted as the common father of the people, appointed Euxenes his lieutenant, and gave him four thousand men for the defence of the country. Xenophon went with him. He left at Ephesus, with Megabyzus, the guardian of Diana's temple, half the gold he had brought with him from his expedition into Persia with Cyrus, to keep it for him in trust, and in case of death, to consecrate it to the goddess.‡

In the mean time, the Lacedæmonians had raised an army, and given the command of it to Aristodemus, tutor to king

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 513. Idem. in Agesil. p. 657. Plut. in Agesil. pp. 603, 604.

† Plut. in Apoph. Laconic. p. 211.

‡ Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 513. Xenoph. de Exped. Cyr. l. v. p. 350.

Agesipolis, then an infant. Their enemies assembled to concert the operations of the war. Timolaus of Corinth said that the Lacedæmonians were like a river that grew larger as it was removed from its source; or a swarm of bees, which it is easy to destroy in their hive, but when suffered to disperse themselves they become formidable by their stings. He was, therefore, of opinion that it was proper to attack them in their capital, which was approved and resolved. But the Lacedæmonians did not give them time. They took the field, and found the enemy near Nemea, a city not very far from Corinth, where a severe battle ensued. The Lacedæmonians had the advantage, which was very considerable. Agesilaus, having received this news at Amphipolis, as he was hastening to the relief of his country, sent it directly to the cities of Asia for their encouragement, and to give them hopes of his speedy return, if the success of affairs would admit it.*

When the approach of Agesilaus was known at Sparta, the Lacedæmonians who remained in the city, to do him honor for the ready obedience he had paid to their orders, caused proclamations to be made by sound of trumpet, that all young persons who were willing to aid their king might come and enlist themselves for that purpose. Not one of them failed to enter himself immediately with the utmost joy. But the ephori chose only fifty of the bravest and most robust, whom they sent him, and desired that he would enter Bœotia with the utmost expedition; which he did accordingly.†

About the same time the two fleets came up with each other near Cnidos, a city of Caria. That of the Lacedæmonians was commanded by Pisander, the brother-in-law of Agesilaus, and that of the Persians by Pharnabazus, and Conon the Athenian. The latter, observing that the king of Persia's supplies came slowly, and occasioned the loss of many opportunities, had resolved to go in person to the court, to solicit the assistance of the king. As he would not prostrate himself before him, according to the Persian custom, he could not explain himself but by the intervention of others. He represented to him, with a force and a spirit seldom pardoned in those who treat with princes, that it was equally shameful and astonishing, that his ministers, contrary to his intention, should suffer affairs to be disconcerted and ruined for want of the necessary expenses; that

* Xenoph. pp. 514-517.

† Plut. in Agesil. p. 605.

the richest king in the world should give place to his enemies in the very point in which he was so infinitely superior to them, that is, in riches; and that for want of remitting the sums his service required to his generals, all their designs were rendered abortive. The king received them perfectly well, and showed by his example, that truth may often be spoken to princes with success, if courage were not wanting. Conon obtained all he demanded, and the king made him admiral of his fleet.*

It was composed of more than ninety galleys, to which the enemy's was somewhat inferior in number. They came in view of each other near Cnidos, a maritime city of Asia Minor. Conon, who had in some measure occasioned the taking of Athens by the loss of the sea-fight near Egospotamos, used extraordinary efforts in this to retrieve his misfortune, and to obliterate by a glorious victory the disgrace of his former defeat. He had this advantage, that in the battle he was about to fight, the Persians would be at the whole expense, and bear all the loss themselves; whereas the entire fruits of the victory would redound to the Athenians, without hazarding any thing of their own.† Pisander had also strong motives to show his valor upon this occasion, that he might not degenerate from the glory of his brother-in-law, and to justify the choice he had made in appointing him admiral. In fact he behaved with great valor, and had at first some advantage; but the battle growing warm, and the allies of Sparta betaking themselves to flight, he could not resolve to follow them, and died sword in hand. Conon took fifty galleys, and the rest escaped to Cnidos. The consequence of this victory was the revolt of almost all the allies of Sparta; several of whom declared for the Athenians, and the rest resumed their ancient liberty. After this battle the affairs of the Lacedæmonians daily declined. All their actions in Asia were no more than the feeble efforts of an expiring power, till the defeats of Leuctra and Mantinea completed their downfall.

Isocrates makes a very just reflection upon the revolutions of Sparta and Athens, which had always their source and origin in the insolent prosperity of both these republics. The Lacedæmonians, who were at first acknowledged masters of Greece without opposition, fell from their authority only by their enormous abuse of it. The Athenians suc-

* Xen. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 518. Diod. l. xiv. p. 302. Just. l. vi. c. 2, et 3.

† *Eo speciosius quod ne ipsorum quidem Atheniensium, sed alieni imperii viribus dimicet, purgaturus periculo regis, victurus præmio patriæ.*—Justin.

ceeded them in power, and at the same time in pride; and we have seen into what an abyss of misfortunes it precipitated them. Sparta having gained the superiority by the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, and the taking of their city, might have improved in their measures from the double experience of the past, as well in regard to what had befallen themselves, as from the recent example of their rival; but the most affecting examples and events seldom or never occasion a people to change their conduct. Sparta became as haughty and untractable as before; and again experienced the same destiny.

To warn the Athenians against this misfortune, Isocrates put them in mind of the past, and of the times wherein they were successful in every thing. "You imagine," says he, "that provided with a numerous fleet, absolute masters at sea, and supported by powerful allies always ready to give you aid, you have nothing to fear, and may enjoy in repose and tranquillity the fruits of your victories. For my part, allow me to speak with truth and freedom, I think quite otherwise. The cause of my apprehension is, my having observed, that the decline of the greatest republics has always been at the time when they believed themselves most powerful, and that their very security has prepared the precipice over which they have fallen. The reason of this is evident. Prosperity and adversity never come alone, but have each their train of very different effects. The first is attended with vain glory, pride, and insolence, which dazzle the mind, and inspire rash and extravagant measures: On the contrary, the companions of adversity are modesty, self-diffidence, and circumspection, which naturally render men prudent, and apt to amend from their own failings. So that it is hard to judge which of the two conditions we ought to desire for a city; as that which appears unhappy, is an almost certain path to prosperity; and the other so flattering and splendid, generally leads on to the greatest misfortunes." The blow which the Lacedæmonians received at the battle of Cnidos is a mournful proof of what he says.*

Agésilas was in Bœotia, and on the point of giving battle, when this unfavorable news was brought him. Apprehending that it might discourage and deter his troops, he caused it to be reported in the army, that the Lacedæmonians had gained a considerable victory at sea: and appearing in public with a wreath of flowers upon his head, he offered

* Isoc. in Orat. Areop. pp. 278-280.

a sacrifice of thanksgiving for the good news, and sent part of it in presents to his officers.* The two armies, almost equal in strength, were in view of each other upon the plains of Coronæa, when they drew up in order of battle. Agesilaus gave the left wing to the Orchomenians, and took the right himself. On the other side, the Thebans were upon the right, and the Argives on the left. Xenophon says, that this was the most furious battle in his time; and he may be believed, as he was present in it, and fought near the person of Agesilaus, with whom he had returned from Asia.†

The first charge was not very obstinate, nor of long continuance. The Thebans soon put the Orchomenians to flight; and Agesilaus overthrew and routed the Argives. But both parties having learned that their left wing had been severely handled and fled, returned immediately; Agesilaus to oppose the Thebans, and to wrest the victory out of their hands; and the Thebans, to follow their left wing, which was retired to Helicon. Agesilaus at that moment might have assured himself of a complete victory, if he had let the Thebans pass on, and charged them afterwards in the rear; but carried away by the ardor of his courage, he resolved to stop them with an attack in front, and to beat them by main force: "in which," says Xenophon, "he showed more valor than prudence."

The Thebans, seeing Agesilaus advance against them, drew all their foot immediately into one body, formed a hollow square, and waited his coming up in good order. The engagement was sharp and bloody on all sides, but particularly where Agesilaus fought at the head of the fifty young Spartans sent him by the city. The valor and emulation of those young men were of great service to Agesilaus, and may be said to have saved his life; for they fought around him with exceeding ardor, and exposed themselves foremost in all dangers for the safety of his person. They could not, however, prevent his receiving several wounds through his armor, from pikes and swords. Notwithstanding, after an exceeding warm dispute, they brought him off alive from the enemy, and making their bodies a rampart for him, slew a great number of Thebans in his defence. Many of those young men were also left upon the field. At length, finding it too difficult to break the Thebans in front, they were compelled to have recourse to what they had at

* Plut. in Agesil. p. 605.

† Ibid. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. pp. 518-520, et in Agesil. pp. 659, 660.

first neglected. They opened their phalanx to let them pass; which being done, as they marched afterwards in more disorder, they charged them again upon the flanks and rear. They could, however, neither break them nor put them to flight. Those brave Thebans made their retreat continually fighting, and gained Helicon, elate with the success of the battle, in which they had remained invincible.

Agesilaus, though very much weakened by the great number of his wounds, and the quantity of blood he had lost, would not retire to his tent, till he had been carried to the place where his phalanx was drawn up, and had seen all the dead bodies removed even upon their own arms. He was informed there, that many of the enemy had taken refuge in the temple of Minerva Itoniensis, which was not very distant from the field of battle, and asked what he would have done with them. As he was full of veneration for the gods, he gave orders to let them go, and even sent a guard to escort them in safety wherever they thought proper.

The next morning, Agesilaus, to try whether the Thebans would have courage to renew the battle, commanded his troops to crown themselves with flowers, and the music of the army to play, while a trophy was erected and adorned in honor of his victory. At the same instant, the enemy sent heralds to demand permission to bury their dead, which he granted with a truce; and having confirmed his victory by that act of a conqueror, he caused himself to be carried to Delphos, where the Pythian games were then celebrated. He made there a solemn procession, which was followed by a sacrifice, and consecrated the tenth part of the booty taken in Asia to the god, which amounted to one hundred talents.* These great men, no less religious than brave, never failed to express by presents their gratitude to the gods for their success in arms, declaring, by that public homage, that they believed themselves indebted for their victories to their protection.

SECTION V.—AGESILAUS RETURNS VICTORIOUS TO SPARTA.
A PEACE, SHAMEFUL TO THE GREEKS, CONCLUDED.

After the festival, Agesilaus returned to Sparta. His citizens received him with all the marks of the most sincere joy, and beheld him with admiration, when they observed the simplicity of his manners, and the constant frugality and temperance of his life; at his return from foreign countries,

* About one hundred and ten thousand dollars.

where pomp, luxury, sloth, and the love of pleasures, entirely prevailed, he was not infected with the manners of the barbarians, as most of the other generals had been: he made no alteration in his diet, bath, equipage of his wife, ornaments of his arms, or furniture of his house. In the midst of so splendid a reputation, and universal applause, always the same, or rather more modest than before, he distinguished himself from the rest of the citizens, only by a greater submission to the laws, and a more inviolable attachment to the customs of his country; convinced, that he was only king to be the brighter example of those virtues to others.*

He made greatness consist in virtue only. Hearing the Great King (so the kings of Persia used to call themselves), spoken of in magnificent terms, and his power extremely extolled; "I cannot conceive," said he, "wherein he is greater than me, unless he be more virtuous."†

There were at Sparta some citizens, who, vitiated by the prevailing taste of Greece, made their merit and glory consist in keeping a great number of horses for the race. He persuaded his sister Cynisca to dispute the prize in the Olympic games, in order to show the Greeks, that those victories on which they set so high a value, were not the effects of valor and bravery, but of riches and expense. She was the first of her sex who shared in this honor. He had the same opinion of the exercises which contributed to render the body more robust, and inure it to labor and fatigue; and to place them in greater estimation, would often honor them with his presence.

Some time after Lysander's death, he discovered the conspiracy formed by that captain against the two kings, which till then had not been heard of, and came to light by a kind of accident, in the following manner. Upon some affairs, which related to the government, it was necessary to consult Lysander's papers, and Agesilaus went to his house for that purpose. In examining them, he fell upon the sheets which contained at large the harangue of Cleon for the new method of proceeding in the election of kings. Surprised at perusing it, he gave over his search, and went away abruptly to communicate that oration to the citizens, and to let them see what manner of man Lysander was, and how much they had been deceived in regard to him. But Lactatidas, a wise and prudent person, and president of the ephori, interposed, by telling him that it was highly im-

* Plut. in Agesil. p. 600.

† Plut. de sui laud. p. 555.

proper to raise Lysander from the dead; on the contrary, that it was necessary to bury his harangue in the same grave with him, as of dangerous tendency, from the great art with which it was composed, and the force of persuasion that prevailed in it throughout, which it might prove no easy matter to resist. Agesilaus was of the same opinion, and the piece was consigned to silence and oblivion, as the best course that could be adopted with it.*

As his influence was very great in the city, he caused Telutias, his brother by the mother's side, to be declared admiral of the fleet. It is to be wished that history, to justify this choice, had mentioned any other qualities in that commander, than his nearness of blood to the king. Agesilaus soon after set out with his land army to besiege Corinth, and took the long walls, as they were called, while his brother Telutias attacked it by sea. He performed several other exploits against the people of Greece at war with Sparta, which although they display the valor and experience of the general, yet are neither very important nor decisive, and we thought, for that reason, might be omitted.†

At the same time, Pharnabazus and Conon, having made themselves masters at sea, ravaged the whole coast of Laconia. That satrap, returning to his government of Phrygia, left Conon the command of the naval army, with very considerable sums for the re-establishment of Athens. Conon, victorious and crowned with glory, repaired thither, where he was received with universal applause. The sad prospect of a city, formerly so flourishing, and at that time reduced to so melancholy a condition, gave him more grief than joy, in seeing his beloved country again, after so many years absence. He lost no time, but fell immediately to work employing, besides masons and the usual artisans, the soldiers, mariners, citizens, allies; in a word, all who were well inclined to Athens; Providence decreeing, that this city, formerly destroyed by the Persians, should be rebuilt by their own hands; and that having been dismantled and demolished by the Lacedæmonians, it should be reinstated at their own cost, and by the spoils taken from them.‡ What a vicissitude and alteration was this! Athens at this time had for her allies, those who had formerly been her most violent enemies, and for enemies, those with whom she had once contracted the closest and strongest union. Conon,

* Plut. in Agesil. p. 606.

† Ibid.

‡ A. M. 3611. Ant. J. C. 393. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. pp. 534-537. Diod. l. xiv. p. 309. Justin. l. vi. c. 5.

seconded by the zeal of the Thebans, soon rebuilt the walls of Athens, restored the city to its ancient splendor, and rendered it more formidable than ever to its enemies. After having offered to the gods a whole hecatomb, that is, a sacrifice of one hundred oxen, as a thanksgiving for the happy re-establishment of Athens, he made a feast, to which all the citizens without exception were invited.*

Sparta could not see without extreme affliction so glorious a revolution. She looked upon the grandeur and power of a city, her ancient rival, and a most continual enemy, as her own ruin, which made the Lacedæmonians take the mean resolution of avenging themselves at once upon Athens, and Conon her restorer, by making peace with the king of Persia. With this view they despatched Antalcides to Tiribazus. His commission consisted of two principal articles. The first was to accuse Conon to that satrap of having defrauded the king of the money, which he had employed in the re-establishment of Athens; and of having formed the design of depriving the Persians of Æolia and Ionia, and to subject them anew to the republic of Athens, upon which they had formerly depended. By the second, he had orders to make the most advantageous proposals to Tiribazus which his master could desire, who, without giving himself any manner of trouble in regard to Asia, only stipulated that all the islands and other cities should enjoy their laws and liberty. The Lacedæmonians thus gave up to the king, with the greatest injustice and the utmost baseness, all the Greeks settled in Asia, for whose liberty Agesilaus had so long fought. It is true, he had no share in this most infamous negotiation; the whole reproach of which ought to fall on Antalcides, who, being the sworn enemy of the king of Sparta, hastened the peace by all means, because the war augmented the authority, glory and reputation of Agesilaus.†

The most considerable cities of Greece had sent deputies at the same time to Tiribazus; and Conon was at the head of those from Athens. They were unanimous in rejecting such proposals. Without speaking of the interests of the Greeks of Asia, with which they were extremely affected, they saw themselves exposed by this treaty; the Athenians, to the loss of the isles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; the Thebans, to abandon the cities of Bœotia, of

* Athen. l. i. p. 3.
Agesil. p. 603.

† Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. pp. 537, 538. Plut. in

which they were in possession, and which would thereby regain their independence; and the Argives, to renounce Corinth, with the loss of which Argos itself would soon, in all probability, be attended. The deputies therefore withdrew, without concluding any thing.

Tiribazus seized Conon, and put him in prison. Not daring to declare openly for the Lacedæmonians, without an express order to that purpose, he contented himself with supplying them privately with considerable sums of money for fitting out a fleet, in order that the other cities of Greece might not be in a condition to oppose them. After having taken these precautions, he set out directly for the court to give the king an account of the state of his negotiation. That prince was well satisfied with it, and directed him in the strongest terms to effect its completion. Tiribazus also laid before him the accusation of Conon by the Lacedæmonians. Some authors, according to Cornelius Nepos, have written, that he was carried to Susa, and there executed by the king's orders. The silence of Xenophon, who was his contemporary, in regard to his death, makes it doubtful whether he did not escape from prison, or suffer, as has been said.

While this treaty was negotiating, several inconsiderable actions passed between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. It was also at the same time that Evagoras extended his conquests in the island of Cyprus, of which we soon shall treat.

Tiribazus at length, upon his return, summoned the deputies of the Grecian cities to be present at the reading of the treaty. It imported, that all the Grecian cities of Asia should remain dependent on the king, and that the rest, as well small as great, should have full possession of their liberty. The king farther reserved to himself the isles of Cyprus and Clazomenæ, and left those of Seyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, to the Athenians, to whom they had long appertained. By the same treaty he engaged to join with such people as came into it, in order to make war by sea and land against all who should refuse to agree to it. We have already said that Sparta herself proposed these conditions.*

All the other cities of Greece, or at least the greatest part of them, rejected so infamous a treaty with horror. However, as they were weakened and exhausted by domestic divisions, and not in a condition to support a war against so powerful a prince, who threatened to fall with all his forces

* A. M. 3617. Ant. J. C. 337. Xenoph. l. v. pp. 543-551

upon those who should refuse to come into this peace, they were obliged against their will to comply with it; except the Thebans, who had the courage to oppose it openly at first, but were at length reduced to accept it, with the others, by whom they found themselves universally abandoned.

Such was the fruit of the jealousy and divisions which armed the Grecian cities against each other, and was the end proposed by the policy of Artaxerxes, in distributing sums of money among the several states; invincible in arms, and by the sword, but not by the gold and presents of the Persians; so much did they differ in this respect from the character of the ancient Greeks their forefathers.

To comprehend rightly how much Sparta and Athens differed from what they had been in former times, we have only to compare the two treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians; the former by Cimon the Athenian, under Artaxerxes Longimanus, above sixty years before, and the latter by Antalcides the Lacedæmonian, under Artaxerxes Mnemon. In the first, Greece, victorious and triumphant, assures the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks, gives laws to the Persians, imposes what conditions she pleases, and prescribes bounds and limits, by prohibiting them to approach nearer to the sea with their troops than the distance of three days' march; or to appear with vessels of war in any of the seas between the Cyanæan and Chalidonian islands; that is, to say, from the Euxine to the coasts of Pamphylia. In the second, on the contrary, Persia, grown haughty and imperious, takes pleasure in humbling its conquerors, in depriving them, with a single stroke of the pen, of their empire in Asia Minor, in compelling them to abandon hastily all the Greeks established in those rich provinces, to subscribe to their own subjection, and to confine themselves in their turn within the narrow bounds of Greece.*

From whence can so strange an alteration arise? Are there not on both sides the same cities, the same people, the same forces, and the same interest? No doubt there are; but they are not the same men, or rather they have no longer the same principles of policy. Let us recall those happy times of Greece, so glorious for Athens and Sparta, when Persia came pouring like a deluge upon this little country with all the force of the east. What was it that rendered the two cities invincible, and superior to such numerous and formidable

* Diod. l. xii. pp. 74, 75.

armies? Their union and good understanding. No dissension between the two states, no jealousy of command, no private view of interest; in fine, no other contests between them but of honor, glory, and the love of their country.

To so laudable an union may be added an irreconcilable hatred for the Persians, which became a kind of nature in the Greeks, and was the most distinguishing character of that nation. It was a capital crime, and punished with death, only to mention peace, or propose any accommodation with them; and an Athenian mother was seen to throw the first stone at her son, who had dared to make such a motion, and to set others the example of stoning him.*

This strict union of the two states, and declared abhorrence of the common enemy, were a long time the potent barriers of their security, rendered them invincible, and may be said to have been the source and principle of all the glorious successes which raised the reputation of Greece to so high a pitch. But by a misfortune common to the most flourishing states, those very successes became the cause of its ruin, and prepared the way for the disgraces it experienced in the sequel.

These two states, which might have carried their victorious arms into the heart of Persia, and have attacked in their turn the great king even upon his throne; instead of forming in concert such an enterprise, which would at once have crowned them with glory, and laden them with riches, have the folly to leave their common enemy at repose, to embroil themselves with each other upon trivial points of honor and interests of small importance, and to exhaust the forces ineffectually against themselves, which ought to have been employed solely against the barbarians, who could not have resisted them. For it is remarkable, that the Persians never had any advantage over the Athenians or Lacedæmonians, while they united with each other, and that it was their own divisions only which supplied them with the means to conquer both alternately, and always the one by the other.†

These divisions induced them to take such measures as neither Sparta nor Athens would ever have otherwise been capable of. We see them both dishonoring themselves by their mean and abject flatteries, not only of the king of Persia, but even of his satraps: paying homage to them,

* Isoc. in Panegy. p. 143.

† Idem. pp. 132-137. In Panath. pp. 524, 525.

earnestly soliciting their favor, cringing to them, and even suffering their ill-humor; and all this to obtain some aid of troops or money, forgetting that the Persians, haughty and insolent to such as seemed afraid of them, became timorous and mean to those who had the courage to despise them. But, in fine, what did they gain by all these mean condescensions? The treaty which gave occasion for these reflections, and will for ever be the reproach of Sparta and Athens.

SECTION VI.—WAR OF ARTAXERXES AGAINST EVAGORAS.

What I have said upon the facility with which the Greeks might have rendered themselves formidable to their enemies, will be more evident, if we consider, on one side, the diversity of people, and extent of country, which composed the vast empire of the Persians, and, on the other, the weakness of the government, incapable of animating so great a mass, and of supporting the weight of so much business and application. In that court, every thing was determined by the intrigues of women, and the cabals of favorites, whose only merit often consisted in flattering their prince, and soothing his passions. It was by their influence officers were chosen, and the first dignities disposed of; by their opinion the services of the generals of armies were judged, and their rewards decided. The sequel will show, that from the same source arose the insurrection of provinces, the distrust of the greatest part of the governors, the discontent and consequent revolt of the best officers, and ill success of almost all the enterprises that were formed.

Artaxerxes, having got rid of the care and perplexity which the war with the Greeks had occasioned, applied himself to the terminating that of Cyprus, which had lasted several years, but had been carried on with little vigor, and turned the greatest part of his forces that way.

Evagoras reigned at that time in Salamin, the capital city of the isle of Cyprus. He was descended from Teucer* of Salamin, who at his return from Troy built this city, and gave it the name of his country. His descendants had reigned there from that time; but a stranger of Phœnicia, having dispossessed the lawful king, had taken his place, and to maintain himself in the usurpation, had filled the city with barbarians, and subjected the whole island to the king of Persia.†

* This Teucer was of Salamin, a little island near Athens, celebrated for the famous battle under Xerxes.

† Isoc. in Evag. p. 380.

Under this tyrant Evagoras was born. He had been carefully educated, and was distinguished among the youth by the beauty of his countenance, the vigor of his body, and more by the modesty and innocence of his manners, which were the greatest ornaments of that age.* As he advanced in years, the greatest virtues, valor, wisdom, and justice, were observed to brighten in him. He afterwards carried these virtues to so conspicuous a height, as to give jealousy to those who governed; who perceived justly that so shining a merit could not continue in the obscurity of a private condition; but his modesty, probity, and integrity, re-assured them, and they reposed an entire confidence in him, to which he always answered by an inviolable fidelity, without ever meditating their expulsion from the throne by violence or treachery.

A more justifiable means conducted him to it, Divine Providence, as Isocrates says, preparing the way for him. One of the principal citizens murdered the person upon the throne, and had contrived to seize Evagoras, and to rid himself of him, in order to secure the crown to himself; but that prince escaping his pursuit, retired to Solos, a city of Cilicia. His banishment was so far from abating his courage, that it gave him new vigor. Attended only with fifty followers, determined like himself to conquer or die, he returned to Salamin, and expelled the usurpers, though supported by the credit and protection of the king of Persia. Having re-established himself in Salamin, he soon rendered his little kingdom most flourishing, by his application to the relief of his subjects, and by protecting them in all things; by governing them with justice and benevolence; by making them active and laborious; by inspiring them with a taste for the cultivation of lands, the breeding of cattle, commerce, and navigation. He formed them also for war, and made them excellent soldiers.

He was already very powerful, and had acquired great reputation, when Conon the Athenian general, after his defeat at Egospotamos, took refuge with him; not thinking it possible to find a safer asylum for himself, nor a more powerful support of his country;† The resemblance of their manners and sentiments soon made them contract a strict amity with each other, which continued ever after, and proved equally advantageous to both. Conon was in great credit at

* Et qui ornat ætatem, pudor.—Cic.

† A. M. 3599. Ant. J. C. 405. Isocrat. in Evag. pp. 393, 395.

the king of Persia's court, which he employed with that prince, by the means of Ctesias the physician, to accommodate his differences with his host Evagoras, and happily effected it.*

Evagoras and Conon, with the noble design of subverting, or at least of reducing the great power of Sparta, which had rendered itself formidable to all Greece, concerted together the means for the attainment of that end. They were both citizens of Athens; the latter by birth, and the other by right of adoption, which his great services and zeal for that republic merited. The satraps of Asia saw with pain their country ravaged by the Lacedæmonians, and found themselves in great difficulties, from not being in a condition to resist them. Evagoras remonstrated to them, that it was necessary to attack the enemy as well by sea as land; and he did not contribute a little, by his influence with the king of Persia, to Conon's being appointed general of his fleet.† The celebrated victory over the Lacedæmonians at Cnidos was the consequence, and gave the mortal wound to that republic.‡

The Athenians, in acknowledgment of the important services Evagoras and Conon and rendered them with Artaxerxes, erected statues in honor of them. §

Evagoras on his side, extending his conquests from city to city, endeavored to make himself master of the whole island. The Cypriots had recourse to the king of Persia. That prince, alarmed by the rapid progress of Evagoras, of which he apprehended the effects, and conscious of what importance it was to him to prevent an island's falling into the hands of an enemy, so favorably situated for holding Asia Minor in awe, promised them an immediate and powerful support, without declaring openly however against Evagoras. ||

Being employed elsewhere by more important affairs, he could not keep his word with them so soon as he expected, and had engaged. The war of Cyprus continued six years, and the success with which Evagoras supported it against the great king, ought to have banished from the Greeks all terror of the Persian name, and united them against the common enemy. ¶ It is true, the succors sent by Artaxerxes till then were very inconsiderable, as they also were the

* A. M. 360 Ant. J. C. 300.

† A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394.

‡ Diocl. l. xiv. p. 311.

¶ A. M. 3614. Ant. J. C. 320. Isocrat. in Paneg. pp. 135, 136.

† A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 398.

§ Pausan. l. i. p. 5.

two following years. During all that time, it was less a real war, than a preparation for war: but when he had disengaged himself from the Greeks, he applied to it vigorously, and attacked Evagoras with all his forces.*

The army by land, commanded by Orontes, his son-in-law, consisted of three hundred thousand men, and the fleet of three hundred galleys; of which Tiribazus, a person of the highest rank and greatest reputation, was admiral. Gaos, his son-in-law, commanded under him. Evagoras on his side assembled as many troops and ships as he could; but they were a handful in comparison with the formidable preparations of the Persians. He had a fleet of only ninety galleys, and his army scarcely amounted to twenty thousand men. As he had abundance of light vessels, he laid snares for those that carried the provisions of the enemy, of which he sunk a great number, took many, and prevented the rest from arriving; which occasioned a famine among the Persians, attended with violent seditions, which could only be appeased by the coming of fresh convoys from Cilicia. Evagoras strengthened his fleet with sixty galleys which he caused to be built, and fifty sent him by Achoris, king of Egypt, with all the money and corn he could have occasion for.

Evagoras with his land forces immediately attacked a part of the enemy's army which was separate from the rest, and entirely routed it. This first action was soon followed by another at sea, in which the Persians were worsted for some time, till animated by the warm reproaches and remonstrances of their admiral, they resumed courage, and obtained a complete victory. Salamin was immediately besieged by sea and land. Evagoras, leaving the defence of the city to his son, Pythagoras, quitted it in the night with ten galleys, and sailed for Egypt, to engage the king to support him vigorously against the common enemy. He did not obtain from him all the aid he expected. At his return, he found the city in exceeding distress; and finding himself without resource or hope, he was obliged to capitulate. The proposals made to him were, that he should abandon all the cities of Cyprus except Salamin, where he should content himself to reign; that he should pay an annual tribute to the king, and remain in obedience to him, as a servant to a master. The extremity to which he was reduced obliged him to accept the other conditions, hard as they

* A. M. 3618. Ant. J. C. 386. Diod. l. xv. pp. 323-333.

were; but he could never resolve to comply with the last, and persisted always in declaring, that he could only treat as a king with a king. Tiribazus, who commanded the siege, would abate nothing of his pretensions.

Orontes, the other general, jealous of his colleague's glory, had written secretly to court against him, accusing him, among other things, of forming designs against the king, and strengthened his accusation from his continuing to hold a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, and his manifest endeavors to make the chiefs of the army his creatures, by means of presents, promises, and a complacency of manners, not natural to him. Artaxerxes, upon these letters, believed he had no time to lose, and that it was necessary to prevent a conspiracy ready to break out. He despatched orders immediately to Orontes to seize Tiribazus, and send him to court in chains, which was instantly put in execution. Tiribazus, upon his arrival, demanded to be brought to a trial in form; that the heads of the accusation should be communicated to him, and the proofs and witnesses produced. The king, employed in other cares, had no leisure at that time to take cognizance of the affair.

Orontes in the mean time, seeing that the besieged made a vigorous defence, and that the soldiers of the army, discontented with the removal of Tiribazus, quitted the service and refused to obey him, was afraid that affairs would take a bad turn with regard to him. He therefore caused Evagoras to be spoken to privately; the negotiation was resumed; the offers made at first by the latter were accepted; and the mortifying article, which had prevented the conclusion of the treaty, retrenched. The siege was raised in consequence. Evagoras continued king of Salamin only, and engaged to pay an annual tribute.*

It appears that this prince lived twelve or thirteen years after the conclusion of the treaty; for his death is dated in the year of the world 3632. His old age was attended with a happiness and tranquillity never interrupted with sickness or disease, the usual effect of a sober and temperate life. Nicocles, his eldest son, succeeded him, and inherited his virtues as well as his throne. He celebrated his funeral with the utmost magnificence. The discourse entitled *Evagoras*, composed by Isocrates, to inspire the young king with the desire of imitating the example of his father, and from which I have extracted the subsequent eulogium, served for

* A. M. 3619. Ant. J. C. 385.

his funeral oration. He also addressed another tract to Nicocles, which bears his name, wherein he gives him admirable precepts for governing well. I shall perhaps have occasion to speak farther of them afterwards.

EULOGY AND CHARACTER OF EVAGORAS.

Though Evagoras was king of only a small state, Isocrates, who was well able to judge of virtue and merit, compares him with the most powerful monarchs, and proposes him as the perfect model of a good king; convinced that not the extent of provinces, but extent of mind and greatness of soul, constitute great princes. He does in fact point out to us many qualities truly royal in him, and which ought to give us a very high idea of his merit.*

Evagoras was not of the number of those princes who believe, that to reign, it is sufficient to be of royal blood: and that the birth which gives a right to the crown, gives also the merit and qualities necessary for wearing it with honor. He did not imagine, that it could be supposed, as every other condition and station of life made a kind of apprenticeship necessary to its success, that the art of reigning, the most difficult and important of all, should require no pains and preparation for its attainment. He came into the world with the most happy dispositions: a great fund of genius, an easy conception, a lively and instant penetration which nothing escaped, a solidity of judgment that immediately resolved what was necessary to be done: qualities which might seem to dispense with all study and application; and yet, as if he had been born without talents, and found himself obliged to supply by study what he might want by nature, he neglected no means for the embellishment of his mind, and devoted a considerable part of his time to improve himself, by reflecting, meditating on, and consulting the judgment and merit of others.

When he ascended the throne, his greatest care and application was to know mankind, in which the ability of a prince, and of those who are at the head of affairs, principally consists. He had no doubt prepared himself for that science by the study of history, which gives a kind of anticipation of it, supplies the place of experience, and teaches us what the men are with whom we live, by what they have been in other ages. But we study men quite differently in

* Isocrat. in Evag.

themselves ; by their manners, characters, conduct, and actions. The love of the commonwealth rendered attentive to all persons who were capable of serving or injuring it. He applied himself to the discovery of their most secret inclinations and principles of action, and to the knowledge of their different talents and degrees of capacity, in order to assign to each his proper post, to bestow authority according to merit, and to make the private and public good promote each other. He neither rewarded nor punished his subjects, says Isocrates, from the report of others, but solely upon his own knowledge and experience of them ; and neither the virtues of the good, nor the vices of the bad, escaped his inquiry and penetration.

He had one quality very seldom found in those who possess the first rank in authority, especially when they believe themselves capable of governing alone ; I mean, a wonderful docility and attention to the opinion of others, which arose from a diffidence in his own abilities. With his great qualities, he did not seem to have occasion for recourse to the counsel of others, and nevertheless made no resolution, and formed no enterprise, without having first consulted the wise persons whom he had placed about him in his court ; instead of which, pride and presumption, the latent poisons of sovereign power, incline the greatest part of those who arrive at thrones, either to ask no advice at all, or not to follow it when they do.

Intent upon discovering the excellent in every form of government and private condition in life, he proposed the uniting of all their high qualities and great advantages in himself ; affable and popular as in a republican state ; grave and serious as in the councils of the aged and the senate ; steady and decisive as monarchy after mature deliberation ; a profound politician by the extent and rectitude of his views ; an accomplished warrior, from intrepid valor in battle, directed by a wise moderation ; a good father, a good relation, a good friend ; and what crowns all his praise, in every circumstance of his character, always great, and always himself.

He supported his dignity and rank, not with an air of pride and haughtiness, but by a serenity of aspect, and a mild and easy majesty, resulting from innate virtues, and the evidence of a good conscience. He won the hearts of his friends by his liberality, and conquered others by a greatness of soul, to which they could not refuse their esteem and admiration.

But what was most royal in him, and attracted the entire confidence of his subjects, neighbors, and even enemies, was his sincerity, faith, and regard to all his engagements; and his hatred, or rather detestation for all deceit, falsehood and fraud. A single word on his side had as much regard paid to it as the most sacred oath; and it was universally known that nothing was capable of inducing him to violate it in the least circumstance whatever.

It was by all these excellent qualities that he effectually reformed the city of Salamin, and entirely changed the face of its affairs in a very short time. He found it gross, savage and barbarous, without any taste either for learning, commerce, or arms. What cannot a prince do, who loves his people, and is beloved by them; who believes himself great and powerful only to render them happy; and knows how to set a just value upon and do honor to their labors, industry, and merit of every kind! He had not been many years upon the throne before arts, sciences, commerce, navigation, and military discipline were seen to flourish at Salamin; insomuch that that city did not give place to the most opulent of Greece.

Isocrates often repeats, that in the praises he gives Evagoras, of which I have only extracted a part, far from exaggerating any thing, he always falls short of truth. To what can we attribute a reign so wise, so just, so moderate, so constantly employed in rendering his subjects happy, and in promoting the public good? The condition of Evagoras, before he came to govern, seems to me to have contributed very much to it. He being born a prince, and having never experienced any other condition than that of master and sovereign, are, in my opinion, great obstacles to the knowledge and practice of the duties of that high station. Evagoras, who came into the world under a tyrant, had not long obeyed before he commanded. He had borne in a private and dependent life, the yoke of an absolute and despotic power. He had seen himself exposed to envy and calumny, and had been in danger for his merit and virtue. Such a prince had only to be told, upon his ascending the throne, what was said to the emperor Trajan: "You have not always been what you now are. Adversity has prepared you to make a good use of power. You have lived long among us, and like us. You have been in danger under bad princes. You have trembled for yourself, and known by experience

how virtue and innocence have been treated.”* What he had personally suffered, what he had feared for himself and others, what he had seen unjust and unreasonable in the conduct of his predecessors, had opened his eyes, and taught him all his duty. It sufficed to tell him what the emperor Galba told Piso, when he adopted him his associate in the empire: “Remember what you condemned or applauded in princes when you were a private man. You have only to consult the judgment you then passed upon them, and to act conformably to it, for your instruction in the art of reigning well.”*

TRIAL OF TIRIBAZUS.

We have already said, that Tiribazus, having been accused by Orontes of forming a conspiracy against the king, had been sent to court in chains. Gaos, admiral of the fleet, who had married his daughter, apprehending that Artaxerxes would involve him in the affair with his father-in-law, and cause him to be put to death upon mere suspicion, conceived that he had no other means for his security than an open revolt. He was very well beloved by the soldiers; and all the officers of the fleet were particularly devoted to him. Without loss of time he sent deputies to Achoris, king of Egypt, and concluded a league with him against the king of Persia. He also solicited the Lacedæmonians warmly to come into that league, with assurances of making them masters of all Greece, and of establishing universally their form of government, at which they had long seemed to aspire. They listened favorably to these proposals, and embraced with joy this occasion of taking up arms against Artaxerxes, especially as the peace they had concluded with him, by which they had given up the Greeks of Asia, had covered them with shame, and filled them with remorse.

As soon as Artaxerxes had put an end to the war of Cyprus, he thought of concluding also the affair of Tiribazus. He was so just as to appoint for that purpose three commissioners, who were great lords of Persia of distinguished probity, and of the highest reputation in his court. The affair came to an examination, and a hearing on both sides. For so considerable a crime as that of having conspired

* *Quam utile est ad usum secundorum per adversa venisse! Vixisti nobiscum, periclitatus es, timuisti. Que tunc erat innocentium vita scis, et expertus es.*—Plin. in Panegy.

† *Utilissimus quidem ac brevissimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus, cogitare quid aut nolueris sub alio principe, aut volueris.*—Tacit. Hist. l. i. c. 16.

against the king's person, no other proofs were produced than the letters of Orontes; that is to say, of a declared enemy, studious to supplant his rival. Orontes was in hopes, from his influence at court, that the affair would not have been discussed in the usual form, and that upon the memorial sent by him, the accused would have been condemned without farther examination. But this was not the custom with the Persians. By an anciently-established regulation, to which, among other privileges, they had a right by birth, no person was ever to be condemned, without being first heard and confronted with his accusers. This was granted to Tiribazus, who answered to all the articles of the letter. As to his connivance with Evagoras, the treaty itself concluded by Orontes was his apology; as it was absolutely the same which that prince had proposed to him, except a condition which would have done honor to his master. As to his intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, the glorious treaty which he had made them enter into, sufficiently explained whether his own or the king's interests were his motives for it. He did not deny his influence in the army; but apprehended it had not been long a crime to be beloved by the officers and soldiers; and concluded his defence in representing the long services he had rendered the king, with inviolable fidelity; and especially his good fortune in having formerly saved his life, when he was hunting, and in great danger of being devoured by two lions. The three commissioners were unanimous in declaring Tiribazus innocent. The king restored him to his former favor; and justly enraged at the black design of Orontes, let the whole weight of his indignation fall upon him. A single example of this kind against informers convicted of falsehood, would for ever shut the door against calumny. How many innocent persons have been destroyed for want of observing the rule, which even the pagans considered as the basis of all justice, and the guardian of the public tranquillity! *

SECTION VII.—THE EXPEDITION OF ARTAXERXES AGAINST THE CADUSIANS. HISTORY OF DATAMES THE CARIAN.

When Artaxerxes had terminated the Cyprian war, he entered upon another against the Cadusians, who it is probable had revolted, and refused to pay the customary tribute; for authors say nothing of the occasion of this war.

* Diodorus defers the decision of this affair till after the war with the Cadusians, of which we shall soon speak: this seems very improbable.

Those people inhabited part of the mountains situated between the Euxine and Caspian seas, in the north of Media. The soil there is so ungrateful, and so ill-adapted for cultivation, that no corn is sown upon it. The people subsist almost entirely upon apples, pears, and other fruits of that kind. Inured from their infancy to a hard and laborious life, they looked upon dangers and fatigues as nothing; and for that reason made excellent soldiers. The king marched against them in person, at the head of an army of three hundred thousand foot, and ten thousand horse. Tiribazus was with him in this expedition.*

Artaxerxes had not advanced far into the country, when his army suffered extremely by famine. The troops could find nothing to subsist upon; and it was impossible to bring provisions from other places, the ways being difficult and impracticable. The whole camp were reduced to eat their beasts of burden; which soon became so scarce, that the head of an ass was valued at sixty drachmas,† and was very difficult to be obtained at that price. The king's table itself began to fall short, and only a few horses remained, the rest having been entirely consumed.

In this melancholy conjuncture, Tiribazus contrived a stratagem, which saved the king and army. The Cadusians had two kings, who were encamped separately with their troops. Tiribazus, who took care to be informed of all that passed, had been apprised that there was some misunderstanding between them, and that their jealousy of each other prevented their acting in concert, as they should have done. After having communicated his design to Artaxerxes, he went himself to one of the kings, and despatched his son to the other. They each of them informed the king to whom they applied, that the other had sent ambassadors to treat with Artaxerxes privately, and advised him to lose no time, but to make his peace directly, in order that the conditions of it might be the more advantageous; promising to assist them with all their influence. The fraud succeeded. The pagans thought it no crime to use it with enemies.‡ Ambassadors set out from both princes, with Tiribazus and his son in their company.

As this double negotiation lasted some time, Artaxerxes began to suspect Tiribazus; and his enemies taking that opportunity, forgot nothing to his prejudice that might ruin

* Plut. in Artax. pp. 1023, 1024.

† Nearly six dollars.

‡ *Dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?*—Virgil.

him in the king's opinion. That prince already repented the confidence he had reposed in him, and thereby gave room for those who envied him to vent their calumnies and invectives. Upon what does the fortune of the most faithful subjects depend with a credulous and suspicious prince? While this passed, Tiribazus arrived on his side, and his son on the other, each with ambassadors from the Cadusians. The treaty being concluded with both parties, and the peace made, Tiribazus became more powerful than ever in his master's favor, and returned with him.

The king's behavior in this march was much admired. Neither the gold with which he was covered, his purple robes, nor the jewels that glittered all over him, and were worth thirty-six millions of livres,* prevented his taking an equal share in every fatigue with the meanest soldier. He was seen with his quiver at his back, and his shield on his arm, to dismount from his horse and march foremost in those rugged and difficult countries. The soldiers observing his patience and fortitude, and animated by his example, became so cheerful that they seemed rather to fly than walk. At length he arrived at one of his palaces, where the gardens were in admirable order, and there was a park of great extent, and well planted, which was the more surprising, as the whole country about it was entirely naked, and bore no kind of trees. As it was the depth of winter, and excessively cold, he gave the soldiers permission to cut down the wood in this park, without excepting the finest trees, either pines or cypresses. But the soldiers being unwilling to fell timber of such exceeding beauty and stateliness, the king took an axe, and began by cutting the finest and largest tree himself; after which the troops spared none, cut down all the wood they wanted, and kindled as many fires as were necessary to their passing the night without any inconvenience. When we reflect how much value great persons generally set upon their gardens and houses of pleasure, we must acknowledge the generosity of Artaxerxes in making this sacrifice, which argued a very laudable goodness of heart, and a sensibility for the distresses and sufferings of his soldiers. But he did not always support that character.

The king had lost in this enterprise a great number of his best troops, and almost all his horses: and as he imagined that he was despised upon that account, and the ill success of his expedition, he became very much out of humor with

* About twelve hundred thousand dollars.

the *grande*es of his court, and put to death a great number of them in the emotions of his wrath, and more out of distrust, and the fear of their attempting something against him ; for fear in a suspicious prince is a very destructive and bloody passion ; whereas true courage is gentle, humane, and averse to all jealousy and suspicion.

One of the principal officers who perished in this expedition against the Cadusians, was Camisares, by nation a Carian, and governor of Leuco-Syria, a province enclosed between Cilicia and Cappadocia. His son Datamès succeeded him in that government, which was given him in consideration of the good services he had also rendered the king in the same expedition. He was the greatest captain of his time ; and Cornelius Nepos, who has given us his life, does not prefer Amilcar and Hannibal to him among the barbarians. It appears from his history of it, that no one ever excelled him in boldness, valor, and ability in inventing schemes and stratagems, in activity in the execution of his designs, in presence of mind to resolve in the heat of action, and to find resources upon the most desperate occasions ; in a word, in every thing that regards military knowledge. It seems that nothing was wanting to his having acquired a more illustrious name, but a noble theatre, and more exalted occasions ; and perhaps a historian to have given a more extensive narration of his exploits : for Cornelius Nepos, according to his general plan, could not relate them but in a very succinct manner.*

He began to distinguish himself particularly by the execution of a commission that was given him to reduce Thyus, a very powerful prince, and governor of Paphlagonia, who had revolted against the king. As he was his near relation, he thought it incumbent upon him at first to try methods of lenity and reconciliation, which almost cost him his life, through the treachery of Thyus, by the ambuscades he laid for him. Having escaped so great a danger, he attacked him with open force ; though he saw himself abandoned by Ariobarzanes, satrap of Lydia, Ionia, and all Phrygia, whom jealousy prevented from giving him aid. He took his enemy prisoner, with his wife and children ; and knowing with what joy the king would receive the news, he endeavored to make it the more sensible by the pleasure of a surprise. He set out with his illustrious prisoner, without giving the court any advice, and made great marches, to prevent its being

* Cor. Nep. in Vit. Datamis.

known from rumor before his arrival. When he came to Susa, he equipped Thyus in a very singular manner. He was a man of a very tall stature, of a haggard and terrible aspect, a black complexion, with the hair of his head and beard very long. He dressed him in a magnificent habit, put a collar and bracelets of gold about his neck and arms, and added to this equipage all the ornaments of a king, as he in fact was. For himself, in the gross habit of a peasant, and clad like a hunter, he led Thyus upon the left in a leash, like a wild beast that had been taken in the snare. The novelty of the sight drew the whole city after it; but nobody was so much surprised and pleased as the king, when he saw them approach in that pleasant masquerade. The rebellion of a prince, very powerful in his country, had given Artaxerxes great and just alarm; and he did not expect to have seen him so soon in his hands. So sudden and successful an execution gave him a higher opinion than ever of the merit of Datames.

To express his sense of it, he gave him an equal share in the command of the army designed against Egypt, with Pharnabazus and Tithraustes, the two principal persons in the state, and even appointed him general-in-chief, when he recalled Pharnabazus.

When he was upon the point of setting out for that expedition, Artaxerxes ordered him to march directly against Aspis, who had made the country revolt, which he commanded in the neighborhood of Cappadocia. The commission was of little importance to an officer who had been appointed general, and besides very dangerous, because it was necessary to go in quest of the enemy into a very remote country. The king soon perceived his error, and countermanded him: but Datames had set out directly with a handful of men, and marched night and day; judging that diligence, without a great number of troops, was all that was necessary to surprise and vanquish the enemy. It happened according to his expectation; and the couriers despatched by the king, met Aspis in chains upon the road to Susa.

Nothing was talked of at court but Datames. It was not known which to admire most, his ready obedience, his wise and enterprising bravery, or his extraordinary success. So glorious a reputation gave offence to the courtiers in power. Enemies in secret to each other, and divided by a contrariety of interests, and a competition in their preten-

sions, they united together against a superior merit, which reproached their defects, and was therefore a crime in their acceptation. They conspired to ruin him in the king's opinion, and succeeded but too well. As they besieged him perpetually, and he was not upon his guard against persons who appeared so well affected to his service, they inspired him with jealousy and suspicion, to the prejudice of the most zealous and faithful of his officers.

An intimate friend of Datames, who held one of the highest posts at the court, apprised him of what passed, and of the conspiracy which had been formed against him, and had already sunk his credit considerably with the king. He represented to him, that if the Egyptian expedition, with which he was charged, should take a bad turn, he would find himself exposed to great dangers: that it was the custom with kings to attribute good successes to themselves and their auspicious fortune only, and to impute the bad to the faults of their generals, for which they were responsible at the peril of their heads: that he ran the greater risk, as all that were about the king's person, and had any ascendant over him, were his declared enemies, and had sworn his destruction.*

Upon this advice, Datames resolved to quit the king's service, though without doing any thing hitherto contrary to the fidelity he owed him. He left the command of the army to Mandrocles of Magnesia, departed with his own troops for Cappadocia, seized Paphlagonia which joined it, allied himself secretly with Ariobarzanes, raised troops, took possession of fortresses, and put good garrisons in them. He received advice that the Pisidians were arming against him. He did not wait their coming on, but made his army march thither under the command of his youngest son, who had the misfortune to be killed in battle. However lively his affliction might be upon that occasion, he concealed his death, least the bad news should discourage his troops. When he approached near the enemy, his first care was to take possession of an advantageous post. Mithrobarzanes, his father-in-law, who commanded the horse, believing his son entirely ruined, determined to go over to the enemy. Datames, without concern or emotion, caused

* Docet eum magno fore in periculo, siquid, illo imperante, in Egypto adversi accidisset. Namque eam esse consuetudinem regum, ut casus adversos hominibus tribuant, secundos fortune suæ: quo facile fieri, ut impellantur ad eorum perniciem, quorum ductu res male gestæ nuncientur. Illum hoc majore fore in discrimine, quod, quibus rex maxime obediat, eos habeat inimicissimos.—Corn. Nep.

a rumor to be spread throughout the army, that it was only a stratagem concerted between him and his father-in-law, and followed him close, as if he designed to put his troops in a position for charging the enemy in two different attacks. This artifice was attended with all the success he expected from it. When they joined battle, Mithrobarzanes was treated as an enemy on both sides, and cut to pieces with his troops. The army of the Pisidians was put to flight, and left Datames master of the field, and of all the rich booty found in the camp of the conquered.*

Datames had not till then declared openly against the king, the actions we have related being only against governors, with whom he might have particular differences, which we have observed before was very common. His own eldest son, called Scismas, made himself his accuser, and discovered his whole design to the king. Artaxerxes was highly apprehensive of the consequence. He knew all the merit of this new enemy, and that he did not engage in any enterprise without having maturely considered all its consequences, and taken the necessary measures to secure its success; and that hitherto the execution had always answered the wisdom of his projects. He sent an army against him into Cappadocia, of almost two hundred thousand men, twenty thousand of which were horse, all commanded by Autophradates. The troops of Datames did not amount to the twentieth part of the king's: so that he had no resource but in himself, the valor of his soldiers, and the happy situation of the post he had chosen; for in that consisted his chief excellence; no captain having better known how to take advantage and choose his ground, when he was to draw up an army in battle.

His post, as I have observed, was infinitely superior to that of the enemy. He had pitched upon a situation where they could not surround him; where, upon the least movement they made, he could come to blows with them with very considerable advantage; and where, had they resolved to fight, their odds in number would have been absolutely useless to them. Autophradates well knew, that, according to all the rules of war, he ought not to hazard a battle in such a conjuncture: but he observed at the same time, that it was much to his dishonor, with so numerous an army, to make choice of a retreat, or to continue any longer inactive before a handful of enemies. He therefore gave the

* Diod. l. xv. p. 399.

signal. The first attack was violent; but the troops of Autophradates soon gave way, and were entirely routed. The victor pursued them for some time with great slaughter. There were only a thousand men killed on the side of Datames.

Several battles, or rather skirmishes, were fought afterwards, in which the latter was always victorious; because, perfectly knowing the country, and succeeding especially in the stratagems of war, he always posted himself advantageously, and engaged the enemy in difficult ground, from whence they could not extricate themselves without loss. Autophradates, seeing all his endeavors ineffectual, and his supplies entirely exhausted, and despairing of ever being able to subject by force so artful and valiant an enemy, entreated an accommodation, and proposed to him his being restored to the king's favor upon honorable conditions. Datames was not ignorant that there was little security for him in such a choice, because princes are seldom reconciled in earnest with a subject who has failed in his obedience, and to whom they see themselves in some sort obliged to submit. However, as only despair had hurried him into the revolt, and he had always retained at heart sentiments of zeal and affection for his prince, he accepted the offers with joy, which would put an end to the violent condition his misfortune had engaged him in, and afford him the means of returning to his duty, and of employing his talents for the service of the prince to whom they were due. He promised to send deputies to the king; upon which ensued a cessation of arms; and Autophradates retired into Phrygia, which was his government.

Datames was not deceived. Artaxerxes, furiously enraged against him, had changed the esteem and affection he formerly professed for him, into an implacable hatred. Finding himself incapable of conquering him by the force of arms, he was not ashamed to employ artifice and treachery: means unworthy of every man of honor, and much more so of a prince. He hired several murderers to assassinate him; but Datames was so happy as to escape their ambuscades. At length Mithridates, the son of Ariobarzanes, to whom the king had made magnificent promises, if he could deliver him from so formidable an enemy, having insinuated himself into his friendship, and having long treated him with all the marks of the most entire fidelity to acquire his confidence, took the advantage of a favorable

opportunity when he was alone, and stabbed him with his sword before he was in a condition to defend himself.

Thus fell this great captain in the snares of a pretended friendship, who had always thought it his honor to observe the most inviolable fidelity, in regard to those with whom he had any engagements.* Happy had he always prided himself also upon being as faithful a subject, as he was a true friend, and if he had not, in the latter part of his life, sullied the lustre of his heroic qualities, by the ill use he made of them, which neither the fear of disgrace, the injustice of those who envied him, the ingratitude of his master for the services he had rendered him, nor any other pretext, could sufficiently authorize.†

I am surprised that, comparable as he was to the greatest persons of antiquity, he had remained in a manner buried in silence and oblivion. His great actions and exploits are, however, worthy of being preserved in history; for it is in such small bodies of troops as those of Datames, that the whole soul is exerted, in which the highest prudence is shown, in which chance has no share, and the abilities of a general appear in their full light.

CHAPTER IV.

HISTORY OF SOCRATES ABRIDGED.

As the death of Socrates is one of the most considerable events of antiquity, I thought it incumbent on me to treat that subject with all the extent it deserves. In this view I shall premise some things, which are necessary to the reader's having a just idea of this prince of philosophers.

Two authors will supply me principally with what I have to say upon this subject, Plato and Xenophon, both disciples of Socrates. It is to them that posterity is indebted for many of his discourses, that philosopher having left nothing in writing, and for an ample account of all the cir-

* *Ita vir, qui multos consilio, neminem perfidia ceperat, simulata captus est amicitia.*—Corn. Nep.

† This doctrine of Mr. Rollin's may do very well in France, where implicit obedience to the grand monarch is the law of the land; but it has too much of that exploded absurdity, passive obedience, founded in an erroneous acceptance of religion, to be admitted in a free nation; where, by the maxims of the law, and the constitution of the government, the subject in many instances is dispensed from his obedience, and may defend himself, even in arms, against his prince; viz. : in cases of life and liberty.—Translator.

cumstances of his condemnation and death.* Plato was an eye-witness of the whole, and relates, in his *Apology*, the manner of the accusation and defence of Socrates, in his *Criton*, his refusal to make his escape out of prison; in his *Phædon*, his admirable discourse upon the immortality of the soul, which was immediately followed by his death. Xenophon was absent at that time, and upon his return after the expedition of young Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes: so that he wrote his *Apology* of Socrates only upon the report of others; but his actions and discourses, in his four books of memorable things, he repeats from his own knowledge. Diogenes Laertius has given us the life of Socrates, but in a very dry and abridged manner.

SECTION I.—BIRTH AND EDUCATION OF SOCRATES.

Socrates was born at Athens, in the fourth year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad.† His father Sophroniscus was a sculptor, and his mother Phanarete a midwife. Hence we may observe, that meanness of birth is no obstacle to true merit, in which alone solid glory and real nobility consist. It appears from the comparisons which Socrates often used in his discourses, that he was neither ashamed of his father's or mother's profession. He was surprised that a sculptor should employ his whole attention to mould an insensible stone into the likeness of a man, and that a man should take so little pains not to resemble an insensible stone.‡ He would often say, that he exercised the functions of a midwife with regard to the mind, in making it bring forth all its thoughts, which was indeed the peculiar talent of Socrates.§ He treated subjects in so simple, natural, and pure an order, that he made those with whom he disputed say what he would, and find an answer themselves to all the questions he proposed to them. He at first learned his father's trade, in which he made himself very expert. In the time of Pausanias, there was a Mercury and the Graces to be seen at Athens of his workmanship; and it is to be presumed these statutes would not have found place among those of the greatest masters in the art, if they had not been thought worthy of it. ||

Criton is reported to have taken him out of his father's shop, from the admiration of his fine genius, and the opinion,

* Socrates, ejus ingenium variosque sermones immortalitati acceptis suis Plato tradidit, literam nullam reliquit.—Cic. de Orat. l. iii. n. 57.

† A. M. 3533. Ant. J. C. 471. Diog. Laert. in Socrat. p. 100. ‡ Ibid. p. 119.

§ Plat. in Theætet. p. 149. &c.

|| Paus. l. ix. p. 596.

that it was inconsistent for a young man capable of the greatest things, to continue perpetually employed upon stone with a chisel in his hand. He was a disciple of Archelaus, who conceived a great affection for him. Archelaus had been pupil to Anaxagoras, a very celebrated philosopher.* His first study was physics, the works of nature and the movement of the heavens, stars, and planets; according to the custom of those times, wherein only that part of philosophy was known, and Xenophon assures us of his being very learned in it.† But after having found by his own experience, how difficult, abstruse, intricate, and at the same time how little useful that kind of learning was to the generality of mankind, he was the first, according to Cicero, who conceived the thought of bringing down philosophy from heaven, to place it in cities, and introduce it into private houses; humanizing it, to use that expression, and rendering it more familiar, more useful in common life, more within the reach of man's capacity, and applying it solely to what might make them more rational, just, and virtuous.‡ He found there was a kind of folly in devoting the whole vivacity of his mind, and employing all his time, in inquiries merely curious, involved in impenetrable darkness, and absolutely incapable of contributing to human happiness; while he neglected to inform himself in the ordinary duties of life, and in learning what is conformable or opposite to piety, justice, and probity: in what fortitude, temperance, and wisdom consist; and what is the end of all government, what the rules of it, and what qualities are necessary for commanding and ruling well. We shall see in the sequel the use he made of this study.§

It was so far from preventing him from discharging the duties of a good citizen, that it was the means of making him the more observant of them. He bore arms, as did all the people of Athens; but with more pure and elevated motives. He made many campaigns, was present in many actions, and always distinguished himself by his valor and fortitude. He was seen towards the end of his life, giving in

* Diod. p. 101.

† Lib. iv. Mem. p. 710.

‡ Socrates primus philosophiam devocavit e cælo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit et coegit de vita et moribus, rebusque bonis et malis querere.—Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. v. n. 10.

Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis, et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante cum philosophi occupati fuerunt, advocavisse philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quereretur; cælestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre.—Cic. Acad. Quæst. l. i. n. 15.

§ Xenoph. Memorab. l. i. p. 710.

the senate, of which he was a member, the most shining proofs of his zeal for justice, without being intimidated by the greatest present dangers.

He had accustomed himself early to a sober, severe, laborious life, without which it seldom happens that men are capable of discharging the greatest part of the duties of good citizens. No man could carry the contempt of riches and the love of poverty farther than he did. He thought it a divine perfection to be in want of nothing, and believed that the less we are contented with the nearer we approach to the Divinity.* Seeing the pomp and show displayed by luxury in certain ceremonies, and the infinite quantity of gold and silver employed in them. "How many things," said he, congratulating himself on his condition, "do I not want!" "Quantis non ego!" †

His father left him eighty minæ, which he lent to one of his friends, who had occasion for that sum. But the affairs of that friend having taken an ill turn, he lost the whole, and suffered that misfortune with such indifference and tranquillity that he did not so much as complain of it.‡ We find it in Xenophon's *Economies*, that his whole estate amounted to no more than five minæ.§ The richest persons of Athens were his friends, who could never prevail on him to accept a share of their wealth. When he was in want of anything he was not ashamed to declare it: "If I had money," said he one day, in an assembly of his friends, "I should buy me a cloak." He did not address himself to any one in particular, but contented himself with that general information. His disciples contended for the honor of making him this small present, which was being too slow, says Seneca; their own observation should have prevented the want and the demand. ||

He generously refused the offers and presents of Archelaus, king of Macedon, who was desirous of having him at his court, adding, "that he could not go to a man who could give him more than it was in his power to return." Another philosopher does not approve this answer. "Was it making a prince a small return," says Seneca, "to undeceive him in his false ideas of grandeur and magnificence;

* Xenoph. *Memorab.* l. i. p. 731.

† Socrates in pompa, cum magna vis auri argentique ferretur: Quam multa non desidero? inquit.—Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. 5.

‡ Liban in *Apolog. Socrat.* p. 610.

§ Xenoph. *Econ.* p. 822.

|| Socrates, amicis audientibus; "Emissem," inquit, "pallium, si nummos haberem." Neminem poposcit, omnes admonuit. A quo acciperet, ambitus fuit. Post hoc quisquis properaverit, sero dat; jam Socrati deficit.—Senec. *de Benef.* l. vii. c. 24.

to inspire him with a contempt for riches; to show him the right use of them; to instruct him in the great art of reigning; in a word, to teach him how to live and how to die? But," continues Seneca, "the true reason which prevented his going to the court of that prince was that he did not think it consistent for him to seek a voluntary servitude, whose liberty a free city could not suffer him to enjoy. *"Noluit ire ad voluntariam servitutem, is, ejus libertatem civitas libera ferre non potuit."**

The peculiar austerity of his life did not render him gloomy and morose, as was too common with the philosophers of those times.† In company and conversation he was always gay and facetious, and the sole joy and spirit of the entertainment. Though he was very poor, he took a pleasure in the neatness of his person and house, and could not suffer the ridiculous affectation of Antisthenes, who always wore dirty and ragged clothes. He told him once that through the holes of his cloak, and the rest of his tatters, abundance of vanity might be discerned.‡

One of the most distinguishing qualities of Socrates was a tranquillity of soul that no accident, no loss, no injury, no ill treatment, could ever alter. Some have believed that he was by nature hasty and passionate, and that the moderation to which he had attained was the object of his reflections and endeavors to subdue and correct himself, which would still add to his merit. Seneca tells us that he had desired his friends to apprise him whenever they saw him ready to fall into a passion, and that he had given them that privilege over him which he himself took with them.§ Indeed, the best time to call in aid against rage and anger, that have so violent and sudden a power over us, is when we are yet ourselves, and in cool blood.|| At the first signal, the least animadversion, he either softened his tone or was silent. Finding himself in great emotion against a slave: "I would beat you," said he, "if I were not angry:" *"Cæderem te, nisi irascerer."*¶ Having received a box on the ear, he contented himself with only saying, with a smile, "'Tis a misfortune not to know when to put on a helmet."**

Without going out of his own house he found enough to exercise his patience to its full extent. Xantippe, his wife, put it to the severest proofs by her capricious, passionate,

* Senec. de Benef. l. v. c. 6. † Xenoph. in Conviv. ‡ Ælian. l. iv. c. 11, et l. ix. c. 35.

§ Senec. de Ira, l. iiii. c. 15.

¶ *Contra potens malum et apud nos gratiosum, dum conspicimus, nostrum sumus, advocemus.* ¶ Senec. de Ira, l. i. c. 15. ** Idem. l. iiii. c. 11.

and violent disposition. It seems, before he took her for his companion, that he was not ignorant of her character: and he says himself, in Xenophon, "that he had expressly chosen her from the conviction that if he should be capable of bearing her insults there would be nobody, though ever so difficult to endure, with whom he could not live."* Never was woman of so violent and capricious a spirit and so bad a temper. There was no kind of abuse or injurious treatment which he did not experience from her. She would sometimes be transported with such excess of rage as to tear off his cloak in the open street, and even one day, after having vented all the reproaches her fury could suggest, she emptied a pot upon his head, at which he only laughed, and, said, "That so much thunder must needs produce a shower."†

Some ancient authors write that Socrates married a second wife, ‡ named Myrto, who was the grand-daughter of Aristides the Just; and that he suffered exceedingly from them both, who were continually quarrelling with each other and never agreed but in loading him with reproaches, and doing him all the injury they could invent. They pretend that during the Peloponnesian war, after the pestilence had swept off great numbers of the Athenians, a decree was made whereby, the sooner to retrieve the ruins of the republic, each citizen was permitted to have two wives at the same time, and that Socrates took advantage of this new law. Those authors found this circumstance solely upon a passage in a treatise on nobility, ascribed to Aristotle. But, besides that, according to Plutarch himself, Panetius, a very grave author, has fully refuted this opinion; neither Plato nor Xenophon, who were well acquainted with all that related to their master, say anything of this second marriage of Socrates, and on another side, Thücydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus Siculus, who have treated at large all the particulars of the Peloponnesian war, are alike silent in regard to the pretended decree of Athens, which permitted bigamy. We may see in the first volumes of the *Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres* a dissertation of Monsieur Hardion's upon this subject, wherein he demonstrates that the second marriage of Socrates, and the decree upon bigamy, are suppositious facts.

* Xenoph. in *Conviv.* p. 876.

† Diog. in *Socrat.* p. 113.

‡ Plut. in *Aristid.* p. 335. *Athen.* l. xiii. p. 555. Diog. *Laert.* in *Socrat.* p. 105.

SECTION II.—OF THE DEMON, OR FAMILIAR SPIRIT OF SOCRATES.

Our knowledge of Socrates would be defective if we knew nothing of the genius which he said had assisted him with its counsel and protection in the greatest part of his actions. It is not agreed among authors what this genius was commonly called, "The Dæmon of Socrates, from the Greek word *Δαιμόνιον*, which signifies something of a divine nature, conceived as a secret voice, a sign, or such an inspiration as diviners are supposed to have had. This genius diverted him from the execution of his designs when they were prejudicial to him, without ever inducing him to act any thing. "Esse divinum quoddam quod Socrates demonium appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit, nunquam impellenti, sæpe revocanti."* Plutarch, in his treatise, entitled, "Of the Genius of Socrates," repeats the different opinions of the ancients upon the existence and nature of this genius. I shall confine myself to that one which seems the most natural and reasonable, though he does not lay much stress upon it.†

We know that the divinity has a clear and unerring knowledge of futurity; that man cannot penetrate into its darkness, but by uncertain and confused conjectures; that those who succeed best in that research, are they who by a more exact and studied comparison of the different causes capable of influencing future events, distinguish, with greater force and perspicuity, what will be the result and issue of the conflict of those different causes, in conducting to the success or miscarriage of an effect or enterprise. This foresight and discernment has something divine in it, exalts us above the rest of mankind, assimilates us to the divinity, and makes us participate in some measure in his councils and designs, by giving us an insight and prescience, to a certain degree, of what he has ordained concerning the future. Socrates had a just and penetrating judgment, joined with the most consummate prudence. He might call this judgment and prudence, *Δαιμόνιον*, "something divine," using indeed a kind of equivocation in the expression, without attributing to himself, however, the merit of his wisdom in conjecturing upon the future. The Abbé Fraguier comes very near the same opinion in the dissertation he has left us upon this subject, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres. ‡

* Cic. de Divin. l. i. n. 122.

† Page 580.

‡ Vol. IV. p. 368.

The effect, or rather function of this genius, was to stop and prevent his acting, without ever inducing him to act. He received also the same impulse, when his friends were about to engage in any bad affair, and communicated it to them; and several instances are related, wherein they found themselves very unfortunate from not having believed him.* Now, what other signification can be given to this, than that under mysterious terms, it implies a mind which by its own lights, and the knowledge of mankind, has attained a sort of insight into futurity? And if Socrates had not intended to lessen in his own person the merit of unerring judgment, by attributing to it a kind of instinct, if at bottom he had desired any thing to be understood, besides the general aid of the divine wisdom, which speaks in every man by the voice of reason, would he have escaped, says Xenophon, the censure of arrogance and falsehood? †

“God has always prevented me from speaking to you,” says he to Alcibiades, “while the weakness of your age would have rendered my discourses ineffectual to you. But I conceive I may now enter into dispute with you, as an ambitious young man, for whom the laws open a way to the dignities of the republic.” ‡ Is it not here evident that prudence prevented Socrates from treating Alcibiades seriously, at a time when grave and severe conversation would have created in him a disgust, of which perhaps he might never have got the better? And when, in his dialogue upon the commonwealth, Socrates ascribes his avoiding public business to inspiration from above, does he mean any thing more than what he says in his apology, “that a just and good man, who intermeddles with the government in a corrupt state, is not long without perishing?” § If, when he appeared before the judges who were to condemn him, that divine voice was not heard to prevent him, as it was usually upon dangerous occasions, the reason is, that he did not deem it a misfortune for him to die, especially at his age, and in his circumstances. || It is well known what his prognostication had been long before, upon the unfortunate expedition to Sicily. He attributed it to his dæmon, and declared it to be the inspiration of that spirit. A wise man, who sees an affair ill concerted, and conducted with passion, may easily prophesy upon the event of it, without the aid of a dæmon’s inspiration.

* Plut. in Theag. p. 128. † Memorab. l. i. p. 708. ‡ Plut. in Alcib. p. 150.
§ Lib. vi. de Rep. p. 496. Apolog. Soc. pp. 31, 32. || Apolog. Soc. p. 40.

It must be allowed, however, that the opinion which gives to men genii and angels to direct and guard them, was not unknown even to the pagans. Plutarch cites the verses of Menander, in which that poet expressly says, "That every man at his birth has a good genius given him, which attends him during the whole course of his life, as a guide and director." *

"Ἀπαντὶ δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαραταεῖ
 "Εὖθ' οὖς γενομένῳ, μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου
 "Ἀγαθός.

It is highly probable, that the dæmon of Socrates, which has been so differently spoken of, and thereby made a question whether it was a good or bad angel, was no more than the force and rectitude of his judgment, which, acting according to the rules of prudence, aided by long experience, and supported by wise reflections, made him foresee the events of those things, upon which he was either consulted, or deliberated himself.

I conceive, at the same time, that he was not sorry the people should believe him inspired, or that he knew futurity by any aid whatever of the divinity. That idea might exalt him very highly in the opinion of the Athenians, and give him an authority, of which the greatest persons of the pagan world were very fond, and which they endeavored to acquire by secret communications, and pretended conferences with some divinity: but it drew the jealousy of many of the citizens upon him. †

SECTION III.—SOCRATES DECLARED THE WISEST OF MANKIND BY THE ORACLE.

This declaration of the oracle, so advantageous in appearance for Socrates, did not a little contribute to the excitement of envy and stirring up of enemies against him, as he tells us himself in his apology, wherein he recounts the occasion and true sense of that oracle. ‡

Chærephon, a zealous disciple of Socrates, when at Delphos, inquired of the oracle, whether there was a wiser man than Socrates in the world; the priestess replied there was none. This answer perplexed Socrates extremely, who could

* De Anim. tranquil. p. 474.

† Lycurgus and Solon had recourse to the authority of oracles to advance their credit. Zeleucus pretended that his laws had been dictated to him by Minerva. Numa Pompilius boasted his conferences with the goddess Egeria. The first Scipio Africanus made the people believe that the gods gave him secret counsels. Even the hand of Sertorius had something divine in it.

‡ Plut. in Apolog. pp. 21, 22.

scarcely comprehend the meaning of it. For on the one side, he well knew, as he says of himself, that there was neither much nor little wisdom in him; and on the other, he could not suspect the oracle of falsehood, the divinity being incapable of telling a lie. He therefore considered it attentively, and took great pains to discover the sense of it. At first he applied himself to a powerful citizen, a statesman, and a great politician, who passed for one of the wisest men of the city, and who was himself as much convinced of his own merit as any body. He found by his conversation that he knew nothing, and insinuated as much to him in terms sufficiently intelligible, which made him extremely odious to that citizen, and all who were present. He did the same by several others of the same profession; and the only result of his inquiry was, to draw upon himself a greater number of enemies. From the statesmen he addressed himself to the poets, whom he found still fuller of self-esteem, but really more void of knowledge and wisdom. He pursued his inquiries to the artisans, and could not meet with one, who, because he succeeded in his own art, did not believe himself very capable, and fully informed in all that was great besides; which presumption was the almost universal failing of the Athenians. As they had naturally an abundance of wit, they pretended to a knowledge of every thing, and believed themselves capable of pronouncing upon all things. His inquiries among strangers were not more successful.

Socrates, afterwards on comparing himself with all those he had questioned, discovered that the difference between him and them was, that they all believed they knew what they did not know, and that for his part he sincerely professed his ignorance. From thence he concluded, that God only is truly wise; and that the true meaning of the oracle was to signify that all human wisdom was of little value, or, to speak more properly, of no value at all. And as to the oracle's naming him, it no doubt did so, says he, by way of setting him up for an example, as if it intended to declare to all men, "the wisest among you is he, who knows, like Socrates, that there is no real wisdom in him." *

* Socrates in omnibus fere sermonibus sic disputat, ut nihil affirmet ipse, refellat alios; nihil se scire dicat, nisi id ipsum, eoque præstare cæteris, quod illi, quæ nesciant, scire se putent; ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod hæc esset una omnia sapientia, non arbitrari se scire quod nesciat.—Cic. Acad. Quæst. l. i. n. 15, 16.

SECTION IV.—SOCRATES DEVOTES HIMSELF ENTIRELY TO THE INSTRUCTION OF THE YOUTH OF ATHENS.

After having related some particulars in the life of Socrates, it is time to proceed to that in which his character principally and peculiarly consisted; I mean the pains he took to instruct mankind, and particularly to form the youth of Athens.

He seemed, says Libanius, to be the common father of the republic; so attentive was he to the happiness and advantage of his whole country. But as it is very difficult to correct the aged, and to make people change principles, who revere the errors in which they have grown grey, he devoted his labors principally to the instruction of youth, in order to sow the seeds of virtue in a soil more fit to produce the fruits of it.*

He had no open school, like the rest of the philosophers, nor set times for his lessons. He had no benches prepared, nor ever mounted a professor's chair. He was the philosopher of all times and seasons. He taught in all places, and upon all occasions. In walking, in conversation, at meals, in the army, and in the midst of the camp, in the public assemblies of the senate or people, in prison itself, and when he drank the poison, he philosophized, says Plutarch, and instructed mankind. And from thence the same judicious author takes occasion to establish a great principle in point of government, which Seneca † before him had placed in all its true light. "To be a public man," says he, "it is not necessary to be actually in office, to wear the robe of judge or magistrate, and to sit in the highest tribunals for the administration of justice. Many do this, who, though honored with the appellation of orators, prætors, and senators, yet if they want the merit of those characters, ought to be regarded as private persons, and often confounded with the lowest and vilest of the populace. But whoever knows how to give wise counsels to those who consult him, to animate the citizens to virtue, and to inspire them with sentiments of

* In Apol. Socrat. p. 641.

† Habet ubi se etiam in privato late explicet magnus animus. Ita delituerit (vir ille) ut ubicunque otium suum absconderit, prodisse velit et singulis et universis, ingenio, voce, consilio. Nec enim is solus reip. prodest, qui candidatos extrahit, et tuetur reos, et de pace belloque senset, sed qui juventutem exhortatur, qui in tanto bonorum præceptorum inopia virtute instruit animos, qui ad pecuniam luxuriamque cursu ruentes prensat ac retrahit, et si nihil aliud certe moratur, in privato publicum negotium arit. An ille plus præstat, qui inter peregrinos et cives, aut urbanus prætor audientibus adsectoris verba pronunciat, quam qui docet, quid sit justitia, quid pietas, quid patientia, quid fortitudo, quid mortis contemptus, quid decorum intellectus quam gratitum bonum sit conscientia?—Senec. de Tranquil. Anim. c. iii.

probity, equity, generosity, and a love of their country, is the true magistrate and ruler, in whatever condition or place he may be." *

Such was Socrates. The services he rendered the state, by the instructions he gave the youth, and the disciples he formed, were inexpressibly great. No master ever had a greater number of pupils, or more illustrious. Plato, though alone, was worth a multitude. When at the point of death, he blessed and thanked God for three things ; that he had been endued with a rational soul, that he was born a Greek and not a barbarian, and that his birth had taken place in the lifetime of Socrates. † Xenophon had the same advantage. It is said that Socrates one day met him in the street, and stopping him with his staff, asked him if he knew where provisions were sold ? It was not difficult to answer this question. But Socrates having asked in what place men learned virtue, and observing that the second question perplexed him : " If you desire to know," continued the philosopher, " follow me, and you shall be informed." Which he did immediately, and was afterwards the first who collected and published his master's discourses. ‡

Aristippus, upon a conversation with Ischomachus, in which he had introduced some of the doctrines of Socrates, conceived so ardent a desire to become his disciple, that his health was greatly impaired, till he could go to the fountain head, and imbibe his fill of a philosophy that taught the knowledge and cure of evil. §

What is reported of Euclid the Megarian gives us a still stronger idea of the desire among the disciples of Socrates to receive the benefit of his instructions. There was at that time an open war between Athens and Megara, which was carried on with so much animosity that the Athenians obliged their generals to take an oath to lay waste the territory of Megara twice a year, and prohibited the Megarians from setting foot in Attica upon pain of death. || This decree could not extinguish nor suspend the zeal of Euclid. He left his city in the evening in the disguise of a woman, with a veil upon his head, and came to the house of Socrates in the night, where he continued till the approach of day, when he returned in the same manner he came. ¶

The ardor of the young Athenians to follow him was incredible. They left father and mother, and renounced all

* Plut. an seni sit ger. resp. p. 796.

† Diog. in Xenoph. p. 120.

‡ Plut. in Pericl. p. 168.

† Plut. in Mario, p. 433.

§ Plut. de Curios. p. 515.

¶ Aul. Gel. Noct. Att. l. vi. c. 10.

parties of pleasure, to attach themselves to him, and to hear his discourses. We may judge of this in the example of Alcibiades, the most ardent and fiery of all the Athenians. The philosopher, however, never spared him, and was always ready to calm the sallies of his passions, and to rebuke his pride, which was his great fault. I have before related some instances of his temper. One day, when Alcibiades was boasting of his wealth, and the great estates in his possession, which generally excites the pride of young people of quality, he carried him to a geographical map, and asked him to find Attica. It was so small that it could scarcely be discerned; he found it, however, though with some difficulty: but upon being desired to point out his own estate there, "It is too small," said he, "to be distinguished in so small a space." "See then," replied Socrates, how much you are affected about an imperceptible point of land.* This reasoning might have been urged much farther. For what was Attica, compared to all Greece, Greece to Europe, Europe to the whole world, and the world itself to the vast extent of the infinite orbs which surround it? What an insect, what a nothing, is the most powerful prince of the earth in the midst of these innumerable bodies and immense spaces, and how much of it does he occupy!

The young people of Athens, dazzled with the glory of Themistocles, Cimon and Pericles, and full of a wild ambition, after having received for some time the lessons of the sophists, who promised to make them very great politicians, conceived themselves capable of every thing, and aspired to the highest employments. One of these, named Glauco, had conceived so strong an idea of entering upon the administration of the public affairs, though not twenty years old, that none of his family or friends were able to divert him from a design so little consistent with his age and capacity. Socrates, who had an affection for him on account of Plato his brother, was the only person who could prevail upon him to change his resolution.†

Meeting him one day, he accosted him so happily with discourse, that he engaged him to listen. "You are desirous, then, to govern the republic," said he to him. "True," replied Glauco. "You cannot have a more noble design," answered Socrates: "For if you succeed, you will have it in your power to serve your friends effectually, to aggrandize your family, and to extend the boundaries of your country.

* *Ælian*, l. iii. c. 28.

† *Xenoph. Memorab.* l. iii. pp. 772-774.

You will make yourself known not only at Athens, but throughout all Greece; and perhaps your renown, like that of Themistocles, may spread abroad among the barbarous nations. In short, wherever you are, you will attract the respect and admiration of the whole world."

So smooth and insinuating a prelude was extremely pleasing to the young man, who was taken on the blind side. He staid willingly, and the conversation continued. "Since you desire to be esteemed and honored, no doubt your view is to be useful to the public?" "Certainly." "Tell me, then, I request you, in the name of the gods, what is the first service you propose to render to the state?" As Glauco seemed at a loss, and meditated upon what he would answer, "I presume," continued Socrates, "it is to enrich it, that is to say, to augment its revenues." "My very thought." "You are well versed, then, undoubtedly, in the revenues of the state, and know perfectly to what they may amount; you have not failed to make them your particular study, in order that, if a fund should happen to fail by any unforeseen accident, you might be able to supply the deficiency by another." "I protest," replied Glauco, "that never entered my thoughts." "At least you will tell me to what the expenses of the republic amount; for you must know the importance of retrenching such as are superfluous." "I own I am as little informed in this point as the other." "You must therefore defer your design of enriching the state till another time; for it is impossible you should do it while you are unacquainted with its revenue and expenses."

"But," said Glauco, "there is still another means which you have not mentioned. A state may be enriched by the ruin of its enemies." "You are in the right," replied Socrates; "but that depends upon its being the strongest; otherwise it incurs the danger of losing what it has. For which reason, he who talks of engaging in a war, ought to know the forces on both sides; that, if he finds his own party strongest, he may boldly advise the war, and if weakest, dissuade the people from undertaking it. Now, do you know the strength of our republic and that of our enemies by sea and land? Have you a statement of them in writing? be so kind as to let me see it?" "I have not at present," said Glauco. "I see, then," said Socrates, "that we shall not presently enter into a war, if you are charged with the government; for you have abundance of inquiries to make, and much pains to go through, before you will resolve upon it." *

He ran over in this manner several other articles no less important, with which Glauco appeared equally unacquainted; till he brought him to confess how ridiculous those people were, who have the rashness to intrude into government, without any other preparation for the service of the public, than that of a high esteem for themselves, and an immoderate ambition of rising to the first places and dignities. "Be careful, dear Glauco," said he to him, "lest a too warm desire of honors should deceive you into pursuits that may cover you with shame, by setting your incapacity and slender abilities in full light."

Glauco improved from the wise admonitions of Socrates, and took time to inform himself in private, before he ventured to appear in public. This is a lesson for all ages, and may be very useful to persons in all stations and conditions of life.

Socrates did not urge his friends to enter early upon public employments; but first to take pains for the attainment of the knowledge necessary to their success in them.* "A man must be very simple," said he, "to believe that the mechanic arts are to be acquired without the help of proper masters, and that the knowledge requisite in governing states, which is the highest degree of human prudence, demands no previous labor and application."† His great care in regard to those who aspired to public employments was to form their manners upon the solid principles of probity and justice; and especially to inspire them with a sincere love of their country, with the most ardent passion for the public good, and a high idea of the power and goodness of the gods; because without these qualities, all other abilities serve only to render men more wicked, and more capable of doing evil. Xenophon has transmitted to us a conversation of Socrates with Euthydemus, upon Providence, which is one of the finest passages to be found in the writings of the ancients.

"Did you never reflect within yourself," said Socrates to Euthydemus, "how much care the gods have taken to bestow upon man all that is necessary to his nature?" "Never, I assure you," replied he. "You see," continued Socrates, "how necessary light is, and how precious that gift of the gods ought to appear to us?" "Without it," added Euthydemus, "we should be like the blind, and all nature, as if it were not, or were dead: but because we have occasion for suspense and relaxation, they have also given

* Xenoph. Memorab. . iv. p. 800.

† Idem. p. 792.

us the night for our repose." "You are in the right, and for this we ought to render them continual praises and thanksgiving. They have ordained that the sun, that bright and luminous star, should preside over the day to distinguish its different parts, and that its light should not only serve to discover the wonders of nature, but to disperse universal life and heat; and at the same time they have commanded the moon and stars to illuminate the night, of itself dark and obscure. Is there any thing more admirable than this variety and vicissitude of day and night, of light and darkness, of labor and rest; and all this for the convenience and good of man?" Socrates enumerates in like manner the infinite advantages we receive from fire and water in the necessities of life; and continuing to observe upon the wonderful attention of Providence in all that regards us, "what say you," continued he, "upon the sun's return after winter to revisit us; and that as the fruits of one season wither and decay, he ripens new ones to succeed them? that having rendered man this service, he retires, lest he should incommode him by excess of heat; and then, after having removed to a certain point, which he could not pass without putting us in danger of perishing with cold, that he returns in the same path to resume his place in those parts of the heavens where his presence is most beneficial to us? and because we could neither support the cold nor heat, if we were to pass in an instant from the one to the other, do you not admire, that while this star approaches and removes so slowly, the two extremities arrive by almost insensible degrees? Is it possible not to discover, in this disposition of the seasons of the year, a providence and goodness, not only attentive to our necessities, but even our delights and enjoyments?"

"All these things," said Euthydemus, "make me doubt whether the gods have any other employment than to shower down their gifts and graces upon mankind. There is one point, however, that puts me to a stand, which is that the brute animals partake of all these blessings as well as ourselves." "Yes," replied Socrates: "but do you not observe, that all these animals subsist only for men's service? the strongest and most vigorous of them he subjects at his will, he makes them tame and gentle, and uses them successfully in his wars, his labors, and the other occasions of life!"

"What if we consider man in himself?" Here Socrates examines the diversity of the senses, by the ministry of which man enjoys all that is best and most excellent in nature; the

vivacity of his wit, and the force of his reason, which exalt him infinitely above all other animals; the wonderful gift of speech, by means of which we communicate our thoughts reciprocally, publish our laws, and govern states.

"From all this," says Socrates, "it is easy to discern that there are gods, and that they have man in their particular care, though he cannot discover them by his senses. Do we perceive the thunder, while it strikes through all things which oppose it? do we distinguish winds while they are tearing up all before them in our view? Our soul itself, with which we are so intimate, which moves and acts us, is it visible? can we behold it? It is the same with regard to the gods, of whom none are visible in the distribution of their favors. The GREAT GOD himself!" These words are remarkable, and demonstrate that Socrates acknowledged one Supreme God, the Author of all being, and superior to all others, who were only the ministers of his will; "this great God, who has formed the universe, and supports the stupendous work, whose every part is furnished with the utmost goodness and harmony; he who preserves them perpetually in immortal vigor, and causes them to obey him with a never-failing punctuality, and a rapidity not to be followed by our imagination; this God makes himself sufficiently visible by the endless wonders of which he is the author; but continues always invisible in himself. Let us not then refuse to believe even what we do not see, and let us supply the defects of our corporeal eyes, by using those of the soul; but especially let us learn to render the just homage of respect and veneration to the Divinity, whose will it seems to be that we should have no other perception of him than by his effects in our favor. Now, this adoration, this homage, consists in pleasing him, and we can only please him in doing his will."

In this manner Socrates instructed youth; these are the principles and sentiments with which he inspired them; on the one side, a perfect submission to the laws and magistrates, in which he made justice consist; on the other, a profound regard for the Divinity, which constitutes religion. In things surpassing our understanding, he advises us to consult the gods; and as they impart themselves only to those who please them, he recommends above all things the making them propitious to us by a wise regularity of conduct.* "The gods are wise," says he, "and it depends upon

* Xenoph. Memorab. l. iv. p. 803, et 805.

them either to grant what we ask, or to give us directly the reverse of it."* He cites an excellent prayer from an anonymous poet: "Great God, give us, we beseech thee, those good things of which we stand in need, whether we crave them or not; and remove from us all those which may be hurtful to us, though we implore them of thee." The vulgar imagined that there are things which the gods observe, and others of which they take no notice: but Socrates taught that the gods observe all our actions and words; that they penetrate into our most secret thoughts, are present in all our deliberations, and that they inspire us in all our actions.

SECTION V.—SOCRATES APPLIES HIMSELF TO DISCREDIT THE SOPHISTS IN THE OPINION OF THE YOUNG ATHENIANS.

Socrates found it necessary to prejudice the young people against a bad taste, which had prevailed for some time in Greece. A set of assuming men arose, who, ranking themselves as the first sages of Greece, were entirely the reverse in their conduct. For, instead of being infinitely remote from all avarice and ambition, like Pittacus, Bias, Thales, and others, who made the study of wisdom their principal occupation, these men were ambitious and covetous, entered into the intrigues and affairs of the world, and made a trade of their pretended knowledge.† They were called sophists, and wandered from city to city. They caused themselves to be cried up as oracles, and walked about attended by crowds of their disciples, who, through a kind of enchantment, abandoned the embraces of their parents, to follow these proud teachers, to whom they paid a great price for their instruction. ‡

There was nothing which these masters did not profess: theology, physics, ethics, arithmetic, astronomy, grammar, music, poetry, rhetoric and history. They knew every thing, and could teach every thing. Their greatest supposed skill lay in philosophy and eloquence. Most of them, like Gorgias, valued themselves upon giving immediate answers to all questions that could be proposed to them. Their young disciples acquired nothing from their precepts, but a silly esteem for themselves, and a universal contempt for every body else; so that not a scholar quitted these schools,

* Plut. in Alcib. l. ii. p. 148.

† Sic enim appellantur hi qui ostentationis aut quæstus causa philosophantur.—Cic. in Lucul. n. 129.

‡ Plut. in Apolog. pp. 19, 20.

who was not more impertinent than when he first entered them.

It was necessary to decry the false eloquence and bad logic of these proud teachers in the opinion of the young Athenians. To attack them openly, and dispute with them in a direct manner by a continued discourse, was what Socrates could well have done, for he possessed in a supreme degree the talents of speaking and reasoning; but this was not the means of succeeding against great harangues, whose sole aim was to captivate their auditors with a vain glitter, and rapid flow of words. He therefore took another course, and employing the turns and address of irony, which he knew how to apply with wonderful art and delicacy, he chose to conceal, under the appearance of simplicity and the affectation of ignorance, all the beauty and great force of his genius.* Nature, which had given him so fine a soul, seemed to have formed his outside expressly for supporting the ironic character. He was very ugly, and besides that had something very dull and stupid in his physiognomy.† The whole air of his person, which had nothing but what was very common and very poor in it, perfectly corresponded with that of his countenance.

Happening to be in company with one of the sophists, he proposed his doubts with a diffident and modest air, asked simple questions in a plain manner, and, as if he had been incapable of expressing himself otherwise, made use of trivial comparisons, and allusions taken from the meanest employments. The sophist heard him with a scornful attention; and instead of giving him a precise answer, fell into his common place expressions, and talked a great deal, without saying any thing to the purpose. Socrates, after having praised his adversary, not with the view of enraging him, entreated him to adapt himself to his weakness, and to come down to his capacity, by satisfying his questions in a few words; because neither his wit nor memory were capable of comprehending or retaining so many fine and exalted notions, and that all his knowledge was confined to question and answer, ‡

* Socrates in ironia dissimulantiaque longe omnibus lepore atque humanitate præstitit.—Cic. l. ii. de Orat. n. 270.

† Zopyrus physiognomon—stupidum esse Socratem dixit et bardum.—Cic. de Fat. n. 10.

‡ Socrates de se ipse detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita, cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est illa dissimulatione, quam Græci *εἰσροφία* vocant.—Cic. Acad. Quest. l. iv. n. 25.

Sed et illum quem nominavi (Gorgiam) et cæteros sophistas, ut e Platone intelligi potest, lusus videmus a Socrate. Is enim percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea, quæ ii respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret.—Cic. de Finib. l. ii. n. 2.

This passed in a numerous assembly; and the sophist could not recede. When Socrates had once got him out of his intrenchment, by obliging him to answer his questions succinctly, he carried him on from one to another, to the most absurd consequences; and after having reduced him either to contradict himself, or be silent, he complained that the learned man would not vouchsafe to instruct him. The young people, however, perceived the incapacity of their master, and changed their admiration for him into contempt. Thus the name of sophist became odious and ridiculous.

It is easy to judge that men of the sophists' character, of whom I have now spoken, who were in high repute with the great; who lorded it among the youth of Athens, and had been long celebrated for their wit and learning, could not be attacked with impunity; especially as they had been taken in the two most sensible points, their fame and their interest. Socrates, for having endeavored to unmask their vices, and discredit their false eloquence, experienced, from these corrupt and haughty men, all that could be feared or expected from the most malignant envy, and the most envenomed hatred; to which it is now time to proceed.*

SECTION VI.—SOCRATES IS ACCUSED OF HOLDING BAD OPINIONS IN REGARD TO THE GODS. HE IS CONDEMNED TO DIE.

Socrates was accused a little before the first year of the 95th Olympiad, soon after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants from Athens, in the sixty-ninth year of his life; but the prosecution had been projected long before.† The oracle of Delphos, which had declared him the wisest of mankind; the contempt into which he had brought the doctrine and morals of the sophists of his time, who were then in high reputation; the liberty with which he attacked all vice; the singular attachment of his disciples for his person and maxims; had all concurred in alienating people from him, and had drawn upon him abundance of envy.

His enemies having sworn his destruction, and perceiving the difficulty of the attempt, prepared the way for it at a distance, and at first attacked him in the dark, and by obscure and secret means. It is said, that to sound the people's disposition in regard to Socrates, and to try whether it would ever be safe to cite him before the judges, they engaged Aristophanes to introduce him at the theatre in a

* Plut. in Apolog. p. 28.

† A. M. 3602. Ant. J. C. 402.

comedy, wherein the first seeds of the accusation meditated against him were sown. It is not certain whether Aristophanes was suborned by Anytus, and the rest of the enemies of Socrates to compose that satirical piece against him. It is very likely that the declared contempt of Socrates for all comedies in general, and for those of Aristophanes in particular, while he professed an extraordinary esteem for the tragedies of Euripides, might be the poet's true motive for taking his revenge of the philosopher. However that might be, Aristophanes, to the disgrace of poetry, lent his pen to the malice of the enemies of Socrates or his own resentment, and employed his whole genius and capacity to depreciate the best and most excellent man that ever the pagan world produced.*

He composed a piece called "The Clouds," wherein he introduced the philosopher, placed in a basket, and lifted up to the clouds, from whence he proclaims maxims, or rather the most ridiculous subtleties. A very aged debtor who desires to escape the close pursuits of his creditors, comes to him to be taught the art of tricking them at law; to prove by unanswerable reasons that he owes them nothing, and in a word, to convert a very bad into a very good cause. But finding himself incapable of any improvements from the sublime lessons of his new master, he brings his son to him in his stead. This young man soon after quits his learned school, so well instructed that at their first meeting he beats his father, and proves to him by subtle, but invincible arguments, that he has reason for treating him in that manner. In every scene where Socrates appears, the poet makes him utter a thousand follies, and as many impieties against the gods; and in particular against Jupiter. He makes him talk like a man of the greatest vanity and opinion of himself, with an equal contempt for all others, who out of criminal curiosity, is for penetrating what passes in the heavens, and for diving into the abysses of the earth; who boasts of having always the means to make injustice triumph; and who is not contented with keeping those secrets for his own use, but teaches them to others, and thereby corrupts youth. All this is attended with refined raillery, and a wit which could not fail of pleasing a people of so quick and delicate a taste as the Athenians, who were besides naturally invidious of all transcendent merit. They were so much charmed with it, that without waiting the conclusion of the represen-

* Ælian, l. ii. c. 13. Plut in Apolog. Socrat. p. 19.

tation, they ordered the name of Aristophanes to be set down above those of all his competitors.

Socrates, who had been informed that he was to be ridiculed in the theatre, went thither upon the day to see the comedy, contrary to his custom ; for it was not common for him to go to those assemblies, unless when some new tragedy of Euripides was to be performed, who was his intimate friend, and whose pieces he esteemed, on account of the solid principles of morality he took care to intersperse in them. It was, however, observed that he had not patience to wait the conclusion of one of them, wherein the actor had begun with a dangerous maxim, and went out immediately, without considering the injury his withdrawing might do to the reputation of his friend. He never went to comedies, unless when Alcibiades and Critias forced him thither against his will, offended at the unbounded license which reigned in them, and incapable of seeing the reputation of his fellow-citizens publicly torn to pieces. He was present at this without the least emotion, and without expressing any discontent : and some strangers being desirous of knowing who the Socrates intended by the play was, he rose up from his seat, and showed himself during the whole representation. He told those who were near him, and were amazed at his indifference and patience, that he imagined himself at a great entertainment, where he was agreeably laughed at, and that it was necessary to let raillery pass.*

It does not appear, as I have already observed, that Aristophanes, though he was not the friend of Socrates, had entered into the black conspiracy of his enemies, and had any thought of causing his destruction. It is more probable that a poet, who diverted the public at the expense of the principal magistrates and most celebrated generals, was also willing to make them laugh at the expense of a philosopher. All the guilt was on the side of those who envied him, and his enemies, who were in hopes of making great use of the representation of this comedy against him. The artifice was indeed profound, and conceived with skill. In acting a man upon the stage, he is only represented on his bad, weak, or ambiguous sides. That view of him is followed with ridicule ; ridicule accustoms people to the contempt of his person ; and contempt proceeds to injustice. For mankind are naturally bold in insulting, abusing, and injuring a man, when once he becomes the object of their general contempt.

* Plut. de Educ. Liber. p. 10.

These were the first blows struck at him, and served as an essay and trial of the great affair meditated against him. It lay dormant a long while, and did not break out until twenty years afterwards. The troubles of the republic might well occasion that long delay; for it was in that interval the enterprise against Sicily was undertaken, the event of which was so unfortunate, that Athens was besieged and taken by Lysander, who changed its form of government, and established the thirty tyrants, who were not expelled till a very short time before the affair we speak of.

Melitus then appeared as accuser, and entered a process in form against Socrates.* His accusation consisted of two heads. The first was, that he did not admit the gods acknowledged by the republic, and that he introduced new divinities; the second, that he corrupted the youth of Athens, and concluded with inferring that sentence of death should pass against him.

Never had accusation so little probability, pretext, or foundation as this. It was now forty years that Socrates had made it his profession to instruct the Athenian youth. He had advanced no opinions in secret or privately. His lessons were given publicly, and in the presence of great numbers of auditors. He had always observed the same conduct, and taught the same principles. What then could be the motive of Melitus for this accusation, after such a length of time? how came his zeal for the public good, after having been languid for so many years, to awake on a sudden, and become so violent? Is it pardonable for so zealous and worthy a citizen as Melitus would appear, to have continued mute and inactive, while any one corrupted all the youth in that city, by instilling seditious maxims into them, and by inspiring them with a disgust and contempt for the established government? "for he who does not prevent an evil, when it is in his power, is equally criminal with him that commits it." Libanius speaks thus in one of his declamations, called the *Apology of Socrates*. "But," continues he, "though Melitus, whether out of distraction, indifference, or constant employment in his affairs, never thought for so many years of entering an accusation against Socrates; how came it to pass, that in a city like Athens, which abounded with wise magistrates, and what is more, with bold informers, so public a conspiracy as that imputed to

* A. M. 3603. Ant. J. C. 401.

Socrates, should escape the eyes of those whom either the love of their country, or invidious malignity, render so vigilant and attentive? nothing was ever less feasible, or more void of all probability." *

As soon as the conspiracy broke out, the friends of Socrates prepared for his defence.† Lysias, the most able orator of his time, brought him an elaborate discourse of his composing, wherein he had set forth the reasons and measures of Socrates in all their light, and interspersed the whole with tender and pathetic strokes, capable of moving the most obdurate hearts. § Socrates read it with pleasure, and highly approved it; but, as it was more conformable to the rules of rhetoric than the sentiments and fortitude of a philosopher, he told him frankly that it did not suit him. Upon which Lysias, having asked how it was possible to be well done, and at the same time not suit him, "in the same manner," said he, using, according to his custom, a simple comparison, "that an excellent workman might bring me magnificent apparel, or shoes embroidered with gold, in which nothing would be wanting on his part, but, which, however, would not fit me." He persisted therefore inflexibly in the resolution, not to demean himself by begging suffrages in the low, abject manner common at that time. He employed neither artifice, nor the glitter of eloquence. He had no recourse either to solicitation or entreaty. He brought neither his wife nor children to incline the judges in his favor by their sighs and tears. Although he firmly refused to have any person besides himself to speak in his defence, and to appear before his judges in the submissive posture of a suppliant, he did not behave in that manner out of pride, or contempt of the tribunal. § It was from a noble and intrepid assurance, resulting from greatness of soul, and the consciousness of his truth and innocence. So that his defence had nothing timorous or weak in it. His discourse was bold, manly, generous, without passion, without emotion, full of the noble liberty of a philosopher, with no other ornament than that of truth, and brightened throughout with the character and language of innocence. Plato, who was present, transcribed it afterwards, and without any additions, composed from it the work, which he

* Liban. in Apolog. Socrat. pp. 645-648. † Cicero. l. i. de Orat. n. 231, 232.

‡ Quint. l. xi. c. 1.

§ His et talibus adductus Socrates, nec patrum quæsit ad iudicium capitis, nec iudicibus supplex fuit: adhibuitque liberam contumaciam a magnitudine animi ductam, non a superbia.—Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. 1.

calls the *Apology* of Socrates, one of the most consummate masterpieces of antiquity. I shall here make an extract from it.

"Upon the day assigned, the proceeding commenced in the usual forms. The parties appeared before the judges, and Melitus spoke. The worse his cause, and the less provided it was with proofs, the more occasion he had for address and art to cover its weakness. He omitted nothing that might render the adverse party odious; instead of reasons, which could but fail him, he substituted the delusive glitter of a lively and pompous eloquence. Socrates, in observing that he could not tell what impression the discourse of his accusers might make upon the judges, owns, that for his part he scarcely knew himself, they had given such artful coloring and plausibility to their arguments, though there was not the least word of truth in all they had advanced.*"

I have already said that their accusation consisted of two heads. The first regarded religion, and stated that Socrates inquired, out of an impious curiosity, into what passed in the heavens, and in the bowels of the earth; that he denied the gods adored by his country, and endeavored to introduce a new worship; and that if he might be believed, an unknown god inspired him in all his actions. In short, he believed there were no gods.†

The second head related to the interest and government of the state, and stated that Socrates corrupted the youth by instilling bad sentiments concerning the Divinity into them, by teaching them a contempt of the laws, and the order established in the republic; by declaring openly against the choice of the magistrates by lot, ‡ by exclaiming against the public assemblies, where he was never seen to appear; by teaching the art of making the worst of causes good; by attaching the youth to himself out of a spirit of pride and ambition, under the pretence of instructing them; and by proving to children that they may abuse their parents with impunity: that he gloried in a pretended oracle and believed himself the wisest of mankind: that he taxed all others with folly, and condemned without reserve all their maxims and actions; constituting himself, by his own authority, the

* Plut. in *Apolog. Socrat.*—Xenoph. in *Apolog. Socrat. et in Memor.*

† Plut. in *Apolog.* p. 24.

‡ Socrates in reality did not approve this manner of electing the magistrates. He observed that when a pilot, a musician, or an architect was wanted, nobody was willing to take him at a venture; though the faults of these people were far from being of the great importance of those errors which were committed in the administration of the republic.—Xenoph. *Memorab.* l. i. p. 712.

general censor and reformer of the state. Notwithstanding which, the effects of his lessons may be seen in the persons of Critias and Alcibiades, his most intimate friends, who have done great mischiefs to their country, and have been the most wicked of citizens, and the most abandoned of men.

This concluded with recommending to the judges to be very much upon their guard against the dazzling eloquence of Socrates, and to suspect extremely the insinuating and artificial turns of address which he would employ to deceive them.

Socrates began his discourse with this point, and declared that he would speak to the judges as it was his custom to talk in his common conversation, that is to say, with much simplicity, and no art.*

He then proceeded to particulars. Upon what foundation could it be alleged that he did not acknowledge the gods of the republic; he, who had often been seen to sacrifice in his own house, and in the temples? Could it be doubted whether he used divination or not, while it was made a crime in him to report, that he received councils from a certain divinity; and thence concluded that he aimed at introducing new deities? But in this he innovated nothing more than others, who, putting their faith in divination, observed the flight of birds, consulted the entrails of victims, and remarked even words and accidental occurrences: different means which the gods employed to give mankind a fore-knowledge of the future. Old or new, it was still evident that Socrates acknowledged divinities, by the confession of even Melitus himself, who in his information averred, that he believed in demons, that is to say, inferior spirits, the offspring of the gods. Now, every man who believes in the offspring of the gods, believes in the gods.†

As to what related to the impious inquiries into natural things imputed to him, without despising or condemning those who applied themselves to the study of physics, he declared, that as for him, he had entirely devoted himself to what concerns moral virtue, the conduct of life, and the rules of government, as a knowledge infinitely more useful than any other; and he called upon all those who had been his hearers, to come forward and deny him if he did not say what was true.‡

“I am accused of corrupting the youth, and of instilling

* Plat. p. 17.

† Plat. p. 27. Xenoph. p. 703.

‡ Xenoph. p. 710.

dangerous maxims into them, as well as in regard to the worship of the gods, as the rules of government. You know, Athenians, that I never made it my profession to teach: nor can envy, however violent against me, reproach me with having ever sold my instructions. I have an undeniable evidence for me in this respect, which is my poverty. Always equally ready to communicate my thoughts either to the rich or poor, and to give them entire leisure to question or answer me, I lend myself to every one who is desirous of becoming virtuous; and if among those who hear me, there are any who prove either good or bad, neither the virtues of one, nor the vices of the other, to which I have not contributed, are to be ascribed to me. My whole employment is to persuade the young and old against too much love for the body, for riches, and all other precarious things, of whatever nature they be, and against too little regard for the soul, which ought to be the object of their affection: for I incessantly urge to you that virtue does not proceed from riches, but on the contrary riches from virtue; and that all the other goods of human life, as well public as private, have their source in the same principle.

“If to speak in this manner be to corrupt youth, I confess, Athenians, that I am guilty, and deserve to be punished. If what I say be not true, it is most easy to convict me of my falsehood. I see here a great number of my disciples; they have only to appear. But perhaps the reserve and consideration for a master who has instructed them will prevent them from declaring against me; at least their fathers, brothers, and uncles, cannot, as good relations and good citizens, dispense with their not standing forth to demand vengeance against the corruptor of their sons, brothers, and nephews. But these are the persons who take upon them my defence, and interest themselves in the success of my cause.

“Pass on me what sentence you please, Athenians; but I can neither repent nor change my conduct. I must not abandon nor suspend a function which God himself has imposed on me, now he has charged me with the care of instructing my fellow-citizens. If, after having faithfully kept all the posts wherein I was placed by our generals at Potidæa, Amphipolis, and Delium, the fear of death should at this time make me abandon that in which the Divine Providence has placed me, by commanding me to pass my life in the study of philosophy, for the instruction of myself

and others ; this would be a most criminal desertion indeed, and make me highly worthy of being cited before this tribunal, as an impious man who does not believe the gods. Should you resolve to acquit me, for the future, I should not hesitate to make answer, Athenians, that I honor and love you, but I shall choose rather to obey God than you ; * and to my latest breath shall never renounce my philosophy, nor cease to exhort and reprove you according to my custom, by telling each of you when you come in my way, ‘My good friend,† and citizen of the most famous city in the world for wisdom, and valor, are you not ashamed, to have no other thoughts than that of amassing wealth, and that of acquiring glory, credit, and dignities, while you neglect the treasures of prudence, truth, and wisdom, and take no pains in rendering your soul as good and perfect as it is capable of being.’‡

“I am reproached with abject fear and meanness of spirit, for being so busy in imparting my advice to every one in private, and for having always avoided being present in your assemblies, to give my counsels to my country. I think I have sufficiently proved my courage and fortitude both in the field, where I have borne arms with you, and in the senate, when I alone opposed the unjust sentence you pronounced against the ten captains, who had taken up and interred the bodies of those who were killed or drowned in the sea-fight near the island Arginusæ, and when, upon more than one occasion, I opposed the violent and cruel orders of the thirty tyrants. What is it, then, that has prevented me from appearing in your assemblies ? It is that dæmon, that divine voice, which you have so often heard me mention, and Melitus has taken so much pains to ridicule. That spirit has attached itself to me from my infancy : it is a voice which I never hear, but when it would prevent me from persisting in something I have resolved ; for it never exhorts me to undertake anything. It is the same being that has always opposed me, when I would have intermeddled in the affairs of the republic ; and that with the greatest reason ; for I should have been among the dead long ago, had I been concerned at the measures of the state, without affecting anything to the advantage of myself or our country. Do not take it ill, I beseech you, if I speak my thoughts without disguise, and with truth and freedom. Every man who would

* Πείσσομαι τῷ θεῷ μάλλον ἢ ὑμῖν.

† The Greek signifies, O best of men, ὦ ἀρίστε ἀνδρῶν, which was an obliging manner of salutation.

‡ Plat. pp. 28, 29.

generously oppose a whole people, either among us or elsewhere, and who inflexibly applies himself to prevent the violation of the laws, and the practice of iniquity in a government, will never do so long with impunity. It is absolutely necessary for him who would contend for justice, if he has any thoughts of living, to remain in a private station, and never to have any share in public affairs.*

“For the rest, Athenians, if, in the extreme danger in which I now am, I do not imitate the behavior of those, who upon less emergencies have implored and supplicated their judges with tears, and have brought forth their children, relations, and friends, it is not through pride and obstinacy, or any contempt for you, but solely for your honor, and for that of the whole city. You, should know that there are among our citizens those who do not regard death as an evil, and who give that name only to injustice and infamy. At my age, and with the reputation, true or false, which I have, would it be consistent for me, after all the lessons I have given upon the contempt of death, to be afraid of it myself, and to belie in my last action all the principles and sentiments of my past life?

“But without speaking of my fame, which I should extremely injure by such a conduct, I do not think it allowable to entreat a judge, nor to be absolved by supplications: he ought to be persuaded and convinced. The judge does not sit upon the bench to show favor by violating the laws, but to do justice in conforming to them. He does not swear to discharge with impunity whom he pleases; but to do justice where it is due. We ought not, therefore, to accustom you to perjury, nor you to suffer yourselves to be accustomed to it, for in so doing, both of us equally injure justice and religion, and both are criminals.

“Do not, therefore, expect from me, Athenians, that I should have recourse among you to means which I believe neither honest nor lawful; especially on this occasion, wherein I am accused of impiety by Melitus. For if I should influence you by my prayers, and thereby induce you to violate your oaths, it would be undeniably evident that I teach you not to believe in the gods; and even in defending and justifying myself, should furnish my adversaries with arms against me, and prove that I believe no divinity. But I am very far from such bad thoughts. I am more convinced of the existence of God than my accusers, and so convinced,

that I abandon myself to God and you, that you may judge of me as you shall deem best for yourselves and me." *

Socrates pronounced this discourse with a firm and intrepid tone. His air, his action, his visage, expressed nothing of the accused: he seemed the master of his judges, from the assurance and greatness of soul with which he spoke, without however losing any thing of the modesty natural to him.† So noble and majestic a deportment displeased and gave offence. It is common for judges, who look upon themselves as the absolute dispensers of life or death to such as are before them, to expect, out of a secret desire, that they should appear in their presence with humble submission and respectful awe; a homage which they think due to their supreme authority.‡

This was the case on this occasion. Melitus, however, had not at first the fifth part of the voices. We have reason to suppose that the judges assembled upon this occasion might amount to five hundred, without reckoning the president. The law condemned the accuser to pay a fine of a thousand drachmas § if he had not the fifth part of the suffrages. This law had been wisely established to check the boldness and impudence of calumniators. Melitus would have been obliged to pay this fine, if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him, and presented themselves also as the accusers of Socrates. Their influence obtained a great number of voices; and there were two hundred and eighty against Socrates, and consequently, only two hundred and twenty for him. He wanted only thirty-one to have been acquitted; for he would then have had two hundred and fifty-one, which would have been the majority.

By this first sentence the judges only declared Socrates guilty, without imposing any penalty.|| For when the law did not determine the punishment, and when a crime against the state was not in question, in which manner I conceive Cicero's terms, "*fraus capitalis*," may be understood, the person found guilty had a right to choose the penalty he thought he deserved. Upon his answer the judges deliberated a second

* Plat. 34, 35.

† Socrates ita in iudicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus vide retur esse iudicium.—Cic. l. i. de Orat. n. 231.

‡ Odit iudex fere litigantis securitatem; cumque jus suum intelligat, tacitus reverentiam postulat.—Quint. l. iv. c. i.

§ Nearly one hundred dollars.
|| *Primis sententiis statuiebant tantum iudices damnarent an absolverent. Erat autem Atheniensi, reo damnato, si fraus capitalis non esset, quasi pœnæ æstimatione. Ex sententia, eum iudicibus daretur, interrogabatur seus quam quasi æstimationem commoverisse se maxime confiteretur.*—Cic. l. i. de Orat. n. 231, 232.

time, and afterwards passed their final sentence. Socrates was informed that he might demand an abatement of the penalty, and change the condemnation of death into banishment, imprisonment, or a fine. He replied generously, that he would choose neither of those punishments, because that would be to acknowledge himself guilty. "Athenians," said he, "to keep you no longer in suspense, as you oblige me to sentence myself, according to what I deserve, I condemn myself, for having passed my life in instructing yourselves and your children; for having neglected with that view my domestic affairs, and all public employments and dignities; for having devoted myself entirely to the service of my country, in laboring incessantly to render my fellow-citizens virtuous; I condemn myself, I say, to be maintained in the Prytaneum at the expense of the republic for the rest of my life." This last answer so much offended the judges,* that they condemned him to drink hemlock, a punishment very common among them.†

This sentence did not shake the constancy of Socrates in the least. "I am going," said he, addressing himself to his judges with a noble tranquillity, "to suffer death by your order, to which nature had condemned me from the first moment of my birth; but my accusers will suffer no less from infamy and injustice by the decrees of truth. Did you expect from me that to extricate myself out of your hands, I would have employed, according to custom, flattery and pathetic expressions, and the timorous and cringing behavior of a suppliant? But in trials, as well as in war, an honest man ought not to use all sorts of means for the preservation of his life. It is equally dishonorable in both, to ransom it only by prayers and tears, and all those abject methods which you see every day practised by people in my present condition." ‡

Apollodorus, who was one of his friends and disciples, having advanced to him to express his grief for his dying innocent: "What!" replied he with a smile, "would you have had me die guilty?"

* Cujus responso sic judices exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.—Cic. l. i. de Orat. n. 233.

† It appears in Plato, that, after this discourse, Socrates, without doubt to remove from him all imputation of pride and contumacy, modestly offered to pay a fine proportionate to his indigence; that is to say, one mina, or about ten dollars, and that, at the instance of his friends, who had bound themselves for him, he rose in his offer to thirty minæ.—Plat. in Apolog. Socrat. p. 28. But Xenophon positively asserts the contrary, p. 705. This difference may be reconciled, perhaps, by supposing that Socrates refused at first to make any offer, and that he suffered himself at length to be overcome by the earnest solicitation of his friends.

‡ Plat. p. 39.

Plutarch, to show that only our weakest part, the body, is in the power of man, but that there is another infinitely more noble part of us entirely superior to their threats, and inaccessible to their inflictions, cites those admirable words of Socrates, which are more applicable to his judges than his accusers: "Anytus and Melitus may kill me, but they cannot hurt me." As if he had said, in the language of the pagans,—Fortune may deprive me of my goods, my health, and my life; but I have a treasure within me, of which no violence can deprive me: I mean virtue, innocence, fortitude, and greatness of mind.*

This great man, fully convinced of the principle he had so often inculcated to his disciples, that guilt is the only evil a wise man ought to fear, chose, rather to be deprived of some years which he might have to live, than to forfeit in an instant the glory of his whole past life, in dishonoring himself for ever, by the shameful behavior he was advised to observe with his judges. Seeing that his own times had but a slight knowledge of him, he referred himself from it to the judgment of posterity, and, by the generous sacrifice of a very advanced life, acquired and assured himself the esteem and admiration of all succeeding ages.†

SECTION VII.—SOCRATES REFUSES TO ESCAPE OUT OF PRISON.

HE DRINKS THE POISON.

After the sentence had been passed upon him, Socrates, with the same intrepid countenance with which he had held the tyrants in awe, went forward towards the prison, which lost that name, says Seneca, when he entered it, and became the residence of virtue and probity.‡ His friends followed him thither, and continued to visit him during the thirty days which passed between his condemnation and death. That delay was occasioned by the following custom. The Athenians sent a ship every year to the isle of Delos, to offer certain sacrifices: and it was prohibited to put any person to death in the city, from the time the priest of Apollo had

* De Anim. Tranquil. p. 475.

† Maluit vir sapientissimus quod superasset ex vita sibi perire, quam quod præterisset: et quando ab hominibus sui temporis parum intelligebatur, posterorum se judiciis reservavit, brevi detrimento jam ultimæ senectutis ævum seculorum omnium consecutis.—Quint. l. i. c. 1.

‡ Socrates eodum illo vultu, quo aliquando solus triginta tyrannos in ordinem redogerat, carcerem intravit, ignominiam ipi loco detracturus. Neque enim poterat carcer videri, in quo Socrates erat.—Senec. de Consol. ad Helvet. c. xiii.

Socrates carcerem intrando purgavit, omni que honestionem curia reddidit.—Id de Vit. Beat. c. 27.

crowned the poop of this vessel, as a signal for its departure, till the same vessel should return. So that sentence having been passed upon Socrates the day after that ceremony began, it was necessary to defer the execution of it for thirty days, during the continuance of this voyage.

In this long interval, death had sufficient opportunity to present itself before his eyes in all its terrors, and to put his constancy to the proof, not only by the severe rigor of a dungeon, and the irons upon his legs, but by the continual prospect and cruel expectation of an event of which nature is always abhorrent. In this sad condition, he did not cease to enjoy that profound tranquillity of mind which his friends had always admired in him. He entertained them with the same temper he had always expressed; and Crito observes, that the evening before his death, he slept as peaceably as at any other time. He also composed a hymn in honor of Apollo and Diana, and turned one of Æsop's fables into verse.*

The day before, or the same day that the ship was to arrive from Delos, the return of which was to be followed by the death of Socrates, Crito, his intimate friend, came to him early in the morning, to inform him of it, and at the same time that it depended only upon himself to quit the prison; that the jailor was bribed; that he would find the doors open, and offered him a safe retreat in Thessaly. Socrates laughed at this proposal, and asked him, "if he knew any place out of Attica where people did not die?" Crito urged the thing very seriously, and pressed him to take advantage of so precious an opportunity, adding argument upon argument to gain his consent, and to engage him to resolve upon his escape. "Without mentioning the inconsolable grief I should suffer for the death of such a friend, how should I support the reproaches of an infinity of people, who would believe that it was in my power to have saved you, but that I would not sacrifice a small part of my wealth for that purpose? Could the people ever be persuaded, that so wise a man as Socrates would not quit his prison, when he might do it with all possible security? Perhaps he might fear to expose his friends, or to occasion the loss of their fortunes, or even of their lives or liberty. Ought there to be any thing more dear and precious to them than the preservation of Socrates? Even strangers themselves dispute that honor with them; many of whom have come expressly with consid-

* Plat. in Criton.

erable sums of money to purchase his escape; and declare that they should think themselves highly honored to receive him among them, and to supply him abundantly with all he could have occasion for. Ought he to abandon himself to enemies, who have occasioned his being condemned unjustly, and can he think it allowable to betray his own cause? Is it not essential to his goodness and justice, to spare his fellow-citizens the guilt of innocent blood? But if all these motives cannot alter him, and he is not concerned in regard to himself, can he be insensible to the interests of his children? In what condition does he leave them? And can he forget the father, to remember only the philosopher?"

Socrates, after having heard him with attention, praised his zeal, and expressed his gratitude; but before he could yield to his opinion, was for examining whether it was just for him to depart out of prison without the consent of the Athenians. It was a matter of doubt with him, whether a man condemned to die, though unjustly, can without a crime escape from justice and the laws? I do not know, whether, even among us, there are not many persons to be found who believe that this may be made a question.

Socrates begins with removing every thing foreign to the subject, and comes immediately to the bottom of the affair. "I should certainly rejoice extremely, most dear Crito, that you could persuade me to quit this place; but cannot resolve to do so, without being first persuaded. We ought not to be in pain for what the people say, but for what the sole Judge of all that is just or unjust shall pronounce upon us, and that alone is truth. All the considerations you have alleged, as to money, reputation, family, prove nothing, unless you show me that what you propose is just and lawful. It is a received and constant principle with us, that all injustice is shameful and fatal to him who commits it, whatever men may say, or whatever good or evil may be the consequence of it. We have always reasoned from this principle, even to our latest days, and have never departed in the least from it. Would it be possible, dear Crito, that at our age, our most serious discourses should resemble those of infants, who say yes, and no, almost in the same breath, and have nothing fixed and determinate!" At each proposition he waited Crito's answer and assent

"Let us, therefore, resume our principles, and endeavor to make use of them at this time. It has always been a

maxim with us, that it is never allowable, upon any pretence whatever, to commit injustice, not even in regard to those who injure us, nor to return evil for evil; and that when we have once engaged our word, we are bound to keep it. Now, if, at the time I should be ready to make my escape, the laws and republic should present themselves in a body before me, what could I answer to the following questions, which they might put to me? 'What are you about to do, Socrates?' To fly from justice in this manner, is it ought else but ruining entirely the laws and the republic? Do you believe that a state subsists, after justice not only ceases to be any longer in force in it, but is even corrupted, subverted, and trod under foot by individuals?' 'But,' say I, 'the republic has done me injustice, and has sentenced me wrongfully. Have you forgot, the laws would reply, that you are under an agreement with us to submit your private judgment to the republic? You were at liberty, if our government and constitutions did not suit you, to retire and settle yourself elsewhere. But a residence of seventy years in our city sufficiently denotes that our plan has not displeased you, and that you have complied with it from an entire knowledge and experience of it, and out of choice. In fact, you owe all you are, and all you possess to it: birth, nurture, education, and establishment; for all these proceed from the tuition and protection of the republic. Do you believe yourself free to break through engagements, which you have confirmed by more than one oath? Though she should intend to destroy you, can you render her evil for evil, and injury for injury? Have you a right to act in that manner with your father and mother; and do you not know that your country is more considerable, and more worthy of respect before God and man, than either father or mother, or all the relations in the world together; that your country is to be honored and revered, to be complied with in her excesses, and to be treated with tenderness and kindness, even in her most violent proceedings? In a word, that she is either to be reclaimed by wise counsels and respectful remonstrances, or to be obeyed in her commands, and suffered without murmuring in all she shall decree? As for your children, Socrates, your friends will render them all the services in their power; Divine Providence at least will not be wanting to them. Resign yourself therefore to our reasons, and take the counsel of those who have given you birth, nurture, and education. Set not

so high a value upon your children, your life, or any thing in the world, as justice : and be assured, that when you appear before the tribunal of Pluto, you will not be at a loss to defend yourself in the presence of your judges. But if you demean yourself otherwise, we shall continue to be your enemies as long as you live, without ever affording you relaxation or repose ; and when you are dead, our sisters, the laws in the regions below, will be as little favorable to you ; knowing that you have been guilty of using your utmost endeavors to destroy us."

Socrates observed to Crito, that he seemed to have a perfect sense of all he had said, and that the force of his reasons had made so strong and irresistible an impression upon his mind, that they entirely engrossed him, and left him neither thoughts nor words to object. Crito, acknowledging that he had nothing to reply, kept silence, and withdrew from his friend.

At length the fatal ship returned to Athens, which was in some measure the signal for the death of Socrates. The next day all his friends, except Plato, who was sick, repaired to the prison early in the morning. The jailer desired them to "wait a little, because the eleven magistrates, who had the direction of the prisons, were at that time notifying the prisoner that he was to die the same day." Presently after, they entered, and found Socrates, whose chains had been taken off,* sitting by Xantippe his wife, who held one of his children in her arms. As soon as she perceived them, setting up great cries, sobbing and tearing her face and hair, she made the prison resound with her complaints : "O my dear Socrates, your friends are come to see you this day for the last time !" He desired that she might be taken away, and she was immediately carried home.

Socrates passed the rest of the day with his friends, and discoursed with them with his usual cheerfulness and tranquillity. The subject of conversation was the most important, and best adapted to the present conjuncture, that is to say, the immortality of the soul. What gave rise to this discourse, was a question in a manner by chance : Whether a true philosopher ought not to desire and take pains to die ? This proposition taken too literally, implied an opinion that a philosopher might kill himself. Socrates maintained that nothing was more erroneous than this notion, and that man,

* At Athens, as soon as sentence was pronounced upon a criminal, he was unbound, and considered as the victim of death, whom it was no longer lawful to keep in chains

appertaining to God, who formed and placed him with his own hand in the post he possesses, cannot abandon it without his permission, nor depart from life without his order. What is it, then, that can induce a philosopher to entertain this love for death? It can be only the hope of that happiness, which he expects in another life; and that hope can be founded only upon the opinion of the soul's immortality.

Socrates employed the last day of his life in entertaining his friends upon this great and important subject; from which conversation, Plato's admirable dialogue, entitled "the Phædon," is wholly taken. He explained to his friends all the arguments for believing the soul immortal, and refuted all the objections against it, which are very nearly the same as are made at this day. This treatise is too long for me to attempt an abstract of it.*

Before he answered any of these objections, he deplored a misfortune very common among men, who, in consequence of hearing ignorant persons, who contradict and doubt every thing, dispute and believe there is nothing certain. "Is it not," said he, "a great misfortune, dear Phædon, that having reasons which are true, certain, and very easy to be understood, there should however be those in the world who are not at all affected with them, from their having heard those frivolous disputes, wherein all things appear sometimes true and sometimes false. These unjust and unreasonable men, instead of blaming themselves for these doubts, or charging them to their own limited capacities, from ascribing the defect to the reasons themselves, proceed at length to a detestation of them, and believe themselves more knowing and judicious than all others, because they imagine they are the only persons who comprehend that there is nothing true or certain in the nature of things." †

Socrates demonstrated the injustice of these pretensions. He observed, that of two things equally uncertain, it consisted with wisdom to choose that which is most advantageous with least hazard. "If what I advance," said he, "upon the immortality of the soul, proves true, it is good to believe it; and if after my death it prove false, I shall always have the advantage from it, to have been less sensible here of the evils which generally attend human life." This reasoning of Socrates, which, we are to suppose, can be only real and true in the mouth of a Christian, is very re-

* Plat. in Phæd. p. 59, &c.

† Plat. pp. 90, 91.

markable. If what I say is true, I gain all things, while I hazard very little; and if false, I lose nothing; on the contrary, I am still a great gainer.*

Socrates does not confine himself to the mere speculation of this great truth, that the soul is immortal; he draws useful and necessary conclusions from it for the conduct of his life; in explaining what the hope of a happy eternity demands from man, that it be not frustrated: and that, instead of attaining the rewards prepared for the good, they do not experience the punishments allotted for the wicked. The philosopher here sets forth these great truths, which a constant tradition, though very much obscured by fiction and fable, had always preserved among the pagans; the last judgment of the righteous and wicked; the eternal punishments to which great criminals are condemned; a place of peace and joy without end for the souls that retain their purity and innocence, or which, during this life, have expiated their offences by repentance and satisfaction; and an intermediate state, in which they purify themselves, for a certain time, from less considerable crimes, that have not been atoned for during this life.

“My friends, there is still one thing, which it is very just to believe; if the soul be immortal, it requires to be cultivated with attention, not only for what we call the time of life, but for that which is to follow, I mean eternity; and the least neglect in this point may be attended with endless consequences. If death were the final dissolution of being, the wicked would be great gainers in it, by being delivered at once from their bodies, their souls, and their vices; but as the soul is immortal, it has no other means of being freed from its evils, nor any safety for it, but in becoming very good and very wise; for it carries nothing away with it, but its good or bad deeds, its virtues or vices, which are commonly the consequences of the education it has received, and the causes of eternal happiness or misery.†

“When the dead are arrived at the fatal rendezvous of departed souls, whither their dæmon‡ conducts them, they are all judged. Those who have passed their lives in a manner neither entirely criminal nor absolutely innocent, are sent into a place where they suffer pains proportioned to their faults, till being purged and cleansed of their guilt, and

* Monsieur Pascal has expatiated upon this reasoning in his seventh article, and deduced from it a demonstration of infinite force.

† Plat. p. 107.

‡ Dæmon is a Greek word which signifies spirit, genius, and with us, an angel.

afterwards restored to liberty, they receive the reward of the good actions they have done in the body. Those who are judged to be incurable upon account of the greatness of their crimes, who have deliberately committed sacrileges and murders, and other such great offences, the fatal destiny that passes judgment upon them, hurls them into Tartarus, from whence they never depart. But those who are found guilty of crimes, great indeed, but worthy of pardon; who have committed violences in the transports of rage against their father or mother, or have killed some one in a like emotion, and afterwards repented, these suffer the same punishment, and in the same place with the last, but for a time only, till by their prayers and supplications they have obtained pardon from those they have injured.

But for those who have passed through life with peculiar sanctity of manners, delivered from their base earthly abodes as from a prison, they are received on high in a pure region which they inhabit; and as philosophy has sufficiently purified them, they live without their bodies,* through all eternity, in a series of joys and delights which it is not easy to describe, and which the shortness of my time will not permit me to explain more at large.

“What I have said will suffice, I conceive, to prove that we ought to endeavor strenuously, throughout our whole lives, to acquire virtue and wisdom, for you see how great a reward and how high a hope is promised to us. And though the immortality of the soul were dubious, instead of appearing a certainty, as it does, every wise man ought to assure himself that it is well worth his trouble to risk his belief of it in this manner. And indeed, can there be a more glorious hazard? We ought to delight ourselves with this blessed hope, for which reason I have lengthened this discourse so much.” †

Cicero expresses these noble sentiments of Socrates with his usual delicacy. Almost at the very moment when he held the deadly draught in his hand, he talked in such a manner, as showed that he looked upon death, not as a violence done to him, but as a means bestowed upon him of ascending to heaven. He declared that upon departing out of this life, two ways are open to us; the one leads to the place of eternal misery such souls as have sullied themselves here below in shameful pleasures and criminal actions; the

* The resurrection of the body was unknown to the pagans.

† Plat. pp. 113, 114.

other conducts those to the happy mansions of the gods, who have retained their purity upon earth, and have led in human bodies a life almost divine.*

When Socrates had done speaking, Crito desired him to give him and the rest of his friends his last instructions in regard to his children, and other affairs, that by executing them, they might have the consolation of doing him some pleasure. "I shall recommend nothing to you this day," replied Socrates, "more than I have always done, which is, to take care of yourselves. You cannot do yourselves a greater service, nor do me and my family a greater pleasure." Crito having asked him afterwards, in what manner he thought fit to be buried; "As you please," said Socrates, "if you can lay hold of me, and I not escape out of your hand." At the same time, looking upon his friends with a smile; "I can never persuade Crito, that Socrates is he who converses with you, and disposes the several parts of his discourse; for he always imagines, that I am what he is about to see dead in a little while. He confounds me with my carcase, and therefore asks me how I would be interred." In finishing those words he rose up, and went to bathe himself in an adjoining chamber. After he came out of the bath, his children were brought to him, for he had three, two very little, and the other grown up. He spoke to them for some time, gave his orders to the woman who took care of them, and then dismissed them. Being returned into his chamber, he laid down upon his bed.†

The servant of the eleven entered at the same instant, and having informed him that the time for drinking the hemlock was come, which was at sunset, was so much affected with sorrow, that he turned his back, and began to weep. "See," said Socrates, "the good heart of this man! Since my imprisonment he has often come to see me, and to converse with me. He is more worthy than all his fellows. How heartily the poor man weeps for me!" This is a remarkable example, and might teach those in an office of this kind, how they ought to behave to all prisoners, but more

* Cum pene in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem trudi, verum in calum videretur ascendere. Ita enim censebat, itaque disservit: duas esse vias duplicesque cursas animorum e corpore excedentium. Num, qui se humanis vitiiis contaminassent, et se totos libidinibus dedidissent, quibus coactati velut domesticis vitiiis atque flagitiis se inquinassent, iis devium quoddam iter esse, seclusum a concilio deorum: qui autem se intergros castosque servavissent, quibusque fuisset minima cum corporibus contagio, seseque ab his semper sevocassent, essentque in corporibus humanis, vitam imitati deorum his ad illos, a quibus essent profecti, redditum facilem patere. — Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. i. n. 71, 72.

† Plat. pp. 115-118.

especially to persons of merit, when they are so unhappy as to fall into their hands. The fatal cup was brought. Socrates asked what was necessary for him to do. "Nothing more," replied the servant, "than, as soon as you have drunk it, to walk about till you find your legs grow weary, and afterwards lie down upon your bed." He took up the cup without any emotion or change in his color or countenance, and regarding the man with a steady and assured look, "well," said he, "what say you of this drink: may one make a libation out of it?" Upon being told that there was only enough for one dose; "we may at least," continued he, "say our prayers to the gods, as is our duty; and implore them to make our exit from this world, and our last stage happy; which is what I most ardently request of them." After having spoke these words, he kept silence for some time, and then drank off the whole draught with an amazing tranquillity, and a serenity of aspect not to be expressed or conceived.

Till then his friends, with great violence to themselves, had refrained from tears; but after he had drunk the potion, they were no longer masters of themselves, but wept abundantly. Apollodorus, who had been in tears during almost the whole conversation, began then to cry aloud, and to lament with such excessive grief, as pierced the hearts of all who were present. Socrates alone remained unmoved, and even reproved his friends, though with his usual mildness and good nature: "What are you doing?" said he to them; "I wonder at you! Ah! what is become of your virtue! Was it not for this I sent away the women, that they might not fall into these weaknesses? For I have always heard say, that we ought to die peaceably, and blessing the gods. Be at ease, I beg you, and show more constancy and resolution." These words filled them with confusion, and obliged them to restrain their tears.

In the mean time he kept walking to and fro; and when he found his legs grow weary, he laid down upon his bed, as he had been directed.

The poison then operated more and more. When Socrates found it began to gain upon the heart, uncovering his face, which had been covered, without doubt to prevent any thing from disturbing him in his last moments, "Crito," said he, which were his last words, "we owe a cock to Æsculapius; discharge that vow for me, and I pray do not forget it;" soon after which he breathed his last. Crito went to

his body, and closed his mouth and eyes. Such was the end of Socrates, in the first year of the 95th Olympiad, and the seventieth of his age. Cicero says he could never read the description of his death in Plato without tears.*

Plato, and the rest of the disciples of Socrates, apprehending that the rage of his accusers was not satiated by that victim, retired to Megara, to the house of Euclid, where they stayed till the storm blew over. Euripides, however, to reproach the Athenians with the horrible crime which they had committed, in condemning the best of men to die upon such slight grounds, composed his tragedy, called *Palamedes*, in which, under the names of that hero, who was also destroyed by a black calumny, he deplored the misfortune of his friends. When the actor came to repeat this verse,

“ You doom the justest of the Greeks to perish ; ”

the whole theatre, remembering Socrates in so distinct an image of him, melted into tears ; and a decree passed, to prohibit speaking any more of him in public. Some believe that Euripides died before Socrates, and reject this circumstance.

However that may be, the people of Athens did not open their eyes till some time after the death of Socrates. Their hatred being satisfied, their prejudices expired, and time having given them opportunity for reflection, the notorious injustice of the sentence appeared in all its horrors. Nothing was heard throughout the city but discourses in favor of Socrates. The academy, the Lycæum, private houses, public walks, and market places, seemed still to re-echo the sound of his loved voice. Here, said they, he formed our youth, and taught our children to love their country, and to honor their parents. In this place, he gave us his admirable lessons, and sometimes made us seasonable reproaches, to engage us more warmly in the pursuit of virtue. Alas, how have we rewarded him for such important services ? Athens was in universal mourning and consternation. The schools were shut up, and all exercises suspended. The accusers were called to account for the innocent blood they had caused to be shed. Melitus was condemned to die, and the rest banished. Plutarch observes that all those who had any share in this black calumny, were in such abomination among the citizens, that no one would give them fire, answer them any question, nor go into the same

* Quid dicam de Socrato cujus morti illacrymari soleo Platonem legens.—*De Nat. Deor. lib. iii. n. 82.*

bath with them ; and had the place cleansed where they had bathed, lest they should be polluted by touching it ; which drove them into such despair, that many of them killed themselves.

The Athenians, not contented with having punished the accusers, caused a statue of brass to be erected to him, of the workmanship of the celebrated Lysippus, and placed it in one of the most conspicuous parts of the city. Their respect and gratitude rose even to a religious veneration ; they dedicated a chapel to him, as to a hero and a demi-god, which they called *Σωκρατεῖον*, or “ The Chapel of Socrates.” *

SECTION VII.—REFLECTIONS ON SOCRATES, AND THE SENTENCE PASSED UPON HIM BY THE ATHENIANS.

We must be very much surprised, when on the one side we consider the extreme delicacy of the people of Athens, as to what regards the worship of the gods, which ran so high as to occasion their condemning the most eminent persons upon the simple suspicion of their failing in respect for them ; and on the other, when we see the exceeding toleration, to call it no worse, with which the same people heard comedies every day, in which all the gods were turned into ridicule, in a manner capable of inspiring the highest contempt for them. All the pieces of Aristophanes abound with pleasantries, or rather buffooneries of this kind ; and if it be true that this poet did not know what it was to spare the greatest men of the republic, it may be said also as justly, he was still less favorable to the gods.

Such were the daily entertainments in the theatre, which the people of Athens not only heard without pain, but with such joy, pleasure, and applause, that they rewarded the poet with public honors, who diverted them so agreeably. What was there in Socrates that came near this excessive license ? Never did any person in the pagan world speak of the Divinity, or of the adoration due to him, in so pure, so noble and respectful a manner. He did not declare against the gods publicly received and honored by a religion more ancient than the city ; he only avoided imputing to them the crimes and infamous actions, which the popular credulity ascribed to them in the opinion of the people. He did not blame the sacrifices, festivals, nor the other ceremonies of religion ; he only taught, that all that pomp and

* *Diog.* p. 116.

outward show could not be agreeable to the gods, without uprightness of intention and purity of heart.

This wise, this enlightened, this religious man, however, with all his veneration and noble sentiments in regard to the Divinity, was condemned as an impious person, by the suffrages of almost a whole people, without his accusers being able to instance one single avowed fact, or to produce any proof with the least appearance of probability.

From whence could so evident, so universal, and so determined a contradiction arise among the Athenians? A people abounding in other respects with wit, taste, and knowledge, must without doubt have had their reasons, at least in appearance, for a conduct so different, and sentiments so opposite to their general character. May we not say that the Athenians considered their gods in a double light? They confined their real religion to the public, solemn, and hereditary worship, as they had received it from their ancestors, as it was established by the laws of the state, had been practised from time immemorial, and especially confirmed by the oracles, augurs, offerings, and sacrifices. It was by this standard that they regulated their piety; against which they could not suffer the least attempt whatever: it was of this worship alone they were jealous; it was for these ancient ceremonies they were such ardent zealots; and they believed, though without foundation, that Socrates was an enemy to them. But there was another kind of religion, founded upon fable, poetical fictions, popular opinions, and foreign customs; for this they were little concerned, and abandoned it entirely to the poets, to the representations of the theatre, and common conversation.

What grossness did they not attribute to Juno and Venus! No citizen would have been satisfied that his wife or daughter should have resembled these goddesses. Timotheus, the famous musician, having represented Diana upon the stage of Athens, transported with folly, fury, and rage, one of the spectators conceived, that he could not make a greater imprecation against him, than to wish his daughter might become like to that divinity. "It is better," says Plutarch, "to believe there are no gods, than to imagine them of this kind; open and declared impiety being less profane, if we may be allowed to say so, than so gross and absurd a superstition." *

However it be, the sentence, the circumstances of which

* Plut. de Superstit. p. 170.

we have related, will, through all ages, cover Athens with infamy and reproach, which all the splendor of its glorious actions, for which it is otherwise so justly renowned, can never obliterate; and shows at the same time, what is to be expected from a people, gentle, humane, and beneficent (for such the Athenians really were), but warm, proud, haughty, inconstant, and wavering with every wind and every impression. It is therefore with reason that their assemblies have been compared to a tempestuous sea; as that element, though calm and peaceable of itself, is subject to be frequently agitated by a violence not its own.

As to Socrates, it must be allowed that the pagan world never produced any thing so great and perfect. When we observe to what height he carries the sublimity of his sentiments, not only in respect to moral virtue, temperance, sobriety, patience in adversity, the love of poverty, and the forgiveness of wrongs; but, what is far more considerable, in regard to the Divinity, his unity, omnipotence, creation of the world, and providence in the government of it; the immortality of the soul, its ultimate and eternal destiny; the rewards of the good, and the punishment of the wicked; when we consider this train of sublime knowledge, we ask our reason whether it is a pagan who thinks and speaks in this manner, and can scarcely persuade ourselves, that from so dark and obscure a fund as paganism, such living and glorious rays of light should shine forth.

It is true, his reputation was not without alloy; and it has been affirmed that the purity of his manners did not answer those of his sentiments. This question has been discussed among the learned; but my plan will not admit me to treat it in its extent. The reader may see Abbé Fraquier's dissertation in defence of Socrates, against the reproaches made him on account of his conduct. The negative argument which he makes use of in his justification, seems a very strong one. He observes that neither Aristophanes, in his comedy of the Clouds, which is entirely against Socrates, nor his vile accusers in his trial, have advanced one word that tends to impeach the purity of his manners, and it is not probable that such violent enemies as those would have neglected one of the most likely methods to discredit him in the opinion of his judges if there had been any foundation or appearance for the use of it.*

I confess, however, that certain principles of Plato, his

* *Memoires de l'Academie des Inscrip.* Vol. IV., p. 372.

disciple, held by him in common with his master, upon the nudity of the combatants in the public games, from which at the same time he did not exclude the fair sex, and the behavior of Socrates himself, who wrestled naked with Alcibiades, gives us no great idea of that philosopher's delicacy in point of modesty and bashfulness. What shall we say of his visit to Theodota, a woman of Athens, of indifferent reputation, only to assure himself with his own eyes of her extraordinary beauty, which was much talked of, and of the precepts he gave her for the attraction of admirers, and the retaining them in her snares? Do such lessons consist much with a philosopher? I pass over many other things in silence.*

I am the less surprised after this, that several of the fathers have censured him in regard to purity of manners, and that they have thought fit to apply to him, as well as to his disciple Plato, what St. Paul † says of the philosophers; that God by a just judgment has abandoned them to a reprobate sense, and to the most shameful lusts, for their punishment; in that having clearly known there was but one true God, they had not honored him as they ought, by publicly avowing their belief, and were not ashamed to associate with him an innumerable multitude of divinities, ridiculous and infamous even in their own opinions.

And in this, properly speaking, consists the crime of Socrates, who was not guilty in the eyes of the Athenians, but gave occasion for his being justly condemned by the eternal truth. It had enlightened his soul with the most pure and sublime lights of which the pagan world was capable; for we are not ignorant, that all knowledge of God, even natural, cannot come but from himself alone. He held admirable principles with relation to the Divinity. He agreeably rallied the fables, upon which the ridiculous mysteries of his age were founded. He often spoke, and in the most exalted terms, of the existence of one only God, eternal, invisible, Creator of the universe, Supreme Director and Arbiter of all events, avenger of crimes, and rewarder of virtues; but he did not dare to give a public testimony of these great truths. He perfectly discerned the false and the ridiculous of the pagan system, and nevertheless, as Seneca says of the wise man, and acted himself, he observed exactly all the customs and ceremonies, not as agreeable to the gods, but as enjoined by the laws.

* Xenoph. Memor. l. iii. pp. 783-786.

† Rom. ch. i. ver. 17-32.

He acknowledged at bottom one only Divinity, and worshipped with the people that multitude of infamous idols which ancient superstition had heaped up during a long succession of ages. He held peculiar opinions in the schools, but followed the multitude in the temples. As a philosopher, he despised and detested the idols in secret; as a citizen of Athens and a senator, he paid them in public the same adoration with others: by so much the more to be condemned, says St. Augustin, as that worship, which was only external and dissembled, seemed to the people to be the effect of sincerity and conviction.*

It cannot be said that Socrates altered his conduct at the end of his life, or that he then expressed a greater zeal for truth. In his defence before the people, he declared that he had always received and honored the same gods as the Athenians, and the last order he gave before he expired, was to sacrifice in his name a cock to Æsculapius. Behold, then, this prince of philosophers, declared by the Delphic oracle the wisest of mankind, who, notwithstanding his internal conviction of the one only Divinity, dies in the bosom of idolatry, and with the profession of adoring all the gods of the pagan theology. Socrates is the more inexcusable in this, that declaring himself a man expressly appointed by Heaven to bear witness to the truth, he fails in the most essential duty of the glorious commission he ascribes to himself. For if there be any truth in religion that we ought more particularly to avow, it is that which regards the unity of the Godhead, and the vanity of idol worship. In this his courage had been well placed; nor would it have been any great difficulty to Socrates, determined besides as he was to die. But, says St. Augustin, these philosophers were not designed by God to enlighten the world, nor to bring men over from the impious worship of false deities to the holy religion of the true God.†

We cannot deny Socrates to have been the hero of the

* Quæ omnia (ait Seneca) sapiens servabit tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis grata—Omnem istam ignobilem deorum turbam, quam longo ævo longa superstitio congessit, sic, inquit, adorabimus, ut meminerimus cultum ejus magis ad morem, quam ad rem, pertinere.—Sed iste quam philosophia quasi liberum fecerat, tamen, quia illustris senator erat, colebat quou reprehendebat, agebat quod arguebat, quod culpabat adorabat—eo damnabilius, quo illa, quæ mendaciter agebat, sic ageret, ut eum populus veraciter agere existimaret.—St. August. de Civit. Dei. l. vi. c. 10.

Eorum sapientes, quos philosophos vocant, scholas habebant dissentientes, templa communia.—Id. lib. de Ver. Rel. c. 1.

† Non sic isti nati erant, ut populorum suorum opinionem ad verum cultum veri Dei a simulacrorum superstitione atque ab nujus mundi vanitate, converterent.—S. August. lib. de Ver. Rel. c. 11.

pagan world in regard to moral virtues. But to judge rightly of him, let us draw a parallel between this supposed hero and the martyrs of Christianity, who often were young children and tender virgins, and yet were not afraid to shed the last drop of their blood, to defend and confirm the same truths which Socrates knew, without daring to assert in public ; I mean, the unity of God and the vanity of idols.

BOOK TENTH.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CONTAINING THE
MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE GREEKS.

MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE GREEKS.

THE most essential part of history, and which it concerns the reader most to know, is that which explains the character and manners, as well of the people in general, as of the great persons in particular, of whom it treats; and this may be said to be in some sort the soul of history, of which the facts are only the body. I have endeavored, as occasion offered, to paint in their true colors the most illustrious personages of Greece; it remains for me to show the genius and character of the people themselves. I shall confine myself to those of Lacedæmon and Athens, who always held the first rank among the Greeks, and shall reduce what I have to say upon this subject to three heads, their political government, war and religion.

Signorius, Meursius, Potter, and several others, who have written upon the Grecian antiquities, supply me with great lights, and are of equal use to me in the matters which remain for me to treat.

CHAPTER I.

OF POLITICAL GOVERNMENT.

THERE are three principal forms of government: Monarchy, in which a single person reigns; Aristocracy, in which the eldest and wisest govern; and Democracy, in which the

supreme authority is lodged in the hands of the people. The most celebrated writers of antiquity, as Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and Plutarch, give the preference to the first kind, as including the most advantages with the fewest inconveniences. But all agree, and it cannot be too often inculcated, that the end of all government, and the duty of every one in authority, in whatever manner it be, is to use his utmost endeavors to render those under his command happy and just, by obtaining for them, on the one side, safety and tranquillity, with the advantages and conveniences of life; and on the other, all the means and helps that may contribute to make them virtuous. As the pilot's object, says Cicero, is to steer his vessel safely into port, the physician's to preserve or restore health, the general's to obtain victory; so a prince, and every one who governs others, ought to make the utility of the governed his view and motive, and to remember that the supreme rule of all just government is the good of the public: "*Salus populi suprema lex esto.*"* He adds, that the greatest and most noble function in the world, is to be the author of the happiness of mankind.†

Plato, in many places, lightly esteems the most shining qualities and actions of those who govern, if they do not tend to promote the two great ends which I have mentioned, the virtue and happiness of the people; and he refutes at large, in the first book of his republic, one Thrasyarchus, who advanced that subjects were born for the prince, and not the prince for his subjects; and that whatever promoted the interests of the prince and commonwealth ought to be deemed just and lawful.‡

In the distinctions which have been made upon the several forms of government, it has been agreed that the most perfect would be that which would unite in itself, by a happy mixture of institutions, all the advantages, and exclude all the inconveniences of the rest; and almost all the ancients have believed, that the Lacedæmonian government came nearest to this idea of perfection. §

ARTICLE I.—OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SPARTA.

From the time that the Heraclides had re-entered Pelopon-

* Cic. de Leg. l. iii. n. 8.

† Tenesne igitur, moderatorem illum reip. quo referre velimus omnia?—Ust gubernatori cursus secundus medico salus, imperatori victoria, sic, huic moderatori reip. beata civium vita proposita est, ut opibus firma copiis locuples, gloria annua, virtute honesta sit. Huius enim operis maximi inter homines atque optimi il lum esse perfectorem volo.—Ad Attic. l. viii. epist. 10.

‡ Pages 338-343.

§ Polyb. l. vi. pp. 458, 459.

nesus, Sparta was governed by two kings, who were always of the same two families, descended from Hercules by two different branches; as I have observed elsewhere. Whether from pride, or the abuse of despotic power, on the side of the kings, or the desire of independence and an immoderate love of liberty on that of the people, Sparta, in its early periods, was always involved in commotions and revolts, which would infallibly have occasioned its ruin, as had happened at Argos and Messene, two neighboring cities equally powerful with itself, if the wise foresight of Lycurgus had not prevented their fatal consequences by the reformation he made in the state. I have related it at large in the life of that legislator, and shall only touch here upon what regards the government.*

SECTION I.—IDEA OF THE SPARTAN GOVERNMENT.

Lycurgus restored order and peace in Sparta by the establishment of the senate. It consisted of twenty-eight senators, over whom the two kings presided. This august council, formed out of the wisest and most experienced men in the nation, served as a counterpoise to the two other authorities, that of the kings and that of the people; and whenever the one was for overbearing the other, the senate interposed, by joining the weakest, and thereby held the balance between both. At length, to prevent this body itself from abusing its power, which was very great, a check was established, by the nomination of five ephori, who were elected out of the people, whose office lasted only one year, and who had authority, not only over the senators, but over the kings themselves.

The power of the kings was extremely limited, especially in the city, and in time of peace. In war they had the command of the fleets and armies, and at that time greater authority. But they had even then, a kind of inspectors and commissioners assigned them, who served as a necessary council, and were generally chosen for that office from those who were out of favor with them, in order that there should be no connivance on their side, and that the republic might be the better served. There was almost continually some secret misunderstanding between the two kings; whether it proceeded from a natural jealousy between the two branches, or was the effect of the Spartan policy, to which their too great union might have given umbrage.†

* Book v. Art. vii. † Arist. de Rep. l. ii. p. 331.

The ephori had a greater authority at Sparta than the tribunes of the Roman people. They presided in the election of the magistrates, and could call them to an account for their administration. Their power extended even to the persons of their kings, and of the princes of the royal blood, whom they had a right to imprison, which they actually used in regard to Pausanias. When they were seated in the tribunal, they did not rise up when the kings entered, which was a mark of respect paid them by all the other magistrates, and seems to imply a kind of superiority in the ephori from their representing the people; and it is observed of Agesilaus, that when he was seated upon his throne to dispense justice, and the ephori came in, he never failed to rise up to do them honor.* It is very probable, that before his time, it was not usual for the kings to act in that manner, Plutarch relating this behavior of Agesilaus as peculiar to him.

All public business was proposed and examined in the senate, and resolutions passed accordingly in the same place. But the decrees of the senate were of no force, unless ratified by the people.

There must have been great wisdom in the laws established by Lycurgus for the government of Sparta, because, as long as they were exactly observed, no commotions or seditions of the people were ever known in the city, no change in the form of government was ever proposed, no private person usurped authority by violence, or made himself tyrant; the people never thought of depriving the two families, in which it had always been, of the sovereignty, nor did any of the kings ever attempt to assume more power than the laws admitted. This reflection, which both Xenophon and Polybius make, shows the idea they had of the wisdom of Lycurgus, in point of his policy, and the opinion we ought to have of it. In fact, no other city of Greece had this advantage; and all of them experienced many changes and vicissitudes, from a want of similar laws to perpetuate their form of government.†

The reason of this constancy and stability of the Lacedæmonians in their government and conduct is, that in Sparta the laws governed absolutely and with sovereign authority; whereas the greater part of the other Grecian cities, abandoned to the caprice of individuals, to despotic power, to an arbitrary and irregular sway, experienced the

* Plut. in Agesil. p. 597.

† Xenoph. in Agesil. p. 651. Polyb. l. vi. p. 456.

truth of Plato's remark, "that the city is miserable, where the magistrates command the laws, and not the laws the magistrates." *

The example of Argos and Messene, which I have already related, would alone suffice to show the justice and truth of that reflection. After their return from the Trojan war, the Greeks, distinguished by the name of Dorians, established themselves in three cities of Peloponnesus, Lacedæmon, Argos, and Messene, and entered into an alliance for their mutual protection. These three cities, governed alike by monarchial power, had equal advantages; except in the fertility of the lands where they were situated, in which the two latter greatly excelled. Argos and Messene, however, did not long preserve their superiority. The haughtiness of the kings, and the disobedience of the people, occasioned their fall from the flourishing condition in which they had been at first, "and their example proved," says Plutarch after Plato, "that it was the peculiar favor of the gods, which gave the Spartans such a man as Lycurgus capable of prescribing so wise and reasonable a plan of government." †

To support it without change, particular care was taken to educate the youth according to the laws and manners of the country, in order that they might become a second nature in them, by being early ingrafted into them, and confirmed by long habit. The hard and sober manner in which they were brought up, inspired them during the rest of their lives with a natural taste for frugality and temperance, that distinguished them from all other people, and wonderfully adapted them to support the fatigues of war. Plato observes that this salutary custom had been banished from Sparta, and all the territory dependent on her, drunkenness, debauchery, and all their consequential disorders; insomuch that it was a crime punishable by law to drink wine to excess even in the Bacchanalia, which everywhere else were days of licentiousness, when entire cities gave themselves up to the greatest excesses. §

They also accustomed the children from their earliest infancy to an entire submission to the laws, magistrates, and all in authority; and their education, properly speaking, was no more than an apprenticeship of obedience. § It was for this reason Agesilaus advised Xenophon to send his

* Plat. l. iv. de Leg. p. 715.

† Plat. l. iii. de Leg. pp. 683-685. Plut. in

Lycurg. p. 43.

‡ Plat. l. i. de Leg. p. 637.

§ ὥστε τὴν παιδείαν εἶναι μελέτην εὐπειρείας.—Plut. in Lycurg. p. 58.

children to Sparta, as to an excellent school, where they might learn the greatest and most noble of all sciences, "to obey and to command," for the one naturally leads on to the other.* It was not only the mean, the poor, and the ordinary citizens, who were subjected in this manner to the laws; but the rich, the powerful, the magistrates, and even kings: and they did not distinguish themselves from the others in any thing but a more exact obedience; convinced that such behavior was the surest means of their being obeyed and respected themselves by their inferiors.

Hence came the highly celebrated answers of Demaratus. Xerxes could not comprehend how the Lacedæmonians, who had no master to control them, should be capable of confronting dangers and death. "They are free and independent of all men," replied Demaratus; "but the law is above them, and commands them; and that law ordains, that they must conquer or die."† Upon another occasion, when somebody expressed their surprise, that being king, he should suffer himself to be banished: "It is," said he, "because at Sparta the laws are more powerful than the kings."‡

This appears evidently in the ready obedience of Agesilaus to the ephori, when recalled by them to the support of his country; a delicate occasion for a king and a conqueror; but to him it seemed more glorious § to obey his country and the laws than to command numerous armies, or even to conquer Asia. ||

SECTION II.—LOVE OF POVERTY INSTITUTED AT SPARTA.

To this entire submission to the laws of the state, Lycurgus added another principle of government no less admirable, which was to remove from Sparta all luxury, profusion, and magnificence; to decriy riches absolutely, to make poverty honorable, and at the same time necessary, by substituting a species of iron money instead of gold and silver coin, which till then had been current. I have explained elsewhere the measures that were used to make so difficult an undertaking succeed, and shall confine myself here to examining what judgment should be passed on it, as it affects a government.

* Μαθησασμένους τῶν μαθημάτων τὸ καλλίστον, ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν.—Plut. in Ages. p. 606.

† Herod. l. vii. cap. 145, 146.

‡ Plut. in Apoph. Lacon. 220.

§ Multo gloriosius duxit, si institutis patriæ paruiisset, quam si bello superasset Asiam.—Cornel. Nep. in Agesil. c. 1v.

|| Idem. in Agesil. pp. 603, 604.

The poverty to which Lycurgus reduced Sparta, and which seemed to prohibit all conquest, and to deprive it of all means to augment its force and grandeur, was well adapted to rendering it powerful and flourishing. Such a constitution of government, which till then had no example, nor has since been imitated by any state, argues a great fund of prudence and policy in a legislator; and the medium conceived afterwards under Lysander, in continuing individuals in their poverty, and restoring to the public the use of gold and silver coin, was it not a wise amendment of what was too rigorous in that law of Lycurgus of which we are speaking?

It seems, if we consult only the common views of human prudence, that it is just to reason in this manner; but the event, which is an infallible evidence and arbiter in this place, obliges me to be of a quite different opinion. While Sparta remained poor, and persisted in the contempt of gold and silver, which continued for several ages, she was powerful and glorious; and the commencement of her decline may be dated from the time when she began to break through the severe prohibition of Lycurgus against the use of gold and silver money.

The education which he instituted for the young Lacedæmonians, the hard and sober life which he recommended with so much care, the painful and violent exercises of the body prescribed by him, the abstraction from all other applications and employment; in a word, all his laws and institutions show that his view was to form a people of soldiers, solely devoted to arms and military operations. I do not pretend to justify absolutely this scheme, which had its great inconveniences; and I have expressed my thoughts of it elsewhere. But, admitting it good, we must confess that that legislator showed great wisdom in the means he took for its execution.

The almost inevitable danger of a people trained up solely for war, who have always their arms in their hands, and what is most to be feared is injustice, violence, ambition, the desire of increasing their power, of taking advantage of the weakness of their neighbors, of oppressing them by force, of invading their lands under false pretexts, which the lust of dominion never fails to suggest, and of extending their bounds as far as possible; all, vices and extremes which are culpable in private persons, and the ordinary intercourse of life, but which men have thought fit to applaud as grandeur and glory in the persons of princes and conquerors.

The great care of Lycurgus was to defend his people against this dangerous temptation. Without mentioning the other means he made use of, he employed two which could not fail of producing their effect. The first was to prohibit all navigation and maritime warfare to his citizens.* The situation of his city, and the fear that commerce, the usual source of luxury and depravity, should corrupt the purity of the Spartan manners, may have been among the causes of this decree. But his principal motive was to put it out of the power of his citizens to project conquests, which a people, shut up within the narrow bounds of a peninsula, could not carry very far without being masters at sea.

The second means, still more efficacious, was to forbid all use of gold and silver money, and to introduce a species of iron coin in its stead, which was of great weight and small value, and could only be current at home. How, with such money, could foreign troops be raised and paid, fleets fitted out, and numerous armies kept up either by land or sea?

The design of Lycurgus in rendering his citizens warlike and putting arms into their hands, was not, as Polybius observes, and Plutarch after him, to make them illustrious conquerors, who might carry war into remote regions and subject great numbers of people.† His sole object was that, shut up within the territories and dominion left them by their ancestors, they should have no thoughts but of maintaining themselves in peace, and defending themselves successfully against such of their neighbors as should have the rashness to invade them, and for this they had occasion for neither gold nor silver, finding in their own country, and still more in their sober and temperate manner of life, all that was sufficient for the support of their armies, when they did not quit their own or the territories of their neighbors.

“Now,” says Polybius, “this plan once admitted, it must be allowed that there is nothing more wise nor more happily conceived than the institutions of Lycurgus for the maintaining a people in the possession of their liberty, and to secure to them the enjoyment of peace and tranquillity. Let us imagine a little republic like that of Sparta, all the citizens of which were inured to labor, accustomed to live

* Ἀπεργετο δὲ αὐτοῖς ναύταις εἶναι, καὶ νουμαχεῖν.—Plut. in Instit. Lacon. p. 239

† Polyb. l. vi. p. 491. Plut. de Lycurg. p. 59.

frugally; warlike, courageous, intrepid; and that the fundamental principle of this small republic is to do no wrong to any one, not to disturb its neighbors, nor invade their lands or interests, but, on the contrary, to declare in favor of the oppressed against the injustice and violence of oppressors; is it not certain that a republic surrounded by a great number of states of equal extent would be generally respected by all the neighboring people, would become the supreme arbiter of all their quarrels, and exercise an empire over them, by so much the more glorious and lasting as it would be voluntary, and founded solely in the opinion those neighbors would have of its virtue, justice, and valor."

This was the end which Lycurgus proposed to himself. Convinced that the happiness of a city, like that of a private person, depends upon virtue, and upon being well within itself, he regulated Sparta so that it might always suffice to its own happiness and act upon principles of wisdom and equity. From thence arose that universal esteem of the neighboring people, and even of strangers, for the Lacedæmonians, who asked of them neither money, ships, nor troops, but only that they would lend them a Spartan to command their armies, and when they had obtained their request, they paid him entire obedience, with every kind of honor and respect. In this manner the Sicilians obeyed Gylippus, the Chalcidians Brasidas, and all the Greeks of Asia, Lysander, Callicratidas, and Agesilaus; regarding the city of Sparta as a model for all others in the arts of living and governing.*

The epoch of the declension of Sparta begins with the open violation of the laws of Lycurgus. I do not pretend that they had always been exactly observed till that time, which was far from being the case, but the spirit and genius of those laws had almost always prevailed with the majority of the persons who governed. No sooner had the ambition of reigning over all Greece inspired them with the design of having naval armies and foreign troops, and that money was necessary for the support of those forces, than Sparta, forgetting her ancient maxims, saw herself reduced to have recourse to the barbarians, whom till then she had detested, and basely to make her court to the kings of Persia, whom she had formerly vanquished with so much glory, and that

* *Προς σύμπασαν τὴν τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν πολιν, ὥσπερ παιδάγωγον ἢ διδασκαλόν ἐνυχήμενος βίον καὶ τεταγμένης ἀποβλέποντες.*—Plut. p. 58.

only to draw from them some aids of money and troops against their own brethren—against people born and settled in Greece like themselves. Thus had they the imprudence and misfortune to recall with gold and silver, into Sparta, all the vices and crimes which the iron money had banished, and to prepare the way for the changes which ensued, and were the cause of their ruin. And this infinitely exalts the wisdom of Lycurgus, in having foreseen, at such a distance, what might strike at the happiness of his citizens, and provided salutary remedies against it in the form of government which he established at Sparta. Another legislator, who had preceded him several ages, has a right to share this glory with him.

SECTION III.—LAWS ESTABLISHED BY MINOS IN CRETE.

It is well known that Lycurgus formed the plan of most of his laws upon the model of those observed in the island of Crete, where he passed a considerable time for the better study of them. It is proper I should give some idea of them here, having forgot to do it in the place where it would have been more natural, that is, when I spoke for the first time of Lycurgus and his institutions.

Minos, who is called in fable the son of Jupiter, was the author of these laws. He lived about one hundred years before the Trojan war.* He was a powerful, wise, and gentle prince, and still more estimable for his moral virtues than his military abilities. After having conquered the island of Crete, and several others in its neighborhood, he applied himself to strengthen by wise laws the new state, of which he had possessed himself by the force of arms. The end which he proposed in the establishment of these laws was to render his subjects happy by making them virtuous. He banished idleness and voluptuousness from his states, and with them luxury and vicious pleasures, the fruitful sources of all vice. Well knowing that liberty was justly regarded as the most precious and greatest good, and that it cannot subsist without a perfect union of the people, he endeavored to establish a kind of equality among them, which is the tie and basis of it, and very proper to remove all envy, jealousy, hatred, and dissension. He did not undertake to make any new divisions of lands, nor to prohibit the use of gold and silver. He applied himself to the unit-

* A. M. 2720. Ant. J. C. 1284.

ing of his subjects by other ties, which seemed to him neither less firm nor less reasonable.*

He decreed, that the children should be all brought up and educated together by troops and bands, in order that they might learn early the same principles and maxims. Their life was hard and sober. They were accustomed to be satisfied with little, to suffer heat and cold, to walk over steep and rugged places, to skirmish with each other in small parties, to suffer courageously the blows they received, and to exercise themselves in a kind of dance, in which they carried arms in their hands, and which was afterwards called the Pyrrhic; in order, says Strabo, that even in their diversions, every thing might create in them a military spirit, and form them for war. They were also made to learn certain airs of music, but of a manly, martial kind.

They were not taught either to ride, or to wear heavy armor; but they were made to excel in drawing the bow, which was their most usual exercise. Crete is not a flat even country, nor fit for breeding horses, like that of the Thessalians, who were esteemed the best cavalry in Greece; but a rough, broken country, full of shelves and highlands, where heavy-armed troops could not exercise themselves in the horse-race. But as to archery and light-armed soldiers, fit to execute the devices and stratagems of war, the Cretans pretended to hold the foremost rank.†

Minos thought proper to establish in Crete a community of tables and meals. Besides several other great advantages which he found in this institution, such as introducing a kind of equality in his dominions (the rich and poor having the same diet), the accustoming his subjects to a frugal and sober life, the creating a friendship and unity between them, by the usual gayety and familiarity of the table, he had also in view the custom of war, in which the soldiers are obliged to eat together. The public supplied the expenses of these tables, the salaries of the magistrates, and the rest allotted for the public meals; so that out of the revenues of the state, a part was applied to the uses of religion, and the women, children, and men of all ages, were fed at the cost, and in the name, of the republic. In this Aristotle gives the preference to the meals of Crete before those of Sparta, wherein private persons were obliged to furnish their proportion, and without it were not admitted into the assemblies; which was to exclude the poor.‡

* Strab. l. x. p. 480. † Plat. de Leg. l. i. p. 623. ‡ Arist. de Rep. l. ii. c. 10.

After eating, the old men discoursed upon the affairs of the state. The conversation turned generally upon the history of the country, upon the actions and virtues of the great men of it, who had distinguished themselves either by their valor in war, or their wisdom in peace; and the youth, who were present at these entertainments, were exhorted to propose those great persons to themselves as their models, for the forming of their manners, and the regulation of their conduct.*

Minos, as well as Lycurgus, is reproached with having no other view in his laws than war; which is a very great fault in a legislator. It is true, this appears to have been his principal object of attention, because he was convinced that the repose, liberty, and riches of his subjects, were under the protection, and in a manner under the guard of arms and military knowledge; the conquered being deprived of all those advantages by the victor. But he ordained, that war should be only made for the sake of peace; and his laws are far from being confined to that sole object.†

Among the Cretans, the cultivation of the mind was not entirely neglected; and care was taken to give the youth some tincture of learning. The works of Homer, of much later date than the laws of Minos, were not unknown among them, though they but lightly esteemed, and made little use of foreign poets.‡ They were very curious in such knowledge as is proper to form the manners; and, what is no small praise, they prided themselves upon thinking much and speaking little.§ The poet Epimenides, who made a voyage to Athens in the time of Solon, and was in great estimation there, was of Crete, and by some placed in the number of the seven sages.¶

One of the institutions of Minos, which Plato admires the most, was to inspire early into the youth a high respect for the maxims, customs, and laws of the state, and not to suffer them to dispute or call in question the wisdom of their institutions, but to consider them not as prescribed and imposed by men, but as emanations of the Divinity himself. Accordingly, he had industriously apprised the people, that Jupiter himself had dictated them to him. He had the same attention in regard to the magistrates and aged persons, whom he recommended to honor in a peculiar manner; and in order that nothing might prevent the respect due to

* Athen. l. iv. p. 643.

† Plat. de Leg. l. i. p. 626.

‡ Plat. de Leg. l. ii. p. 680.

§ Idem. l. i. p. 641.

¶ Plut. in Solon. p. 48.

them, he ordained, that if any defects were observed in them, they should never be mentioned in the presence of the youth: a wise precaution, and which would be very becoming in the ordinary practice of life!*

The government of Crete was at first monarchical, of which Minos has left a perfect model to all ages. According to him, as a great and most excellent † man observes, the king can do every thing over the people, but the laws every thing over him. He has an absolute power to do good; and his hands are tied up from doing evil. The laws intrust the people in his hands as the most sacred of deposits, upon condition that he shall be their common father. The same laws require that a single man, by his wisdom and moderation, shall constitute the felicity of an infinite number of subjects; and not that the subjects, by their misery and abject slavery, shall be substituted to gratify the pride and low passions of a single man. According to him, the king ought to be, when abroad, the defender of his country, at the head of her armies, and when at home, the judge of his people, to render them good, wise, and happy. It is not for himself that the gods have made him king, and he is only so for the service of his people. He owes them his whole time, care and affection; and is worthy of the throne, only as he gives and devotes himself to the public good. Such is the idea which Minos had of the sovereignty; of which he was a living image in his own person, and which Hesiod has perfectly expressed in two words, by calling him "the most royal of mortal kings," βασιλευσάτων θνητων βασιληων; that is to say, that he possessed in a supreme degree all royal virtues, and was a king of all things. ‡

It appears, that the authority of king was not of long duration; and that it gave place to a republican government, as Minos had intended. The senate, composed of thirty persons, formed the public council. In that assembly, the public affairs were examined, and resolutions taken; but they were of no force, till the people had given them their approbation, and confirmed them by their suffrages. The magistrates, to the number of ten, established for maintaining good order in the state, and therefore called *cosmi*, Κοσμοι held the two other bodies of the state in check, and were the balance between them. In time of war, the same persons commanded the army. They were chosen by lot,

* Plat. de Leg. l. i. p. 634.

† Monsieur de Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambray.

‡ Plat. in Min. p. 220.

but only out of certain families. Their office was for life; and they were not accountable to any for their administration. Out of this company the senators were elected.*

The Cretans made the slaves and mercenaries cultivate their lands, who were obliged to pay them a certain annual sum. They were called *Periœci*, probably from their being people in the neighborhood, whom *Minos* had subjected. As they inhabited an island, and consequently a country separated from all others, the Cretans had not so much to fear from these vassals as the *Lacedæmonians* from the *Helots*, who often joined the neighboring people against them. A custom anciently established in *Crete*, from whence it was adopted by the *Romans*, gives us reason to believe, that the vassals who cultivated the lands were treated with great kindness and favor. In the feasts of *Mercury*, the masters waited on their slaves at the table and did them the same offices as they received from them the rest of the year; precious remains and traces of the primitive world, in which all men were equal, that seemed to inform the masters, that their servants were of the same condition with themselves, and that to treat them with cruelty or pride, was to renounce humanity. ‡

As a prince cannot do every thing alone, and is obliged to associate co-operators with himself, for whose conduct he is accountable, *Minos* charged his brother *Rhadamanthus* with a share in the administration of justice in the capital city, which is the most essential and indispensable function of sovereignty. He knew his probity, disinterestedness, ability and constancy, and had taken pains to form him for so important an office. Another minister had the care of the rest of the cities, who made a circuit three times in a year, to examine whether the laws established by the prince were duly observed, and the inferior magistrates and officers religiously acquitted themselves of their duty. ‡

Crete, under so wise a government, changed its aspect entirely, and seemed to have become the abode of virtue, probity, and justice; as we may judge, from what fable tells us of the honor *Jupiter* did these three brothers, in making them judges of the other world; for everybody knows, that fable is founded upon real history, though disguised under pleasing emblems and allegories, adapted to recommend truth by the ornaments of fancy.

* *Arist. de Rep.* l. ii. c. 10.

‡ *Plut. in Min.* c. 320.

† *Athen.* l. xiv. p. 639.

It was, according to fabulous tradition, a law established from the beginning of time, that men in departing out of this life should be judged, in order to their receiving the reward or punishment due to their good or evil actions. In the reign of Saturn, and in the first years of that of Jupiter, this judgment was pronounced at the instant preceding death, which left room for very flagrant injustice. Princes, who had been cruel and tyrannical, appearing before their judges in all the pomp and splendor of their power, and producing witnesses to depose in their favor, because, as they were still alive, they dreaded their anger; the judges, dazzled with this vain show, and deceived by such false evidence, declared these princes innocent, and dismissed them, with permission to enter into the happy abodes of the just. The same may be said in regard to the rich; but for the poor and helpless, calumny and malice pursued them even to this last tribunal, and found means to have them doomed for ever as criminals.*

Fable adds, that upon reiterated complaints and warm remonstrances made to Jupiter upon this account, he changed the form of these trials. The time for them was fixed to be the very moment after death. Rhadamanthus and Æacus, both sons of Jove, were appointed judges; the first for the Asiatics, the second for the Europeans; and Minos over them to decide in cases of doubt and obscurity. Their tribunal was situated in a place called "The Field of Truth," because neither falsehood nor calumny can approach it. The greatest prince was obliged to appear there, as soon as he had resigned his last breath, deprived of all his grandeur, reduced to his naked self, without defence or protection, silent and trembling for his own doom, after having made the whole world tremble for theirs. If he were found guilty of crimes which were of a nature to be expiated, he was confined in Tartarus for a certain time only, and with an assurance of being released, as soon as he should be sufficiently purified. But if his crimes were unpardonable, such as injustice, perjury, and the oppression of his people, he was cast into the same Tartarus, there to suffer eternal miseries. The just, on the contrary, of whatever condition, were conducted into the blessed abodes of peace and joy, to partake of a felicity that should have no end.

Who does not see that the poets, under the cover of these fictions, ingenious indeed, but little to the honor of

* Plat. in *Georg.* pp. 523-526. In *Axiach.* p. 37.

the gods, intended to give us the model of an accomplished prince, whose first care is to render justice to his people; and to represent the extraordinary happiness which Crete enjoyed under the wise government of Minos? This happiness did not expire with him. The laws which he established subsisted in all their vigor even in Plato's time; that is to say, more than nine hundred years after.* And they were considered the effect of his long conversations for many years with Jupiter,† who had condescended to become his teacher, to enter into a familiarity with him as with a friend,‡ and to form him in the great art of reigning, with a secret complacency, as a favorite disciple, and a tenderly beloved son.§ It is in this manner Plato explains these words of Homer: *Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστης*; the most exalted praise, according to him, that can be given to a mortal, and which that poet ascribed only to Minos.||

Notwithstanding his exalted and real merit, the theatres of Athens resounded continually with imprecations against the memory of Minos; and Socrates, in the dialogue of Plato which I have already often cited, observes upon, and gives a reason for them: but first he makes a reflection well worthy of being considered. "When either the praise or dispraise of great men is in question, it is infinitely proper," says he, "to treat them with circumspection and wisdom; because upon that depends the idea which men form to themselves of virtue and vice, and the distinction they ought to make between the good and the bad. For," adds he, "God conceives a just indignation, when a person is blamed who resembles himself, as well as when another is praised who is the reverse of him. We must not believe that nothing is sacred but brass and marble (he speaks of the statutes that were worshipped): the just man is the most sacred, and the wicked the most detestable, of all beings in this world."

After this reflection, Socrates observes, that the source and cause of the hatred of the Athenians towards Minos, was the unjust and cruel tribute he imposed upon them, in obliging them to send him, every nine years, seven young men, and as many maids, to be devoured by the Minotaur; and he could not avoid reproaching that prince, with hav-

* Plat in Min. p. 321.

† Et Jovis arcanis Minos admissus.—Horat.

‡ This poetical fiction is perhaps taken from the Holy Scriptures, which say of Moses, "And the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend."—Exod. xxxiii 11.

§ Plat. in Min p. 349.

|| Odyss. ver. 179.

ing drawn upon himself the abhorrence of a city like Athens, abounding with learned men, and of having sharpened the tongues of the poets against him; a dangerous and formidable race of men from the poisoned shafts which they never fail to discharge against their enemies.

It appears from what I have repeated, that Plato imputes to Minos the imposition of that cruel tribute. Apollodorus, Strabo, and Plutarch, seem to be of the same opinion. Monsieur the Abbé Banier alleges and proves that they are mistaken, and confound the first Minos, of whom we speak, with a second, his grandson, who reigned after him in Crete, and to avenge the death of his son Androgeus, killed in Attica, declared war against the Athenians, and imposed that tribute to which Theseus put an end by killing the Minotaur.* It would indeed be difficult to reconcile so inhuman and barbarous a conduct with what all antiquity relates of the goodness, lenity, and equity of Minos; and with the magnificent praises it bestows upon the polity and institutions of Crete.

It is true that the Cretans degenerated very much from their ancient reputation, which at length they absolutely lost by an entire change of their own manners, becoming avaricious and self-interested, to such a degree as to think that no gain was base, enemies of labor and regularity of life, professed liars and knaves; so that to Cretize became a proverb among the Greeks, implying to lie and to deceive. Everybody knows that St. Paul† cites against them as truth, the testimony of one of their ancient poets, supposed to be Epimenides, who paints them in colors much to their dishonor; but this change of manners, in whatever time it might happen, does not at all affect the probity of the ancient Cretans, nor the glory of Minos their king.

The most certain proof of that legislator's wisdom, as Plato observes, is the solid and lasting happiness, which was the effect of the sole imitation of his laws by Sparta. Lycurgus had regulated the government of that city upon the plan and idea of that of Crete, and it subsisted in an uniform manner for many ages, without experiencing his vicissitudes and revolutions so common in all other states of Greece. ‡

ARTICLE II.—OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS.

The government of Athens was neither so permanent

* Mem. de l'Acad. des. Inscript. Vol. III.

† Κρήτες αἰ ψεύσονται, κακαθηρία, γαστερες ἀργαί.—Tit. l. 12.

‡ Plat. p. 320.

nor so uniform as that of Sparta ; but suffered various alterations according to the diversity of times and circumstances. Athens, after having long been governed by kings, and afterwards by archons, assumed entire liberty, which gave place, however, for some years to the tyrannic power of the Pisistratides, but was soon after re-established, and subsisted with splendor till the defeat in Sicily, and the taking of the city by the Lacedæmonians. These subjected them to the thirty tyrants, whose authority was not of long duration, and gave place again to liberty, which continued amid various events, during a long series of years, till the Roman power had subdued Greece, and reduced it into a province.

I shall consider in this place only the popular government, and shall examine in particular five or six heads : the foundation of government according to Solon's establishment ; the different parts of which the republic consisted ; the council or senate of the five hundred ; the assemblies of the people ; the different tribunals for the administration of justice, and the revenues or finances of the republic. I shall be obliged to be more extensive upon what regards the government of Athens than I have been upon that of Sparta, because the latter is almost sufficiently known from what has been said of it in the Life of Lycurgus.*

SECTION I.—FOUNDATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS.

Solon was not the first who established the popular government at Athens. Theseus long before him had traced out the plan, and began the execution of it. After having united the twelve towns into one city, he divided the inhabitants into three bodies ; that of the nobility, to whom the superintendence in religious affairs and all offices were confided ; the laborers or husbandmen ; and artisans. He had proposed the establishment of a kind of equality between the three orders ; for if the nobles were considered by their honors and dignities, the husbandmen had the advantage of their utility to the public, and the necessity there was for their labors ; and the artisans had the superiority to both the other bodies in their number. Athens, to speak properly, did not become a popular state till the establishment of the nine archons, whose authority continued only for one year, whereas before it was for ten ; and it was not till

* Book v. Art. 8.

many years after, that Solon, by the wisdom of his laws, instituted and confirmed this form of government.*

Solon's great principle was to establish as much as possible a kind of equality among his citizens, which he regarded with reason as the foundation and essential point of liberty.† He resolved therefore to leave the public employments in the hands of the rich, as they had been till then, but to give the poor also some share in the government, from which they were excluded. For this reason he made an estimation of what each individual was worth. Those who were found to have an annual revenue of five hundred measures, as well in grain as liquid things, were placed in the first class, and called the pentacosimedimni, that is, those who had a revenue of five hundred measures. The second class was composed of such as had three hundred, and could maintain a horse for war; these were called horsemen, or knights. Those who had only two hundred, were in the third class, and were called zugitæ.‡ Out of these three classes only, the magistrates and commanders were chosen. All the other citizens, who were below those three classes, and had less revenues, were comprised under the name of theti, hirelings, or workmen laboring with their hands. Solon did not permit them to hold any office, and granted them only the right of giving their suffrages in the assemblies and trials of the people, which at first seemed a very slight privilege, but at length was found to be a very great advantage, as will appear hereafter. I do not know whether Solon foresaw it; but he used to say that the people were never more obedient and submissive, than when they possessed neither too much nor too little liberty:§ which comes very near Galba's expression, || when, to incline Piso to treat the Roman people with goodness and lenity, he desires him to remember, "that he was going to command men who were incapable of bearing either entire liberty or absolute subjection."¶

The people of Athens, becoming more haughty after their victories over the Persians, pretended to have a right to share in all the public offices and the magistracy; and Aristides, to prevent the disorders which a too tenacious

* Plut. in Thes. p. 10, 11.

† Plut. in Solon. p. 87.

‡ It is believed they were so called from their being ranked between the knights and the theti; as in the galleys those who rowed in the middle were termed zugitæ; their place was between the thalamitæ and thranitæ.

§ Plut. in Solon. p. 110.

|| Tacit. Hist. l. x. c. 16.

¶ Imperaturus es hominibus, qui nec totam servitutem pati possunt, nec totam libertatem.

opposition might have occasioned, thought proper to give way to them in this point.* It appears, however, from a passage in Xenophon, that the people contented themselves with the offices from whence some profit arose, and left those which related more particularly to the government of the state in the hands of the rich.†

The citizens of the three first classes paid every year a certain sum of money, to be laid up in the public treasury; ‡ the first a talent, § the knights half a talent, and the zugitæ ten minæ. ||

As the proportion of revenue determined the order of the classes, when their revenues augmented, the people were allowed to rise to a superior class.

If Plutarch may be believed, Solon formed two councils, which were a kind of double limitation to check and regulate the assemblies of the people. The first was the Areopagus: but it was much more ancient than his institutions; and he only reformed it, and gave it a new lustre by augmenting its power. The second was the council of the four hundred, that is, a hundred of each tribe; for Cecrops, the first king of the Athenians, had divided the people into four tribes. Clisthenes long after him changed that order, and established ten. It was in this council of the four hundred that all affairs were considered before they were proposed to the assembly of the people, as we shall soon explain.¶

I do not mention here another division of the people into three parties or factions, which till the time of Pisistratus were a continual source of troubles and seditions. One of these three parties was formed out of those who inhabited the high lands, and favored popular government; the other out of those who lived in the plains, and they were for oligarchy; and the third out of the people upon the coast, and these held the mean between both.

It is necessary, for the better understanding what we have now said, to enter into a more particular account of the Athenian people.

SECTION II.—OF THE INHABITANTS OF ATHENS.

There were three sorts of inhabitants at Athens; citizens, strangers, and servants.** In the account taken by Demetrius Phalereus in the 116th Olympiad, their number amount-

* Plut. in Aristid. p. 332.

† Xenoph. de Rep. Athen. p. 691.

‡ Pollux. l. viii. c. 10.

§ About one thousand dollars.

|| Nearly one hundred dollars.

¶ Solon. p. 88.

** A M. 3693. Ant, J. C. 314. Athen. l. vi. p. 272.

ed to twenty-one thousand citizens, ten thousand strangers, and forty thousand servants.* The number of citizens was almost the same in the time of Cecrops but less under Pericles.

I.—OF THE CITIZENS.

A citizen could only be such by birth or adoption. To be a natural denizen of Athens, it was necessary to be born of a father and mother both free, and Athenians. We have seen that Pericles restored this law to all its force, which had not been exactly observed, and which he himself some short time after infringed. The people could confer the freedom of the city upon strangers, and those whom they had so adopted, enjoyed almost the same rights and privileges as the natural citizens. The quality of citizen of Athens was sometimes granted in honor and gratitude to those who had rendered great services to the state, as to Hippocrates; and even kings have sometimes obtained that title for themselves and their children. Evagoras, king of Cyprus, thought it much to his honor.†

When the young men attained the age of twenty, they were enrolled upon the list of citizens, after having taken an oath; and it was only in virtue of that public and solemn act that they became members of the state. The form of this oath is exceedingly remarkable, which Stobæus and Pollux have preserved in the following words: "I will never dishonor the profession of arms, nor save my life by a shameful flight. I will fight to my last breath for the religion and civil interests of the state, in concert with the other citizens, and alone if occasion should require. I will not bring my country into a worse condition than I found it, but will use my utmost endeavors to make it most happy and flourishing. I will always submit myself to the laws and magistrates, and to all that shall be ordained by the common consent of the people. If any one shall violate or make void the laws, I will not disguise or conceal such an attempt, but will oppose it, either alone or in conjunction with my fellow-citizens; and I will constantly adhere to the religion of my forefathers. To all which I call to witness Agraulis, Enyalus, Mars, and Jupiter."‡ I leave the reader to his own reflections upon this august ceremony, well adapted to inspire the love of country into the hearts of the young citizens.

* The text says, *μυριάδας τεσσαράκοντα*, four hundred thousand, which is a manifest error.

† Book v. Art. 8.

‡ Pollux. l. viii. c. 9.

The people had at first been divided into four tribes, and afterwards into ten. Each tribe was subdivided into several parts, which were called *Ἀῖμοι*, Pagi. It was by these two titles the citizens were described in the public acts. "Melitus, e tribu Cecropide, e pago Pitthensi."

II.—OF THE STRANGERS.

I distinguish by this name, those who being of a foreign country, came to settle at Athens, or in Attica, either on account of commerce, or exercising any trade. They were termed *μέτοικοι*, inquilini. They had no share in the government, nor vote in the assembly of the people, and could not be admitted into any office. They put themselves under the protection of some citizen, as we find from a passage of Terence,* and upon that account were obliged to render him certain duties and services, as the clients did at Rome to their patrons. They were bound to observe all the laws of the republic, and to conform entirely to all its customs. They paid a yearly tribute to the state of twelve drachmas; and in default of payment were made slaves, and exposed to sale. Xenocrates, the celebrated, but poor philosopher, was very near experiencing this misfortune, and was carried to prison; but Lycurgus the orator having paid the tax, released him from the farmers of the public revenues; a kind of men who in all times have paid very little respect to merit, with the exception of an exceeding few of their number. That philosopher meeting some time after the sons of his deliverer, told them, "I pay your father the favor he has done me with usury, for all the world praises him upon my account." †

III.—OF THE SERVANTS.

There were two kinds of them. The one, who were free, and not able to get their bread by their work, were obliged by the bad state of their affairs to go into service; and their condition was easy, and not laborious. The service of the other was forced and unavoidable; these were slaves, who had either been taken prisoners in war, or bought such as trafficked publicly in them. They constituted a part of the estate of their master, who disposed of them at pleasure, but generally treated them with great humanity. Demosthenes

* *Thais patri se commendavit in clientelam et fidem; nobis dedit sese.*—Eunuch, Act. 5, scen. ult.

† *Plut. in Flamin. p. 375.*

observes, in one of his harangues, that the condition of servants was infinitely more gentle in Athens than anywhere else. There was in that city an asylum and place of refuge for slaves, where the bones of Theseus had been interred; and that asylum subsisted in Plutarch's time. How glorious was it for Theseus, that his tomb should do that twelve hundred years after his death, which he had done himself during his life, and continue the protector of the oppressed, as he had been! *

When the slaves were treated with too much rigor and inhumanity, they had their action against their masters, who were obliged to sell them to others, if the fact were sufficiently proved.† They could ransom themselves even against their masters' consent, when they had laid up money enough for that purpose. For out of what they got by their labor, after having paid a certain proportion to their masters, they kept the remainder for themselves, and made a stock of it at their own disposal. Private persons, when they were satisfied with their services, often gave these slaves their liberty, when the necessity of the times obliged the state to arm and enlist them for war among the citizens. ‡

The humane and equitable usage with which the Athenians treated their servants and slaves, was an effect of the good temper natural to that people, and very remote from the austere and cruel severity of the Lacedæmonians in regard to their Helots, which often brought their republic to the very brink of destruction. Plutarch, with great reason, condemns this rigor. He thinks it proper to habituate one's self always to mercy, even with regard to beasts, were it only, says he, to learn by that means to treat them well, and for the sake of becoming humane and benevolent. He relates upon this occasion a very singular fact, and very proper to explain the character of the Athenians. After having finished the temple called Hecatompædon, they set all the beasts of burden at liberty that had been employed in the work, and assigned them fat pasturages as consecrated animals. And it was said, that one of these beasts having come to offer itself at the work, and put itself at the head of those that drew the carriages to the citadel, walking foremost as if to exhort and encourage them, the Athenians ordained by a decree, that the creature should be maintained at the public expense till its death. §

* Philip. 3.

† Plaut. in Casin.

‡ Plut. de Superstit. p. 166.

§ Plut. in Catone, pp. 338, 339.

SECTION III.—OF THE COUNCIL OR SENATE OF FIVE HUNDRED.

In consequence of Solon's institutions, the people of Athens had a great share and authority in the government. Appeals might be brought to their tribunal in all causes; they had a right to cancel the old laws, and establish new ones; in a word, all important affairs, whether relating to war or peace, were decided in their assemblies. In order to their determinations being made with more wisdom and maturity, Solon had instituted a council, composed of four hundred senators, one hundred out of each tribe, which were then four in number; they prepared and digested the affairs which were to be laid before the people, as we shall soon explain more at large. Clisthenes, about one hundred years after Solon, having increased the number of tribes to ten, augmented also that of the senators to five hundred; each tribe supplying fifty. This was called the council or senate of the five hundred. They received their stipend out of the public treasury.

They were chosen by lot, in which they made use of black and white beans, which were mingled and shaken in an urn, and each tribe gave in the name of those who aspired to that trust, and had the revenue assigned by the laws to qualify them for it. None could be admitted under the age of thirty. After inquiry made into the manners and conduct of the candidate, he was made to take an oath, whereby he engaged to give at all times the best counsel he could to the people of Athens, and never to depart in the least from the tenor of the laws.

This senate assembled every day, except upon the days appointed for festivals. Each tribe in its turn furnished those who were to preside in it, called Prytanes, *Προταγεις*, and this rank was decided by lot. The presidency continued thirty-five days, which, being reckoned ten times, amounts to the number of days, except four, of the lunar year followed at Athens. The time of the presidency, or prytanism, was divided into five weeks, with regard to the five tens of the Prytanes, who were to preside in them; and every week seven of these ten Prytanes, drawn by lot, presided, each their day, and were denominated *Πρόεδροι*, that is to say, Presidents. He who was so for the day, presided in the assembly of the senators, and in that of the people, and was called *Ἐπιστατης*. He was charged with the public seal, and with the keys of the citadel and treasury.

The senators, before they assembled, offered a sacrifice

to Jupiter and Minerva under the additional appellation of Goddess of Good Council, *βουλᾶτος βουλᾶία*, to demand the prudence and understanding necessary in wise deliberations. The president proposed the business which was to be considered in the assembly. Every one gave his opinion in his turn, and always standing. After a question had been settled, it was drawn up in writing, and read with a loud voice. Each senator then gave his vote by putting a bean into the urn. If the number of the white beans exceeded, the question passed; otherwise it was rejected. This sort of decree was called *Ψήφισμα*, or *Προβουλευμα*, as much as to say, preparatory resolution. It was afterwards laid before the assembly of the people, where, if it was received and approved, it had the force of a law; if not, its authority subsisted only one year. This shows with what wisdom Solon established this council, to inform and direct the people, to fix their inconstancy, to prevent their temerity, and to assist their deliberations with a prudence and maturity not to be expected in a confused and tumultuous assembly, composed of a great number of citizens, most of them without education, capacity, or much zeal for the public good. The reciprocal dependency and natural intercourse of the two bodies of the state, which were obliged to lend each other their authority, and remained equally without force when without union and a good understanding, were judiciously contrived for supporting a wise balance between the two bodies; the people not being able to institute any thing without its being first proposed and approved by the senate, nor the senate to pass any decree into a law till it had been ratified by the people.

We may judge of the importance of this council by the matters which were treated in it; the same, without any exception, as were laid before the people: war, taxes, maritime affairs, treaties of peace, alliances; in a word, whatever related to government; without mentioning the account which they obliged the magistrates to give on quitting their offices, and their frequent decisions and judgments upon the most serious and important affairs.

SECTION IV.—OF THE AREOPAGUS.

This council took its name from the place where it assembled, called *Ἀρειωσπαγος*. The Quarter, or Hill of Mars, because, according to some, Mars had been cited thither in judgment for a murder committed by him. It was believed

to be as ancient as the nation. Cicero and Plutarch attributed the institution of it to Solon; but he only re-established it by giving it more lustre and authority than it had had till then, and for that reason was looked upon as its founder. The number of the senators of the Areopagus was not fixed; at certain times they amounted to two or three hundred. Solon thought proper that only those who had borne the office of archon should be honored with that dignity.

The senate had the care of seeing the laws duly observed, of inspecting the manners of the people, and especially of judging in criminal cases. They held their sittings in an open place, and during the night: very probably to avoid being under the same roof with the criminals, and not to defile themselves by such an intercourse with them; and likewise that they might not be softened by the sight of the guilty, but be enabled to judge according to justice and the laws. It was for the same reason that the orators were not permitted to use any exordium or peroration, nor allowed to excite the passions, and were obliged to confine themselves solely to the subject matter of their cause. The severity of their judgments was exceedingly dreaded, particularly in regard to murder; and they were highly attentive to inspire their citizens with horror for that crime. They condemned a child to be put to death, for making it his pastime to put out the eyes of quails; conceiving this sanguinary inclination as the mark of a very wicked disposition, which might one day prove fatal to many, if he was suffered to grow up with impunity.*

The affairs of religion, as blasphemies against the gods, contempt of sacred mysteries, different species of impiety, and the introduction of new ceremonies and new divinities, were also brought before this tribunal. We read in Justin Martyr, that Plato, who in his travels in Egypt had acquired great lights concerning the unity of God, when he returned to Athens, took great care to dissemble and conceal his sentiments, for fear of being obliged to appear and give an account of them before the Areopagitæ; † and we know that St. Paul was traduced before them, as teaching a new doctrine, and endeavoring to introduce new gods.‡

These judges were in great reputation for their probity, equity, and prudence, and generally respected. Cicero, in

* Nec mihi videntur Areopagitæ, cum damnaverunt puerum oculos coturnicum cruentum, aliud judicasse quam id signum esse perniciosissimæ mentis, multisque malo futuræ si adolevisset.—Quintil. l. v. c. 9.

† Cohort ad Græc.

‡ Acts xvii. 18-20.

writing to his friend Atticus upon the fortitude, constancy, and wise severity of the Roman senate thinks he pays it a great encomium, in comparing it with the Areopagus. "*Senatus $\Delta\rho\epsilon\omega\iota\varsigma$ παγος*, nil constantius, nil severius, nil fortius." * Cicero must have conceived a very favorable idea of it, to speak of it as he does in the first book of his Offices. He compares the famous battle of Salamin, in which Themistocles has so great a part, with the establishment of the Areopagus, which he ascribes to Solon, and does not scruple to prefer, or at least to equal the legislator's service to that for which Athens was obliged to the general of its army. "For in reality," says he, "that victor was useful to the republic only for once, but the Areopagus will be so throughout all ages; as by the wisdom of that tribunal, the laws and ancient customs of the Athenian state are preserved. Themistocles did no service to the Areopagus; but the Areopagus abundantly contributed to the victory of Themistocles; because the republic was at that time directed by the wise counsels of that august senate." †

It appears from this passage of Cicero, that the Areopagus had a great share in the government, and was, no doubt, consulted upon important affairs. Cicero may, in this instance, have confounded the council of the Areopagus with that of the Five Hundred. It is certain, however, that the Areopagitæ were extremely active in the public affairs.

Pericles, who could never enter the Areopagus, because, chance always having been against him, he had not passed through any of the employments necessary to his admission, attempted to weaken its authority, and attained his point, which is a great blot in his reputation.

SECTION V.—OF THE MAGISTRATES.

Of these a great number were established for different functions. I shall only speak of the archons, who are the best known. I have observed elsewhere that they succeeded the kings, and that their authority at first continued during life. It was at length limited to ten years, and reduced at last to one. When Solon was commissioned to reform the

* Ad Attic. l. i. ep. 13.

† Quamvis Themistocles jure laudetur, et sit ejus nomen, quam Solonis illustrius, citeturque Salamis clarissimæ festis victoriæ, quæ anteponatur consilio Solonis ei, quo primum constituit Areopagitas: non minus præclarum hoc, quam illud judicandum est. Illud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit civitati, hoc consilio leges Atheniensium, hoc majorum instituta servantur. Et Themistocles quidem nihil dixerit, in quo ipse Areopagum juverit: at ille adjuvit Themistoclem. Est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus ejus, qui a Solone erat constitutus.—Offic. l. i. n. 75.

government, he found them thus established, to the number of nine. He did not abolish their office, but he very much diminished their power.

The first of these nine magistrates was called the archon by way of eminence, and the year was denominated from him: "Under such an archon such a battle was fought." * The second was called the king, and was a vestige of the authority to which they had succeeded. The third was the polemarch, who at first commanded the armies, and always retained that name, though he had not the same authority, some part of which he had so long preserved. For we have seen, in speaking of the battle of Marathon, that the polemarch had a right to vote in the council of war, as well as the ten generals then in command. The six other archons were called by the common name, thesmothetæ, which implies that they had a particular superintendence over the laws, in order to their being duly observed. These nine archons had each of them a peculiar province, and were judges in certain affairs allotted to their cognizance. I do not think it necessary to enter into the particulars of their duty, nor into those of many other employments and offices, established for the administration of justice, for the levying of taxes and tributes, for the preservation of good order in the city, for supplying it with provisions; in a word, for every thing relating to commerce and civil society.

SECTION VI.—OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF THE PEOPLE.

These were of two sorts, the one ordinary, and fixed to certain days; and for these there was no kind of summons: the other extraordinary, according to the different occasions that arose; and the people were informed of it by an express proclamation.

The place of the assembly was not fixed. Sometimes it was at the public market-place, sometimes a part of the city near the citadel, called *Πρυτανεύς*, and sometimes the theatre of Bacchus.

The prytanes generally assembled the people. Some days before the assembly, papers were fixed up wherein the business to be considered was made known.

All the citizens, poor as well as rich, had a right to give their suffrages. Those who failed of being present at the assembly, or came too late, were liable to a penalty; and to

* From thence he was called *Ἐπώνυμος*.

secure a punctual attendance, a reward was annexed to it, at first of an obolus, the sixth part of a drachma, and afterwards of three oboli.

The assembly always began with sacrifices and prayers, in order to obtain from the gods the knowledge and understanding necessary to wise deliberations; and they never failed to add the most terrible imprecations against such as should wilfully advise anything contrary to the public good.

The president proposed the affair upon which they were to deliberate. If it had been examined in the senate, and drawn up there as a question, it was read, after which those who would speak were invited to ascend the tribunal, that they might be the better heard by the people, and inform them in the matter proposed. The oldest general spoke first, and then the rest according to their seniority. When the orators had done speaking, and concluded that it was necessary to approve or reject the decree of the senate, the people proceeded to vote; and the most common method of doing it was by holding up their hands, to denote their approbation; which was called *χεῖρουσινεῖν*. The assembly was sometimes adjourned till another day, because it was too late for the number of those who lifted up their hands to be distinguished, and the plurality decided. After a resolution had been formed in this manner, it was reduced to writing, and read by an officer to the people with a loud voice, who confirmed it again by holding up their hands as before; after which the decree had the force of a law: and this was called *ψήφισμα* from the Greek word *ψῆφος*, which signifies "a pebble," or "a small stone," because they were sometimes used in giving suffrages by ballot.

All the great affairs of the republic were discussed in these assemblies. It was in them new laws were proposed, and old ones amended; the religion and worship of the gods examined; magistrates, generals and officers created; their behavior and conduct inquired into; peace or war concluded; deputies and ambassadors appointed; treaties and alliances ratified; freedom of the city granted; rewards and honors decreed for those who had distinguished themselves in war, or rendered great service to the republic; and punishments ordained for those who had behaved themselves ill, or had violated the laws of the state, and were banished by ostracism. In fine, justice was administered, and judgment passed there, upon the most important affairs. We

see from this account, which is however very imperfect, how far the power of the people extended; and with what truth it may be said that the government of Athens, though qualified with aristocracy, and the authority of the elders, was by its constitution democratical and popular.

I shall take occasion to observe in the sequel, of what weight the talent of eloquence is in such a republic, and in what manner orators ought to be considered in it. It is not easy to conceive how they could make themselves heard in so numerous an assembly, and where such a number of auditors were present. We may judge how great that was, from what has been said of it in two instances. The first relates to ostracism, and the other to the adoption of a stranger for a citizen. On each of these occasions, it was necessary that no less than six thousand citizens should be present in the assembly.

I reserve for another place the reflections which naturally arise from what I have already related, and what remains for me to say farther upon the government of Athens.

SECTION VII.—OF TRIALS.

There were different tribunals, according to the difference of the affairs to be adjudged; but appeals might be brought to the people from all decrees of other judges; and it was this that rendered their power so great and considerable.* All the allies, when they had any cause to try, were obliged to repair to Athens, where they often remained a considerable time, without being able to obtain audience, from the multiplicity of affairs to be adjudged. This law had been imposed upon them in order to render them more dependent upon the people, and more submissive to their authority; instead of which, had they sent commissioners to the places, they would have been the sole persons to whom the allies would have made their court, and paid their homage.

The parties pleaded their causes either in person, or employed advocates to do it for them. The time allowed for the hearing was generally fixed; and a water-clock, called in Greek *κλεψύδρα*, regulated its duration. The decree was passed by plurality of voices; and when the suffrages were equal the judges inclined to the side of mercy, and acquitted the accused. It was remarkable, that a friend was not obliged to give evidence against a friend.

* Xenoph. de Rep. Athen. p. 664.

All the citizens, even the poorest, and such as had no estates, were admitted into the number of the judges; provided they had attained the age of thirty, and were known to be persons of good morals. While they sat in judgment, they held in their hands a kind of sceptre, which was the mark of their dignity, and laid it down when they withdrew.

The salary of the judges was different at different times. They had at first only an obolus a day, and afterwards three, where their fee remained fixed. It was but a small matter in itself, but became in time a very great charge to the public, and exhausted the treasury without greatly enriching individuals. We may judge of this from what is related by Aristophanes in the comedy of the Wasps, wherein that poet ridicules the passion of the Athenians for trying causes, and their eager desire for the gain arising from it, which protracted and multiplied suits to infinity.

In this comedy, a young Athenian, who was to act the part I have mentioned, of turning the judges and trials of Athens into ridicule, from a state of the revenues paid into the public treasury, finds their amount to be two thousand talents.* He then examines how much of that sum falls to the share of the judges, with whom Athens was over-run, at three oboli each per day. This appears to be annually, including all of them, only one hundred and fifty talents.† The calculation is easy. The judges were paid only ten months in the year, the other two being employed in festivals, when all proceedings at law were prohibited. Now, three oboli a day paid to six thousand men, makes fifteen talents a month, and consequently one hundred and fifty in ten months. According to this calculation the most assiduous judge gained only about twenty-five dollars a year. "What then becomes of the remainder of the two thousand talents?" cries the young Athenian. "What," replies his father, who was one of the judges, "it goes to those—but let us not expose the shame of Athens; let us always be for the people." The young Athenian goes on to explain, that the remainder went to such as robbed the public treasury; to the orators, who incessantly flattered the people; and to those who were employed in the government and the army. I have extracted this remark from the works of Father Brumoi the Jesuit, with which I will make very free, when I come to speak of public shows and dramatic representations.

* About 2,000,000 dollars.

† About 150,000 dollars.

SECTION VIII.—OF THE AMPHICTYONS.

The famous council of the Amphictyons is introduced here, though not peculiar to the Athenians, but common to all Greece, because it is often mentioned in Grecian history; and I do not know that I shall have a more proper occasion to speak of it.

The assembly of the Amphictyons was in a manner the general assembly of the states of Greece. The establishment of it is attributed to Amphictyon, king of Athens, and son of Deucalion, from whom it derived its name. His principal view in the institution of this council, was to unite in the sacred band of amity the several people of Greece admitted into it, and to oblige them by that union to undertake the defence of each other, and be mutually vigilant for the happiness and tranquillity of their country. The Amphictyons were also created to be the protectors of the oracle of Delphos, and the guardians of the prodigious riches of that temple; and also to adjudge the differences which might arise between the Delphians and those who came to consult the oracle. This council was held at Thermopylæ, and sometimes at Delphos itself. It assembled regularly twice a year, in the spring and autumn, and more frequently when affairs required.

The number of people or cities which had a right to sit in this assembly is not precisely known, and varied, without doubt, at different times. When the Lacedæmonians, in order to pass in it what decrees they thought fit, were for excluding the Thessalians, Argives, and Thebans, Themistocles,* in the speech he made to the Amphictyons to prevent that design from taking effect, seems to insinuate that there were only thirty-one cities at that time which had this right.

Each city sent two deputies, and consequently had two votes in the council, and that without distinction, or the more powerful having any preogative of honor or pre-eminence over inferior states in regard to the suffrages; the liberty upon which these people valued themselves, requiring that every thing should be equal among them.

The Amphictyons had full power to discuss and determine finally in all differences which might arise between the Amphictyonic cities, and to fine the culpable in such manner as they thought fit. They could employ not only the rigor

* Plut. in Themist. p. 122.

of the laws in the execution of their decrees, but even raise troops, if it were necessary, to compel such as rebelled to submit to them. The three sacred wars undertaken by their order, of which I have spoken elsewhere, are an evident proof of this power.

Before they were installed into this body, they took a very remarkable oath, the form of which has been preserved by Æschines, and is as follows: "I swear, that I will never destroy any of the cities honored with the right of sitting in the Amphietyonic council, nor turn their running waters out of their course either in time of peace or war. If any people shall make such an attempt, I hereby engage to carry the war into their country, to demolish their cities, towns and villages, and to treat them in all things as the most cruel enemies. Moreover, if at any time any persons shall dare to be so impious as to steal and take away any of the rich offerings preserved in the temple of Apollo at Delphos, or abet any others in committing that crime, either by aiding or only counselling him therein, I will use my feet, hands, voice, in a word, all my powers and faculties, to avenge such sacrilege." That oath was attended with the most terrible imprecations and curses: "That if any one infringes any thing contained in the oath I have now taken, whether private person, city, or people, may that person, city, or people, be deemed accursed; and in that acceptance, experience the whole vengeance of Apollo, Latona, Diana, and Minerva the foreknower. May their country produce none of the fruits of the earth, and their women, instead of generating children resembling their fathers, bring forth nothing but monsters; may their animals share in the same curse. May those sacrilegious men lose all suits at law; may they be conquered in war, have their houses demolished, and, together with their children, be put to the sword."* I am not astonished, that after such terrible engagements, the holy war undertaken by the order of the Amphietyons should be carried on with so much ardor and fury. The religion of an oath was of great force with the ancients; and how much more regard ought to be had to it in the Christian world, which professes to believe that the violation of it shall be punished with eternal torments; and yet how many are there among us, who make a trifle of breaking through the most solemn oaths!

The authority of the Amphietyons had always been of

* Æschyl. in Orat. *περί παρρησιότητος*.

great weight in Greece ; but it began to decline exceedingly from the moment they condescended to admit Philip of Macedon into their body. For that prince, enjoying by this means all their rights and privileges, soon knew how to set himself above all law, and to abuse his power, so far as to preside by proxy both in this illustrious assembly, and in the Pythian games ; of which games the Amphietyons were judges and agonothetæ by virtue of their office. Demosthenes reproaches him with this in his third Philippic ; “ When he does not deign,” says he, “ to honor us with his presence, he sends HIS SLAVES to preside over us.” An odious but emphatical term, and in the spirit of Grecian liberty, by which the Athenian orator gives an idea of the base and abject subjection of the greatest lords in Philip’s court.

If the reader desires a farther knowledge of what relates to the Amphietyons, he may consult the dissertation of Monsieur Valois, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres,* wherein this subject is treated with great extent and erudition.

SECTION IX.—OF THE REVENUES OF ATHENS.

The revenues, *τελη*, according to the passage of Aristophanes which I have cited above, and as they were computed in the time of the Peloponnesian war, amounted to two thousand talents.† They were generally reduced to four classes.

1. The first comprised the revenues arising from agriculture, the sale of woods, the produce of mines, and other funds of a like nature, appertaining to the public. Among these may be included the duties upon the import and export of merchandise, and the taxes levied upon the inhabitants of the city, both natives and strangers.

The history of Athens often makes mention of the silver mines of Laurium, which was a mountain situated between the Piræus and Cape Sunium ; and those of Thrace, from whence many persons extracted immense riches. Xenophon, in a treatise wherein he states this matter at large, demonstrates how much the public might gain by industriously working these mines, from the example of the many persons they had enriched.‡ Hipponicus § let his mines and six hundred slaves to an undertaker, who paid him an obolus a-day for each slave, clear of all charges, which amounted in

* Vol. III.

† De ration, reddituum.

‡ About 2,000,000 dollars.

§ Page 925.

the whole to a minæ.* Nicias, who was killed in Sicily, farmed out his mines and a thousand slaves in the same manner, and with the same profit in proportion to that number.

2. The second class of revenue were the contributions paid the Athenians by the allies for the common expenses of the war. Under Aristides, they amounted only to four hundred and sixty talents.† Pericles augmented them almost a third, and raised them to six hundred; and some time after they amounted to thirteen hundred. Taxes, which in the beginning were moderate and necessary, became thus in a little time excessive and exorbitant, notwithstanding all the protestations made to the allies, and the most solemn engagements to the contrary.

3. A third sort of revenue were the extraordinary capitation taxes, levied indiscriminately upon the inhabitants of the country, in pressing occasions and emergencies of the state.

4. The fines laid upon persons by the judges for different misdemeanors constituted the fourth class, and were applied to the uses of the public, and laid up in the treasury; except the tenth part of them, which was consecrated to Minerva, and one fiftieth to the other divinities.

The most natural and legal application of these different revenues of the republic, was to the payment of the sea and land forces, to the building and fitting out fleets, keeping up and repairing the public buildings, temples, walls, ports and citadels. But the greatest part of them, especially after the time of Pericles, was misapplied to unnecessary uses, and often consumed in frivolous expenses; games, feasts, and shows, which cost immense sums, and were of no manner of utility to the state.

SECTION X.—OF THE EDUCATION OF THE YOUTH.

I place this article under the head of government, because all celebrated legislators have with reason believed that the education of youth was an essential part of it.

The exercises that served for the forming of either the bodies or minds of the young Athenians, and the same may be said of almost all the people of Greece, were dancing, music, hunting, fencing, riding, polite learning, and philosophy. It may be observed that I speak generally, and treat these several articles very slightly.

* Ten dollars. Six oboli made a drachm, one hundred drachms a minæ, and sixty minæ a talent.

† A talent was worth about a thousand dollars.

I.—DANCING.—MUSIC.

Dancing was one of the exercises of the body, cultivated by the Greeks with great attention. It made a part of what the ancients called the gymnastic, divided according to Plato into two kinds, the orchestric, which derives its name from the dance, *ὀρχεῖσθαι*; and the Palæstric, so called from a Greek word *Παλῆ* which signifies wrestling. The exercises of the latter kind principally conduced to form the body for the fatigues of war, navigation, agriculture, and the other employments of society.

Another end of dancing was to teach such rules of motion as were most proper to render the shape free and easy; to give the body a just proportion, and the whole person an unconstrained, noble, and graceful air; in a word, an external politeness, if we may be allowed to use that expression, which never fails to prejudice people in favor of those who have been formed to it early.

Music was cultivated with no less application and success. The ancients ascribed wonderful effects to it. They believed it very proper to calm the passions, soften the manners, and even humanize people naturally savage and barbarous. Polybius, a grave and serious historian, and who is certainly worthy of belief, attributes to the study of music the extreme difference between two people of Arcadia, the one infinitely beloved and esteemed for the elegance of their manners, their benevolent inclinations, humanity to strangers, and piety to the gods; the other, on the contrary, generally reproached and hated for their malignity, brutality, and irreligion. "I mean," says he, "the true and noble music industriously cultivated by the one, and absolutely neglected by the other." *

After this, it is not surprising that the Greeks considered music as an essential part in the education of youth. Socrates himself, at a very advanced age, was not ashamed to learn to play upon musical instruments.† Themistocles, however otherwise esteemed, was thought to be wanting in point of merit, because at an entertainment he could not touch the lyre like the rest of the company.‡ Ignorance in this respect was deemed a defect of education; on the con-

* Polyb. pp. 288-291.

† Socrates, jam senex, instituti lyra non erubescibat.—Quintil. l. i. c. 10.

‡ Themistocles, cum in epulis recusasset ivram, habitus est indoctor.—Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. i. n. 4.

trary, skill in it did honor to the greatest men.* Epaminondas was praised for dancing, and playing well upon the flute.† We may observe in this place the different tastes and genius of nations. The Romans were far from having the same opinion with the Greeks in regard to music and dancing, and set no value upon them. It is very likely that the wisest and most learned among the latter did not apply to them with any great industry; and Philip's expression to his son Alexander, who had shown too much skill in music at a feast, induces me to be of this opinion: "Are you not ashamed," said he, "to sing so well?"

There was a foundation however for this esteem for dancing and music. Both were employed in the most august feasts and the ceremonies of religion, to express their acknowledgment to their gods with the greater force and dignity, for the favors they had vouchsafed to confer upon them. They had generally the greatest share in their feasts and entertainments, which seldom or never began or ended without some odes being sung in honor of the victors in the Olympic games, and on other similar occasions. They had a part also in war; and we know that the Lacedæmonians marched to battle dancing, and to the sound of flutes. Plato, the most grave philosopher of antiquity, valued both these arts, not as simple amusements, but as they had a great share in the ceremonies of religion and military exercises. Hence we see him very intent, in his books of laws, to prescribe rules upon dancing and music, and to keep them within the bounds of utility and decorum.‡

They did not continue long within these restrictions. The license of the Grecian stage, on which dancing was in the highest vogue, and in a manner prostituted to buffoons and the most contemptible people, who made no other use of it, than to suggest or excite the most vicious passions, soon corrupted an art, which might have been of some advantage, had it been regulated by Plato's opinion. Music underwent a like change; and perhaps the corruption of this did not a little contribute to the perversion of dancing. Voluptuousness and sensual pleasure were the sole arbiters consulted in the uses made of both; and the theatre became a school of every kind of vice.

* Summam eruditionem Græci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus—discebantque id omnes, nec qui nesciebat, satis excultus doctrina putabatur.—Ibid.

† In Epaminondæ virtutibus commemoratum est, saltasse eum commode, scienterque tibi cantasse—scilicet non eadem omnibus honesta sunt atque turpia, sed omnia majorum institutis judicantur.—Corn. Nep. in præfet, Vit. Epap.

‡ De Leg. l. vii.

Plutarch in lamenting that the art of dancing was so degenerate from the merit which rendered it estimable to the great men of antiquity, does not omit to observe that it was corrupted by a vicious kind of poetry, and a soft effeminate music, with which it was ill united, and which had taken place of the ancient poetry and music, that had something noble, majestic, and even religious and heavenly in them. He adds that, being made subservient to low taste and sensuality, by their aid, it exercised a kind of tyrannical power in the theatres, which were become the public schools of criminal passions and gross vices, wherein no regard was had to reason.*

The reader will, without doubt, readily apply this passage of Plutarch to the sort of music which engrosses our theatres at this day, and which, by its effeminate and wanton airs, has given the last wound to the little manly force and virtue that remained among us. Quintilian describes the music of the times in these terms: "*Quæ nunc in scenis effeminata, et impudicis modis fracta, non ex parte minima, si quid in nobis virilis roboris manebat, excidit.*"†

II.—OF THE OTHER EXERCISES OF THE BODY.

The young Athenians, and in general all the Greeks, were very attentive to forming themselves to all the exercises of the body, and to go through their lessons regularly with the masters of the palæstræ. They called the places allotted for these exercises, palæstræ or gymnasia, which in a degree resemble our academies. Plato, in his book of laws, after having shown of what importance it was in war to cultivate the hands and feet, adds, that, far from banishing from a well regulated republic the profession of the athletæ, prizes should, on the contrary, be proposed for all exercises that conduce to the improvement of military virtue, such as those which render the body more active, and fitter for the race, more hard, robust, and supple, more capable of supporting great fatigues, and effecting great enterprises.‡ We must remember, that there was no Athenian who ought not to have been capable of handling the oar in the largest galleys. The citizens themselves performed this labor, which was not left to slaves and criminals, as in these days. They were all brought up to the art of war, and often obliged to wear arms of iron from head to

* Sympos. l. ix. qu. 15, p. 748. † Quintil. l. i. c. 1.
Lib. viii. de Leg. pp. 832, 833.

foot, of a great weight. For this reason, Plato and all the ancients looked upon the exercises of the body as highly useful, and even absolutely necessary to the good of the public; and therefore this philosopher excluded from them only those who were incapable of service in war.

There were also masters who taught the youth to ride, and to handle their arms or fence; and others whose business it was to instruct them in all that was necessary to be known, in order to excel in the military art, and to become good commanders. The whole science of the latter consisted in what the ancients called the tactics, that is to say, the art of drawing up troops in battle, and of performing military evolutions.* That science was useful, but did not suffice. Xenophon shows its defect, in producing a young man lately come from such a school, in which he imagined he had learned every thing, though in reality he had only acquired a foolish esteem for himself, accompanied with profound ignorance. He gives him, by the mouth of Socrates, admirable precepts upon the business of a soldier, and very proper to form an excellent officer.†

Hunting was also considered by the ancients as a fit exercise for forming youth to the stratagems and fatigues of war. It was for this reason that Xenophon, who was a great general as well as a great philosopher, did not think it beneath him to write a treatise expressly upon hunting, in which he descends to the lowest particular; and animadverts upon the considerable advantages derived from it, from being inured to suffer hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, without being discouraged either by the length of the chase, the difficulty of the clefts and thickets through which it is often necessary to press, or the small success of the long and painful fatigues which they often undergo to no purpose. He adds that this innocent pleasure removes others equally shameful and criminal; but that a wise and moderate man would not, however, abandon himself so far to it as to neglect the care of his domestic affairs.‡ The same author, in the *Cyropædia*, frequently praises hunting, which he looks upon as a real exercise of war, and shows, in the example of his young hero, the good use that may be made of it.§

III. OF THE EXERCISES OF THE MIND.

Athens, to speak properly, was the school and abode of

* Plut. in Lachete, p. 181. † Memorab. l. iii. pp. 761, 762.

‡ De Venatione.

§ Cyrop. l. i. pp. 5, 6, et l. ii. pp. 59, 60.

polite learning, arts, and sciences. The study of poesy, eloquence, philosophy, and mathematics, were in great vogue there, and much cultivated by the youth.

The young people were sent first to learn grammar under masters, who taught them regularly, and upon proper principles, their own language; by which they attained a knowledge of all its beauty, energy, number, and cadence. Hence proceeded the universal fine taste of Athens, where, as history informs us, a simple herb-woman distinguished Theophrastus to be a stranger, from the affectation of a single word in expressing himself. And from the same cause, the orators were greatly apprehensive of letting fall the least injudicious expression, for fear of offending so refined and delicate an audience. It was very common for the young people to get the tragedies represented upon the stage by heart. We have seen that after the defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse, many of them, who had been taken prisoners and made slaves, softened their slavery by reciting the works of Euripides to their masters, who, extremely delighted with hearing such sublime verses, treated them from thenceforth with kindness and humanity.* The compositions of the other poets had no doubt the same effect: and Plutarch tell us that Alcibiades, when very young, having entered a school in which there was not a Homer, gave the master a box on the ear as an ignorant fellow, and one who dishonored his profession.†

As for eloquence, it is no wonder that it was particularly studied at Athens, as it opened the way to the highest offices, reigned absolute in the assemblies, decided the most important affairs of state, and gave an almost unlimited power to those who had the talent of speaking in an eminent degree.

This, therefore, was the great employment of the young citizens of Athens, especially of those who aspired to the highest employments. To the study of rhetoric they annexed that of philosophy: I comprise under the latter all the sciences, which are either parts of, or relate to it. The persons known to antiquity under the name of sophists, had acquired a great reputation at Athens, especially in the time of Socrates. These teachers, who were as presumptuous as avaricious, set themselves up for universal scholars. Their whole art lay in philosophy and eloquence; both of which they corrupted by the false taste and wrong principles

* Cic. in Brut. p. 172—Quintil. l. viii. c. 1.—Plut. in Peric. p. 156.

† In Alcib. p. 194.

which they instilled into their disciples. I have observed in the life of Socrates, that philosopher's endeavors and success in discrediting them.

CHAPTER I.

OF WAR.

SECTION I.—PEOPLE OF GREECE IN ALL TIMES VERY WAR-LIKE.

No people of antiquity, except the Romans, could dispute the glory of arms and military virtue with the Greeks. During the Trojan war Greece signalized her valor in battle and acquired immortal fame by the bravery of her captains sent thither. This expedition was, however, properly speaking, no more than the cradle of her infant glory; and the great exploits by which she distinguished herself there were only her first essays and apprenticeship in the art of war.

There were in Greece at that time several small republics, neighbors to one another by their situation, but extremely remote in their customs, laws, characters, and particularly in their interests. This difference of manners and interests was a continual source and occasion of divisions among them. Every city, dissatisfied with its own dominion, was studious to aggrandize itself at the expense of its next neighbors, according as they lay most commodious for it. Hence, all these little states, either out of ambition and to extend their conquests, or the necessity of a just defence, were always under arms, and by that continual exercise of war, formed in the people a martial spirit and an intrepidity which made them invincible in the field, as appeared when the united forces of the east came to invade Greece, and made her sensible of what she was, and of what she was capable.

Two cities distinguished themselves above the rest, and held indisputably the first rank; these were Sparta and Athens. In consequence of which those cities, either successively or together, had the empire of Greece, and maintained themselves through a long series of ages in a power which their superiority of merit, universally acknowledged by all the other states, had acquired them. This merit con-

sisted principally in their military knowledge and martial virtue, the most glorious proofs of which they had given in the war against the Persians. Thebes disputed this honor with them for some years by surprising actions of valor, which had something of prodigy in them; this, however, was but a momentary blaze, which, after having shone out with exceeding splendor, soon disappeared, and left that city in its original obscurity. Sparta and Athens will therefore be the only objects of our reflections as to what relates to war, and we shall join them together, in order to be the better able to distinguish their characters, as well in what they resemble as in what they differ from each other.

SECTION II.—ORIGIN AND CAUSE OF THE VALOR AND MILITARY VIRTUE OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS.

All the laws of Sparta and institutions of Lycurgus seem to have had no other object than war, and tended solely to the making the subjects of that republic a body of soldiers. All other employments, all other exercises, were prohibited among them. Arts, polite learning, sciences, trades, even husbandry itself, had no share in their application, and seemed in their eyes unworthy of them. From their earliest infancy no other taste was instilled into them but for arms, and indeed the Spartan education was wonderfully adapted to that end. To go barefoot, to lie hard, to be satisfied with little meat and drink, to suffer heat and cold, to exercise continually in hunting, wrestling, running on foot and horseback, to be inured to blows and wounds without venting either complaint or groan; these were the rudiments of the Spartan youth with regard to war, and enabled them to support all its fatigues and to confront all its dangers.

The habit of obeying, contracted from their infancy, respect for the magistrates and elders, a perfect submission to the laws, from which no age nor condition was exempted, prepared them amazingly for military discipline, which is in a manner the soul of war, and the principle of success in all great enterprises.

One of these laws was to conquer or die, and never to surrender to the enemy. Leonidas, with his three hundred Spartans, was an illustrious example of this, and his intrepid valor, extolled in all ages with the highest applauses, and proposed as a model to all posterity, had given the same

spirit to the nation, and traced out for them the plan they were to follow. The disgrace and infamy annexed to the violation of this law, and to such as quitted their arms in battle, confirmed the observance of it, and rendered it in a manner inviolable. The mothers recommended to their sons, when they set out for the field, to return either with or upon their bucklers. They did not weep for those who died with their arms in their hands, but for those who preserved themselves by flight. Can we be surprised after this that a small body of such soldiers, with such principles, should put an innumerable army of barbarians to a stand?

The Athenians were not bred up so roughly as the people of Sparta, but possessed of equal valor. The taste of the two people was quite different in regard to education and employment, but they attained the same end, though by different means. The Spartans knew only how to use their arms, and were no more than soldiers; but, among the Athenians, and we must say as much for the other people of Greece, arts, trades, husbandry, commerce, and navigation, were held in honor, and thought no disgrace to any one. These occupations were no obstacles to the valor and knowledge necessary in war; they disqualified none for rising to the greatest commands and first dignities of the republic. Plutarch observes that Solon, seeing that the territory of Attica was barren, applied himself to turning the industry of his citizens upon arts, trades, and commerce, in order to supply his country thereby with what it wanted in fertility. This taste became one of the maxims of the government and fundamental laws of the state, and perpetuated itself among the people, but without diminishing in the least their ardor for war.

The ancient glory of the nation, which had always distinguished itself by military bravery, was a powerful motive for not degenerating from the reputation of their ancestors. The famous battle of Marathon, wherein they had sustained alone the shock of the barbarians, and gained a signal victory over them, infinitely heightened their courage; and the battle of Salamin, in the success of which they had the greatest share, raised them to the highest pitch of glory, and rendered them capable of the greatest enterprises.

A noble emulation not to give place in point of merit to Sparta, the rival of Athens, and a lively jealousy of their glory, which during the war with the Persians contained itself within due bounds, were another strong incentive to the

Athenians, who every day made new efforts to surpass themselves and sustain their reputation.

The rewards and honors granted to those who had distinguished themselves in battle; the monuments erected in memory of the citizens who had died in defence of their country; the funeral orations publicly pronounced in the midst of the most august religious ceremonies, to render their names immortal; all conspired infinitely to eternize the valor of both nations, and particularly of the Athenians, and to make fortitude a kind of law and indispensable necessity with them.

There was a law at Athens by which it was ordained that those who had been maimed in war should be maintained at the public expense. The same favor was granted to the fathers and mothers, as well as the children, of such as had fallen in battle and left their families poor and not in a condition to maintain themselves. The republic, like a good mother, generously took them into her care, and, with great regard to them, supplied all the duties and procured all the relief they could have expected from those whose loss they deplored.*

This exalted the courage of the Athenians, and rendered their troops invincible, though not very numerous. In the battle of Plataeæ, where the army of the barbarians, commanded by Mardonius, consisted of no less than three hundred thousand men, and the united forces of the Greeks, of only one hundred and eight thousand two hundred men; there were in the latter only ten thousand Lacedæmonians, one-half of whom were Spartans, that is to say, inhabitants of Sparta, and eight thousand Athenians. It is true, each Spartan brought with him seven helots, amounting to thirty-five thousand men; but they were scarcely ever reckoned as soldiers.

This great merit in point of martial valor, generally acknowledged by the other states and people, did not suppress in their minds all sentiments of envy and jealousy, as appeared once in relation to the Lacedæmonians. The allies, who were very far superior to them in number, were mortified to see themselves subjected to their orders, and murmured against it in secret. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, without seeming to have any knowledge of their disgust, assembled the whole army, and after having made all the allies sit down on one side, and the Lacedæmonians by them-

* Plut. in Solon. p. 96.—Idem. in Menex. pp. 248, 249.—Diog. Laert. in Solon. D. 37.

selves on the other, he caused proclamation to be made by a herald, that all smiths, masons, carpenters, and so on, through the other trades, should rise up. Almost all the allies did so, and not one of the Lacedæmonians, to whom all trades were prohibited. Agesilaus then smiling, "You see," said he, "how many more soldiers Sparta furnishes, than all the rest of the allies together;" thereby intimating that to be a good soldier, it was necessary to be only a soldier; that trades diverted the artisan from applying himself wholly to the profession of arms and the science of war, and prevented his succeeding so well in it as those who made it their sole business and exercise. But Agesilaus spoke and acted in that manner from the prejudice of his opinion in favor of Lacedæmonian education; for indeed those whom he was for having considered only as simple artisans, had well demonstrated in the glorious victories they had gained over the Persians, and even Sparta itself, that they were by no means inferior to the Lacedæmonians either in valor or military knowledge.

SECTION III.—OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF TROOPS WHICH COMPOSED THE ARMIES OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS.

The armies both of Sparta and Athens were composed of four sorts of troops; citizens, allies, mercenaries, and slaves. The soldiers were sometimes marked in the hand, to distinguish them from the slaves, who had that character impressed upon their forehead. Interpreters believe that in allusion to this double manner of marking, it is said in the Revelation, that all were obliged "to receive the mark of the beast in their right hand, or in their foreheads;"* and that St. Paul says of himself, "I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus."†

The citizens of Lacedæmon were of two sorts, either those who inhabited Sparta itself, and who for that reason were called Spartans, or those who lived in the country. In the time of Lycurgus, the Spartans amounted to nine thousand, and the others to thirty thousand. This number seems to have been somewhat diminished in the time of Xerxes, as Demaratus, speaking to him of the Lacedæmonian troops, computes only eight thousand Spartans. The latter were the flower of the nation; and we may judge of the value they set upon them, by the anxiety the republic expressed for three or four hundred, besieged by the Athenians in the

* Rev. xiii. 16.

† Gal. vi. 17.

small island of Sphacteria, where they were taken prisoners. The Lacedæmonians generally spared the troops of their country very much, and sent only a few of them into the armies. When a Lacedæmonian general was asked how many Spartans there were in the army? he answered, "As many as are necessary to repulse the enemy." They served the state at their own expense, and it was not till after a length of time that they received pay from the public.

The greatest number of the troops in the two republics were composed of the allies; who were paid by the cities which sent them.

The foreign troops in the pay of the republic, to the aid of which they were called in, were styled mercenaries.

The Spartans never marched without helots; and we have seen that in the battle of Plataæ every citizen had seven. I do not believe this number was fixed; nor do I well comprehend for what service they were designed. It would have been very ill policy to have put arms into the hands of so great a number of slaves, generally much discontented with their master's harsh treatment of them, and who in consequence had every thing to fear from them in a battle. Herodotus, however, in the passage I have cited from him, represents them carrying arms in the field as light-armed soldiers.

The infantry consisted of two kinds of soldiers. The one were heavy-armed, and carried great bucklers, lances, half-pikes, and scimitars. The other were light-armed, that is to say, with bows and slings. They were commonly placed in the front of the battle, or upon the wings as a first line to shoot their arrows, and throw javelins and stones at the enemy; and then when they had discharged, they retired through the intervals behind the battalions as a second line, and continued their volleys.

Thucydides, in describing the battle of Mantinæa, divides the Lacedæmonian troops in this manner. There were seven regiments of four companies each, without including the Squirites, to the number of six hundred; these were horsemen, of whom I shall soon speak farther. The company consisted, according to the Greek interpreter, of one hundred and twenty-eight men, and was subdivided into four platoons, each of thirty-two men. So that a regiment amounted to five hundred and twelve men, and the seven made together three thousand five hundred and eighty-four. Each platoon had four men in front and eight in depth, for

that was the usual depth of the files, which the officers might change as occasion required.*

The Lacedæmonians did not actually begin to use cavalry till after the war with Messene, where they perceived their want of it. They raised their horse principally in a small city not far from Lacedæmon, called Sciros, from whence these troops were denominated Scirites, or Squirites. They were always on the extremity of the left wing, which was their post by right.†

Cavalry was still more uncommon among the Athenians, on account of the situation of Attica, broken with numerous mountains. It did not amount, after the war with the Persians, which was the time when the prosperity of Greece was at the highest, to more than three hundred horse, but increased afterwards to twelve hundred; a small body for so powerful a republic.

I have already observed, that among the ancients, as well Greeks as Romans, no mention is made of the stirrup, which is very surprising. They threw themselves nimbly on horseback.

—————Corpora saltu
Subjiciunt in equos; —Æn. l. xi. ver. 287.
“And with a leap sit steady on the horse.”

Sometimes the horse, broke early to that kind of manage, would stoop down before, to give his master the opportunity of mounting with more ease.

Inde inclinatus collum, submissus et armos
De more, inflexis præbebat scandere terga
Cruribus. —Sil. Ital. de Equo Cælii Equ. Rom.

Those whom age or weakness rendered heavy, made use of a servant in mounting on horseback, in which they imitated the Persians, with whom it was the common custom. Gracchus caused fine stones to be placed on each side of the great roads of Italy, at certain distances from one another, to help travellers to get on horseback without the assistance of any body.‡

I am surprised that the Athenians, expert as they were in the art of war, did not distinguish that the cavalry was the most essential part of an army, especially in battles; and that some of their generals did not turn their attention that way, as Themistocles did in regard to maritime affairs. Xenophon was well capable of rendering them a like service in respect to the cavalry, of the importance of which

* Thucyd. l. v. p. 390.

† Ibid.

‡ Αναβολέως μη διομενος. This word αναβολεις, signifies a servant who has helped his master to mount on horseback.—Plut. in Gracch. p. 833.

he was perfectly apprised. He wrote two treatises upon this subject; one of which regards the care it is necessary to take of horses, and how to understand and break them; to which he adds the exercise of the squadron, both well worthy of being read by all who profess arms. In the latter he states the means of placing the cavalry in honor, and lays down rules upon the military art in general, which might be of very great use to all those who are designed for the employment of war.

I have wondered, in running over this second treatise, to see with what care Xenophon, a soldier and a pagan, recommends the practice of religion, a veneration for the gods, and the necessity of imploring their aid upon all occasions. He repeats this maxim in thirteen different places of a tract in other respects brief enough; and rightly judging that these religious insinuations might give some people offence, he makes a kind of apology for them, and concludes the piece with a reflection, which I shall repeat entire in this place. "If any one," says he, "wonders that I insist so much here upon the necessity of not forming any enterprises without first endeavoring to render the Divinity favorable and propitious, let him reflect, that there are in war a thousand unforeseen and obscure conjunctures, where in the generals, vigilant to take advantages, and lay ambuscades for each other, from the uncertainty of an enemy's motions, can take no other council than that of the gods. Nothing is doubtful or obscure with them. They unfold the future to whom they please, on the inspection of the entrails of beasts, by the singing of birds, by visions, or in dreams. Now, we may presume that the gods are more inclined to enlighten the minds of such as consult them, not only in urgent necessities, but who at all times, and when no dangers threaten them, render them all the homage and adoration of which they are capable."

It became this great man to give the most important instructions to his son Gryllus, to whom we addressed the treatise we mention; and who, according to the common opinion, was appointed to discipline the Athenian cavalry.

SECTION IV.—OF MARITIME AFFAIRS, FLEETS, AND NAVAL FORCES.

If the Athenians were inferior to the Lacedæmonians in respect to cavalry, they surpassed them greatly in naval affairs, by which means they became masters at sea, and obtained a superiority over all the other states of Greece. As

a knowledge of this subject is very necessary to rightly understand many passages in this history, I shall treat it more extensively than other matters, and shall make great use of what the learned father Don Bernard de Montfaucon has said of it in his books upon antiquity.

The principal parts of a ship were the prow or head, the poop or stern, and the middle, called in Latin *carina*, the hulk or waist.

The prow was the forward extremity of the ship; it was generally adorned with paintings, and different sculptures of gods, men, or animals. The beak, called *rostrum*, lay lower, and level with the water; it was a piece of timber which projected from the prow, covered at the point with brass, and sometimes with iron. The Greeks termed it *ῥοστόν*.

The other extremity of the ship, opposite to the prow, was called the poop. There the pilot sat and held the helm, which was a longer and larger oar than the rest.

The waist was the hollow of the vessel, or the hold.

The ships were of two kinds, vessels of war and vessels of burden, intended for commerce or as transports. The former were generally propelled by oars, the latter by sails. Both were sometimes, but rarely used together. The ships of war were also called Long Ships, and by that name distinguished from vessels of burden.

The long ships were further divided into two classes: those which were called *actuariæ naves*, and were very light vessels like our brigantines; and those called only long ships. The first were usually termed open ships, because they had no decks. Some of these light vessels were larger than ordinary, and had twenty, thirty, and forty oars, half on one side, and half on the other, all on the same line.

The long ships which were used in war, were of two sorts. Some had only one rank of oars on one side; others two, three, four, five, or a greater number, to forty; but these last were rather for show than use.

The long ships of one rank of oars were called *aphracti*; that is to say, uncovered, and had no decks; in which they differed from the *cataphracti*, which had decks. They had only small places at the head and stern to stand on in the time of action.

The ships most commonly used in the battles of the ancients, were those which carried from three to five ranks or benches of oars, and were called *triremes* and *quinqueremes*.

It is a great question, and has given rise to many learned dissertations, how these benches of oars were disposed.

Some will have it that they were placed at length, like the ranks of oars in the modern galleys. Others maintain that the ranges of the biremes, triremes, quinqueremes, and so on to the number of forty in some vessels, were one above another. To support this last opinion, innumerable passages are cited from ancient authors, which seem to leave no manner of doubt in it, and are strongly corroborated by the column of Trajan, which represents these ranks one above another. Father Montfaucon, however, avers that all the persons of greatest skill in naval affairs, whom he had consulted, declared that such an arrangement seemed to them utterly impossible. This manner of reasoning is a weak proof against the experience of so many ages, confirmed by so many authors. It is true, that in admitting these ranks of oars to be disposed perpendicularly one above another, it is not easy to comprehend how they could be worked; but in the biremes and triremes of the column of Trajan, the lower ranks were placed obliquely, and as it were rising by degrees.

In ancient times, the ships with several ranks of oars were unknown. They made use of long ships, in which the rowers, whatever might be their number, worked all upon the same line. Such was the fleet which the Greeks sent against Troy. It was composed of twelve hundred sail; of which the galleys of Bœotia contained each one hundred and twenty men, and those of Philoctetes fifty; which no doubt includes the largest and smallest vessels. Their galleys had no decks, but were built like common boats, "which is still practised," says Thucydides, "by the pirates, to prevent their being so soon discovered at a distance."*

The Corinthians are said to have been the first who changed the form of ships; and instead of simple galleys, made vessels with three ranks, in order to add by the multiplicity of oars to the swiftness and impetuosity of their motion. Their city, advantageously situated between two seas, lay commodiously for commerce, and served as an emporium for merchandise. From their example the inhabitants of Coreyra, and the tyrants of Sicily, also equipped many galleys of three benches, a short time before the war against the Persians. It was about the same time that the Athenians, at the warm instances of Themistocles, who foresaw the war which soon broke out, built ships of the same form, the whole deck not being yet in use;

* Thucyd. i. 1. p. 3.

and from thenceforth they applied themselves to naval affairs with incredible ardor and success.*

The beak of the prow (rostrum) was that part of the vessel which was mostly used in sea-fights. Ariston of Corinth persuaded the Syracusans, when their city was besieged by the Athenians, to make the prows lower and shorter, which advice gained them the victory: for the prows of the Athenian vessels being very high and weak, their beaks struck only the parts above water, and for that reason did little damage to the enemy's ships; whereas the Syracusans, whose prows were strong and low, and their beaks level with the water, often sunk the triremes of the Athenians with a single blow.†

Two classes of people served on board these galleys. The one was composed of the rowers (remiges), and the mariners (nautæ), employed in steering and working the ships. The other consisted of the soldiers intended for the fight, who were denominated *επιβιτται*. This distinction was not made in early times, when the same persons rowed, fought, and did all the necessary work of the ship, as was occasionally the case at a later period. For Thucydides, in describing the arrival of the Athenian fleet at the small island of Sphacteria, observes that only the rowers of the lowest bench remained in the ships, and that the rest went on shore with their arms.‡

The condition of the rowers was very hard and laborious. I have already said that the rowers, as well as mariners, were all citizens and freemen, and not slaves or strangers. The rowers were distinguished by three several stages. The lower rank were called *thalamitæ*, the middle *zugitæ*, and the highest *thranitæ*. Thucydides remarks that the latter had greater pay than the rest, because they worked with longer and heavier oars than those of the lower benches. It seems that the crew, in order to act in concert, and with better effect, were sometimes guided by the singing of a man, and sometimes by the sound of an instrument; and this grateful harmony served not only to regulate the motion of their oars, but to mitigate and soothe the pains of their labor.§

It is a question among the learned, whether there was a single man to every oar in these great ships, or several

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 10. † Diod. l. xiii. p. 141. ‡ Thucyd. l. i. v. p. 275.

§ *Musicam natura ipsa videtur ad tolerandos facilius labores veluti muneri nobis dedisse. Siquidem et remiges cantus hortatur; nec solum in iis operibus in quibus plurium conatus præeunte aliqua jucunda voce conspirat, sed etiam singulorum fatigatio quamlibet se rudi modulatione solatur.*—Quintil. l. i. c. 10.

as in the galleys of the present day. What Thucydides observes on the pay of the *thranitæ*, seems to imply that they worked singly. For if others had shared the work with them, wherefore had they greater pay given them than those who managed an oar alone, as the latter had as much, and perhaps more labor than they? Father Montfaucon believes, that in the vessels of five ranks, there might have been several men to a single oar.

He who took care of the whole crew, and commanded the vessel, was called *nauclerus*, and was the principal officer. The second was the pilot (*gubernator*), whose station was in the poop, where he held the helm and steered the vessel. His skill consisted in knowing the coasts, ports, rocks, shoals, and especially the winds and stars; for before the invention of the compass, the pilot had nothing to direct him during the night but the stars.

The soldiers who fought in the ships were armed almost in the same manner as the land forces.

The Athenians, at the battle of Salamin, had one hundred and eighty vessels, and in each of them eighteen fighting men, four of whom were archers, and the rest heavy-armed troops. The officer who commanded these soldiers, was called *τρωπαρχος*, and the commander of the whole fleet, *ναυαρχος* or *στρατηγος*.*

We cannot exactly tell the number of soldiers, mariners and rowers, that served on board each ship; but it generally amounted to about two hundred, as appears from the estimate of Horodotus of the Persian fleet in the time of Xerxes, and in other places, where he mentions that of the Greeks. I mean here the great vessels, the triremes, which were the species most in use.

The pay of those who served in these ships varied greatly at different times. When the younger Cyrus arrived in Asia, it was only three oboli, or half a drachm; and the treaty between the Persians and Lacedæmonians was concluded on this condition, which gives reason to believe that the usual pay was three oboli.† Cyrus, at Lysander's request, added a fourth.‡ It was frequently raised to a whole drachm.§ In the fleet fitted out against Sicily, the Athenians gave a drachm a day to the troops. The sum of sixty talents, which the people of Eggesta advanced the

* Plut. in Themist. p. 119.

† This treaty stipulated that the Persians should pay thirty minæ a month for each ship, which was half a talent; the whole amounted to three oboli a day for every man that served on board.

‡ Xenoph. Hist. i. i. p. 441.

§ Thucyd. i. vi. p. 431.

Athenians monthly for the maintaining of sixty ships, shows that the pay of each vessel for a month amounted to a talent, which supposes that each ship's company consisted of three hundred men, each of whom received a drachm per pay.* As the officers' pay was higher, the republic perhaps either furnished the overplus, or it was deducted out of the total of the sum advanced for a vessel, by abating something in the pay of the private men.

The same may be said of the land troops as has been said of the seamen, except that the horse had double pay. It appears that the ordinary pay of the foot was three oboli a day, and that it was augmented according to times and occasions. Thimbron, the Lacedæmonian, when he marched against Tissaphernes, promised a daric a month to each soldier, two to a captain, and four to the colonels.† Now, a daric a month is four oboli a day. Young Cyrus, to animate his troops, who were discouraged by the length of their march, instead of one daric, promised one and a half to each soldier, which amounted to a drachm a day.

It may be asked how the Lacedæmonians, whose iron coin, the only species current among them, was of no value elsewhere, could maintain armies by sea and land, and where they found money for their subsistence. They no doubt raised it, as the Athenians did, by contributions from their allies, and the cities to which they gave liberty and protection, or from those they had conquered from their enemies. Their second fund for paying their fleet and armies, was the aids they drew from the king of Persia, as we have seen on several occasions.

SECTION V.—PECULIAR CHARACTER OF THE ATHENIANS.

Plutarch furnishes us with almost all the matter upon this head. Every body knows how well he succeeded in copying nature in his portraits, and how well qualified he was to trace the character of a people, whose genius and manners he had studied with so profound an attention.

I. "The people of Athens," says Plutarch, "were easily provoked to anger, and as easily reduced to resume their sentiments of benevolence and compassion."‡ History furnishes us with numerous examples of this kind. Witness the sentence of death passed against the inhabitants of Mitylene, which was revoked the next day: the condemnation of

* Thucyd. l. v. p. 415.

† Xenoph. Exped. Cyr. l. vii.

‡ "Ο δῆμος Ἀθηναίων ευκίνητός ἐστι πρὸς ὀργήν. ευμεταγέτος ἱπρὸς ἔλεον.—Plut. in Præcept. Reip. Ger. p. 793.

the ten generals, and of Socrates, both follow with an immediate repentance and most lively grief.

II. "They were better pleased with penetrating and almost guessing an affair themselves, than to give themselves leisure to be informed of it thoroughly, and in all its extent." *

Nothing is more surprising than this circumstance in their character, which is very hard to conceive, and seems almost incredible. Artificers, husbandmen, soldiers, and mariners, are generally a stupid, heavy kind of people, and very dull in their conceptions; but the people of Athens were of a quite different turn. They had naturally an amazing penetration, vivacity, and even delicacy of wit. I have already mentioned what happened to Theophrastus. He was cheapening something of an old woman at Athens that sold herbs. "No, stranger," said she, "you shall have it for no less." He was strangely surprised to find himself treated as a stranger who had passed almost his whole life at Athens, and who prided himself upon excelling all others in the elegance of his language.† It was, however, from that she knew he was not of her country. We have said that the Athenian soldiers knew the fine passages of Euripides by heart. These artificers and soldiers, from assisting at the public deliberations, were also versed in affairs of state, and understood every thing immediately. We may judge of this from the orations of Demosthenes, whose style, we know, is ardent, brief, and concise.

III. "As they naturally inclined to relieve persons of a low condition and mean circumstances, so were they fond of conversations seasoned with pleasantry, and calculated to make people laugh." ‡

— They assisted persons of a mean condition, because from such they had nothing to apprehend in regard to their liberty, and saw in them the characters of equality and resemblance with themselves. They loved pleasantry, and showed in that that they were men, but men abounding with humanity and indulgence, who understood raillery, who were not prone to take offence, nor over delicate in point of respect to be paid them. § One day when the assembly was

* Μάλλον ὕψους ὑπνόειν, ἢ διδάσκεισθαι καθ' ἡσυχίαν βουλόμενος.

† Cum Theophrastus percontaretur ex ancilla quadam, quanti aliquid venderet, et responderet illa, atque addidisset: Hospes, non pote minoris; tulit moleste, se non effugere hospitris speciem, cum ætatem ageret Athenis, optimeque loqueretur.—Cic. de Cla. Orat. n. 17.

‡ Ὡς περ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ἀδόξοις καὶ ταπείνοις βοήθειν προθυμότερος οὕτως τῶν λόγων τοὺς παιγνιώδεις καὶ γελοίους ἀσπάζεται καὶ προτιμᾷ.

§ Xenoph. de Athen. Rep. p. 601.

fully formed, and the people had already taken their places and sat down, Cleon, after having made them wait his coming a great while, appeared at last with a wreath of flowers upon his head, and desired the people to adjourn their deliberations to the next day. "For to-day," said he, "I have business. I have been sacrificing to the gods; and I am to entertain some strangers, my friends, at supper." The Athenians, setting up a laugh, rose and broke up the assembly. At Carthage, such a pleasantry would have cost any man his life, who had presumed to vent it, and to take such a liberty with a proud, haughty, jealous, morose people, of a genius averse to complacency, and less inclined to humor. Upon another occasion, the orator Stratocles, having informed the people of a victory, and caused sacrifices to be offered in consequence, three days after, news came of the defeat of the army. As the people expressed their discontent and resentment upon the false information, he asked them, "of what they had to complain, and what harm he had done them, in making them pass three days more agreeably than they would otherwise have done?"

IV. "They were pleased with hearing themselves praised, and could not bear to be railed at, or criticised." The least acquaintance with Aristophanes and Demosthenes will show with what address and effect they employed praises and criticisms with regard to the people of Athens.*

"When the republic enjoyed peace and tranquillity," says Plutarch in another place, "the Athenian people diverted themselves with the orators who flattered them; but in important affairs, and emergencies of the state, they became serious, and gave the preference to those whose custom it had been to oppose their unjust desires; such as Pericles, Phocion, and Demosthenes."†

V. "They kept those who governed them in awe, and showed their humanity even to their enemies."‡

The people of Athens made good use of the talents of those who distinguished themselves by their eloquence and prudence; but they were full of suspicion, and kept themselves always on their guard against the superiority of genius and ability; they took pleasure in restraining their courage, and lessening their glory and reputation. This may be judged from the ostracism, which was instituted only as a curb on those whose merit and popularity ran too high, and which spared neither the greatest nor the most worthy per-

* Τοῖς μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν αὐτὸν μάλιστα χαίρει, τοῖς δὲ σκώπτουσιν ἥμιστά δυσχεραίνει.

† Plut. in Phocion, p. 746.

‡ Φόβερὸς ἔστιν ἄχρι τῶν ἀρχόντων, εἰτα φιλάνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πολεμίων.

sons. The hatred of tyranny and tyrants, which was in a manner innate with the Athenians, made them extremely jealous and apprehensive for their liberty with regard to those who governed.

In regard to their enemies, they did not treat them with rigor; they did not make an insolent use of victory, nor exercise any cruelty towards the vanquished. The amnesty decreed after the tyranny of the thirty, shows that they could forget the injuries which had been done them.

To these different characteristics, which Plutarch unites in the same passages of his works, some others may be added, extracted principally from the same author.

VI. It was from this fund of humanity and benevolence, of which I have now spoken, and which was natural to the Athenians, that they were so attentive to the rules of politeness, and so delicate in point of just behavior; qualities which one would not expect to find among the common people.* In the war against Philip of Macedon, having intercepted one of his couriers, they read all the letters he carried, except that of Olympias his wife, which they returned sealed up and unopened, out of regard to conjugal love and secrecy, the rites of which are sacred, and ought to be respected even among enemies. The same Athenians, having decreed that a strict search should be made after the presents distributed by Harpalus among the orators, would not suffer the house of Callicles, who was lately married, to be visited, out of respect for his bride, who had not long been home. Such behavior is not very common; and upon like occasions people do not stand much upon forms and politeness.†

VII. The taste of the Athenians for all arts and sciences is too well known to require dwelling long upon it in this place. Besides which, I shall have occasion to speak of it with some extent elsewhere. But we cannot, without admiration, behold a people, composed for the most part of artisans, husbandmen, soldiers, and mariners, carrying delicacy of taste in every thing to so high a degree of perfection, which seems the peculiar attribute of a more exalted condition and noble education.

VIII. It is no less wonderful that this people should have such great views and should rise so high in their pretensions.‡ In the war which Alcibiades caused them to undertake, fired with vast projects and unbounded hopes,

* Πάτριον αὐτοῖς καὶ σύμῳτον ἦν τὸ φιλόπρῳπον.—In Pelop. p. 280.

† Plut. in Demetr. p. 898.

‡ Μέγα φρονεῖ, μέγαλον ὀρέγεται.

they did not confine themselves to the taking of Syracuse, or the conquest of Sicily, but had already in idea added Italy, Peloponnesus, Libya, the Carthaginian gates, and the empire of the sea to the pillars of Hercules. Their enterprise failed ; but they had formed it, and the taking of Syracuse, which seemed no great difficulty, might have enabled them to put it in execution.

IX. The same people, so great, and we may say so haughty in their projects, had nothing of that character in other respects. In what regarded the expense of the table, dress, furniture, private buildings, and, in a word, private life, they were frugal, simple, modest, and poor ; but sumptuous and magnificent in every thing public, and capable of doing honor to the state. Their victories, conquests, wealth, and continual intercourse with the people of Asia Minor, introduced neither luxury, gluttony, pomp nor vain profusion among them. Xenophon observes that a citizen could not be distinguished from a slave by his dress. The richest inhabitants, and the most famous generals, were not ashamed to go to market themselves.*

It was very glorious for Athens to have produced and formed so many persons illustrious in the arts of war and government ; in philosophy, eloquence, poesy, painting, sculpture and architecture ; to have alone furnished more great men in every other department than any other city in the world ; except perhaps Rome, which had imbibed learning and arts from her, and knew how to improve her lessons to the best advantage ; † to have been in a manner the school of almost all the world ; to have served, and still continue to serve, as the model for nations which pride themselves most upon the excellency of taste ; in a word, to have taught the language, and prescribed the laws of all that regards the talents and productions of the mind. The part of this history, wherein I shall treat of the sciences and learned men that rendered Greece illustrious, with the arts, and those who excelled in them, will set this in a clear light.

X. I shall conclude this description of the Athenians with one more attribute, which cannot be denied them, and appears evidently in all their actions and enterprises ; and that is, their ardent love of liberty. This was their darling passion and great principle of policy. We see them, from the commencement of the war with the Persians, sacrificing

* De Rep. Athen. p. 696.

† Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes
Intulit agresti Latio. —Horat. Epist. i. l. 2.
"Greece taken, took her savage victors' hearts,
And polish'd rustic Latium with her arts."

every thing to the liberty of Greece. They abandoned, without the least regret, their lands, estates, city and houses, and removed to their ships in order to fight the common enemy, whose view was to enslave them. What could be more glorious for Athens, than when all the allies were trembling at the vast offers made her by the king of Persia, to answer his ambassador by the mouth of Aristides, that all the gold and silver in the world was not capable of tempting them to sell their own, or the liberty of Greece? *

It was from such generous sentiments that the Athenians not only became the bulwark of Greece, but preserved the rest of Europe, and all the western world, from the invasion of the Persians.

These great qualities were mingled with great defects, often the very reverse of them, such as we may imagine in a fluctuating, light, inconstant, and capricious people, like the Athenians.

SECTION VI.—COMMON CHARACTER OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS.

I cannot refuse giving a place here to what Mr. Bossuet says upon the character of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. The passage is long, but will not appear so, as it includes all that is wanting to a perfect knowledge of the genius of both these people.

Among all the republics of which Greece was composed, Athens and Lacedæmon were undoubtedly the principal. No people could possess more wit than the Athenians, nor more solid sense than the Lacedæmonians. Athens affected pleasure; the Lacedæmonian manner of living was hard and laborious. Both loved glory and liberty; but the liberty of Athens tended to licentiousness. The love of power among the Lacedæmonians, though restricted by severe laws at home, was the more ardent to extend itself abroad. Athens also was fond of power, but upon another principle, in which interest had a share with glory. Her citizens excelled in the art of navigation, and the sovereignty at sea had enriched her. To continue in the sole possession of all commerce, there was nothing she would not have subjected to her power; and her riches, which inspired this passion, supplied her with the means of gratifying it. On the contrary, at Lacedæmon money was in contempt. As all the laws tended to make the latter a military republic, the glory of arms was the sole object that engrossed her citizens. From thence she naturally affected dominion; and the more

* Plut. in Aristid. p. 324.

she was above interest, the more she abandoned herself to ambition.

Lacedæmon, from her regular life, was steady and determinate in her maxims and measures. Athens was more lively and active, but the people had too much control. Their laws and philosophy had indeed the most happy effect upon excellent natural capacities like theirs; but reason alone was not capable of keeping them within due bounds. A wise Athenian, who perfectly knew the genius of his country, informs us, that fear was necessary to keep those too ardent and free spirits in order; and that it was impossible to govern them, after the victory at Salamin had removed their fears of the Persians.*

They were therefore ruined by the glory of their great actions, and the supposed security of their present condition. The magistrates were no longer heard, and as Persia was afflicted with excessive slavery, so Athens, says Plato, experienced all the evils of excessive liberty.

These two great republics, so opposite in their manners and conduct, interfered with each other in the design they had each formed of subjecting all Greece; so that they were always enemies, more from the contrariety of their interests, than the dissimilarity of their genius.

The Grecian cities were against submitting to the dominion of either the one or the other; for besides the desire of preserving their liberty, they found the empire of those two republics too grievous to bear. That of the Lacedæmonians, who were observed to have something almost brutal in their character, was severe. A government too rigid, and a life too laborious, rendered their tempers too haughty, austere, and imperious in power: besides which, it could never be expected to live in peace under the authority of a city, which, formed for war, could not support itself but by continuing perpetually in arms.† So that the Lacedæmonians were capable of attaining to command, and all the world were afraid they should do so.‡

The Athenians were naturally obliging and agreeable. Nothing was more delightful to behold than their city, in which feasts and games were perpetual: their wit, liberty, and the various passions of men, daily exhibited new objects; but the inequality of their conduct disgusted their allies, and was still more insupportable to their own subjects. It was impossible for them not to experience the extravagance and caprice of a flattered people, which is, according to Plato,

* Plat. l. iii. de Leg.

† Aristot. Polit. l. i. p. 4.

‡ Xenoph. de Rep. Lacon.

somewhat more dangerous than the same excesses in a prince vitiated by flattery.*

These two cities did not permit Greece to continue in repose. We have seen the Peloponnesian and other wars which were always occasioned or fomented by the jealousy of Lacedæmon and Athens. But the same jealousies which involved Greece in troubles, supported it in some measure, and prevented its falling into the dependence of either the one or the other of those republics.

The Persians soon perceived this condition of Greece; and accordingly the whole mystery of their politics consisted in keeping up those jealousies, and fomenting those divisions. Lacedæmon, which was the most ambitious, was the first that gave them occasion to enter into the quarrels of the Greeks. They engaged in them from the sole view of making themselves masters of the whole nation; and, industrious to weaken the Greeks by their own arms, they waited only the opportunity to crush them altogether. The states of Greece, in their wars, regarded only the king of Persia, whom they called the Great King, or "the King," by way of eminence, as if they had already been of the number of his subjects. But it was impossible that the ancient spirit of Greece should not revive when they were upon the point of falling into slavery, and the hands of the barbarians.†

The petty kings of Greece undertook to oppose this great king, and to ruin his empire. But with a small army, disciplined as we have related, Agesilaus, king of Sparta, made the Persians tremble in Asia Minor, and showed that it was not impossible to subvert their power.‡ The divisions of Greece alone put a stop to his conquests. The famous retreat of the ten thousand who, after the death of the younger Cyrus, made their way in a hostile manner through the whole Persian empire, and returned into their own country, fully demonstrated to Greece that her soldiery was invincible, and that only their domestic divisions could subject them to an enemy too weak to resist their united force.

We shall see, in the sequel of this history, how Philip, king of Macedon, taking advantage of these divisions, succeeded at length, between address and force, in making himself little less than the sovereign of Greece, and in obliging the whole nation to march under his colors against the common enemy. What he had only planned, his son Alexander brought to perfection, who showed the wondering world, how much ability and valor avail against the most numerous armies, and the most formidable preparations.

* Plat. de Rep. l. viii.

† Plat. l. iii. de Leg. Isocrat. Panegyri.

‡ Polyb. l. iii.

BOOK ELEVENTH.

THE HISTORIES OF DIONYSIUS AND HIS SON, TYRANTS OF SYRACUSE.

SYRACUSE had for about sixty years enjoyed the liberty gained by the expulsion of the family of Gelon. The events which passed in that interval, except the invasion of the Athenians, are of no great importance, and little known, but those which follow are of a different nature, and make amends for the chasm: I mean the reigns of Dionysius and his son, tyrants of Syracuse; the first of whom governed thirty-eight, and the latter twelve years.* As this history is entirely foreign to what passed in Greece at the same time, I shall relate it in this place altogether and by itself; observing only, that the first twenty years of it, upon which I am now entering, agree almost in point of time with the last preceding twenty years.

This history will present to our view a series of the most odious and horrid crimes, though it abounds at the same time with instruction. When on the one side we behold a prince, the declared enemy of liberty, justice, and laws, trampling on the most sacred rights of nature and religion, inflicting the most cruel torments upon his subjects, beheading some, burning others for a slight word, delighting and feasting himself with human blood, and gratifying his savage inhumanity with the sufferings and miseries of every age and condition,† can we deny a truth, which the pagan world

* After having been expelled for more than ten years, he reascended the throne, and reigned two or three years.

† *Erit Dionysius illic tyrannus, libertatis, justitiæ, legum exitium—Alios uret, alios verberabit, alios ob levem offensam jubebit detruncari.—Senec. de Consol. ad Marc. c. xvii.*

Sanguine humano non tantum gaudet, sed pascitur; sed ut supplicis omnium ætatum crudelitatem insatiabilem explet.—Id. de Benef. l. vii. c. 19.

itself has confessed, and Plutarch has taken occasion to observe in speaking of the tyrants of Sicily, "that God in his anger gives such princes to a people, and makes use of the impious and the wicked to punish the guilty and the criminal?" On the other side when the same prince, the dread and terror of Syracuse, is perpetually anxious, and trembling for his own life, and, abandoned to remorse and regret, can find no person in his whole state, not even his wives or children, in whom he can confide, who will not think with Tacitus, "that it is not without reason that the oracle of wisdom has declared, that if the hearts of tyrants could be seen, we should find them torn in pieces with a thousand evils; it being certain that the body does not suffer more from inflictions and torments, than the minds of such wretches from their crimes, cruelties, and the injustice and violence of their proceedings.*

The condition of a good prince is quite different. He loves his people, and is beloved by them: he enjoys a perfect tranquillity within himself, and lives with his subjects as a father with his children. Though he knows that the sword of justice is in his hands, he apprehends the use of it. He loves to turn aside its edge, and can never resolve to display his power, but with great reluctance, in the last extremity, and with all the forms and sanction of the laws.† "A tyrant punishes only from caprice and passion; and believes," says Plutarch upon Dionysius, "that he is not really master, and does not act with supreme authority, but as he sets himself above all laws, has no other but his will and pleasure, and sees himself obeyed implicitly: whereas," continues the same author, "he that can do whatever he will, is in great danger of doing what he ought not."‡

Besides these characteristics of cruelty and tyranny, which particularly distinguish the first Dionysius, we shall see in his history, all that unbounded ambition, sustained by great valor, extensive abilities, and the necessary talents for acquiring the confidence of a people, is capable of undertak-

* Neque frustra præstanti-sinus sapientiæ firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse a pici, laniatus et ictus; quando, ut corpora verberibus, ita sævitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceretur.—Tacit. Annal. l. vii. c. 6.

† Hæc est in maxima potestate verissima animi temperantia, non cupiditate aliqua, non temeritate incendi; non priorum principum exemplis corruptum, quantum in ci es saes liceat, experiendo tentare; sed hebetare aciem imperii sui.—Quid interest inter tyrannum et regem (species enim ipsa fortunæ ac licentia par est), nisi quod tyranni in voluptate sæviunt, reges non nisi ex causa et necessitate?—Senec. de Clem. lib. i. c. 11.

‡ Ἐφ' ἡ ἀπολαύειν μάλιστα τῆς ἀρχῆς ὅταν ταχέως ἂ βούλεται ποιῇ. Μέγας οὖν ὁ κίνδυνος βούλεσθαι ἂ μὴ δεῖ, τὸν ἂ βούλεται ποιεῖν δυνάμενον.—Ad. Princ. Indoct. p. 782.

ing for the attainment of sovereignty; the various means which he had, the address to employ for the maintaining himself in it against the opposition of his enemies and the odium of the public; and lastly, the tyrant's success in escaping, during a reign of thirty-eight years, the many conspiracies formed against him, and in transmitting peaceably the tyranny to his son, as a legitimate possession and a right of inheritance.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter contains the history of Dionysius the Elder, who reigned thirty-eight years.

SECTION I.—MEANS MADE USE OF BY DIONYSIUS THE ELDER TO POSSESS HIMSELF OF THE TYRANNY.

Dionysius was a native of Syracuse, of noble and illustrious extraction according to some, but others say that his birth was base and obscure. However that may be, he distinguished himself by his valor, and acquired great reputation in a war with the Carthaginians. He was one of those who accompanied Hermocrates, when he attempted to re-enter Syracuse by force of arms, after having been banished through the intrigues of his enemies. The event of that enterprise was unsuccessful and Hermocrates was killed. The Syracusans did not spare his accomplices, several of whom were publicly executed. Dionysius was left among the wounded. The report of his death, designedly given out by his relations, saved his life. Providence would have spared Syracuse many misfortunes, had he expired either in the fight, or by the executioner.*

The Carthaginians had made several attempts to establish themselves in Sicily, and to possess themselves of the principal towns of that island, as we have observed elsewhere.† Its happy situation for their maritime commerce, the fertility of its soil, and the riches of its inhabitants, were powerful inducements to such an enterprise. We may form an idea of the wealth of its cities from the account given of Agrigentum. The temples were of extraordinary magnificence, especially that of Jupiter Olympus, which

* *Diod. l. xlii. p. 197.*

† In the history of the Carthaginians, Book II. Part 1.

was three hundred and forty feet in length, sixty in breadth, and one hundred and twenty in height. The piazzas, or galleries, in their extent and beauty, answered to the rest of the building. On one side was represented the battle of the giants, on the other, the taking of Troy, in figures as large as life. Without the city was an artificial lake, which was seven stadia, or more than a quarter of a league, in circumference. It was full of all kinds of fish, covered with swans and other water-fowls, and afforded the most agreeable prospect imaginable.*

It was at the time of which we are now speaking, that Exenetes, victor in the Olympic games, entered the city in triumph in a magnificent chariot, attended by three hundred more, all drawn by white horses. Their robes were adorned with gold and silver; and nothing was ever more splendid than their appearance. Gellias, the most wealthy of the citizens of Agrigentum, erected several large apartments in his house for the reception and entertainment of his guests. Servants waited by his order at the gates of the city, to invite all strangers to lodge at their master's house, and conduct them thither. Hospitality was much practised and esteemed by the generality of that city. A violent storm having obliged one hundred horsemen to take shelter there, Gellias entertained them all in his house, and supplied them immediately with dry clothes, of which he had always a great quantity in his wardrobe. This is understanding how to make a noble use of riches. His cellar is much talked of by historians, in which he had three hundred reservoirs hewn out of the rock, each of which contained one hundred amphoræ.†

This great and opulent city was besieged, and at length taken by the Carthaginians. Its fall shook all Sicily, and spread an universal terror. The cause of its being lost was imputed to the Syracusans, who had but weakly aided it. Dionysius, who from that time had no other thoughts but of his grand designs, and was secretly active in laying the foundations of his future power, took advantage of this favorable opportunity, and of the general complaints of Sicily against the Syracusans, to render the magistrates odious, and to exclaim against their administration. In a public assembly, held to deliberate on the state of affairs, when nobody dared to speak for fear of the persons at the

* Diod. l. xlii. pp. 203, 206.

† An amphora contained about seven gallons; consequently, one hundred contained seven hundred gallons, or eleven hogsheads seven gallons.

helm, Dionysius rose up, and boldly accused the magistrates of treason; adding that it was his opinion, that they ought to be deposed immediately, without waiting till the term of their administration should expire. They retorted this audacity with treating him as a seditious person, and a disturber of the public tranquillity, and as such laid a fine upon him according to the laws. This was to be paid before he could be admitted to speak again, and Dionysius was not in a condition to discharge it. Philistus, one of the richest citizens, who wrote a history of Sicily, which has not come down to us, deposited the money, and exhorted him at the same time to give his opinion upon the state of affairs, with all the liberty which became a citizen zealous for his country.

Dionysius accordingly resumed his discourse with more vigor than before. He had long cultivated the talent of eloquence, which he looked upon with reason as very necessary in a republican government; especially in his views of acquiring the people's favor, and of conciliating them to his measures. He began with describing in a lively and pathetic manner the ruin of Agrigentum, a neighboring city, in their alliance; the deplorable extremity to which the inhabitants had been reduced, of quitting the place under the cover of the night; the cries and lamentations of infants, and of aged and sick persons, whom they had been obliged to abandon to a cruel and merciless enemy; and the consequent murder of all who had been left in the city, whom the barbarous victor dragged from the temples and altars of the gods, feeble refuges against the Carthaginian fury and impiety. He imputed all these evils to the treachery of the commanders of the army, who, instead of marching to the relief of Agrigentum, had retreated with their troops; to the criminal protraction and delay of the magistrates, corrupted by Carthaginian bribes; and to the pride of the great and rich, who regarded nothing but establishing their own power upon the ruin of their country's liberty. He represented Syracuse as composed of two different bodies; the one, by their power and influence, usurping all the dignities and wealth of the state; the other, obscure, despised, and trod under foot, bearing the yoke of a shameful servitude, and rather slaves than citizens. He concluded with saying, that the only remedy for so many evils was to elect persons from among the people, devoted to their interests, and who, not being capable of rendering themselves formidable by

their riches and authority, would be solely employed for the public good, and apply themselves in earnest to the re-establishment of the liberty of Syracuse.

This discourse was listened to with infinite pleasure, as all speeches are which flatter the natural propensity of inferiors to complain of the government, and was followed with the universal applause of the people, who always give themselves up blindly to those who know how to deceive them under the specious pretext of serving their interest. All the magistrates were deposed upon the spot and others, at the head of whom was Dionysius, were substituted in their stead.

This was only the first step to the tyranny, at which he did not stop. The success of his undertaking inspired him with new courage and confidence. He had also in view the displacing of the generals of the army, and to have their power transferred to himself. The design was bold and dangerous, and he applied himself to it with address. Before he attacked them openly, he planted his batteries against them at a distance: calumniating them by his emissaries to the people, and sparing no pains to render them suspected. He caused it to be whispered among the populace, that those commanders held secret intelligence with the enemy; that disguised couriers were frequently seen passing and re-passing; and that it was not to be doubted but some conspiracy was on foot. He affected on his side not to see those leaders, nor to open himself to them at all upon the affairs of the public. He communicated none of his designs to them; as if he was apprehensive of rendering himself suspected by having any intercourse or correspondence with them. Persons of sense and discernment were not at a loss to discover the tendency of these undermining arts; nor were they silent upon the occasion: but the common people, prejudiced in his favor, incessantly applauded and admired his zeal, and looked upon him as the sole protector and asserter of their rights and liberties.

Another scheme, which he set at work with his usual address, was of very great service to him, and greatly promoted his designs. There was a great number of banished persons dispersed throughout Sicily, whom the faction of the nobility of Syracuse had expelled from the city at different times, and upon different pretences. He knew what an addition of strength so numerous a body of citizens would be to him, whom gratitude to a benefactor, and re-

sentment against those who had occasioned their banishment, the hope of retrieving their affairs, and of enriching themselves out of the spoils of his enemies, rendered most proper for the execution of his designs, and attached firmly to his person and interest. He endeavored, therefore, to obtain their recall. It was given out, that it was necessary to raise a numerous body of troops to oppose the progress of the Carthaginians; and the people were in great trouble on account of the expense to which the new levies would amount. Dionysius took advantage of this favorable conjuncture, and the disposition of the public. He represented, that it was ridiculous to bring foreign troops at a great expense from Italy and Peloponnesus, while they might supply themselves with excellent soldiers, without being at any charge at all: that there were numbers of Syracusans in every part of Sicily, who, notwithstanding the ill treatment they had received, had always retained the hearts of citizens under the name and condition of exiles; that they preserved a tender affection and inviolable fidelity for their country, and had chose to wander about Sicily without support or settlement, rather than take part with the armies of the enemy, notwithstanding the advantageous offers to induce them to do so. This discourse of Dionysius had all the effect upon the people he could have wished. His colleagues, who had perceived plainly what he had in view, were afraid to contradict him, rightly judging that their opposition would not only prove ineffectual, but incense the people against them, and even augment the reputation of Dionysius, to whom it would leave the honor of recalling the exiles. Their return was therefore decreed and they accordingly all came to Syracuse without losing time.

A deputation from Gela, a city dependent on Syracuse, arrived about the same time, to demand that the garrison should be reinforced. Dionysius immediately marched thither with two thousand foot, and four hundred horse. He found the city in great commotion, and divided into two factions; one composed of the people, and the other of the rich and powerful. The latter having been tried in form, were condemned by the assembly to die, and to have their estates confiscated for the use of the public. This confiscation was applied to pay off the arrears, which had long been due to the former garrisons, commanded by Dexippus the Lacedæmonian; and Dionysius promised the troops which he brought with him to Syracuse, to double the pay they

were to receive from the city. This was attaching so many new creatures to himself. The inhabitants of Gela treated him with the highest marks of honor, and sent deputies to Syracuse, to return their thanks for the important service that city had done them in sending Dionysius thither. Having endeavored in vain to bring Dexippus into his measures, he returned with his troops to Syracuse, after having promised the inhabitants of Gela, who used all means in their power to keep him among them, that he would soon return with more considerable aid.

He arrived at Syracuse just as the people were coming out of the theatre, who ran in throngs about him, inquiring with earnestness what he had heard of the Carthaginians. He answered with a sad and dejected air, that the city nourished far more dangerous and formidable enemies in her bosom; that while Carthage was making extraordinary preparations for the invasion of Syracuse, those who were in command, instead of rousing the zeal and attention of the citizens, and setting every thing at work against the approach of so potent an enemy, lulled them with trivial amusements and idle shows, and suffered the troops to want necessities; converting their pay to their private uses in a fraudulent manner, destructive to the public affairs; that he had always sufficiently comprehended the cause of such conduct; that, however, it was not now upon mere conjecture, but upon too evident proof, his complaints were founded; that Imilcar, the general of the Carthaginians, had sent an officer to him, under the pretext of treating about the ransom of prisoners, but in reality to prevail on him not to be too strict in examining into the conduct of his colleagues; and that if he would not enter into the measures of Carthage, he at least would not oppose them; that for his part, he came to resign his command, and to abdicate his dignity, that he might leave no room for injurious suspicions of his acting in concert, and holding intelligence with traitors who sold the commonwealth.

This discourse being rumored among the troops, and about the city, occasioned great disquietude and alarm. The next day the assembly was summoned, and Dionysus renewed his complaints against the generals, which were received with universal applause. Some of the assembly cried out, that it was necessary to appoint him generalissimo, with unlimited power: and that it would be too late for so salutary a recourse, when the enemy was at the gates of Syra-

cuse ; that the importance of the war which threatened them required such a leader ; that it was in the same manner that Gelon was formerly elected generalissimo, and defeated the Carthaginian army at Himera, which consisted of three hundred thousand men ; that as for the accusation alleged against the traitors, it might be deferred to another day, but that the present affair would admit no delay. Nor was it in fact deferred ; for the people, who, when once prejudiced, run headlong after their opinion without examining any thing, immediately elected Dionysius generalissimo with unlimited power. In the same assembly he caused it to be decreed, that the soldiers' pay should be doubled, insinuating that the state would be amply reimbursed by the conquests consequent to that advance. This being done, and the assembly dismissed, the Syracusans, upon cool reflection on what had passed, began to be in some consternation, as if it had not been the effect of their own choice ; and comprehended, though too late, that from the desire of preserving their liberty, they had given themselves up to a master.

Dionysius rightly judged the importance of taking his measures before the people repented what they had done. There remained but one step more to the tyranny, which was, to have a body of guards assigned him ; and that he accomplished in a most artful and politic manner. He proposed, that all the citizens under forty years of age, and capable of bearing arms, should march with provisions for thirty days to the city of Leontium. The Syracusans were at that time in possession of the place, and had a garrison in it. It was full of fugitives and foreign soldiers, who were very fit persons for the execution of his designs. He justly suspected that the greatest part of the Syracusans would not follow him. He set out, however, and encamped in the night upon the plains near the city. It was not long before a great noise was heard throughout the camp. This tumult was raised by persons stationed for that purpose by Dionysius. He pretended that ambuscades had been laid with design to assassinate him, and in great trouble and alarm retired for refuge into the citadel of Leontium, where he passed the rest of the night, after having caused a great number of fires to be lighted, and had drawn off such of the troops as he most confided in. At break of day the people assembled in a body, to whom, still expressing great apprehension, he explained the danger he had been in, and demanded permission to choose himself a guard of six hundred men for the

security of his person. Pisistratus had set him the example long before, and had used the same stratagem when he made himself tyrant of Athens. His demand seemed very reasonable, and was accordingly complied with. He chose a thousand men for his guard upon the spot, armed them completely, equipped them magnificently, and made them great promises for their encouragement. He also attached the foreign soldiers to his interest in a peculiar manner, by speaking to them with great freedom and affability. He made many removals and alterations in the troops, to secure the officers in his interest, and dismissed Dexippus to Sparta, in whom he could not confide. At the same time he ordered a great part of the garrison, which he had sent to Gela, to join him, and assembled from all parts, fugitives, exiles, debtors, and criminals; a train worthy of a tyrant.

With this escort he returned to Syracuse, which trembled at his approach. The people were no longer in a condition to oppose his undertakings, or to dispute his authority. The city was full of foreign soldiers, and saw itself upon the point of being attacked by the Carthaginians. To strengthen himself the more in tyranny, he espoused the daughter of Hermocrates, the most powerful citizen of Syracuse, and who contributed the most to the defeat of the Athenians. He also gave his sister in marriage to Polyxenus, brother-in-law of Hermocrates. He afterwards summoned an assembly, in which he rid himself of Daphneus and Demarchus, who had been the most active in opposing his usurpation. In this manner Dionysius, from a simple notary, and a citizen of the lowest class, made himself absolute lord and tyrant of the greatest and most opulent city of Sicily.

SECTION II. — COMMOTIONS IN SICILY AND AT SYRACUSE AGAINST DIONYSIUS. HE FINDS MEANS TO DISPEL THEM.

Dionysius experienced a violent opposition in the beginning of his usurpation. The Carthaginians having besieged Gela, he marched to its relief; and after some unsuccessful endeavors against the enemy, threw himself into the place. He acted there with little vigor; and the only service he did the inhabitants was, to cover their flight in person, when they abandoned their city in the night. He was suspected of acting in concert with the enemy, especially as they did not pursue him, and he lost very few of his foreign soldiers. All the inhabitants who remained at Gela were butchered.

Those of Camarina, to avoid the same fate, followed their example, and withdrew, with all the effects they could carry away. The moving sight of aged persons, matrons, young virgins, and tender infants, hurried on beyond their strength, excited compassion in the troops of Dionysius and incensed them against the tyrant. Those he had raised in Italy withdrew to their own country, but the Syracusan cavalry, after having made a vain attempt to kill him upon the march, from his being surrounded with his foreigners, pushed forward, and having entered Syracuse, went directly to his palace, which they plundered, treating his wife at the same time with so much violence and ill-usage that she died of it soon-after. Dionysius, who had foreseen their design, pursued them closely, with only one hundred horse and four hundred foot, and, having marched almost twenty leagues with the utmost expedition, he arrived at midnight at one of the gates, which he found shut against him. He set fire to it, and opened himself a passage in that manner. The richest of the citizens ran thither to dispute his entrance, but were surrounded by the soldiers, and almost all of them killed. Dionysius, having entered the city, put all to the sword that came in his way, plundered the houses of his enemies, of whom he killed a great number, and forced the rest to leave Syracuse. The next morning the whole body of the troops arrived.* The unhappy fugitives of Gela and Camarina, terrified by the conduct of the tyrant, retired to the Leontines. Imilcar having sent a herald to Syracuse, a treaty was concluded, as mentioned in the history of the Carthaginians.† By one of the articles it was stipulated that Syracuse should continue under the government of Dionysius, which confirmed all the suspicions which had been conceived of him. The death of Darius Nothus happened in the same year.‡

It was then he sacrificed everything that gave umbrage to his repose and security. He knew that after having deprived the Syracusans of all that was dear to them he could not fail of incurring their extreme abhorrence; and the fear of the miseries he had to expect in consequence increased in the usurper in proportion to their hatred of him. He looked upon all his new subjects as so many enemies, and believed that he could only avoid the dangers which surrounded him on all sides, and threatened him in all places, by cutting off one part of the people to intimidate the other. He did not

* Diod. l. xiii. pp. 227, 230. † Vol. I. ‡ A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404.

consider that in adding the cruelty of executions to the oppression of the public he only multiplied his enemies, and induced them, after the loss of their liberty, to preserve at least their lives by attempting to deprive him of his.

Dionysius, who foresaw that the Syracusans would not fail to take advantage of the repose, in which the treaty lately concluded with the Carthaginians had left them, to attempt the re-establishment of their liberty, neglected nothing on his side in support of his power. He fortified the part of the city called the Isle, which was before very strong from the nature of its situation, and might be defended by a moderate garrison. He surrounded it with good walls, flanked at due distances with high towers; and separated in that manner from the rest of the city. To these works he added a strong citadel, to serve him for a retreat and refuge in case of accident, and caused a great number of shops and piazzas to be erected, capable of containing a considerable multitude of inhabitants. §

He selected the best of the lands, which he bestowed upon his creatures and the officers appointed by him, and distributed the rest in equal proportion among the citizens and strangers, including the slaves, who had been made free from the first. He divided the houses in the same manner, reserving those in the Isle for such of the citizens as he could most confide in, and for his strangers.

After having taken these precautions for his security, he began to think of subjecting several free states of Sicily, which had aided the Carthaginians. He began with the siege of Herbesses. The Syracusans in his army, finding themselves with arms in their hands, thought it their duty to use them for the re-establishment of their liberty. On one occasion, when they had assembled to concert measures, one of the officers, who took upon him to reprove them on that account, was killed upon the spot, and his death served as a signal for their revolt. They sent immediately to Ætna for the horse, who had retired thither at the beginning of the revolution. Dionysius, alarmed at this motion, raised the siege, and marched directly to Syracuse, to keep it in obedience. The revolvers pursued him closely, and having seized upon the suburb Epipolis, cut off all communication with the country. They received aid from their allies both by sea and land, and, setting a price upon the tyrant's head, promised the freedom of their city to such of the strangers

as should abandon him. A great number came over to them, whom they treated with the utmost favor and humanity. They advanced with their machines and battered the walls of the Isle vigorously, without giving Dionysius the least respite.

The tyrant, finding himself reduced to extremities, abandoned by the greatest part of the strangers, and shut up on the side of the country, assembled his friends to consult with them, rather by what kind of death he should put a glorious period to his career than upon the means of saving himself. They endeavored to inspire him with new courage, and were divided in their opinions, but at last the advice of Philistus prevailed, which was that he should by no means renounce the tyranny. Dionysius, to gain time, sent deputies to the revolters, and demanded permission to quit the place with his adherents, which was granted, together with five ships to transport his people and effects.

He had, however, sent despatches secretly to the Campanians, who garrisoned the places in the possession of the Carthaginians, with offers of considerable reward, if they would come to his relief.

The Syracusans, who, after the treaty, believed their business done, and the tyrant entirely defeated, had disarmed part of their troops, and the rest acted with great indolence and little discipline. The arrival of the Campanians, to the number of twelve hundred horse, infinitely surprised and alarmed the city. After having beat such as disputed their passage, they opened themselves a way to Dionysius. At the same time three hundred soldiers more arrived to his assistance; the face of things was then entirely altered, and terror and dejection changed parties. Dionysius, in a sally, drove them vigorously as far as that part of the city Neapolis. The slaughter was not very considerable, because he had given orders to spare those who fled. He caused the dead to be interred, and gave those who had retired to Ætna to understand that they might return with entire security. Many came to Syracuse, but others did not think it advisable to confide in the faith of a tyrant. The Campanians were rewarded to their satisfaction, and dismissed.

The Lacedæmonians at this time took such measures in regard to Syracuse as were unworthy of the Spartan name. They had lately subverted the liberty of Athens, and declared publicly against popular government in all the cities dependent upon them. They deputed one of their citizens

to Syracuse, to express in appearance the part they took in the misfortunes of that city, and to offer their aid, but in reality he was sent to confirm Dionysius in supporting himself in the tyranny, expecting that from the increase of his power he would prove of great advantage and support to their own.

Dionysius saw, from what had so lately happened at Syracuse, what he was to expect from the people for the future. While the inhabitants were employed abroad in the harvest, he entered their houses and seized upon all the arms he could find. He afterwards enclosed the citadel with an additional wall, fitted out many ships, armed great numbers of strangers, and took all possible measures to secure himself against the disaffection of the Syracusans.

After having made this provision for his safety at home, he prepared to extend his conquests abroad, from whence he did not only propose the increase of his dominion and revenues, but the additional advantage of diverting his subjects from the sense of their lost liberty by turning their attention upon their ancient and always abhorred enemy, and by employing them in lofty projects, military expeditions, and glorious exploits, to which the hopes of riches and plunder would be annexed. He conceived this to be also the means of acquiring the affection of his troops: and that the esteem of the people would be a consequence of the grandeur and success of his enterprises.

Dionysius wanted neither courage nor policy, and had all the qualities of a great general. He took, either by force or fraud, Naxos, Catana, Leontium, Ætna, and Enna, towns in the neighborhood of Syracuse, which for that reason were very convenient to his purposes. Some of them he treated with favor and clemency, to engage the esteem and confidence of the people: others he plundered, to strike terror into the country. The inhabitants of Leontium were transplanted to Syracuse.

These conquests alarmed the neighboring cities, which saw themselves threatened with the same misfortune. Rhegium, situated upon the opposite coast of the strait which divides Sicily from Italy, prepared to prevent it, and entered into an alliance with the Syracusan exiles, who were very numerous, and with the Messenians on the Sicilian side of the strait, who were to aid them with a powerful supply. They had levied a considerable army, and were on the point of marching against the tyrant, when discord arose among

the troops, and rendered the enterprise abortive. It terminated in a treaty of peace and alliance between Dionysius and the two cities.

He had long revolved in his mind a great design, which was to ruin the Carthaginian power in Sicily, a great obstacle to his own, as his discontented subjects never failed of refuge in the towns dependent upon that nation. The accident of the plague, which had lately ravaged Carthage, and extremely diminished its strength, seemed to present a favorable opportunity for the execution of his design. But as a man of ability, he knew, that to ensure success, the greatness of the preparations should correspond with the magnitude of the enterprise, and he applied himself to them in a manner which shows the extent of his views, and extraordinary capacity. He therefore used uncommon pains and application for that purpose; conscious that the war, into which he was entering with one of the most powerful nations then in the world, might be of long duration, and be attended with various success.

His first care was to bring to Syracuse, as well from the conquered cities in Sicily as from Greece and Italy, a great number of artisans and workmen of all kinds, whom he induced to come thither by the offer of great gain and reward, the certain means of engaging the most excellent persons in every profession. He caused an infinite number of every kind of arms to be made; swords, javelins, lances, partisans, helmets, cuirasses, and bucklers; all after the manner of the nation by whom they were to be worn. He built also a great number of galleys, that had from three to five benches of oars and were of an entirely new construction, with an adequate number of barks and other vessels for the transportation of troops and provisions.

The whole city seemed but one workshop, and continually resounded with the noise of the several artisans. Not only the porches, piazzas, porticoes, places of exercise, and public places, but private houses of any extent, were full of workmen. Dionysius had distributed them with admirable order. Each class of artists, separated by streets and districts, had its overseers and inspectors, who, by their presence and direction, promoted and completed the works. Dionysius himself was perpetually among the workmen, encouraging them with praise and rewarding their merit. He knew how to confer different marks of honor upon them, according as they distinguished themselves by their ingenuity and appli-

cation. He would even make some of them dine at his own table, where he entertained them with the freedom and kindness of a friend. It is justly said, that honor nourishes arts and sciences, and that men of all ranks and conditions are animated by the love of glory.* The prince who knows how to put in motion, under proper regulation, the two great springs and strongest incentives of the human soul, interest and glory, will soon make all arts and sciences flourish in his kingdom, and fill it at small expense with persons who excel in every profession. This was now the case at Syracuse; where a single person of great ability in the art of governing, excited such ardor and emulation among the artificers, as is not easy to imagine or describe.

Dionysius applied himself more particularly to the navy. He knew that Corinth had invented the art of building galleys with three and five benches of oars, and was ambitious of acquiring for Syracuse, a Corinthian colony, the glory of bringing that art to perfection, which he effected. The timber for building his galleys was brought, part of it from Italy, where it was drawn on carriages to the sea-side, and from thence shipped to Syracuse; and part from Mount *Ætna*, which at that time produced abundance of pine and fir trees. In a short time a fleet of two hundred galleys were seen in a manner to rise out of the sea; and a hundred others formerly built were refitted by his order. He caused also one hundred and sixty sheds to be erected within the great port, each of them capable of containing two galleys, and one hundred and fifty more to be repaired.

The sight of such a fleet, built in so short a time, and fitted out with so much magnificence, would have given reason to believe that all Sicily had united its labors and revenues in accomplishing so great a work. On the other side, the view of such an incredible quantity of arms newly made, would have inclined one to think that Dionysius had solely employed himself in providing them, and had exhausted his treasures in the expense. They consisted of one hundred and forty thousand shields, and as many helmets and swords; and upwards of fourteen thousand cuirasses, finished with all the art and elegance imaginable. These were intended for the horse, for the tribunes and centurions of the foot, and for the foreign troops, who had the guard of his person. Darts, arrows, and lances, were innumerable; and engines

* *Honos alit artes, omnesque incenduntur ad studia gloriæ.—Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. i. n. 4.*

and machines of war, in proportion to the rest of the preparations.

The fleet was to be manned by an equal number of citizens and strangers. Dionysius did not think of raising troops till all his preparations were complete. Syracuse and the cities dependent on it supplied him with part of his forces. Many came from Greece, especially from Sparta. The considerable pay he offered, brought soldiers in crowds from all parts to enlist in his service.

He omitted none of the precautions necessary to the success of his enterprise, the importance as well as difficulty of which was well known to him. He was not ignorant that every thing depends upon the zeal and affection of the troops for their general, and applied himself particularly to the gaining of the hearts, not of his own subjects only, but of all the inhabitants of Sicily, and succeeded in it wonderfully. He had entirely changed his behavior for some time. Kindness, courtesy, clemency, a disposition to do good, and an insinuating complacency towards all, had taken place of that haughty and imperious air, and cruel disposition, which had rendered him so odious. He was so entirely altered, that he did not seem to be the same man.

While he was hastening his preparations for the war, and striving to attain the affections of his subjects, he meditated an alliance with the two powerful cities, Rhegium and Messina, which were capable of disconcerting his great designs by a formidable diversion. The league formed by those cities some time before, though without any effect, gave him some uneasiness. He therefore thought it necessary to make sure of the amity of both. He presented the inhabitants of Messina with a considerable quantity of land, which was situated in their neighborhood, and lay very commodiously for them. To give the people of Rhegium an instance of his esteem and regard for them, he sent ambassadors to desire that they would give him one of their citizens in marriage. He had lost his first wife in the popular commotion, as before related.

Dionysius, sensible that nothing establishes a throne more effectually than the prospect of a successor who may enter into the same designs, have the same interests, pursue the same plan, and observe the same maxims of government, took the opportunity of the present tranquillity of his affairs to contract a double marriage, in order to have a successor to whom he might transfer the sovereignty, which had cost him so much pains and dangers to acquire.

The people of Rhegium, to whom Dionysius had first applied, having called a council to take his demand into consideration, came to a resolution not to contract any alliance with a tyrant; and for their final answer returned, that they had only the hangman's daughter to give him. The raillery went home and cut deep. We shall see in the sequel how dear that city paid for their jest.

The Locrians, to whom Dionysius sent the same ambassadors, did not show themselves so difficult and delicate, but sent him Doris for a wife, who was the daughter of one of their most illustrious citizens. He caused her to be brought from Locris in a galley with five benches of oars, of extraordinary magnificence, and glittering on all sides with gold and silver. He married, at the same time, Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus, the most considerable and powerful of the Syracusan citizens, and sister of Dion, of whom much will be said hereafter. She was brought to his palace in a chariot drawn by four white horses, which was then a singular mark of distinction. The nuptials of both were celebrated the same day with universal rejoicings throughout the whole city, and was attended with feasts and presents of incredible magnificence.

It was contrary to the manners and universal custom of the western nations, from all antiquity, that he espoused two wives at once; taking in this, as in every thing else, the liberty assumed by tyrants of setting themselves above all laws.

Dionysius seemed to have an equal affection for the two wives, without giving the preference to either, to remove all causes of jealousy and discord. The people of Syracuse reported that he preferred his own country-woman to the stranger; but the latter had the good fortune to bring her husband the first son, which supported him not a little against the cabals and intrigues of the Syracusans. Aristomache was a long time without any symptoms of child-bearing; though Dionysius desired so earnestly to have issue by her, that he put the mother of his Locrian wife to death, accusing her of hindering Aristomache from conceiving by witchcraft.

Aristomache's brother was the celebrated Dion, in great estimation with Dionysius. He was at first obliged for his credit to his sister's favor; but after distinguishing his great capacity in many instances, his own merit made him much beloved and regarded by the tyrant. Among other marks

of confidence which Dionysius bestowed on him, he ordered his treasurers to supply him, without further orders, with whatever money he should demand, provided they informed him the same day they paid it.

Dion had naturally a great and most noble soul. A happy accident had conduced to inspire and confirm in him the most elevated sentiments. It was a kind of chance, or rather, as Plutarch says, a peculiar providence, which at a distance laid the foundations of the Syracusan liberty, that brought Plato, the most celebrated of philosophers, to Syracuse. Dion became his friend and disciple, and made great improvements from his lessons; for though brought up in a luxurious and voluptuous court, where the supreme good was made to consist in pleasure and magnificence, he had no sooner heard the precepts of his new master, and imbibed a taste of the philosophy that inculcates virtue, than his soul was inflamed with the love of it. Plato, in one of his letters, gives this glorious testimony of him, that he had never met with a young man upon whom his discourses made so great an impression, or who had conceived his principles with so much ardor and vivacity.

As Dion was young and unexperienced, observing the facility with which Plato had changed his taste and inclinations, he imagined, with great simplicity, that the same reasons would have the same effects upon the mind of Dionysius, and from that opinion could not rest till he had prevailed upon the tyrant to hear and converse with him. Dionysius consented; but the lust of tyrannic power had taken too deep a root in his heart to be eradicated from it. It was like an indelible dye that had penetrated his inmost soul, from whence it was impossible ever to efface it.*

Though the stay of Plato at the court made no alteration in Dionysius, he persevered in giving Dion the same instances of his esteem and confidence, and even to support, without taking offence, the freedom with which he spoke to him. Dionysius, ridiculing one day the government of Gelon, formerly king of Syracuse, and saying, in allusion to his name, that he had been the "laughing stock" † of Sicily, the whole court expressed great admiration, and took great pains in praising the quaintness and delicacy of the conceit, insipid and flat as it was, as puns and quibbles generally are. Dion took it in a serious light, and was so

* Τὴν βαβὴν οὐκ ἀνίεντα τῆς τυραννίδος, ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ δευσοποιὸν ὄυσαν καὶ δυσέκπλυντον. Δρομαίους δὲ ὄντας ἐτι δεῖ τῶν χρηστῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι λόγων.—Plut. in Moral. p. 779.

† Γέγως, signifies a laughing stock.

bold as to represent to him, that he was in the wrong to talk in that manner of a prince, whose wise and equitable conduct had been an excellent model of government, and given the Syracusans a favorable opinion of monarchical power. "You reign," added he, "and have been trusted, for Gelon's sake; but for your sake no man will ever be trusted after you." It was very extraordinary for a tyrant to suffer himself to be talked to in such a manner with impunity.*

SECTION III.—DIONYSIUS DECLARES WAR AGAINST THE CARTHAGINIANS. VARIOUS SUCCESES OF IT.

Dionysius, seeing that his great preparations were complete, and that he was in a condition to take the field, publicly opened his design to the Syracusans, in order to interest them the more in the success of the enterprise, and told them that it was against the Carthaginians. He represented that people as the perpetual and inveterate enemy of the Greeks, and especially of those who inhabited Sicily; that the plague, which lately wasted Carthage, had presented a favorable opportunity, which ought not to be neglected; that the people in subjection to so cruel a power waited only the signal to declare against it; that it would be much for the glory of Syracuse to reinstate in their liberty the Grecian cities which had so long groaned under the yoke of the barbarians; that in declaring war at present against the Carthaginians, they only preceded them in doing so for some time; since, as soon as they had retrieved their losses, they would not fail to attack Syracuse with all their forces.

The assembly were unanimously of the same opinion. The ancient and natural hatred of the barbarians; their anger against them for having given Syracuse a master; and the hope that with arms in their hands they might find some occasion of recovering their liberty, united them in their suffrages. The war was resolved on without any opposition, and began that very instant. There were as well in the city as the port, a great number of Carthaginians, who, upon the faith of treaties, and under the peace, exercised traffic, and thought themselves in security. The populace, by authority of Dionysius, upon the breaking up of the assembly, ran to their houses and ships, plundered their goods, and carried off their effects. They met with the same treatment throughout Sicily; to which murders and

* Plut. p. 960.

massacres were added, by way of reprisal for the many murders committed by the barbarians on those they conquered, and to show them what they had to expect, if they continued to make war with the same inhumanity.

After this bloody execution, Dionysius sent a letter by a herald to Carthage, in which he signified that the Syracusans declared war against the Carthaginians, if they did not withdraw their garrisons from all the Grecian cities held by them in Sicily. The reading of this letter at first in the senate, and afterwards in the assembly of the people, occasioned an uncommon alarm, as the pestilence had reduced the city to a deplorable condition. However, they were not dismayed, but prepared for a vigorous defence. They raised troops with the utmost diligence, and Imilcar set out immediately to put himself at the head of the Carthaginian army in Sicily.

Dionysius on his side lost no time, and took the field with his army, which daily increased by the arrival of new troops, who came to join him from all parts. It amounted to eighty thousand foot, and three thousand horse. The fleet consisted of two hundred galleys, and five hundred barks laden with provisions, and machines of war. He opened the campaign with the siege of Motya, a fortified town under the Carthaginians near mount Eryx, in a little island something more than a quarter of a league from the continent, to which it was joined by a small neck of land, which the besieged immediately cut off to prevent the approaches of the enemy on that side.

Dionysius, having left the care of the siege to Leptinus, who commanded the fleet, went with his land forces to attack the places in alliance with the Carthaginians. Terrified by the approach of so numerous an army, they all surrendered except five, which were Ancyra, Solos or Panormus, Palermo, Segesta, and Entalla, the last two of which places he besieged.

Imilcar, however, to make a diversion, detached ten galleys of his fleet, with orders to attack and surprise in the night all the vessels which remained in the port of Syracuse. The commander of this expedition entered the port according to his orders without resistance, and after having sunk a great part of the vessels which he found there, retired well satisfied with the success of his enterprise.

Dionysius, after having wasted the enemy's country, returned, and sat down with his whole army before Motya;

and having employed a great number of hands in making dams and moles, he repaired the neck of land, and brought his engines to work on that side. The place was attacked and defended with the utmost vigor. After the besiegers had passed the breach, and entered the city, the besieged persisted a great while in defending themselves with incredible valor; so that it was necessary to pursue and drive them from house to house. The soldiers, enraged at so obstinate a defence, put all before them to the sword; regarding neither age, sex, nor condition, and sparing none except those who had taken refuge in the temples. The town was abandoned to the discretion of the soldiers; Dionysius being pleased with an occasion of attaching the troops to his service by the allurements and hope of gain.

The Carthaginians made an extraordinary effort the next year, and raised an army of three hundred thousand foot, and four thousand horse. The fleet under Mago's command consisted of four hundred galleys, and upwards of six hundred vessels laden with provisions and engines of war. Imilcar had given the captains of the fleet his orders sealed up, which were not to be opened till they were out at sea. He had taken this precaution, that his designs might be kept secret, and to prevent spies from sending advices of them to Sicily. The rendezvous was at Palermo; where the fleet arrived without much loss in their passage. Imilcar took Eryx by treachery, and soon after reduced Motya to surrender. Messina seemed to him a place of importance; because it might favor the landing of troops from Italy and Sicily, and interrupt the passage of those who should come from Peloponnesus. After a long and vigorous defence, it fell into his hands; and some time after he entirely demolished it.

Dionysius, seeing his forces extremely inferior to the enemy, retired to Syracuse. Almost all the people of Sicily, who hated him from the beginning, and were only reconciled to him in appearance, and out of fear, took this occasion to quit his party, and to join the Carthaginians. The tyrant levied new troops, and gave the slaves their liberty, that they might serve on board the fleet. His army amounted to thirty thousand foot, and three thousand horse, and his fleet to one hundred and eighty galleys. With these forces he took the field, and removed about eighteen leagues from Syracuse. Imilcar advanced continually with his land army, followed by his fleet, which kept near the coast. When he

arrived at Naxos, he could not continue his march upon the sea side, and was obliged to make a long circuit round mount *Ætna*, which by a new eruption had set the country about it on fire, and covered it with ashes. He ordered his fleet to wait his coming up at *Catana*. *Dionysius*, apprised of this, thought the opportunity favorable for attacking it, while separate from the land forces, and while his own, drawn up in battle upon the shore, might be of service to animate and support his fleet. The scheme was wisely concerted, but the success not answerable to it. *Leptinus*, his admiral, having advanced inconsiderately with thirty galleys, contrary to the opinion of *Dionysius*, who had particularly recommended to him not to divide his forces, at first sunk several of the enemy's ships; but upon being surrounded by a greater number, was forced to fly. His whole fleet followed his example, and was eagerly pursued by the *Carthaginians*. *Mago* detached boats full of soldiers, with orders to kill all who endeavored to save themselves by swimming to shore. The land army, drawn up there, saw them perish miserably, without being able to give them any assistance. The loss on the side of the *Sicilians* was very great; more than one hundred galleys being either taken or sunk, and twenty thousand men perishing either in the battle or the pursuit.

The *Sicilians*, who were afraid to shut themselves up in *Syracuse*, where they could not fail of being besieged very soon, solicited *Dionysius* to lead them against *Imilcar*, whom so bold an enterprise might disconcert; besides which, they should find his troops fatigued with their long and hasty march. The proposal pleased him at first; but upon reflecting that *Mago*, with the victorious fleet, might, notwithstanding, advance and take *Syracuse*, he thought it more advisable to return thither, which caused him the loss of many of his troops, who deserted in numbers on all sides. *Imilcar*, after a march of two days, arrived at *Catana*, where he halted some days to refresh his army, and refit his fleet, which had suffered exceedingly in a violent storm.

He then marched to *Syracuse*, and made his fleet enter the port in triumph. More than two hundred galleys, adorned with the spoils of their victory, made a noble appearance as they advanced; the crews forming a kind of concert by the uniform and regular order they observed in the motion of their oars. They were followed by a great number of smaller barks; so that the port, although very

large, was scarcely capable of containing them; the whole sea being in a manner covered with sails. At the same time, on the other side appeared the land army, consisting of three hundred thousand foot, and four thousand horse. Imilcar pitched his tent in the temple of Jupiter, and the army encamped around, at somewhat more than half a league's distance from the city. It is easy to judge the consternation and alarm which such a prospect must have given the Syracusans. The Carthaginian general advanced with his troops to the walls to offer the city battle, and at the same time seized upon the two remaining ports * by a detachment of one hundred galleys. As he saw no motion on the side of the Syracusans, he retired contented, for that time, with the enemy's confessing their inequality. For thirty days together he laid waste the country, cutting down all the trees, and destroying all before him. He then made himself master of the suburb called Achradina, and plundered the temples of Ceres and Proserpina. Foreseeing that the siege would be of long duration, he intrenched his camp, and enclosed it with strong walls, after having demolished for that purpose all the tombs, and among others that of Gelon and his wife Demarate, which was a monument of great magnificence. He built three forts at some distance from each other; the first at Pemmyra; the second towards the middle of the port; the third near the temple of Jupiter, for the security of his magazines of corn and wine. He sent also a great number of small vessels to Sardinia and Africa to fetch provisions.†

At the same time arrived Polyxenus, whom his brother-in-law Dionysius had despatched before into Italy and Greece for all the aid he could obtain, and brought with him a fleet of thirty ships, commanded by Pharacides the Lacedæmonian. This reinforcement came in very good time, and gave the Syracusans new spirit. Upon seeing a bark laden with provisions for the enemy, they detached five galleys and took it. The Carthaginians gave them chase with forty sail, to which they advanced with their whole fleet; and in the battle carried the admiral's galley, damaged many others, took twenty-four, pursued the rest to the place where their whole fleet rode, and offered them battle a second time, which the Carthaginians, discouraged by the check they had received, were afraid to accept.

The Syracusans, emboldened by so unexpected a victory,

* The little port, and that of Trogilus.

† Diod. pp. 286-296.

returned to the city with the galleys they had taken, and entered it in a kind of triumph. Animated by this success, which could only be ascribed to their valor (for Dionysius was then absent with a small detachment of the fleet to procure provisions, attended by Leptinus), they encouraged each other; and seeing they did not want arms, they reproached themselves with cowardice, ardently exclaiming that the time was come for throwing off the shameful yoke of servitude, and resuming their ancient liberty.

While they were in the midst of these discourses, dispersed in small parties, the tyrant arrived, and having summoned an assembly, he congratulated the Syracusans upon their late victory, and promised in a short time to put an end to the war, and to deliver them from the enemy. He was about to dismiss the assembly, when Theodorus, one of the most illustrious of the citizens, a person of sense and valor, took upon him to speak, and to declare boldly for liberty. "We are told," said he, "of restoring peace, terminating the war, and of being delivered from the enemy. What signifies such language from Dionysius? Can we have peace in the wretched state of slavery imposed upon us? Have we any enemy more to be dreaded than the enemy who subverts our liberty, or a war more cruel than that which he has made upon us for so many years? Let Imilear conquer, while he contents himself with laying a tribute upon us, and leaves us the exercise of our laws! The tyrant that enslaves us, knows no other but his avarice, his cruelty, his ambition! The temples of the gods, robbed by his sacrilegious hands, our goods made a prey, and our lands abandoned to his instruments, our persons daily exposed to the most shameful and cruel treatment, the blood of so many citizens shed in the midst of us, and before our eyes: these are the fruits of his reign, and the peace which he obtains for us! Was it for the support of our liberties he built yon citadel, that he has enclosed it with such strong walls and high towers, and has called in for his guard that tribe of strangers and barbarians who insult us with impunity? How long, Syracusans! shall we suffer such indignities, more insupportable to the brave and generous than death itself? Bold and intrepid abroad against the enemy, shall we always tremble like cowards in the presence of a tyrant? Providence, which has again put arms into our hands, directs us in the use of them! Sparta, and the other cities in our alliance, who hold it their glory to be free and in-

dependent, would deem us unworthy of the Grecian name if we had any other sentiments. Let us show that we do not degenerate from our ancestors. If Dionysius consents to retire from among us, let us open him our gates, and let him take along with him whatever he pleases : but if he persists in tyranny, let him experience what effects the love of liberty has upon the brave and resolute."

After this speech, all the Syracusans, in suspense between hope and fear, looked earnestly upon their allies, and particularly upon the Spartans. Pharacides, who commanded their fleet, rose up to speak. It was expected that a citizen of Sparta would declare in favor of liberty ; but he did quite the reverse ; and told them that his republic had sent him to the aid of the Syracusans and Dionysius, and not to make war upon Dionysius, or to subvert his authority. This answer confounded the Syracusans ; and the tyrant's guard arriving at the same time, the assembly broke up. Dionysius perceiving more than ever what he had to fear, used all his endeavors to ingratiate himself with the people, and to attach the citizens to his interests ; making presents to some, inviting others to eat with him, and affecting upon all occasions to treat them with kindness and familiarity.

It must have been about this time that Polyxenus, brother-in-law to Dionysius, who had married his sister Thesta, having without doubt declared against him in this conspiracy, fled from Sicily for the preservation of his life, and to avoid falling into the tyrant's hands. Dionysius sent for his sister, and reproached her very bitterly for not apprising him of her husband's intended flight, as she could not be ignorant of it. She replied, without expressing the least surprise or fear, "have I then appeared so bad a wife to you, and of so mean a soul, as to have abandoned my husband in his flight, and not to have desired to share in his dangers and misfortunes? No! I knew nothing of it, or I should have been much happier in being called the wife of Polyxenus the exile, in all places, than to be called in Syracuse the sister of the tyrant." Dionysius could not but admire an answer so full of spirit and generosity ; and the Syracusans in general were so charmed with her virtue, that after the tyranny was suppressed, the same honors, equipage, and train of a queen, which she had before enjoyed, were continued to her during her life ; and after her death the whole people attended her body to the tomb, and honored her funeral with an extraordinary appearance.*

* Plut. in Dion. p. 966.

On the side of the Carthaginians, affairs began suddenly to take a new face. They had committed an irretrievable error in not attacking Syracuse upon their arrival, and in not taking advantage of the consternation which the sight of a fleet and army, equally formidable, had occasioned. The plague, which was looked upon as a punishment sent from heaven for the plundering of temples and demolishing of tombs, had destroyed great numbers of their army in a short time. I have described the extraordinary symptoms of it in the history of the Carthaginians. To add to that misfortune, the Syracusans, being informed of their unhappy condition, attacked them in the night by sea and land. The surprise, terror, and even haste they were in, to put themselves into a posture of defence, threw them into new difficulty and confusion. They knew not on which side to send relief, all being equally in danger. Many of their vessels were sunk, and others almost entirely disabled, and a much greater number destroyed by fire. The old men, women, and children, ran in crowds to the walls to be witnesses of that scene of horror, and lifted up their hands towards heaven, returning thanks to the gods for so signal a protection of their city. The slaughter within and without the camp, and on board the vessels, was great and dreadful, and ended only with the day.

Imilear, reduced to despair, offered Dionysius secretly three hundred talents for permission to retire in the night with the remains of his army and fleet. The tyrant, who was not displeased with leaving the Carthaginians some resource, to keep his subjects in continual awe, gave his consent; but only for the citizens of Carthage. Upon which Imilear set out with the Carthaginians, and only forty ships, leaving the rest of his troops behind. The Corinthians, discovering from the noise and motion of the galleys, that Imilear was making his escape, sent to inform Dionysius of his flight, who affected ignorance of it, and gave immediate orders to pursue him: but as these orders were slowly executed, they followed the enemy themselves, and sunk several vessels of their rear-guard.

Dionysius then marched out with his troops; but before their arrival, the Sicilians in the Carthaginian service had retired to their several countries. Having first posted his troops in the passes, he advanced directly to the enemy's camp, though it was not quite day. The barbarians, who saw themselves cruelly abandoned and betrayed by Imilear

and the Sicilians, lost courage and fled. Some of them were taken by the troops in the passes; others laid down their arms, and asked for quarter. Only the Iberians drew up, and sent a herald to capitulate with Dionysius, who incorporated them into his guards. The rest were all made prisoners.

Such was the fate of the Carthaginians, which shows, says the historian, Diodorus Siculus, that humiliation succeeds pride, and that those who are too much puffed up with power and success are soon obliged to confess their weakness and vanity. These haughty victors, masters of almost all Sicily, who looked upon Syracuse as already their own, and who entered at first triumphant into the great port, insulting the citizens, were now reduced to fly shamefully under the covert of the night, dragging away with them the sad ruins and miserable remains of their fleet and army, and trembling for the fate of their native country. Imilcar, who had neither regarded the sacred refuge of temples, nor the inviolable sanctity of tombs, after having left one hundred and fifty thousand men unburied in the enemy's country, returned to perish miserably at Carthage, avenging upon himself by his death, the contempt which he had expressed for gods and men.

Dionysius, who was suspicious of the strangers in his service, removed ten thousand of them, and, under the pretence of rewarding their merit, gave them the city of Leontium, which was in reality very commodiously situated, and an advantageous settlement. He confided the guard of his person to other foreigners, and the slaves whom he had made free. He made several attempts upon places in Sicily, and in the neighboring country, especially against Rhegium.* The people of Italy, seeing themselves in danger, entered into a powerful alliance to put a stop to his conquests. The success was nearly equal on both sides.

About this time, the Gauls, who some months before had burned Rome, sent deputies to Dionysius, who was at that time in Italy, to make an alliance with him. The advices he had received of the great preparations making by the Carthaginians for war, obliged him to return to Sicily.†

The Carthaginians having set on foot a numerous army under the conduct of Mago, made new efforts against Syracuse, but with no better success than the former. They terminated in an accommodation with Dionysius.

* Diod. l. xiv. pp. 304-310.

† Justin. l. xx. c. 5.

He again attacked Rhegium, and at first received no inconsiderable check. But having gained a great victory over the Greeks of Italy, in which he took more than ten thousand prisoners, he dismissed them all without ransom, contrary to their expectation; with a view of dividing the Italians from the interests of Rhegium, and of dissolving a powerful league, which might have defeated his designs. Having by this action of favor and generosity acquired the good opinion of all the inhabitants of the country, and from enemies made them his friends and allies, he returned against Rhegium. He was extremely incensed against that city on account of their refusing to give him one of their citizens in marriage, and the insolent answer with which that refusal was attended. The besieged, finding themselves incapable of resisting so numerous an army as that of Dionysius, and expecting no quarter if the city should be taken by assault, began to talk of capitulating; to which he hearkened not unwillingly. He made them pay three hundred talents, deliver up all their vessels, to the number of seventy, and put one hundred hostages into his hands; after which he raised the seige. It was not out of favor and clemency that he acted in this manner, but to make their destruction sure, after having first reduced their power.*

Accordingly, the next year, under the false pretext, and with the reproach of their having violated the treaty, he besieged them again with all his forces, first sending back their hostages. Both parties acted with the utmost vigor. The desire of revenge on one side, and the fear of the greatest cruelties on the other, animated the troops. Those of the city were commanded by Phyto, a brave and intrepid man, whom the danger of his country rendered more courageous. He made frequent and destructive sallies. In one of them, Dionysius received a wound from which he recovered with great difficulty. The siege went on slowly, and had already continued eleven months, when a cruel famine reduced the city to the last extremities. A measure of wheat, of about six bushels, was sold for five minæ. After having consumed all their horses and beasts of carriage, they were obliged to support themselves with leather and hides, which they boiled; and at last to feed upon the grass of the fields like beasts; a resource of which Dionysius soon deprived them, by making his horse eat up all the herbage around the city. Necessity at length reduced them to sur-

* A. M. 3615. Ant. J. C. 386.

render at discretion; and Dionysius entered the place, which he found covered with dead bodies. Those who survived were rather skeletons than men. He took about six thousand prisoners, whom he sent to Syracuse. Such as could pay one minæ he dismissed, and sold the rest for slaves.

Dionysius let the whole weight of his resentment and revenge fall upon Phyto. He began with ordering his son to be thrown into the sea. The next day he ordered the father to be fastened to the extremity of the highest of his engines, for a spectacle to the whole army, and in that condition he sent to tell him that his son had been thrown into the sea. "Then he is happier than me by a day," replied that unfortunate parent. He afterwards caused him to be led through the whole city, to be scourged with rods, and to suffer a thousand other indignities, while a herald proclaimed "that the perfidious traitor was treated in that manner for having inspired the people of Rhegium with rebellion." "Say rather," answered that generous defender of his country's liberty, "that a faithful citizen is so used for having refused to sacrifice his country to a tyrant." Such an object and such a discourse drew tears from all eyes, and even from the soldiers of Dionysius. He was afraid that his prisoner would be taken from him before he had satiated his revenge, and ordered him to be thrown into the sea directly.

SECTION IV.—VIOLENT PASSION OF DIONYSIUS FOR POETRY. HIS DEATH AND BAD QUALITIES.

At an interval which the success against Rhegium had left, Dionysius the tyrant, who was fond of all kinds of glory, and prided himself upon the excellence of his genius, sent his brother Thearides to Olympia, to dispute in his name the prizes of the chariot-race and poetry.*

The circumstance of which I am about to treat, and which regards the taste or rather passion of Dionysius for poetry and polite learning, being one of his peculiar characteristics, and having besides a mixture of good and bad in itself, makes it requisite, for a right understanding of it, to distinguish wherein this taste of his is either laudable or worthy of blame.

I shall say much upon the tyrant's general character, with whose vices of ambition and tyranny many great

* Diod. l. xiv. p. 318.

qualities were united, which ought not to be disguised or misrepresented; the veracity of history requiring that justice should be done even to the most wicked, when they are not so in every respect. We have seen several things in his character that certainly deserve praise; I mean in regard to his manners and behavior; the mildness with which he suffered the freedom of young Dion; the admiration he expressed of the bold and generous answer of his sister Thesta upon account of her husband's flight; his gracious and insinuating deportment upon several other occasions to the Syracusans; the familiarity of his discourse with the meanest citizens, and even workmen; the equality he observed between his two wives, and his kindness and respect for them; all which imply that Dionysius had more equity, moderation, affability, and generosity, than is commonly ascribed to him. He is not such a tyrant as Phalaris, Alexander of Phæræ, Caligula, Nero, or Caracalla.

But, to return to the taste of Dionysius for poetry. In his intervals of leisure, he indulged in the conversation of persons of wit, and in the study of arts and sciences. He was particularly fond of versifying, and employed himself in the composition of poems, especially of tragedies. Thus far this passion of his may be excused, having something undoubtedly laudable in it; I mean in the taste for polite learning, the esteem he expressed for learned men, his inclination to do them kindnesses, and the application of his leisure hours. Was it not better to employ them in the exercise of his wit, and the cultivation of science, than in feasting, dancing, theatrical amusements, gaming, frivolous company, and other pleasures still more pernicious, as Dionysius the younger wisely remarked when at Corinth. Philip of Macedon, being at table with him, spoke of the odes and tragedies which his father had left behind him, with an air of railery and contempt, and seemed to be under some difficulty to comprehend at what time of his life he had leisure for such compositions; Dionysius smartly replied, "The difficulty is very great indeed! Why, he composed them at those hours which you and I, and many others, as we have reason to believe, pass in drinking and other diversions." *

Julius Cæsar, and the emperor Augustus, applied themselves to poetry, and composed tragedies. Lucullus intended to have written the memoirs of his military actions in

* Plut. in Timol. p. 243. Plut. in Lucul. p. 492.

verse. The comedies of Terence were attributed to Lelius and Scipio, both great captains, especially the latter; and that report was so far from lessening their reputation at Rome, that it added to the general esteem for them.*

These relaxations of mind therefore were not censurable in their own nature; this taste for poetry was rather laudable, if kept within due bounds; but Dionysius was ridiculous for pretending to excel all others in it. He could not endure either a superior or competitor in any thing. From being in the sole possession of supreme authority, he had accustomed himself to imagine his wit of the same rank with his power; in a word, he was in every thing a tyrant. His immoderate estimation of his own merit, flowed in some measure from the overbearing turn of mind which empire and command had given him. The continual applauses of a court, and the flatteries of those who knew how to recommend themselves by his darling foible, were another source of this vain conceit. What is there, indeed, that a great man, a minister, or a prince, who is continually receiving such incense, will not think himself capable of?† It is well known that Cardinal Richelieu, in the midst of the greatest affairs, not only composed dramatic poems, but prided himself on his excellency that way; and what is more, his jealousy in that point rose so high as to use his authority by way of criticism upon the compositions of those, to whom the public, a just and incorruptible judge in the question, had given the preference against him.

Dionysius did not reflect that there are things, in which, though estimable in themselves, and honorable in private persons, it does not become a prince to desire to excel. I have mentioned elsewhere Philip of Macedon's expression to his son, upon his having shown too much skill in music at a public entertainment; "Are you not ashamed," said he, "to sing so well?" It was acting inconsistently with the dignity of his character. If Cæsar and Augustus, when they wrote tragedies, had desired to equal or excel Sophocles, it had not only been ridiculous, but a reproach to them. And the reason is, because a prince, being obliged by an essential and indispensable duty to apply himself incessantly to the affairs of government, and having a multiplicity of various business always recurring to him, can make no other use of the sciences than to divert him, at such short

* Suet. in Cæs. c. lvi. in August. c. lxxxv.

† —Nihil est quod credere de se
Non possit, cum laudatur diis æqua potestas.—Juvenal.

intervals as will not admit any great progress in them, nor a hope of excelling those who employ themselves in no other study. Hence, when the public sees a prince affect the first rank in this kind of merit, it may justly conclude, that he neglects his more important duties, and he owes to his people's happiness, to give himself up to an employment which wastes his time and application of mind ineffectually.

We must, however, do Dionysius the justice to own that he never was reproachable for letting poetry interfere to the prejudice of his great affairs, or that it made him less active and diligent on any important occasion.

I have already said that this prince in an interval of peace, had sent his brother Thearides to Olympia, to dispute the prize of poetry and the chariot race in his name. When he arrived in the assembly, the beauty as well as number of his chariots, and the magnificence of his pavilion, embroidered with gold and silver, attracted the eyes and admiration of all the spectators. The ear was no less charmed when the poems of Dionysius were read. He had chosen expressly for the occasion, readers, called *ραψωδοι*, with sonorous, musical voices, who might be heard far and distinctly, and who knew how to give a just emphasis and measure to the verses which they repeated. At first this had a very happy effect, and the whole audience were deceived by the art and sweetness of the pronounciation. But that was soon at an end, and the mind not long amused by the ears. The verses then appeared in all their ridicule. The audience were ashamed of having applauded them; and their praise was turned into laughter, scorn, and insult. To express their contempt and indignation, they tore the rich pavilion of Dionysius in pieces. Lycius, the celebrated orator, who had come to the Olympic games to dispute the prize of eloquence, which he had carried several times before, undertook to prove that it was inconsistent with the honor of Greece, the friend and asserter of liberty, to admit to share in the celebration of the sacred games, an impious tyrant who had no other thoughts than of subjecting all Greece to his power. Dionysius was not then affronted in that manner, but the event proved almost equally disgraceful to him. His chariots having entered the lists, were all of them carried out of the course by a headlong impetuosity, or dashed in pieces against one another. And to complete the misfortune, the galley, which carried the persons whom Dionysius

had sent to the games, met with a violent storm, and did not return to Syracuse without great difficulty. When the pilots arrived there, out of hatred and contempt for the tyrant, they reported throughout the city that it was his vile poems which had occasioned so many miscarriages to the readers, racers, and even the ship itself. This bad success did not at all discourage Dionysius, nor make him abate any thing in his high opinion of his poetic talent. The flatterers, who abounded in his court, did not fail to insinuate that such injurious treatment of his poems could proceed only from envy, which always fastens upon what is most excellent; and that sooner or later, the invidious themselves would be constrained by demonstration to do justice to his merit, and acknowledge his superiority to all other poets.*

The extravagance of Dionysius in that respect was inconceivable. He was undoubtedly a great warrior, and an excellent captain; but he fancied himself a much better poet, and believed that his verses were a far greater honor to him than all his victories. To attempt to undeceive him in an opinion so favorable to himself, had been an ill way of making court to him; so that all the learned men and poets, who eat at his table in great numbers, seemed to be in an ecstacy of admiration whenever he read them his poems. Never, according to them, was there any thing to be compared with them; all was great, all noble in his poetry; all was majestic, or to speak more properly, all divine.†

Philoxenus was the only one among them who did not run with the stream into excessive praise and flattery. He was a man of great reputation, and excelled in dithyrambic poetry. There is a story told of him, which Fontaine has applied admirably. Being at table with Dionysius, and seeing a very small fish set before him, and a large one before the king, he laid his ear close to the little fish. He was asked the meaning of that pleasantry: "I was inquiring," said he, "about some affairs that happened in the reign of Nereus; but this young native of the floods can give me no information; yours is elder, and without doubt knows something of the matter."

Dionysius having read one day some of his verses to Philoxenus, and having pressed him to give his opinion of them, he answered with entire freedom, and told him plainly his real sentiments. Dionysius, who was not accus-

* Diod. l. xiv. p. 318.

† Diod. l. xv. p. 331.

tomed to such language, was extremely offended; and ascribing his boldness to envy, gave orders to carry him to the mines, the common jail being so called. The whole court were afflicted upon this account, and solicited for the generous prisoner, whose release they obtained. He was enlarged the next day, and restored to favor.

At the entertainment made that day by Dionysius for the same guests, which was a kind of ratification of the pardon, and at which they were for that reason more than usually gay and cheerful; after they had plentifully regaled a great while, the prince did not fail to introduce his poems into the conversation, which were the most frequent subject of it. He chose some passages which he had taken extraordinary pains in composing, and conceived to be masterpieces, as was very discernible from the self-satisfaction and complacency he expressed while they were read. But his delight could not be perfect without the approbation of Philoxenus, upon which he set the greater value, as it was not his custom to be so profuse of it as the rest. What had passed the evening before was a sufficient lesson for the poet. When Dionysius asked his thoughts of the verses, Philoxenus made no answer; but, turning towards the guards, who always stood round the table, he said in a serious, though humorous tone, without any emotion. "Carry me back to the mines." The prince took all the force and spirit of that ingenious pleasantry without being offended. The sprightliness of the conceit atoned for its freedom, which at another time would have touched him to the quick, and made him excessively angry. He only laughed at it, but did not make it a cause of quarrel with the poet.

He did not manifest the same temper upon a gross jest by Antiphon, which was indeed of a different kind, and seemed to argue a violent and bloody intention. The prince in conversation asked which was the best kind of brass? After the company had given their opinions, Antiphon said, "that was the best of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made."* This witty expression, if it may be called so, cost him his life.†

The friends of Philoxenus, apprehending that his too great liberty might be also attended with fatal consequences, represented to him in the most serious manner, that those

* The deliverers of Athens from the tyranny of the Pisistratides.

† Plut. Moral. p. 78, et 883.

who live with princes must speak their language; that they hate to hear any thing not agreeable to themselves; that whoever does not know how to dissemble, is not qualified for a court; that the favors and liberalities which Dionysius continually bestowed upon them, well deserved the return of complaisance; that, in a word, with his blunt freedom, and plain truth, he was in danger of losing not only his fortune, but his life. Philoxenus told them that he would take their good advice, and for the future give such a turn to his answers, as should satisfy Dionysius without injuring truth.

Accordingly, some time after, Dionysius having read a piece of his composing upon a very mournful subject, wherein he wished to move compassion and draw tears from the eyes of the audience, addressed himself again to Philoxenus, and asked him his opinion of it. Philoxenus answered him by one word, *Οιζυρα*, which in the Greek language has two different significations. In one of them it implies mournful moving things, such as inspire sentiments of pity and compassion; in the other, it expresses something very mean, defective, pitiful, and miserable. Dionysius, who was fond of his verses, and believed that every body must have the same good opinion of them, took that word in the favorable construction, and was extremely satisfied with Philoxenus. The rest of the company were not mistaken, but understood it in the right sense, though without explaining themselves.

Nothing could cure his folly for versification. It appears from Diodorus Siculus,* that having sent his poems a second time to Olympia, they were treated with the same ridicule and contempt as before. That news which could not be kept from him, threw him into an excess of melancholy, which he could never get over, and turned soon after into a kind of madness and frenzy. He complained that envy and jealousy, the certain enemies of true merit, were always at war with him, and that all the world conspired to the ruin of his reputation. He accused his best friends with the same design; some of them he put to death, and others he banished; among whom were Leptinus his brother, and Philistus, who had done him such great services, and to whom he was obliged for his power. They retired to Thurium in Italy, from whence they were recalled some time after, and reinstated in all their fortunes and his favor;

particularly Leptinus, who married the daughter of Dionysius.

To remove his melancholy for the ill success of his verses, it was necessary to find some employment, with which his wars and buildings supplied him. He had formed a design of establishing powerful colonies in the part of Italy situated upon the Adriatic sea, opposite to Epirus; in order that his fleet might not want a secure retreat, when he should employ his forces on that side; and with this view he made an alliance with the Illyrians, and restored Alcetes, king of the Molossians, to his throne. His principal design was to attack Epirus; and to make himself master of the immense treasures which had been for many ages amassing in the temple of Delphos. Before he could set this project on foot, which required great preparations, he seemed to make an essay of his genius for it, by another of the same kind, though of much more easy execution. Having made a sudden irruption into Tuscany, under the pretence of pursuing pirates, he plundered a very rich temple in the suburbs of Agyllum, a city of that country, and carried away a sum exceeding one thousand five hundred talents. He had occasion for money to support his great expense at Syracuse, as well in fortifying the port, and to make it capable of receiving two hundred galleys, as to enclose the whole city with good walls, erect magnificent temples, and build a place of exercise upon the banks of the river Anapus.*

At the same time he formed the design of driving the Carthaginians entirely out of Sicily. A first victory which he gained put him almost in a condition to accomplish his project; but the loss of a second battle, in which his brother Leptinus was killed, put an end to his hopes, and obliged him to enter into a treaty, by which he gave up several towns to the Carthaginians, and paid them great sums of money to reimburse their expenses in the war. An attempt which he made upon them some years after, in taking advantage of the desolation occasioned by the plague at Carthage, was equally unsuccessful.†

Another victory of a very different kind, though not less desirable to him, made him amends, or at least comforted him for the ill-success of his arms. He had caused a tragedy of his to be represented at Athens for the prize in the celebrated feast of Bacchus, and was declared victor. Such a victory with the Athenians, who were the best judges of

* *Diod. l. xv. pp. 336, 337.*

† See the history of the Carthaginians.

this kind of literature, seems to argue that the poetry of Dionysius was not so mean and pitiful, and that it is very possible the aversion of the Greeks for every thing which came from a tyrant had a great share in the contemptuous sentence passed upon his poems in the Olympic games. However that may be, Dionysius received the news with inexpressible transports of joy. Public thanksgivings were made to the gods, the temples being scarcely capable of containing the concourse of the people. Nothing was seen throughout the city, but feasting and rejoicing; and Dionysius regaled all his friends with the most extraordinary magnificence. Self-satisfied to a degree that cannot be described, he believed himself at the summit of glory, and did the honors of his table with a gayety and ease, and at the same time with a grace and dignity, that charmed all the world. He invited his guests to eat and drink more by his example than expressions, and carried the civilities of that kind to such an excess that at the close of the banquet he was seized with violent pains, occasioned by an indigestion, of which it was not difficult to foresee the consequences.*

Dionysius had three children by his wife Doris, and four by Aristomache, two of which were daughters, the one named Sophrosyne, the other Arete. Sophrosyne was married to his eldest son, Dionysius the younger, whom he had by his Locrian wife, and Arete espoused her brother Theorides. But Theorides dying soon, Dion married his widow Arete, who was his own niece.†

As the distemper of Dionysius left no hopes for his life, Dion took upon him to discourse to him upon his children by Aristomache, who were at the same time his brothers-in-law and nephews, and to insinuate to him that it was just to prefer the issue of his Syracusan wife to that of a stranger. But the physicians, desirous of making their court to young Dionysius, the Locrian's son, for whom the throne was intended, did not give him time to alter his purpose: for Dionysius, having demanded a medicine that would make him sleep, they gave him so strong a dose, as quite stupified his senses, and laid him in a sleep that continued for the rest of his life. He had reigned thirty-eight years.

He was certainly a prince of very great political and military abilities, and had occasion for them all in raising himself as he did from a mean condition to so high a rank.

* Diod. l. xv. pp. 384, 385.

† Plut. in Dion. p. 969.

After having held the sovereignty thirty-eight years, he transmitted it peaceably to a successor of his own issue and election; and had established his power upon such solid foundations, that his son, notwithstanding the slenderness of his capacity for governing, retained it twelve years after his death. All which could not have been effected without a great fund of merit as to his capacity. But what qualities could cover the vices which rendered him the object of his subjects' abhorrence? His ambition knew neither law nor limitation; his avarice spared nothing, not even the most sacred places; his cruelty had often no regard to the affinity of blood; and his open and professed impiety only acknowledged the Divinity to insult him.

In his return to Syracuse, with a very favorable wind, from plundering the temple of Proserpine at Locris, "See," said he to his friends with a smile of contempt, "how the immortal gods favor the navigation of the sacrilegious!"

Having occasion for money to carry on the war against the Carthaginians, he plundered the temple of Jupiter, and took from that god a robe of solid gold, which ornament Hiero the tyrant had given him out of the spoils of the Carthaginians. He even jested upon that occasion, saying that a robe of gold was much too heavy in summer, and too cold in winter; and at the same time ordered one of wool to be thrown over the god's shoulders; adding, that such a habit would be commodious in all seasons.*

At another time he ordered the golden beard of Æsculapius of Epidaurus to be taken off; assigning as a reason, that it was very inconsistent for the son to have a beard, when the father had none.†

He caused all the tables of silver to be taken out of the temples; and as there was generally inscribed upon them, according to the custom of the Greeks, "to the good gods;" he would, he said, take the benefit of their goodness.

As for less prizes, such as cups, and crowns of gold, which the statues held in their hands, he carried them off without any ceremony; saying, it was not taking, but receiving them; and that it was idle and ridiculous to ask the gods perpetually for good things, and to refuse them, when they held out their hands themselves to present them to you. These spoils were carried by his order to the market, and sold at public sale; and when he had got the money for

* Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. xv. n. 83. 84.

† Æsculapius was the son of Apollo, who was represented without a beard.

them, he ordered proclamation to be made, that whoever had in their custody any things taken out of sacred places, should restore them entire, within a limited time, to the temples from whence they were brought; adding in this manner to his impiety to the gods, injustice to man.

The amazing precautions which Dionysius thought necessary to the security of his life, show to what anxiety and apprehension he was abandoned. He wore under his robe a cuirass of brass. He never harangued the people but from the top of a high tower; and thought proper to make himself invulnerable by being inaccessible. Not daring to confide in any of his friends or relations, his guard was composed of slaves and strangers. He went abroad as little as possible; fear obliged him to condemn himself to a kind of imprisonment.* These extraordinary precautions were used without doubt only at certain intervals of his reign, when frequent conspiracies against him had rendered him more timid and suspicious than usual; for at other times we have seen that he conversed freely enough with the people, and was accessible even to familiarity. In those dark days of distrust and fear, he fancied that he saw all mankind in arms against him. A word which escaped his barber, who boasted, by way of jest, "that he held a razor at the tyrant's throat every week," cost him his life.† From thenceforth, in order not to abandon his head and life to the hands of a barber, he made his daughters, though very young, perform that despicable office; and when they were more advanced in years, he took the scissiors and razors from them, and taught them to singe off his beard with nut-shells. He was at last reduced to do himself that office, not daring, it seems, to trust even his own daughters any longer.‡ He never went into the chamber of his wives at night, till they had been first searched with the utmost care and circumspection. His bed was surrounded with a very broad and deep trench, with a small draw-bridge over it for the entrance. After having well locked and bolted the doors of his apartment, he drew up the bridge, that he might sleep in security. Neither his brother, nor even his sons, could be admitted into his chamber without first changing their clothes, and being visited by the guards.§ Is passing one's days in such a continual circle of distrust and terror, to live, to reign?

In the midst of all his greatness, possessed of riches, and

* Tusc. Quest. l. v. n. 57, 63.

† Cie. de Offic. i. ii. n. 54.

‡ Plut. de Garrul. p. 503.

§ Plut. in Dion. p. 961.

surrounded with pleasures of every kind, during a reign of nearly forty years, notwithstanding all his presents and profusions, he never was capable of making a single friend. He passed his life with none but trembling slaves and sordid flatterers, and never tasted the joy of loving, or of being beloved, nor the charms of social truth and reciprocal confidence. This he owed himself upon an occasion not unworthy of repetition.

Damon and Pythias had both been educated in the principles of the Pythagorean philosophy, and were united to each other in the strictest ties of friendship, which they had mutually sworn to observe with inviolable fidelity, which was put to a severe trial. One of them being condemned to die by the tyrant, petitioned for permission to make a journey into his own country, to settle his affairs, promising to return at a fixed time, the other generously offering to be his security. The courtiers, and Dionysius in particular, expected with impatience the event of so delicate and extraordinary an adventure. The day fixed for his return drawing nigh, and he not appearing, every body began to blame the rash and imprudent zeal of his friend, who had bound himself in such a manner. But he, far from expressing any fear or concern, replied with tranquillity in his looks, and confidence in his expressions, that he was assured his friend would return, as he accordingly did upon the day and hour agreed. The tyrant, struck with admiration at so uncommon an instance of fidelity, and softened with the view of so amiable a union, granted him his life, and desired to be admitted as a third person into their friendship.*

He expressed with equal ingenuity, on another occasion, what he thought of his condition. One of his courtiers, named Damocles, was perpetually extolling with rapture his treasures, grandeur, the number of his troops, the extent of his dominions, the magnificence of his palaces, and the universal abundance of all good things and enjoyments in his possession; always repeating that never man was happier than Dionysius. "Because you are of that opinion," said the tyrant to him one day, "will you taste, and make proof of my felicity in person?" The offer was accepted with joy. Damocles was placed upon a golden bed, covered with carpets of inestimable value. The side-boards were loaded with vessels of gold and silver. The most beautiful slaves in the most splendid habits stood around, watching the least

* Cic. de Offic. l. iii. n. 43. Val. Max. l. iv. c. 7.

signal to serve him. The most exquisite essences and perfumes had not been spared. The table was spread with proportionate magnificence. Damocles was all joy, and looked upon himself as the happiest man in the world; when, unfortunately casting up his eyes, he beheld over his head the point of a sword, which hung from the roof by a single horse-hair. He was immediately seized with a cold sweat; every thing disappeared in an instant; he could see nothing but the sword, nor think of any thing but his danger. In the height of his fear he desired permission to retire, and declared that he would be happy no longer: a very natural image of the life of a tyrant. And yet Dionysius reigned, as I have observed before, thirty-eight years.*

CHAPTER II.

THIS chapter includes the history of Dionysius the younger, tyrant of Syracuse, son of the former; and that of Dion his near relation.

SECTION I.—DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER SUCCEEDS HIS FATHER. HE INVITES PLATO TO HIS COURT.

Dionysius the elder was succeeded by one of his sons of his own name, commonly called Dionysius the younger.† After his father's funeral had been solemnized with the utmost magnificence, he assembled the people, and desired that they would have the same good inclinations for him as they had manifested towards his father. They were very different from each other in their character: for the latter was as peaceable and calm in his disposition, as the former was active and enterprising; which would have been no disadvantage to his people, had that mildness and moderation been the effect of a wise and judicious understanding, and not of natural sloth and indolence of temper.‡

It was surprising to see Dionysius the younger take quiet possession of the tyranny after the death of his father, as of a right of inheritance, notwithstanding the passion of the Syracusans for liberty, which could not but revive upon so favorable an occasion, and the weakness of a young prince undistinguished by his merit, and void of experience. It

* Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. v. n. 61, 62.

† A. M. 3632. *Ant. J. C.* 372. *Diod.* l. xv. p. 385. ‡ *Idem.* l. xvi. p. 410.

seemed as if the last years of the elder Dionysius, who had applied himself towards the close of his life in making his subjects taste the advantages of his government, had in some measure reconciled them to the tyranny; especially after his exploits by sea and land had acquired him a great reputation, and infinitely exalted the glory of the Syracusan power, which he had found means to render formidable to Carthage itself, as well as to the most powerful states of Greece and Italy. Besides which, it was to be feared that, should they attempt a change in the government, the sad consequences of a civil war might deprive them of all those advantages; and at the same time the gentle and humane disposition of young Dionysius gave them reason to entertain the most favorable hopes for the future. He therefore peaceably ascended his father's throne.*

Dion, the bravest, and at the same time the wisest of the Syracusans, brother-in-law of Dionysius, might have been of great support to him, had he known how to make use of his counsels. In the first assembly held by Dionysius and all his friends, Dion spoke in so wise a manner upon what was necessary and expedient in the present conjuncture, as showed that the rest were like infants in comparison with him, and, in regard to a just boldness and freedom of speech, were no more than despicable slaves of the tyranny, solely employed in the abject endeavor of pleasing the prince. But what surprised and amazed them most was, that Dion, at a time when the whole court were struck with terror at the prospect of the storm forming on the side of Carthage, and just ready to break upon Sicily, should insist, that if Dionysius desired peace, he would embark immediately for Africa, and dispel this tempest to his satisfaction; or if he preferred the war, that he would himself furnish and maintain fifty galleys of three benches, completely equipped for service.†

Dionysius greatly admiring and extolling his generous magnanimity, professed the highest gratitude to him for his zeal and affection; but the courtiers who looked upon Dion's magnificence as a reproach to themselves, and his great power as a diminution of their own, took immediate occasion from thence to calumniate him, and spared no discourse

* The history of England presents something similar to this in the famous Cromwell, who died in his bed with as much tranquillity as the best of princes, and was interred with the same honors and pomp as the most lawful sovereign. Richard his son succeeded him and was for some time in equal authority with his father, though he had not any of his great qualities.

† Plut. in Dion. pp. 960, 961.

that might influence the young prince against him. They insinuated that, in making himself strong at sea, he would open his way to the tyranny; and that he designed to transport the sovereignty on board his vessels to his nephews, the sons of Aristomache.

But what displeased them most with Dion, was his manner of life, which was a continual reproach to theirs. For these courtiers having presently insinuated themselves, and got the ascendancy of the young tyrant, who had been wretchedly educated, thought of nothing but of supplying him perpetually with new amusements, keeping him always employed in feasting, abandoned to women and all manner of shameful pleasures. In the beginning of his reign he made a debauch which continued for three months; during which time, his palace, shut against all persons of sense and reason, was crowded with drunkards, and resounded with nothing but low buffoonery, obscene jests, lewd songs, dances, masquerades, and every kind of gross and dissolute extravagance. It is therefore natural to believe, that nothing could be more offensive and disgusting to them than the presence of Dion, who indulged in none of these pleasures. For which reason, painting his virtues in such of the colors of vice as were most likely to disguise them, they found means to calumniate him with the prince, and to make his gravity pass for arrogance, and his freedom of speech for insolence and sedition. If he advanced any wise counsel, they treated him as a sour pedagogue, who took upon him to obtrude his lectures, and to school his prince without being asked; and if he refused to share in the debauch with the rest, they called him a misanthrope, a splenetic melancholy wretch, who from the fantastic height of virtue looked down with contempt on the rest of the world, of whom he set himself up for the censor.*

And indeed it must be confessed that he had naturally something austere and rigid in his manners and behavior, which seemed to argue a haughtiness of nature, very likely to disgust a young prince, nurtured from his infancy amid flatteries and submissions. But his best friends and those who were most nearly attached to him, full of admiration for his integrity, fortitude, and nobleness of sentiments, represented to him, that for a statesman, who ought to know how to adapt himself to the different dispositions of men, and to apply them to his purposes, his temper was too harsh

* Athen. l. x. p. 435.

and forbidding. Plato afterwards took pains to correct that defect in him, by making him intimate with a philosopher of a gay and polite turn of mind, whose conversation was very proper to inspire him with more easy and insinuating manners. He observes also upon that failing, in a letter to him, wherein he speaks in this manner: "consider, I beseech you, that you are censured with being deficient in point of good nature and affability; and be fully assured, that the most certain means to the success of affairs is to be agreeable to the persons with whom we have to act. A haughty deportment keeps people at a distance, and obliges a man to pass his life in solitude."* Notwithstanding this defect he continued to be highly considered at court; where his superior abilities and transcendant merit made him absolutely necessary, especially at a time when the state was threatened with great danger and emergency.

As he believed that all the vices of young Dionysius were the effect of his bad education, and entire ignorance of his duty, he conceived, justly, that the best remedy would be, to associate him, if possible, with persons of wit and sense, whose solid, but agreeable conversation, might at once instruct and divert him, for the prince did not naturally want capability and genius.†

The sequel will show that Dionysius the younger had a natural propensity to what was good and virtuous, and a taste and capacity for arts and sciences. He knew how to set a value upon the merits and talents by which men are distinguished. He delighted in conversing with persons of ability, and from his correspondence with them, made himself capable of the highest improvements. He went so far as to familiarize the throne with the sciences, which of themselves have little or no access to it; and by rendering them in a manner his favorites, he gave them courage to make their appearance in courts. His protection was the patent of nobility, by which he raised them to honor and distinction. Nor was he insensible to the joys of friendship. In private he was a good parent, relation, and master, and acquired the affection of all who approached him. He was not naturally inclined to violence or cruelty, and it might be said of him, that he was rather a tyrant by succession and inheritance, than by temper and inclination.

* *Ἡ δ' αὐθάδεια ἐρημία ξίνοικος.* Plat. Epist. iv.—M. Davier translates these words, "pride is always the companion of solitude." I have shown wherein this version is faulty.—*Art of teaching the Belles Lettres*, Vol. III. p. 505.

† Plut. in Dion. p. 962. Plat. Epist. vii. 327, 328.

We may hence conclude that he might have made a very tolerable prince (not to say a good one), had an early and proper care been taken to cultivate the happy disposition which he brought with him into the world. But his father, to whom all merit, even in his own children, gave umbrage, industriously suppressed in him all tendency to goodness, and every noble and elevated sentiment, by a base and obscure education, with the view of preventing his attempting any thing against himself. It was therefore desirable that a person of Dion's character should be thrown in the way of Dionysius, or rather that the prince should be impressed with a desire to find such a friend.

This was what Dion labored at with wonderful address. He often talked to him of Plato, as the most profound and illustrious of philosophers, whose merit he had experienced, and to whom he was obliged for all he knew. He enlarged upon the elevation of his genius, the extent of his knowledge, the amiableness of his character, and the charms of his conversation. He represented him particularly as the man of the world most capable of forming him in the arts of governing, upon which his own and the people's happiness depended. He told him that his subjects, governed for the future with lenity and indulgence, as a good father governs his family, would voluntarily render that obedience to his moderation and justice, which force and violence extorted from them against their will; and that by such a conduct he would, from a tyrant, become a just king, to whom all submission would be paid out of affection and gratitude.

It is incredible how much these discourses, introduced in conversation from time to time, as if by accident, without affectation, or the appearance of any premeditated design, inflamed the young prince with the desire of knowing and conversing with Plato. He wrote to him in the most importunate and obliging manner to that purpose; he despatched couriers after couriers to hasten his voyage: while Plato, who apprehended the consequences, and had little hopes of any good effect from it, protracted the affair, and without absolutely refusing, sufficiently intimated, that he could not resolve upon it without doing violence to himself. The obstacles and difficulties made to the young prince's request, were so far from disgusting him, that they only served, as it commonly happens, to inflame his desire. The Pythagorean philosophers of Grecia Major in Italy joined their entreaties with his and Dion's, who, on

his part, redoubled his instances, and used the strongest arguments to conquer Plato's repugnance. "This is not," said he, "the concern of a private person, but of a powerful prince, whose change of manners will have the same effect throughout his whole dominion, with the extent of which you are not unacquainted. It is himself who makes all these advances; who importunes and solicits you to come to his assistance, and employs the interests of all your friends to that purpose. What more favorable conjuncture could we expect from the divine providence, than that which offers itself? Are you not afraid that your delays will give the flatterers who surround the young prince, the opportunity of drawing him over to themselves, and of seducing him to change his resolution? What reproaches would you not make yourself, and what dishonor would it not be to philosophy, should it ever be said that Plato, whose counsels to Dionysius might have established a wise and equitable government in Sicily, abandoned it all to the evils of tyranny, rather than undergo the fatigues of a voyage, or from I know not what other imaginary difficulties?"

Plato could not resist solicitations of so much force. Vanquished by the consideration of his own character, and to obviate the reproach of his being a philosopher in words only, without having ever shown himself such in his actions, and conscious besides of the great advantages which Sicily might acquire from his voyage, he suffered himself to be persuaded.*

The flatterers of the court of Dionysius, terrified with the resolution he had taken, contrary to their remonstrances, and fearing the presence of Plato, the consequences of which they foresaw, united against him as their common enemy. They rightly judged that, if, according to the new maxims of government, all things were to be measured by the standard of true merit, and no favor to be expected from the prince but for the services done to the state, they had nothing farther to expect, and might wait their whole lives at court to no manner of purpose. They therefore spared no pains to render Plato's voyage ineffectual, though they were not able to prevent it. They prevailed upon Dionysius to recall Philistus from banishment, who was not only an able soldier but a great historian, very eloquent and learned, and a zealous advocate for the tyranny. They hoped to find a counterpoise in him against Plato and his philosophy.

* Plut. p. 962.

Upon his being banished by Dionysius the elder, on some personal discontent, he retired into the city of Adria, where it was believed he composed the greatest part of his writings. He wrote the history of Egypt in twelve books, that of Sicily in eleven, and of Dionysius the tyrant in six; all which works are entirely lost.* Cicero praises him much, and calls him Thucydides the Less, "pene pusillus Thucydides," † to signify that he copied after that author not unhappily. The courtiers at the same time made complaints against Dion to Dionysius, accusing him of having held conferences with Herodotus and Heraclides, the secret enemies of that prince, upon measures for subverting the tyranny.

This was the state of affairs when Plato arrived in Sicily. He was received with infinite caresses, and with the highest marks of honor and respect. Upon his landing, he found one of the prince's chariots, equally magnificent in its horses and ornaments, waiting for him. The tyrant offered a sacrifice, as if some singular instance of good fortune had befallen him; nor was he mistaken, for a wise man, who is capable of giving a prince good counsels, is a treasure of inestimable value to a whole nation. But the worth of such a person is rarely known, and more rarely applied to the uses which might be made of it. ‡

Plato found the most happy dispositions imaginable in young Dionysius, who applied himself entirely to his lessons and counsels. But as he had improved infinitely from the precepts and example of Socrates his master, the most capable of all the pagan world in forming the mind for a right taste of truth, he took care to adapt himself with wonderful address to the young tyrant's humor, avoiding all direct attacks upon his passions; taking pains to acquire his confidence by kind and insinuating behavior; and particularly endeavoring to render virtue amiable, and at the same time triumphant over vice, which keeps mankind in its chains by the sole force of allurements, pleasures, and voluptuousness.

The change was sudden and surprising. The young prince, who had abandoned himself till then, to idleness, pleasure, and luxury, and was ignorant of all the duties of his character, the inevitable consequence of a dissolute life,

* Diod. l. xlii. p. 222.

† Hunc (Thucydidem) consecutus est Syracusius Philistus, qui cum Dionysii tyranni familiarissimus esset, otium suum consumpsit in historia scribenda, maximeque Thucydidem est, sicut mihi videtur, imitatus.—Cic. de Orat. l. ii. n. 57.

Siculus ille creber, acutus, brevis, pene pusillus Thucydides.—Id. Epist. xlii. ad Q. Frat. l. ii.

‡ Plut. in Dion. p. 963.

awaking as from a lethargic sleep, began to open his eyes, to have some idea of the beauty of virtue, and to relish the refined pleasure of conversation, equally solid and agreeable. He was now passionately fond of learning and instruction, as he had once been averse and repugnant to them. The court, which always imitates the prince, and follows his inclinations in every thing, entered into the same way of thinking. The apartments of the palace, like so many schools of geometry, were full of the dust made use of by the professors of that science in tracing their figures ; and in a very short time the study of philosophy, and of every kind of literature, became the reigning and universal taste.

The great benefit of these studies in regard to a prince, does not consist alone in storing his mind with an infinity of the most curious, useful, and often necessary notions of things, but has the farther advantage of abstracting himself from idleness, indolence, and the frivolous amusements of a court ; of habituating him to a life of application and reflection ; of inspiring him with a passion to inform himself in the duties of the sovereignty, and to know the characters of such as have excelled in the art of reigning ; in a word, of making himself capable of governing the state in his own person, and of seeing every thing with his own eyes ; that is to say, to be indeed a king ; but what the courtiers and flatterers are almost always unanimous in opposing.

They were considerably alarmed by a word that escaped Dionysius, and showed how much he was affected with the discourses he had heard upon the happiness of a king, regarded with tender affection by his people as their common father, and the wretched condition of a tyrant, whom they abhor and detest. Some days after Plato's arrival, was the anniversary, on which a solemn sacrifice was offered in the palace for the prince's prosperity. The herald having prayed to this effect according to custom, "that it would please the gods to support the tyranny, and preserve the tyrant ;" Dionysius, who was not far from him, and to whom these terms began to grow odious, called out to him aloud, "will you not give over cursing me?" Philistus and his party were infinitely alarmed at that expression, and judged from it, that time and habit must give Plato an irresistible influence over Dionysius, if the correspondence of a few days could so entirely alter his disposition. They therefore set themselves to work upon new and more effectual stratagems against him.

They began by turning the retired life which Dionysius led with Plato, and the studies in which he employed himself, into ridicule, as if intended to make a philosopher of him. But that was not all; they labored in concert to render the zeal of Dion and Plato suspected, and even odious to him. They represented them as impertinent censors and imperious pedagogues, who assumed an authority over him, which neither consisted with his age nor rank.* It is no wonder that a young prince like Dionysius, who, with the most excellent natural parts, and amidst the best examples, would have found it difficult to have supported himself, should at length give way to such artful insinuations in a court that had long been infected, where there was no emulation but to excel in vice, and where he was continually besieged by a crowd of flatterers incessantly praising and admiring him in every thing.†

But the principal application of the courtiers was to decry the character and conduct of Dion himself, not separately, nor by whispers, but altogether, and in public. They talked openly, and to whoever would give them the hearing, that it was visible, Dion made use of Plato's eloquence to insinuate and enchant Dionysius, with a design to draw him into a voluntary resignation of the throne, that he might take possession of it for his nephews, the children of Aristomache, and establish them in the sovereignty. They added, that it was very extraordinary and afflicting, that the Athenians, who had formerly invaded Sicily with great forces both by sea and land, which had all perished there without being able to take Syracuse, should now with a single sophist attain their point, and subvert the tyranny of Dionysius, by persuading him to dismiss the ten thousand strangers of his guards; to lay aside his fleet of four hundred galleys, which he always kept in readiness for service; and to disband his ten thousand horse, and the greatest part of his foot; for the sake of going to find in the academy, the place where Plato taught, a pretended supreme good, not explicable, and to make himself happy in imagination by the study of geometry, while he abandoned to Dion and his nephews a real and substantial felicity, consisting in empire, riches, luxury and pleasure.

* *Tristes et superciliosus alienæ vitæ censores, publicos pædagogos.*—Senec. Epist. cxxi.

† *Vix artibus honestis pudor retinetur, nedum inter certamina vitiorum pudicitia, aut modestia, aut quid quam probi moris servaretur.*—Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 15.

SECTION II.—BANISHMENT OF DION.

The courtiers, intent upon making the best use of every favorable moment, continually besieged the young prince, and, concealing their secret motives under the appearance of zeal for his service, and an affected moderation in regard to Dion, incessantly advised him to take proper measures for the security of his life and throne. Such repeated discourses soon raised in the mind of Dionysius the most violent suspicions of Dion, which presently increased into fierce resentment, and broke out in an open rupture. Letters were privately brought to Dionysius, written by Dion to the Carthaginian ambassadors, wherein he tells them, "that when they should treat of peace with Dionysius he would advise them not to open the conferences but in his presence; because he would assist them in making their treaty more firm and lasting." Dionysius read these letters to Philistus; and having concerted with him what measures to take, he amused Dion with the appearance of a reconciliation, and led him alone to the sea-side below the citadel, where he showed him his letters, and accused him of having entered into a league against him with the Carthaginians. Dion would have justified himself, but he refused to hear him, and made him immediately go on board a brigantine, which had orders to carry him to the coast of Italy, and to leave him there. Dion immediately after set sail for Peloponnesus.*

So hard and unjust a treatment could not fail of making a great noise, and the whole city declared against it; especially as it was reported, though without foundation, that Plato had been put to death.† Dionysius, who apprehended the consequences, took pains to appease the public discontent, and to obviate complaints. He gave Dion's relations two vessels to transport to him, in Peloponnesus, his riches and numerous family; for he had the equipage of a king.‡

As soon as Dion was gone, Dionysius made Plato change his lodging, and brought him into the citadel; in appearance to do him honor, but in reality to assure himself of his person, and prevent him from going to join Dion. In bringing Plato near to him, he might also have in view the opportunity of hearing him more frequently and more commodiously. For, charmed with the delights of his conversation, and studious of pleasing him in every thing, and to merit his affection, he had conceived an esteem, or rather passion for

* Diod. l. xvi. n. 410, 411.

† Plut. p. 964.

‡ Plat. Epist. vii.

him, which rose even to jealousy, but a jealousy of that violence that could suffer neither companion nor rival. He was for engrossing him entirely to himself, for reigning solely in his thoughts and affections, and for being the only object of his love and esteem: he seemed content to give him all his treasures and authority, provided he would but love him better than Dion, and not prefer the latter's friendship to his. Plutarch has reason to call this passion a tyrannic affection.* Plato had much to suffer from it; for it had all the symptoms of the most ardent jealousy. Sometimes it was all friendship, caresses, and fond respect, with an unbounded effusion of heart, and an endless swell of tender sentiments; sometimes it was all reproaches, menaces, fierce passion, and wild emotion; and soon after it sunk into repentance, excuses, tears, and humble entreaties of pardon and forgiveness.

About this time a war broke out, very advantageously for Plato, which obliged Dionysius to restore him his liberty, and send him home. At his departure, he would have laden him with presents, but Plato refused them, contenting himself with his promise to recall Dion the following spring. He did not keep his word, and only sent him his revenues, desiring Plato in his letters to excuse his breach of promise at the time specified, and to impute it only to the war. He assured him that, as soon as peace should be concluded, Dion should return; upon condition, however, that he should continue quiet, and not intermeddle in affairs, nor endeavor to lessen him in the opinion of the Greeks.

Plato, in his return to Greece, went to see the games at Olympia, where he happened to lodge among strangers of distinction. He ate and passed whole days with them, behaving himself in a plain and simple manner, without ever mentioning Socrates or the academy, or making himself known in any thing, except that his name was Plato. The strangers were overjoyed with having met with so kind and amiable a companion; but as he never talked of any thing out of common conversation, they had not the most remote idea that he was the philosopher whose reputation was so universal. When the games were over, they went with him to Athens, where he provided them with lodgings. They had scarcely arrived there, when they desired him to

* Ἡράσθη τυράννικον ἔρωτα.

† In amore hæc omnia insunt vitia; suspiciones, inimitiæ, injuriæ, invidia, bellum, pax rursum.—Terrent. in Eunuch.

In amore hæc sunt mala, bellum, pax rursum.—Horat.

carry them to see the famous philosopher of his name, who had been the disciple of Socrates. Plato told them, smiling, that he was the man; upon which the strangers, surprised at their having possessed so inestimable a treasure without knowing it, were much displeased with, and secretly reproached themselves for not having discerned the great merit of the man through the veil of simplicity and modesty which he had thrown over it, while they admired him the more on that account.

The time Dion passed at Athens was not lost. He employed it chiefly in the study of philosophy, for which he had a great taste, and which was become his passion.* He knew, however, which is not very easy, how to confine it within just bounds, and never gave himself up to it at the expense of any duty.† It was at the same time Plato made him contract a particular friendship with his nephew Speusippus, who, uniting the easy and insinuating manners of a courtier with the gravity of a philosopher, knew how to associate mirth and innocent pleasure with the most serious affairs, and by that character, very rarely found among men of learning, was the most proper of all men to soften what was too rough and austere in the temper of Dion.

While Dion was at Athens, it fell to Plato's turn to give the public games, and to have tragedies performed at the feast of Bacchus, which was usually attended with great magnificence and expense, from an extraordinary emulation which had grown into fashion. Dion defrayed the whole charge. Plato, who was studious of all occasions of producing him to the public, was well pleased to resign that honor to him, as his magnificence might make him still better beloved and esteemed by the Athenians.

Dion visited all the other cities of Greece, where he was present at all their feasts and assemblies, and conversed with the most excellent wits, and the most profound statesmen. He was not distinguished in company by the loftiness and pride too common in persons of his rank, but, on the contrary, by an unaffected, simple and modest air; and especially by the elevation of his genius, the extent of his knowledge, and the wisdom of his reflections. All cities paid him the highest honors, and the Lacedæmonians declared him a citizen of Sparta, without regard to the resentment of Dionysius, though he actually assisted them at that time with a power-

* Plat. in Dion. p. 964.

† Retinuitque, quod est difficillimum, ex sapientia modum.—Tacit. in Vit. Agric. n. 4.

ful supply in their war against the Thebans. So many marks of esteem and distinction alarmed the tyrant's jealousy. He put a stop to the remittance of Dion's revenues, and ordered them to be received by his own officers.

After Dionysius had put an end to the war in which he was engaged in Sicily, but of which history relates no circumstance, he was afraid that his treatment of Plato would prejudice the philosophers against him, and make him pass for their enemy. For this reason he invited the most learned men of Italy to his court, where he held frequent assemblies, in which, out of a foolish ambition, he endeavored to excel them all in eloquence and profound knowledge; repeating, without application, such of Plato's discourses as he retained. But as he had those discourses only by rote, and his heart had never been rightly affected with them, the source of his eloquence was soon exhausted. He then perceived what he had lost, by not having made a better use of that treasure of wisdom once in his possession, and under his own roof, and by not having heard to their full extent, the admirable lectures of the greatest philosopher in the world.*

As in tyrants every thing is violent and irregular, Dionysius was suddenly seized with an excessive desire of seeing Plato again, and used all means for that purpose. He prevailed upon Architas and the other Pythagorean philosophers, to write to him, that he might return with all manner of security; and to be bound for the performance of all the promises which had been made to him. They deputed Archidemus to Plato; and Dionysius sent at the same time two galleys of three benches of oars, with several of his friends on board, to entreat his compliance. He also wrote letters to him with his own hand, in which he frankly declared that, if he would not be persuaded to come to Sicily, Dion had nothing to expect from him; but if he came, that he might entirely dispose of every thing in his power.

Dion received several letters at the same time from his wife and sister, who pressed him to prevail upon Plato to make the voyage, and to satisfy the impatience of Dionysius, that he might have no pretexts against him on that account. Whatever repugnance Plato had to it, he could not resist the warm solicitations made to him, and determined to go to Sicily for the third time, at seventy years of age.

His arrival gave the people new hopes, who flattered

* Plat. Epist. vii. pp. 338, 340. Plut. in Dion. pp. 964, 966.

themselves that his wisdom would at length overthrow the tyranny, and the joy of Dionysius was inexpressible. He appointed the apartment of the gardens for his lodging, the most honorable in the palace, and had so much confidence in him, that he suffered his access to him at all hours, without being searched, a favor which was not granted to any of his best friends.

After the first salutations were over, Plato was for entering into Dion's affair, which he had much at heart, and which was the principal motive of his voyage. But Dionysius put it off at first; to which ensued complaints and murmurings, though not outwardly expressed for some time. The tyrant took great care to conceal his sentiments upon that head, endeavoring by all manner of honors, and by all possible regard and complacency, to abate his friendship for Dion. Plato dissembled on his side; and though extremely shocked at so notorious a breach of faith, he kept his opinion to himself.

While they were upon these terms, and believed that nobody penetrated their secret, Helicon of Cyzicum, one of Plato's particular friends, foretold that on a certain day there would be an eclipse of the sun; which happening exactly at the hour he predicted, so much surprised and astonished Dionysius, a proof that he was no great philosopher, that he made him a present of a talent. Aristippus, jesting upon that occasion, said that he had also something very incredible and extraordinary to foretell. Upon being pressed to explain himself, "I prophesy," said he, "that it will not be long before Dionysius and Plato, who seem to agree so well with each other, will be enemies."

Dionysius verified this prediction; for, being weary of the constraint he laid upon himself, he ordered all Dion's lands and effects to be sold, and applied the money to his own use. At the same time he made Plato quit the apartments in the garden, and gave him another lodging without the castle, in the midst of his guards, who had long hated him, and would have been glad of an opportunity to kill him, because he had advised Dionysius to renounce the tyranny, to disband them, and to live without any other guard than the love of his people. Plato was sensible that he owed his life to the tyrant's favor, who restrained the fury of his guard.

Architas, the celebrated Pythagorean philosopher, who was the principal person and supreme magistrate of Taren-

tum, had no sooner heard of Plato's great danger than he sent ambassadors with a galley of thirty oars to demand him from Dionysius, and to remind him that he came to Syracuse only upon his promise and that of all the Pythagorean philosophers, who had engaged for his safety; that, therefore, he could not retain him against his will, nor suffer any insult to be offered to his person, without a manifest breach of faith, and absolutely forfeiting the opinion of all honest men. These just remonstrances awakened a sense of shame in the tyrant, who at last permitted Plato to return to Greece.

Philosophy and wisdom abandoned the palace with him. To the conversations, as agreeable as useful, to that taste and passion for the arts and sciences, to the grave and judicious reflections of a profoundly wise politician, idle conversation, frivolous amusements and a stupid indolence, entirely averse from everything serious or reasonable, were seen to succeed. Gluttony, drunkenness and debauchery resumed their empire at the court, and transformed it from the school of virtue, which it had been under Plato, into the real stable of Circe.*

SECTION III.—DION SETS OUT TO DELIVER SYRACUSE. HIS DEATH.

When Plato had quitted Sicily, Dionysius threw off all reserve, and married his sister, Arete, Dion's wife, to Timocrates, one of his friends. So unworthy a treatment was in a manner the signal of the war. From that moment Dion resolved to attack the tyrant with open force, and to revenge himself of all the wrongs he had done him. Plato did all in his power to make him change his resolution, but, finding his endeavors ineffectual, he foretold the misfortunes he was about to occasion, and declared that he must expect neither assistance nor relief from him; that, as he had been the guest and companion of Dionysius, had lodged in his palace, and joined in the same sacrifices with him, he should never forget the duties of hospitality; and, at the same time, not to be wanting in his friendship for Dion, that he would continue neuter, always ready to discharge the offices of a mediator between them, though he should oppose their designs when they tended to the destruction of each other.†

Whatever motives might have actuated Plato, this was

* Plut. in Moral. p. 52.

† A. M. 3643. Ant. J. C. 361. Plut. in Dion. pp. 966, 968.

the opinion, which he openly expressed. On the other hand, Speusippus, and all the rest of Dion's friends, continually exhorted him to go and restore the liberty of Sicily, which opened its arms to him, and was ready to receive him with the utmost joy. This was, indeed, the disposition of Syracuse, which Speusippus, during his residence there with Plato, had sufficiently experienced. This was the universal cry ; while they importuned and adjured Dion to come thither, desiring him not to be in any anxiety for the want of ships or troops, but only to embark in the first merchant vessel he met with, and lend his person and name to the Syracusans against Dionysius.

Dion did not hesitate any longer upon taking that resolution which, in one respect, cost him not a little. From the time that Dionysius had obliged him to quit Syracuse and Sicily, he had led, in his banishment, the most agreeable life it was possible to imagine for a person who, like him, had contracted a taste for the delights of study. He enjoyed in peace the conversation of the philosophers, and was present at their disputations, shining in a manner entirely peculiar to himself, by the greatness of his genius and the solidity of his judgment, going to all the cities of Greece to see and converse with the most eminent for knowledge and capacity, and to correspond with the ablest politicians, leaving everywhere the marks of his liberality and magnificence, equally beloved and respected by all that knew him, and receiving, wherever he came, the highest honors, which were rendered more to his merit than his birth. It was from so happy a life that he withdrew himself to go to the relief of his country, which implored his protection, and to deliver it from the yoke of a tyranny under which it had long groaned.

No enterprise, perhaps, was ever formed with so much boldness or conducted with so much prudence. Dion began to raise foreign troops privately, by proper agents, for the better concealment of his design. A great number of considerable persons, who were at the head of affairs, joined with him. But what is very surprising, of all those whom the tyrant had banished, and who were not less than a thousand, only twenty-five accompanied him in his expedition, so much had fear got possession of them. The isle of Zacynthus was the place of rendezvous, where his troops assembled to the number of nearly eight hundred, but all of them of tried courage, excellently disciplined and robust, of

a daring and experience rarely to be found among the most brave and warlike, and, in fine, highly capable of animating the troops which Dion was in hopes of finding in Sicily, and of setting them the example of fighting with all the valor so noble an enterprise required.

But, when they were to set forward, and it was known that this armament was intended against Sicily and Dionysius, for till then it had not been declared, they were all in consternation, and repented their having engaged in the enterprise, which they could not but conceive as the effect of extreme rashness and folly, that in the last despair was for putting every thing to the hazard. Dion had occasion at this time for all his resolution and eloquence, to reanimate the troops and remove their fears. But after he had spoken to them, and with an assured, though modest, tone, had made them understand that he did not lead them in this expedition as soldiers, but as officers, to put them at the head of the Syracusans and all the people of Sicily, who had long been prepared for a revolt, their dread and sadness were changed into shouts of joy, and they desired nothing so much as to proceed on their voyage.

Dion, having prepared a magnificent sacrifice to be offered to Apollo, put himself at the head of his troops, completely armed, and in that equipage marched in procession to the temple. He afterwards gave a great feast to the whole company, at the end of which, after the libations and solemn prayers had been made, there happened a sudden eclipse of the moon. Dion, who was well versed in the causes of such appearances, reassured his soldiers, who were at first in some terror upon that account. The next day they embarked on board two trading vessels, which were followed by a third not so large, and by two barks of thirty oars.

Who could have imagined, says a historian, that a man with two merchant vessels should ever dare to attack a prince who had four hundred ships of war, a hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse, with magazines of arms, and corn in proportion, and treasures sufficient to pay and maintain them, who, besides all this, was in possession of one of the greatest and strongest cities then in the world, with ports, arsenals, and impregnable citadels, with the additional strength and support of a great number of potent allies?*

* It is not easy to comprehend how the two Dionysii were capable of maintaining so great a force by sea and land, their dominions being only a part of Sicily, and consequently of no great extent. It is true, that the city of Syracuse had been very much enriched by commerce; and that those two princes received

The event will show, whether force or power are sufficient chains for retaining a state in subjection, as the elder Dionysius flattered himself; or if the goodness, humanity, and justice of princes, and the love of subjects, are not infinitely stronger and more indissoluble ties.*

Dion having put to sea with his small body of troops, was twelve days under sail with little wind, and the thirteenth arrived at Pachynus, a cape of Sicily, about twelve or fifteen leagues from Syracuse. When they reached that place, the pilot gave notice that they must land directly, as there was reason to fear a hurricane, and therefore not proper to put to sea. But Dion, who was unwilling to make his descent so near the enemy, and chose to land farther off, doubled the cape of Pachynus, which he had no sooner passed, than a furious storm arose, attended with rain, thunder and lightning, which drove his ships to the eastern coast of Africa, where they were in great danger of dashing to pieces against the rocks. Happily for them, a south wind rising suddenly, contrary to expectation, they unfurled all their sails, and after having made vows to the gods, they stood out to sea for Sicily. They ran in this manner four days; and on the fifth entered the port of Minoa, a small town of Sicily, under the Carthaginians, whose commander, Synalus, was Dion's particular friend and guest. They were perfectly well received, and would have staid there some time to refresh themselves after the rude fatigues they had suffered during the storm, if they had not been informed that Dionysius was absent, having embarked some days before for the coast of Italy, attended by eighty vessels. The soldiers demanded earnestly to be led on against the enemy; and Dion having desired Synalus to send the baggage after him when proper, marched directly to Syracuse.†

His troops increased considerably upon his route, by the great number of those who came to join him from all parts. The news of his arrival being soon known at Syracuse, Timocrates, who had married Dion's wife, the sister of Dionysius, to whom he had left the command of the city in his absence, despatched a courier to him into Italy, with advice of Dion's progress. But that courier being almost at his great contributions both from the places of Sicily and Italy in their dependence. But it is still no easy matter to conceive how all this should suffice to the enormous expenses of Dionysius the elder, in fitting out great fleets, raising and maintaining numerous armies, and erecting magnificent buildings. It is to be wished that historians had given us some clearer information on this head.

* Dion. l. xvi. 413. † Plut. in Dion. pp. 968-972. Diod. l. xvi. pp. 414-417.

journey's end, was so fatigued with having run the greater part of the night, that he found himself under the necessity of stopping to take a little sleep. In the mean time, a wolf, attracted by the smell of a piece of meat which he had in his wallet, came to the place, and ran away with both the flesh and the bag, in which he had also put his despatches. Dionysius was by this means prevented for some time from knowing that Dion had arrived, and then received the news from other hands.

When Dion was near the Anapus, which runs about half a league from the city, he ordered his troops to halt, and offered a sacrifice upon the river-side, addressing his prayers to the rising sun. All who were present, seeing him with a wreath of flowers upon his head, which he wore upon account of the sacrifice, crowned themselves also in the same manner, as animated with one and the same spirit. He had been joined on his march by at least five thousand men, and advanced with them toward the city. The most considerable of the inhabitants came out in white habits to receive him at the gates. At the same time the people fell upon the tyrant's friends, and upon the spies and informers; an accursed race of wretches, THE ENEMIES OF THE GODS AND MEN,* says Plutarch, who made it the business of their lives to disperse themselves into all parts, to mingle with the citizens, to pry into their affairs, and to report to the tyrant whatever they said or thought, and often what they neither said nor thought. These were the first victims to the fury of the people, and were put to death immediately. Timocrates, not being able to throw himself into the citadel, rode off on horseback.

At that instant Dion appeared within sight of the walls. He marched at the head of his troops magnificently armed, with his brother Megacles on one side, and Callippus the Athenian on the other, both crowned with chaplets of flowers. After him came a hundred of the foreign soldiers, fine troops, whom he had chosen for his guard. The rest followed in order of battle, with the officers at the head of them. The Syracusans beheld them with inexpressible satisfaction, and received them as a sacred procession, whom the gods themselves regarded with pleasure, and who restored them their liberty with the democracy, forty-eight years after they had been banished from their city.

After Dion had made his entry, he ordered the trumpets

* Ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσίους, καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθρούς.

to sound, to appease the noise and tumult; and silence being made, a herald proclaimed that "Dion and Megacles were come to abolish the tyranny, and to free the Syracusans and all the people of Sicily from the yoke of the tyrant." And being desirous to harangue the people in person, he went to the upper part of the city, through the quarter called Achradina. Wherever he passed, the Syracusans had set out, on both sides of the streets, tables and bowls, and had prepared victims; and as he came before their houses, they threw all sorts of flowers upon him, addressing vows and prayers to him as to a god. Such was the origin of idolatry, which paid divine honors to those who had done the people any great and signal services. And can there be any service, any gift, so valuable as that of liberty; not far from the citadel, and below the place called Pentapylæ, stood a sundial upon a high pedestal, erected by Dionysius. Dion placed himself upon it; and in a speech to the people, exhorted them to employ their utmost efforts for the recovery and preservation of their liberty. The Syracusans, transported with what he said, and to express their gratitude and affection, elected him and his brother generals, with supreme authority; and by their consent, and at their entreaty, joined with them twenty of the most considerable citizens, half of whom were of the number of those who had been banished by Dionysius, and returned with Dion.

Having afterwards taken the castle of Epipolis, he set the citizens who were prisoners in it at liberty, and fortified it with strong works. Dionysius arrived from Italy seven days after, and entered the citadel by sea. The same day a great number of carriages brought Dion the arms which he had left with Sinalus. These he distributed among the citizens who were unprovided. All the rest armed and equipped themselves as well as they could, expressing the greatest ardor and satisfaction.

Dionysius began by sending ambassadors to Dion and the Syracusans, with proposals which seemed very advantageous. The answer was, that by way of preliminary, he must abdicate the tyranny, to which Dionysius did not seem averse. From thence he came to interviews and conferences, which were only feints to gain time, and abate the ardor of the Syracusans by the hope of an accommodation. Accordingly, having made the deputies, who were sent to treat with him, prisoners, he suddenly attacked, with a great part of his troops, the wall with which the Syracusans had sur-

rounded the citadel, and made several breaches in it. So warm and unexpected an assault threw Dion's soldiers into great confusion, who immediately fled. Dion endeavored in vain to stop them; and believing example more powerful than words, he threw himself fiercely into the midst of the enemy, where he stood their charge with intrepid courage, and killed great numbers of them. He received a wound in the hand from a spear; his arms were scarcely proof against the number of darts thrown at him, and his shield being pierced through in many places with spears and javelins, he was at length beat down. His soldiers immediately brought him off from the enemy. He left Timonides to command them; and getting on horseback, rode through the whole city, stopped the flight of the Syracusans, and taking the foreign soldiers whom he had left to guard the quarter called Achradina, he led them on fresh against the troops of Dionysius, who were already fatigued, and entirely discouraged by so vigorous and unexpected a resistance. It was now no longer a battle, but a pursuit. A great number of the tyrant's troops were killed on the spot, and the rest escaped with difficulty into the citadel. This victory was signal and glorious. The Syracusans, to reward the valor of the foreign troops, gave each of them a considerable sum of money; and these soldiers, to honor Dion, presented him with a crown of gold.

Soon after heralds came from Dionysius, with several letters for Dion from the women of his family, and with one from Dionysius himself. Dion ordered them all to be read in a full assembly. That of Dionysius was couched in the form of a request and justification, intermixed, however, with the most terrible menaces against the persons who were dearest to Dion, his sister, wife, and son. It was written with an art and address exceedingly proper to render Dion suspected. Dionysius put him in mind of the ardor and zeal he had formerly expressed for the support of the tyranny. He exhorted him at a distance, and with some obscurity, though easy enough to be understood, not to abolish it entirely, but to preserve it for himself. He advised him not to give the people their liberty, who were far from being attached to him; nor to abandon his own safety, and that of his friends and relations, to the capricious humor of a violent and inconstant multitude.

The reading of this letter had the effect Dionysius proposed. The Syracusans, without regard to Dion's goodness

to them, and the greatness of his soul in forgetting his dearest interests, and the ties of nature, to restore them their liberty, took umbrage at his too great authority, and conceived injurious suspicions of him. The arrival of Heraclides confirmed them in their sentiments, and determined them to act accordingly. He was one of the banished persons, a good soldier, and well known among the troops for having been in considerable commands under the tyrant, very bold and ambitious, and a secret enemy of Dion's, between whom and himself there had been some difference in Peloponnesus. He came to Syracuse with seven galleys of three benches of oars, and three other vessels, not to join Dion, but in the resolution to march with his own forces against the tyrant, whom he found reduced to shut himself up in the citadel. His first endeavor was to ingratiate himself with the people; for which an open and insinuating behavior made him very fit, while Dion's austere gravity was offensive to the multitude, especially as they were become more haughty and untractable from the last victory, and expected to be treated like a popular state, even before they could call themselves a free people; * that is to say, in the full sense of the Greek terms, they were for being used with complaisance, flattery, regard, and a deference to all their capricious humors.†

What gratitude could be expected from a people that consulted only their passions and blind prejudices? The Syracusans formed an assembly immediately of their own accord, and chose Heraclides admiral. Dion came unexpectedly thither, and complained highly of such a proceeding; as the charge conferred upon Heraclides was an abridgement of his office; that he was no longer generalissimo, if another commanded at sea. These remonstrances obliged the Syracusans, against their will, to deprive Heraclides of the office they had so lately conferred upon him. When the assembly broke up, Dion sent for him, and after some gentle reprimands for his strange conduct with regard to him in so delicate a conjuncture, wherein the least divisions among them might ruin every thing, he summoned a new assembly himself, and, in the presence of the whole people, appointed Heraclides admiral, and gave him a guard, as he had himself.

He thought that by the force of kind offices he would

* Ποδ τοῦ δήμος εἶναι, τὸ δημαγωγείσθαι λέγοντες.

† Plut. in Dion. pp. 972, 975. Dion. l. xvi. pp. 419, 422.

get the better of his rival's ill-will, who, in his expressions and outward behavior, made his court to Dion, confessed his obligations to him, and obeyed his orders with a promptitude and punctuality, which expressed an entire devotion to his service, and a desire of occasions to do him pleasure, but who secretly, by his intrigues and cabals, influenced the people against him, and opposed his designs in every thing. If Dion gave his consent that Dionysius should quit the citadel by treaty, he was accused of favoring, and intending to save him: if, to satisfy them, he continued the siege without hearkening to any proposals of accommodation, they did not fail to reproach him with the desire of protracting the war, for the sake of continuing in command, and to keep the citizens in awe and respect.

Philistus, who came to the tyrant's relief with several galleys, having been defeated and put to death, Dionysius sent to offer Dion the citadel, with the arms and troops in it, and money to pay them for five months, if he might be permitted by a treaty to retire into Italy for the rest of his life, and be allowed the revenue of certain lands, which he mentioned in the neighborhood of Syracuse. The Syracusans, who were in hopes of taking Dionysius alive, rejected these proposals; and Dionysius, despairing of reconciling them to his terms, left the citadel in the hands of his eldest son Apollocrates, and taking the advantage of a favorable wind, embarked for Italy with his treasures and effects of the greatest value, and such of his friends as were dearest to him.*

Heraclides, who commanded the galleys, was very much blamed for having suffered him to escape by his negligence. To regain the peoples' favor, he proposed a new distribution of lands, insinuating, that as liberty was founded in equality, so poverty was the principle of servitude. Upon Dion's opposing this motion, Heraclides persuaded the people to reduce the pay of the foreign troops, who amounted to three thousand men, to declare a new division of land, to appoint new generals, and deliver themselves in good time from Dion's insupportable severity. The Syracusans agreed, and nominated twenty-five new officers, Heraclides being one of the number.

At the same time they sent privately to solicit the foreign soldiers to abandon Dion, and to join with them, promising to give them a share in the government as natives and

citizens. These generous troops received the offer with disdain; and then placing Dion in the centre of them, with a fidelity and affection of which there are few examples, they made their bodies and their arms a rampart for him, and carried him out of the city without doing the least violence to any body; but warmly reproaching all they met with ingratitude and perfidy. The Syracusans, who contemned their small number, and attributed their moderation to fear and want of courage, began to attack them, not doubting but they should defeat and put them all to the sword before they got out of the city.

Dion, reduced to the necessity of either fighting the citizens, or perishing with his troops, held out his hands to the Syracusans, imploring them in the most tender and affectionate manner to desist, and pointing to the citadel full of enemies, who saw all that passed with the utmost joy. But finding them deaf and insensible to all his remonstrances, he commanded his soldiers to march in close order without attacking; which they obeyed; contenting themselves with making a great noise with their arms, and raising great cries, as if they were going to fall upon the Syracusans. The latter were dismayed with those appearances, and ran away in every street without being pursued. Dion hastened the march of his troops towards the country of the Leontines.

The officers of the Syracusans, laughed at and ridiculed by the women of the city, were desirous to retrieve their honor and made their troops take arms, and return to the pursuit of Dion. They came up with him at the pass of a river, and made their horse advance to skirmish. But when they saw that Dion was resolved in earnest to repel their insults, and had made his troops face about with great indignation, they were again seized with terror; and flying in a more shameful manner than before, made all the haste they could to regain the city.

The Leontines received Dion with great marks of honor and esteem. They also made presents to his soldiers, and declared them free citizens. Some days after which, they sent ambassadors to demand justice for the ill treatment of those troops to the Syracusans, who on their side sent deputies to complain of Dion. Syracuse was intoxicated with inconsiderate joy and insolent prosperity, which entirely banished reflection and judgment.*

* Plut. pp. 975, 981. Diocl. l. xvi. pp. 422, 423.

Every thing conspired to swell and inflame their pride. The citadel was so much reduced by famine, that the soldiers of Dionysius, after having suffered very much, resolved at last to surrender. They sent in the night to make that proposal, and were to fulfil the conditions the next morning. But at day-break, while they were preparing to execute the treaty, Nypsius, an able and valiant general, whom Dionysius had sent from Italy with corn and money to the besieged, appeared with his galleys, and anchored near Arethusa. Plenty succeeding on a sudden to famine, Nypsius landed his troops, and summoned an assembly, wherein he made a speech to the soldiers suitable to the present conjuncture, which determined them to hazard all dangers. The citadel, that was upon the point of surrendering, was relieved in this manner, contrary to all expectation.

The Syracusans at the same time hastened on board their galleys, and attacked the enemy's fleet. They sunk some of their ships, took others, and pursued the rest to the shore. But this very victory was the cause of their ruin. Abandoned to their own discretion, without either leader or authority to command them, or counsel, the officers as well as soldiers gave themselves up to rejoicing, feasting, drinking, debauchery, and every kind of loose excess. Nypsius knew well how to take advantage of this general infatuation. He attacked the wall that enclosed the citadel; and having made himself master of it, he demolished it in several places, and permitted his soldiers to enter and plunder the city. All things were in the utmost confusion. Here the citizens, half asleep, had their throats cut; their houses were plundered, while the women and children were driven off into the citadel, without regard to their tears, cries, and lamentations.

There was but one man who could remedy this misfortune, and preserve the city. This was in every body's thoughts, but no one had courage enough to propose it; so much ashamed were they of the ungenerous manner in which they had driven him out. As the danger increased every moment, and already approached the quarter Achradina, in the height of their extremity and despair, a voice was heard from the horse and allies, which said, "that it was absolutely necessary to recall Dion and the Peloponnesian troops from the country of the Leontines." As soon as any body had courage enough to utter these words, they were the general cry of the Syracusans, who, with tears of joy and grief, made prayers to the gods, that they would

bring him back to them. The hope alone of seeing him again, gave them new courage, and enabled them to make head against the enemy. The deputies set out immediately with full speed, and arrived at the city of Leontium late in the evening.

As soon as they alighted, they threw themselves at Dion's feet, bathed in tears, and related the deplorable extremity to which the Syracusans were reduced. Some of the Leontines, and several of the Peloponnesian soldiers, who had seen them arrive, were already assembled round Dion, and conceived rightly, from their emotion and prostrate behavior, that something very extraordinary had happened. Dion had no sooner heard what they had to say, than he conducted them to the assembly, which formed itself immediately, for the people ran thither with great eagerness. The two principal deputies explained in a few words the greatness of their distress, and "implored the foreign troops to hasten to the relief of the Syracusans, and to forget the ill-treatment they had received: especially as that unfortunate people had already paid a severer penalty for it, than the most injured among them would desire to impose."

The deputies having finished their discourse, the whole theatre, where the assembly was held, continued sad and silent. Dion rose; but as soon as he began to speak, a torrent of tears suppressed his utterance. The foreign soldiers called out to him to take courage, and expressed a generous compassion for his grief. At length, having recovered himself a little, he spoke to them in these terms: "men of Peloponnesus, and you our allies, I have assembled you here, that you might deliberate upon what regards yourselves; as for my part, I must not deliberate upon any thing when Syracuse is in danger. If I cannot preserve it, I go to perish with it, and to bury myself in its ruins. But for you, if you are resolved to assist us once more, us, who are the most imprudent and most unfortunate of mankind, come and relieve the city of Syracuse, from henceforth the work of your hands. If not, and the just subjects of complaint which you have against the Syracusans, determine you to abandon them in their present condition, and to suffer them to perish: may you receive from the immortal gods the reward you merit for the affection and fidelity which you have hitherto expressed for me. For the rest, I have only to desire that you will keep Dion in your remembrance, who did not abandon you when unworthily treated by his country, nor his country when fallen into misfortunes."

As soon as he had ceased speaking, the foreign soldiers rose up with loud cries and entreated him to lead them on that moment to the relief of Syracuse. The deputies, transported with joy, saluted and embraced them, praying the gods to bestow upon Dion and them all happiness and prosperity. When the tumult was appeased, Dion ordered them to prepare for the march, and as soon as they had supped, to return with their arms to the same place, being determined to set out that night and fly to the relief of his country.

In the mean time, at Syracuse, the officers of Dionysius, after having done all the mischief they could to the city, retired at night into the citadel with the loss of some of their soldiers.

This short respite gave the seditious orators new courage, who, flattering themselves that the enemy would lie still after what they had done, exhorted the Syracusans to think no farther of Dion, not to receive him if he came to their relief with his foreign troops nor to yield to them in courage, but to defend their city and liberty, with their own arms and valor. New deputies were instantly despatched from the general officer to prevent his coming, and from the principal citizens and his friends, to desire him to hasten his march, which difference of sentiments, and contrariety of advices, occasioned his marching slowly, and by small journeys.

When the night was far spent, Dion's enemies seized the gates of the city, to prevent his entrance. At the same instant Nypsius, well apprised of all that passed in Syracuse, made a sally from the citadel with a great body of troops, and more determinate than before. They demolished the wall that enclosed them entirely and entered the city, which they plundered. Nothing but slaughter and blood was seen every where. Nor did they stop for the pillage, but seemed to have no other view than to ruin and destroy all before them. One would have thought, that the son of Dionysius, whom his father had left in the citadel, being reduced to despair, and prompted by an excess of hatred for the Syracusans, was determined to bury the tyranny in the ruins of the city. To prevent Dion's relief of it, they had recourse to fire, the swiftest of destructions, burning with torches and lighted straw all places within their power, and throwing combustibles against the rest. The Syracusans who fled to avoid the flames, were butchered in the streets; and

those who, to avoid the all-murdering sword, retired into the houses, were driven out of them again by the encroaching fire; for there were many houses burning, and many that fell upon the people in the streets.

These very flames opened the city for Dion, by obliging the citizens to agree in not keeping the gates shut against him. Couriers after couriers were despatched to hasten his march. Heraclides himself, his most declared and mortal enemy, deputed his brother, and afterwards his uncle Theodotus, to conjure him to advance with the utmost speed, there being nobody besides himself to make head against the enemy, he being wounded, and the city almost entirely ruined, and reduced to ashes.

Dion received the news when he was about sixty stadia from the gates. His soldiers upon that occasion marched with the utmost diligence, and with so good a will that it was not long before he arrived at the walls of the city. He there detached his light-armed troops against the enemy, to re-animate the Syracusans by the sight of them. He then drew up his heavy-armed infantry, and the citizens who came running on all sides to join him. He divided them into small parties of greater depth than front, and put different officers at the head of them, that they might be capable of attacking in several places at once, and appear stronger and more formidable to the enemy.

After having made these dispositions, and prayed to the gods, he marched across the city against the enemy. In every street, as he passed, he was welcomed with acclamations, cries of joy, and songs of victory, mingled with the prayers and blessings of all the Syracusans, who called Dion their preserver and their god, and his soldiers their brothers and fellow-citizens. At that instant, there was not a single man in the city so fond of life, as not to be much more in pain for Dion's safety than his own, and not to fear much more for him than for all the rest together, seeing him march foremost to so great a danger, over blood, fire, and dead bodies, with which the streets and public places were universally covered.

On the other hand, a view of the enemy was no less terrible; for they were animated by rage and despair, and were posted in line of battle behind the ruins of the walls they had thrown down, which made the approach very difficult and dangerous. They were under the necessity of defending the citadel, which was their safety and retreat,

and durst not move from it lest their communication should be cut off. But what was most capable of disordering and discouraging Dion's soldiers, and made their march very painful and difficult, was the fire. For wherever they turned themselves, they marched by the light of the houses on fire, and were obliged to go over ruins in the midst of flames; exposing themselves to being crushed by the fall of walls, beams, and roofs of houses, which tottered half consumed by the flames, and under the necessity of keeping their ranks, while they opened their way through frightful clouds of smoke mingled with dust.

When they had joined the enemy, only a very small number on each side were capable of engaging, from the want of room and the unevenness of the ground. But at length, Dion's soldiers, encouraged and supported by the cries and ardor of the Syracusans, charged the enemy with such redoubled vigor that the troops of Nypsius gave way. The greatest part of them escaped into the citadel, which was very near; and those who remained without, being broken, were cut to pieces in the pursuit by the foreign troops.

The time would not admit their making immediate rejoicings for their victory, in the manner so great an exploit deserved; the Syracusans being obliged to apply to the preservation of their houses, and to pass the whole night in extinguishing the fire; which however they did not effect without great difficulty.

At the return of day, none of the seditious orators durst stay in the city; but all fled, self-condemned, to avoid the punishment due to their crimes. Only Heraclides and Theodotus came to Dion, and put themselves into his hands, confessing their injurious treatment of him, and conjuring him not to imitate their ill conduct; that it became Dion, superior as he was in all other respects to the rest of mankind, to show himself as much so in that greatness of soul, which could conquer resentment and revenge, and forgive the ungrateful, who owned themselves unworthy of his pardon.

Heraclides and Theodotus having made these supplications, Dion's friends advised him not to spare men of their vile and malignant disposition; but to abandon Heraclides to the soldiers, and in so doing, exterminate from the state that spirit of sedition and intrigue; a distemper that has really something of madness in it, and is no less to be feared from its pernicious consequences than tyranny itself. But Dion,

to appease them, said, "that other captains generally made the means of conquering their enemies their sole application; that for his part, he had passed much time in the academy in learning to subdue anger, envy, and all the jarring passions of the mind; that the sign of having conquered them, is not kindness and affability to friends and persons of merit, but treating those with humanity who have injured us, and in being always ready to forgive them; that he did not desire so much to appear superior to Heraclides in power and ability, as in wisdom and justice, for in that, true and essential superiority consists; that if Heraclides be wicked, invidious, and perfidious, must Dion contaminate and dishonor himself with low resentment? It is true, according to human laws, there seems to be less injustice in revenging an injury than committing it; but if we consult nature, we shall find both the one and the other to have their rise in the same weakness of mind. Besides, there is no disposition so obdurate and savage, as not to be vanquished by the force of kind usage and obligations." Dion, upon these maxims, pardoned Heraclides.

He next applied himself to enclosing the citadel with a new work; and he ordered each of the Syracusans to go and cut a large stake. In the night, he set his soldiers to work, while the Syracusans took their rest. He surrounded the citadel in this manner with a strong palisade, before it was perceived; so that in the morning, the greatness of the work, and the suddenness of the execution, were matter of admiration for all the world, as well the enemy as the citizens.

Having finished this palisade, he buried the dead; and dismissing the prisoners taken from the enemy, he summoned an assembly. Heraclides proposed in it that Dion should be elected generalissimo, with supreme authority by sea and land. All the people of worth, and the most considerable of the citizens, were pleased with the proposal, and desired that it might have the authority of the assembly. But the mariners and artisans were sorry that Heraclides should lose the office of admiral; and convinced, that although he were little estimable in all other respects, he would at least be more for the people than Dion, they opposed it with all their power. Dion, to avoid disturbance and confusion, did not insist upon that point, and acquiesced, that Heraclides should continue to command in chief at sea. But his opposing the distribution of lands and houses,

which they were very desirous should take place, and his cancelling and annulling whatever had been decreed upon that head, embroiled him with them irretrievably.

Hercalides, taking advantage of a disposition so favorable to his views, did not fail to revive his cabals and intrigues, as appeared openly by his attempt to make himself master of Syracuse, and to shut the gates upon his rival: but it proved unsuccessful. A Spartan who had been sent to the aid of Syracuse, negotiated a new accommodation between Heraclides and Dion, under the strictest oaths, and the strongest assurances of obedience on the side of the former: weak ties to a man void of faith and probity.

The Syracusans, having dismissed their sea-forces, who were become unnecessary, applied solely to the siege of the citadel, and rebuilt the wall which had been thrown down. As no relief came to the besieged, and bread began to fall short with them, the soldiers grew mutinous, and would observe no discipline. The son of Dionysius, finding himself without hope or resource, capitulated with Dion, to surrender the citadel, with all the arms and munitions of war. He carried his mother and sisters away with him, filled five galleys with his people and effects, and went to his father; for Dion gave him entire liberty to retire unmolested. It is easy to conceive the joy of the city upon his departure. Women, children, old people, all were passionately fond of gratifying their eyes from the port with so agreeable a spectacle, and to solemnize the joyful day on which, after so many years of servitude, the sun arose for the first time on the Syracusan liberty.

Apollocrates having set sail, and Dion begun his march to enter the citadel, the princesses, who were there, did not stay till he arrived, but came out to meet him at the gates. Aristomache led the son of Dion; after whom came Arete, his wife, with her eyes fixed upon the ground, and full of tears. Dion embraced his sister first, and afterwards his son. Aristomache then presenting Arete to him, spoke thus: "the tears you see her shed, the shame expressed in her looks, at the time when your presence restores us life and joy, her silence itself, and her confusion, sufficiently denote the grief she suffers at the sight of a husband, to whom another has been substituted contrary to her will, but who alone has always possessed her heart. Shall she salute you as her uncle, or shall she embrace you as her husband?" Aristomache having spoken in this manner, Dion,

with his face bathed in tears, tenderly embraced his wife, to whom he gave his son, and sent them home to his house ; because he thought proper to leave the citadel to the discretion of the Syracusans, as an evidence of their liberty.

For himself, after having rewarded with a magnificence truly royal all those who had contributed to his success, according to their rank and merit, as the height of glory and happiness, and the object not only of Sicily, but of Carthage and all Greece, who esteemed him the wisest and most fortunate captain that ever lived, he constantly retained his original simplicity ; as modest and plain in his dress, equipage, and table, as if he had lived in the academy with Plato, and not with people bred in armies, with officers and soldiers, who often breathe nothing but pleasures and magnificence. Accordingly, at the time Plato wrote to him, "that the eyes of all mankind were upon him alone," little affected with that general admiration, his thoughts were always intent upon the academy, that school of wisdom and virtue, where exploits and successes were not judged of by the external splendor and noise with which they were attended, but from the wise and moderate use of them.

Dion designed to establish a form of government in Syracuse, composed of the Spartan and Cretan, but wherein the aristocratical was always to prevail, and to decide important affairs by the authority which, according to his plan, was to be vested in the council of elders. Heraclides, still turbulent and seditious according to custom, and solely intent upon gaining the people by flattery, caresses, and other popular arts, again opposed him in his scheme. One day when Dion sent for him to the council, he answered that he would not come ; and that, being only a private person, he should be in the assembly with the rest of the citizens, whenever it was summoned. His view, in such behavior, was to make his court to the people, and to render Dion odious ; who, weary of his repeated insults, permitted those whom he had formerly prevented, to kill him. They accordingly went to his house, and despatched him. We shall see presently Dion's own sense of this action.

The Syracusans were highly affected at his death ; but as Dion solemnized his funeral with great magnificence, followed his body in person at the head of his whole army, and afterwards harangued the people upon the occasion, they were appeased, and forgave him the murder ; convinced

that it was impossible for the city ever to be free from commotions and sedition while Heraclides and Dion governed together.

After that murder, Dion never knew joy or peace of mind. A hideous spectre which he saw in the night filled him with trouble, terror, and melancholy. The phantom seemed to be a woman of enormous stature, who, in her attire, air, and haggard looks, resembled a fury sweeping his house with violence.* His son's death, who for some unknown grief had thrown himself from the roof of a house, passed for the accomplishment of that ominous apparition, and was the prelude to his misfortunes. Callippus gave the last hand to them. He was an Athenian, with whom Dion had contracted an intimate friendship, while he lodged at his house at Athens, and with whom he lived ever after with entire freedom and unbounded confidence. Callippus, having given himself up to his ambitious views, and entertained thoughts of making himself master of Syracuse, threw off all regard for the sacred ties of friendship and hospitality, and contrived to get rid of Dion, who was the sole obstacle to his designs. Notwithstanding his care to conceal them, they were discovered, and came to the ears of Dion's sister and wife, who lost no time, and spared no pains, to learn the truth by a very strict inquiry. To prevent its effects, he went to them with tears in his eyes, and the appearance of being inconsolable that any person should suspect him of such a crime, or think him capable of so black a design. They insisted upon his taking the great oath, as it was called. The person who swore it, was wrapped in the purple mantle of the goddess Proserpine, and holding a lighted torch in his hand, pronounced in the temple the most dreadful execrations against himself which it is possible to imagine.

The oath cost him nothing; but did not convince the princesses. They daily received new intimation of his guilt from several hands, as did Dion himself, whose friends in general persuaded him to prevent the crime of Callippus by a just and sudden punishment. But he never resolved upon it. The death of Heraclides, which he looked upon as a horrible blot on his reputation and virtue, was perpetually present to his troubled imagination, and renewed by continual terrors his grief and repentance. Tormented night and day by that cruel remembrance, he professed

* Plut. pp. 981-983. Diod. p. 432.

that he had rather die a thousand deaths, and present his throat himself to any one that would kill him, than to live under the necessity of continual precautions, not only against his enemies, but the best of his friends.

Callippus ill deserved that name. He hastened the execution of his crime, and caused Dion to be assassinated in his own house by the Zacynthian soldiers, who were entirely devoted to his interest. The sister and wife of that prince were put into prison, where the latter was delivered of a son, which she resolved to nurse there herself.

After this murder, Callippus was sometime in a splendid condition, having made himself master of Syracuse by means of the troops, who were entirely devoted to his service, on account of the gifts which he bestowed upon them. The pagans believed, that the divinity ought to punish great crimes in a sudden and extraordinary manner in this life; and Plutarch observes, that the success of Callippus occasioned very great complaints against the gods, for suffering, calmly and without indignation, the vilest of men to raise himself to so exalted a fortune by so detestable and impious a means. But Providence was not long without justifying itself; for Callippus soon suffered the punishment of his guilt. Having marched with his troops to take Catana, Syracuse revolted against him, and threw off so shameful a subjection. He afterwards attacked Messina, where he lost a great many men, and particularly the Zacynthian soldiers, who had murdered Dion. No city of Sicily would receive him; but all detesting him as the most execrable of wretches, he retired to Rhegium, where, after having led for some time a miserable life, he was killed by Leptinus and Polysperchon, and, it was said, with the same dagger with which Dion had been assassinated.*

History has few examples of so distinct an attention of Providence to punish great crimes, such as murder, perfidy, treason, either in the authors of those crimes themselves, who commanded or executed them, or in the accomplices any way concerned in them. Divine justice manifests itself from time to time in this manner, to prove that it is not unconcerned and inattentive; and to prevent the inundation of crimes, which an entire impunity would occasion; but it does not always distinguish itself by remarkable chastisements in this world, to intimate to mankind that greater punishments are reserved for guilt in the next.

As for Aristomache and Arete, as soon as they came out of prison, Icetas of Syracuse, one of Dion's friends, received them into his house, and treated them at first with an intention, fidelity, and generosity of the most exemplary kind; but, complying at last with Dion's enemies, he provided a bark for them, and having put them on board, under the pretence of sending them to Peloponnesus, he gave orders to those who were to carry them, to kill them on the passage and throw them into the sea. He was not long without receiving the chastisement due to his black treachery; for being taken by Timoleon, he was put to death. The Syracusans, fully to avenge Dion, killed also the two sons of that traitor.

The relations and friends of Dion, soon after his death, had written to Plato, to consult him upon the manner in which they should behave in the present troubled and fluctuating condition of Syracuse, and to know what sort of government it was proper to establish there. Plato, who knew that the Syracusans were equally incapable of entire liberty or absolute servitude, exhorted them strenuously to pacify all things as soon as possible, and for that purpose to change the tyranny, the very name of which was odious, into a lawful sovereignty, which would make subjection easy and agreeable. He advised them, and according to him it had been Dion's opinion, to create three kings; one to be Hipparinus, Dion's son; another Hipparinus, brother of Dionysius the younger, who seemed to be well inclined towards the people; and Dionysius himself, if he would comply with such conditions as should be prescribed him; their authority to be not unlike that of the kings of Sparta. At the same time thirty-five magistrates were to be appointed, to take care that the laws should be duly observed, to have great authority both in times of war and peace, and to serve as a balance between the power of the kings, the senate, and the people.*

It does not appear that this advice was ever followed, which indeed had its great inconveniences. It is only known, that Hipparinus, the brother of Dionysius, having landed at Syracuse with a fleet, and considerable forces, expelled Calippus, and exercised the sovereign power two years.†

The history of Sicily, as related thus far, includes about fifty years, beginning with Dionysius the elder, who reigned thirty-eight, and continuing to the death of Dion. I shall

* Plat. Epist. viii.

† Diod. l. xvi. p. 436.

return in the sequel to the affairs of Sicily, and shall relate the end of Dionysius the younger, and the re-establishment of the Syracusan liberty by Timoleon.

SECTION IV.—CHARACTER OF DION.

It is not easy to find so many excellent qualities in one person as were united in Dion. I do not consider, in this place, his wonderful taste for the sciences, his art of associating them with the greatest employments of war and peace, of extracting from them rules of conduct, and maxims of government, and of making them an equally useful and honorable entertainment of his leisure. I confine myself to the statesman and patriot; and in this view, how admirable does he appear! greatness of soul, elevation of sentiments, generosity in bestowing his wealth, heroic valor in battle, attended with a coolness of temper, and a prudence scarcely to be paralleled; a mind vast, and capable of the highest views, a constancy not to be shaken by the greatest dangers, or the most unexpected revolution of fortune, the love of country and of the public good carried almost to excess; these are part of Dion's virtues. The design he formed of delivering his country from the yoke of the tyranny, and his boldness and wisdom in the execution of it, show what he was capable of.

But what I conceive the greatest beauty in Dion's character, the most worthy of admiration, and if I may say so, the most above human nature, is the greatness of soul, and unexampled patience, with which he suffered the ingratitude of his country. He had abandoned and sacrificed every thing to come to their relief; he had reduced the tyranny to extremities, and was upon the point of re-establishing them in the full possession of their liberty: in return for such great services, they shamefully expelled him from the city, accompanied with a handful of foreign soldiers, whose fidelity they had not been able to corrupt; they loaded him with injuries, and added to their base perfidy the most cruel outrages and indignity. To punish those ungrateful traitors, he had only a signal to give, and to leave the rest to the indignation of his soldiers: master of theirs, as well as of his own temper, he checked their impetuosity, and without disarming their hands, restrained their just rage, suffering them in the very height and ardor of an attack, only to terrify, and not kill, his enemies, because he could not forget that they were his fellow-citizens and brethren.

There seems to be only one defect that can be objected to Dion, which is, his having something rigid and austere in his humor, that made him less accessible and sociable than he should have been, and kept even persons of worth and his best friends at a kind of distance. Plato, and those who had his glory sincerely at heart, had often animadverted upon this turn of mind in him: but notwithstanding the reproaches which were made upon his too austere gravity, and the inflexible severity with which he treated the people, he still prided himself upon abating nothing of them: whether his genius was entirely averse to the arts of insinuation and persuasion, or that, from the view of correcting and reforming the Syracusans, vitiated and corrupted by the flattering and complaisant discourses of their orators, he chose that rough and manly manner of behavior to them.

Dion was mistaken in the most essential points of governing. From the throne to the lowest office in the state, whoever is charged with the care of ruling and conducting others, ought particularly to study the art* of managing men's tempers, and of giving them that bent and turn of mind that may best suit his measures; which cannot be done by assuming the severe master, by commanding haughtily, and contenting one's self with laying down the rule and the duty with inflexible rigor. There is in the right itself, in virtue and the exercise of all functions, an exactitude and steadiness, or rather a kind of stiffness, which frequently degenerates into a vice when carried to extremes. I know it is never allowable to break through rules; but it is always laudable, and often necessary, to soften, and make them more convertible, which is best effected by a kindness of manners, and an insinuating behavior; not always exacting the discharge of a duty in its utmost rigor; overlooking abundance of small faults, that do not merit much notice, and observing upon those which are more considerable, with favor and goodness; in a word, in endeavoring by all possible means to acquire people's affection, and to render virtue and duty amiable.

Dion's permission to kill Heraclides, which was obtained with difficulty, or rather forced from him, contrary to his natural disposition, as well as principles, cost him dear, and brought the trouble and anguish upon him, that lasted till the day of his death, and of which they were the principal cause.

* Which art an ancient poet called "*flexanima, atque omnium regina rerum oratio.*"—Cic. l. i. de Divin. p. 80.

SECTION V.—DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER REASCENDS THE THRONE.

Callippus, who had caused Dion to be murdered, and had substituted himself in his place, did not possess his power long. Thirteen months after, Hipparnius, brother of Dionysius, arriving unexpectedly at Syracuse with a numerous fleet, expelled him from the city, and recovered his paternal sovereignty which he held during two years.*

Syracuse and all Sicily, being harassed by different factions and intestine war, were in a miserable condition. Dionysius, taking the advantage of these troubles, ten years after he had been obliged to quit the throne, had assembled some foreign troops, and having overcome Nypsius, who had made himself master of Syracuse, he reinstated himself in the possession of his dominions.†

It was perhaps to thank the gods for his re-establishment, and to express his gratitude to them, that he sent statues of gold and ivory to Olympia and Delphos, of very great value. The galleys which carried them were taken by Iphierates, who was at that time near Coreyra (now Corfu) with a fleet. He wrote to Athens to know in what manner he should dispose of his sacred booty, and was answered, not to examine scrupulously for what it was designed, but to make use of it for the subsistence of his troops. Dionysius complained excessively of such treatment to the Athenians, in a letter which he wrote them, wherein he reproached, with great warmth and justice, their avarice and sacrilegious impiety.‡

A commander of pirates had acted much more nobly and more religiously in regard to the Romans about fifty years before. After the taking of Veii, which had been ten years besieged, they sent a golden cup to Delphos. The deputies who carried that present were taken by the pirates of Lipara, and carried to that island. It was the custom to divide all prizes they took as a common stock. The island at that time was under the government of a magistrate, more like the Romans in his manners than those he governed. He was called Timasitheus;§ and his behavior agreed well with the signification of his name. Full of regard for the envoys, the sacred gift they carried, the motive of their offering, and more for the majesty of the god for whom it was de-

* A. M. 3647. Ant. J. C. 357. Dioid. l. xvi. pp. 432, 436.

† A. M. 3654. Ant. J. C. 350.

‡ Dioid. l. xvi. p. 453.

§ Timasitheus signifies one who honors the gods.

signed, he inspired the multitude, that generally follow the example of those who rule them, with the same sentiments of respect and religion. The envoys were received, therefore, with all the marks of distinction, and their expenses borne by the public. Timasitheus convoyed them with a good squadron to Delphos, and brought them back in the same manner to Rome. It is easy to judge how sensibly the Romans were affected with so noble a proceeding. By a decree of the senate, they rewarded Timasitheus with great presents, and granted him the right of hospitality.* And fifty years after, when the Romans took Lipara from the Carthaginians, with the same gratitude as if the action had been but lately done, they thought themselves obliged to do farther honor to the family of their benefactor, and resolved that all his descendants should be for ever exempted from the tribute imposed upon the inhabitants of that island.†

This was certainly great and noble on both sides; but the contrast does no honor to the Athenians.

To return to Dionysius. Though he expressed some regard for the gods, his actions argued no humanity for his subjects. His past misfortunes, instead of correcting and softening his disposition, had only served to inflame it, and to render him more savage and brutal than before.

The most worthy and considerable of the citizens, not being able to support so cruel a servitude, had recourse to Icetas, king of the Leontines, and abandoning themselves to his conduct, elected him their general; not that they believed he differed in any thing from the most declared tyrants, but because they had no other resource. ‡

During these transactions, the Carthaginians, who were almost always at war with the Syracusans, arrived in Sicily with a large fleet; and having made great progress there, the Sicilians, and the people of Syracuse, resolved to send an embassy into Greece, to demand aid of the Corinthians, from whom the Syracusans were descended, and who had always openly declared against tyrants and in favor of liberty. Icetas, who proposed no other end from his com-

* Mors erat civitatis, velut publico latrocinio, partam prædam dividere. Forte eo anno in summo magistratu erat Timasitheus quidam. Romanis vir similior quam suis: qui legatorum nomen, donumque, et deum cui mitteretur, et doni causam veritus ipse, multitudinem quoque, quæ semper ferme regenti est similis, religionis justæ implevit; adductosque in publicum hospitium legatos, cum presidio etiam navium Delphos prosecutos, Romanis inde hospites restituit. Hospitium cum eo senatus consulto est factum, donaque publice data.—Tit. Liv.

† Tit. Liv. Decad. l. i. v. c. 28. Diod. l. xiv. p. 307.

‡ Dion. l. xvi. p. 459, et 461. Plut. in Timol. p. 236, et 243.

mand than to make himself master of Syracuse, and had no thoughts of setting it free, treated secretly with the Carthaginians, though in public he affected to praise the wise measures of the Syracusans, and even sent his deputies along with theirs.

Corinth received the ambassadors kindly, and immediately appointed Timoleon their general. He had led a retired life for twenty years, without interfering in public affairs, and was far from believing, that, at his age, and in the circumstances he then was, he should be thought of upon such an occasion.*

He was descended from one of the noblest families in Corinth, loved his country passionately, and discovered upon all occasions a singular humanity of temper, except against tyrants and bad men. He was an excellent captain; and as in his youth he had all the maturity of age, in age he had all the fire and courage of the most ardent youth.

He had an elder brother, called Timophanes, whom he tenderly loved, as he had demonstrated in a battle, in which he covered him with his body, and saved his life at the great danger of his own; but his country was still dearer to him. That brother having made himself tyrant of it, so black a crime gave him the deepest affliction. He made use of all possible means to bring him back to his duty; kindness, friendship, affection, remonstrances, and even menaces. But finding all his endeavors ineffectual, and that nothing could prevail upon a heart abandoned to ambition, he caused his brother to be assassinated in his presence by two of his friends and intimates, and thought, that upon such an occasion, the laws of nature ought to give place to those of his country.

That action was admired and applauded by the principal citizens of Corinth, and by most of the philosophers, who looked upon it as the most noble effort of human virtue; and Plutarch seems to pass the same judgment upon it. All the world were not of that opinion; and some people reproached him as an abominable fratricide, who could not fail of drawing down the vengeance of the gods upon him. His mother, especially, in the excess of her grief, uttered the most dreadful curses and imprecations against him; and when he came to console her, not being able to bear the sight of her son's murderer, she thrust him away with indignation, and shut her doors against him.

He was then struck with all the horror of the most guilty ; and giving himself up to the most bitter remorse, considered Timophanes no longer as a tyrant, but as a brother, and resolved to put an end to his life, by abstaining from all nourishment. It was with great difficulty his friends dissuaded him from that fatal resolution. Overcome by their prayers and entreaties, he was at length prevailed upon to live, but he condemned himself to pass the rest of his days in solitude. From that moment he renounced all public affairs, and for several years never came to the city, but wandered about in the most solitary and desert places, abandoned to excess of grief and melancholy : so true it is, that neither the praise of flatterers, nor the false reasonings of politicians, can suppress the cries of conscience, which is at once the witness, judge, and executioner of those who presume to violate the most sacred rights and ties of nature.

He passed twenty years in this condition. He did, indeed, return to Corinth at the latter part of that time ; but lived there always private and retired, without concerning himself with the administration of the government. It was not without great reluctance that he accepted the employment of general : but he did not think it allowable to refuse the service of his country ; and his duty prevailed against his inclination.

While Timoleon assembled his troops, and was preparing to sail, the Corinthians received letters from Ictas, in which he told them, "that it was not necessary for them to make any further levies, or exhaust themselves in great exigencies to come to Sicily, and to expose themselves to evident danger ; the Carthaginians, apprised of their design, were waiting to intercept their squadron in its passage with a great fleet ; and that their slowness in sending their troops, had obliged him to call in the Carthaginians themselves to his aid, and to make use of them against the tyrant." He had made a secret treaty with them, by which it was stipulated, that after the expulsion of Dionysius from Syracuse, he should take possession of it in his place.

The reading of these letters, far from cooling the zeal of the Corinthians, only incensed them more than at first, and hastened the departure of Timoleon. He embarked on board ten galleys, and arrived safe upon the coast of Italy, where the news that came from Sicily extremely perplexed him, and discouraged his troops. An account was brought that Ictas had defeated Dionysius, and having made him-

self master of the greatest part of Syracuse, had obliged the tyrant to shut himself up in the citadel, and in that quarter called the Isle, where he besieged him; and that he had given orders to the Carthaginians to prevent Timoleon's approach, and to come on shore, that they might make a peaceable partition of Sicily between them, when they should have compelled that general to retire.

The Carthaginians, in consequence, had sent twenty galleys to Rhegium. The Corinthians, upon their arrival at that port, found ambassadors from Ictas, who declared to Timoleon that he might come to Syracuse, and would be well received there, provided he dismissed his troops. The proposal was entirely injurious, and at the same time more perplexing. It seemed impossible to beat the vessels which the barbarians had caused to advance to intercept them in their passage, being twice their force; and to retire, was to abandon all Sicily to extreme distress, which could not avoid being the reward of the treachery of Ictas, and of the support which the Carthaginians should give the tyranny.

In this delicate conjuncture, Timoleon demanded a conference with the ambassadors, and the principal officers of the Carthaginian squadron, in the presence of the people of Rhegium. It was only, he said, to discharge himself and for his own security, that his country might not accuse him of having disobeyed its orders, and betrayed its interests. The governor and magistrates of Rhegium understood his designs. They desired nothing more than to see the Corinthians in possession of Sicily, and apprehended nothing so much as the neighborhood of the barbarians. They summoned, therefore, an assembly, and shut the gates of the city, upon pretence of preventing the citizens from going abroad, in order to their applying themselves solely to the present affair.

The people being assembled, long speeches were made of little or no tendency; every body treating the same subject, and repeating the same reasons or adding new ones, only to protract the council, and to gain time. While this was doing, nine of the Corinthian galleys went off, and were suffered to pass by the Carthaginian vessels, believing that their departure had been concerted with their own officers, who were in the city, and that those nine galleys were to return to Corinth, the tenth remaining to carry Timoleon to Ictas at Syracuse. When Timoleon was informed in a whisper, that his galleys were at sea, he slipped gently

through the crowd, which to favor his going off, thronged exceedingly round the tribunal. He got to the sea-side, embarked directly, and having rejoined his galleys, they arrived together at Tauromenium, a city of Sicily, where they were received with open arms by Andromachus, who commanded it, and who joined his citizens with the Corinthian troops, to reinstate the Sicilian liberties.

It is easy to comprehend how much the Carthaginians were surprised and ashamed of being so deceived; but they were told, that being Phœnicians, who passed for the greatest cheats in the world, fraud and artifice ought not to give them so much astonishment and displeasure.

Upon the news of Timoleon's arrival, Icetas was terrified, and made the greatest part of the Carthaginian galleys advance. They had a hundred and fifty long ships, fifty thousand foot, and three hundred armed chariots. The Syracusans lost all hope when they saw the Carthaginians in possession of the port, Icetas master of the city, Dionysius blocked up in the citadel, and Timoleon without any other hold in Sicily than the small city of Tauromenium, on the coast, with little hope and less force; for his troops did not amount in all to more than a thousand soldiers, and he had scarcely provisions for their subsistence. Besides which, the cities placed no confidence in him. The ills they had suffered from the extortion and cruelty that had been practiced among them, had exasperated them against all commanders of troops, especially after the horrid treachery of Callippus and Pharax; who being both sent, the one from Athens, and the other from Sparta, to free Sicily and expel the tyrants, made them conceive the tyranny gentle and desirable, so severe were the vexations with which they had oppressed them. They were afraid of experiencing the same treatment from Timoleon.

The inhabitants of Adranon, a small city below Mount *Ætna*, being divided among themselves, one party had called on Icetas and the Carthaginians, and the other had applied to Timoleon. The two chiefs arrived almost at the same time in the neighborhood of Adranon; the former with five thousand men, and the latter with only twelve hundred. Notwithstanding this inequality, Timoleon, who justly conceived that he should find the Carthaginians in disorder, and employed in taking up their quarters and pitching their tents, made his troops advance, and without losing time to rest them, as the officers advised him, he

marched directly to charge the enemy, who no sooner saw him than they fled. This occasioned their only killing three hundred, and taking twice as many prisoners; but the Carthaginians lost their camp, and all their baggage. The Adranites opened their gates at the same time, and received Timoleon. Other cities sent their deputies to him soon after, and made their submission.

Dionysius himself, who renounced his vain hopes, and saw himself at the point of being reduced, as full of contempt for Icetas, who had suffered himself to be so shamefully defeated, as of admiration and esteem for Timoleon, sent ambassadors to the latter, to treat of surrendering himself and the citadel to the Corinthians. Timoleon, taking the advantage of so unexpected a good fortune, made Euclid and Telemachus, with four hundred soldiers, file off into the castle; not all at once, nor in the day-time, that being impossible, the Carthaginians being masters of the gate, but in platoons, and by stealth. Those troops having got successfully into the citadel, took possession of it, with all the tyrant's moveables, and provisions of war. For he had a considerable number of horse, all sorts of engines and darts, besides seventy thousand suits of armor, which had been laid up there long before. Dionysius had also two thousand regular troops, which with the rest he surrendered to Timoleon. And for himself, taking with him his money, and some few of his friends, he embarked, unperceived by the troops of Icetas, and repaired to the camp of Timoleon.

It was the first time in his life that he had appeared in the low and abject state of a private person, and a suppliant; he who had been born and nurtured in the arms of tyranny, and had seen himself master of the most powerful kingdom that had ever been usurped by tyrants. He had possessed it ten years entire, before Dion took arms against him, and some years after, though always in the midst of wars and battles. He was sent to Corinth with only one galley, without convoy, and with very little money. He served there for a sight, every body running to gaze at him; some with a secret joy of heart, to gratify their eyes with the view of the miseries of a man whom the name of a tyrant rendered odious; others, with a kind of compassion, from comparing the splendid condition from which he had fallen, with the immeasurable depth of distress into which they beheld him plunged.*

His manner of life at Corinth did not long excite any sentiments in regard to him but those of contempt and indignation. He passed whole days in perfumers' shops, in taverns, or with actresses and singers, disputing with them upon the rules of music and the harmony of airs. Some people have thought that he behaved in such a manner out of policy, not to give umbrage to the Corinthians, nor to discover any thought or desire of recovering his dominions. But such an opinion does him too much honor, and it seems more probable that, nurtured and educated as he was in drunkenness and debauchery, he only followed his inclination; and that he passed his life in the kind of slavery into which he was fallen, as he had done upon the throne, having no other resource or consolation in his misfortunes.

Some writers say that the extreme poverty to which he was reduced at Corinth obliged him to open a school there, and to teach children to read, perhaps, says Cicero,* without doubt jestingly, to retain a species of empire, and not absolutely to renounce the habit and pleasure of commanding.† Whether that were his motive or not, it is certain that Dionysius, who had seen himself master of Syracuse, of almost all Sicily, who had possessed immense riches, and had numerous fleets and great armies of horse and foot under his command, that the same Dionysius, reduced now almost to beggary, and from a king become a schoolmaster, was a good lesson for persons of exalted stations not to confide in their grandeur nor to rely too much upon their fortune.‡ The Lacedæmonians some time after gave Philip this admonition. That prince having written to them in very haughty and menacing terms, they made him no other answer but "Dionysius at Corinth."§

An expression of Dionysius, which has been preserved, seems to argue, if it be true, that he knew how to make a good use of his adversity, and to turn his misfortunes to advantage, which would be very much to his praise, but contrary to what has been related of him before. While he lived at Corinth a stranger rallied him unseasonably, and with an indecent grossness, upon his commerce with the philosophers during his most splendid fortune, and asked him, by way of insult, "of what consequence all the wis-

* *Dionysius Corinthi pueros, docebat, usque adeo imperio carere non poterat.*

† *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. iii. n. 27.*

‡ *Tanta mutatione majores natu, nequis nimis fortunæ crederet, magister ludi factus ex tyranno docuit.*—*Val. Max. l. vi. c. 9.*

§ *Demet. Phaler. de Eloc. l. viii.*

dom of Plato had been to him?" "Can you believe, then," replied he, "that I have received no benefit from Plato, and see me bear ill fortune as I do?" *

SECTION VI.—TIMOLEON RESTORES LIBERTY TO SYRACUSE,
AND INSTITUTES WISE LAWS. HIS DEATH.

After the treaty of Dionysius, Icetas pressed the siege of the citadel of Syracuse with the utmost vigor, and kept it so closely blocked up that the convoys sent to the Corinthians could not enter it without great difficulty. Timoleon, who was at Catana, sent them frequently thither. To deprive them of this relief, Icetas and Mago set out together with design to besiege that place. During their absence Leon, the Corinthian, who commanded in the citadel, having observed from the ramparts that those who had been left to continue the siege were very remiss in their duty, he made a sudden furious sally upon them while they were dispersed, killed part of them, put the rest to flight, and seized the quarter of the city called Achradina, which was the strongest part of it, and had been least injured by the enemy. Leon fortified it in the best manner the time would admit, and joined it to the citadel by works of communication.†

This bad news caused Mago and Icetas to return immediately. At the same time a body of troops from Corinth landed safely in Sicily, having deceived the vigilance of the Carthaginian squadron posted to intercept them. When they were landed, Timoleon received them with joy, and, after having taken possession of Messina, marched in order of battle against Syracuse. His army consisted of four thousand men. When he approached the city his first care was to send emissaries among the soldiers that bore arms for Icetas. They represented to them that it was highly shameful for Greeks, as they were, to labor that Syracuse and all Sicily should be given up to the Carthaginians, the most faithless and cruel of all barbarians; that Icetas had only to join Timoleon, and to act in concert with him against the common enemy. These soldiers, having spread these insinuations throughout the whole camp, gave Mago violent suspicions of his being betrayed, besides which he had already for some time sought a pretext to retire. For these

* Plut. in Timol. p. 243.

† A. M. 3658. Ant. J. C. 346. Plut. in Timol. pp. 243-246. Diocl. l. xvi. p. 465, et 474.

reasons, notwithstanding the entreaties and warm remonstrances of Icetas, he weighed anchor and set sail for Africa, shamefully abandoning the conquest of Sicily.

Timoleon's army the next day appeared before the place in line of battle, and attacked it in three different quarters with so much vigor and success that the troops of Icetas were totally overthrown and put to flight. Thus, by a good fortune that has few examples, he carried Syracuse by force in an instant, which was at that time one of the strongest cities in the world. When he had made himself master of it he did not act like Dion, in sparing the forts and public edifices for their beauty and magnificence. To avoid giving the same cause of suspicion, which at first decried, though without foundation, and at length ruined that great man, he caused proclamation to be made by sound of trumpet, that all Syracusans who would come with their tools might employ themselves in demolishing the forts of the tyrants. In consequence of which the Syracusans, considered that proclamation and day as the commencement of their liberty, and ran in multitudes to the citadel, and not only demolished that, but also the palaces of the tyrants, at the same time breaking open and destroying their tombs.

The citadel being razed, and the ground made level, Timoleon caused tribunals to be erected upon it, for the dispensation of justice, in the name of the people; that the same place from whence, under the tyrants, every day some bloody edict had issued, might become the asylum and bulwark of liberty and innocence.

Timoleon was master of the city, but it wanted people to inhabit it, for, some having perished in the wars and seditions, and others having fled to avoid the power of the tyrants, Syracuse was become a desert, and the grass was grown so high in the streets that horses grazed in them. All the cities in Sicily were almost in the same condition. Timoleon and the Syracusans, therefore, found it necessary to write to Corinth to desire that people might be sent from Greece to inhabit Syracuse; that otherwise the country could never recover itself, and was beside threatened with a new war. For they had received advice that, Mago having killed himself, the Carthaginians, enraged at his having acquitted himself so ill of the charge, had hung up his body upon a cross, and were making great levies to return into Sicily with a more numerous army than at the beginning of the year.

Those letters being arrived with ambassadors from Syr-

accuse, who conjured the Corinthians to take compassion on their city, and to be a second time the founders of it, the Corinthians did not consider the calamity of that people as an occasion of aggrandizing themselves, and of making themselves masters of the city, according to the maxims of a base and infamous policy; but, sending to all the sacred games of Greece, and to all public assemblies, they caused proclamation to be made in them by heralds that the Corinthians, having abolished the tyranny and expelled the tyrants, they declared free and independent the Syracusans and all the people of Sicily who should return to their own country, and exhorted them to repair thither, to partake of an equal and just distribution of the lands among them. At the same time they despatched couriers into Asia, and into all the isles, whither great numbers of fugitives had retired, to invite them to come as soon as possible to Corinth, which would provide them vessels, commanders, and a safe convoy to transport them into their own country, at its own expense.

Upon this publication Corinth received universal praises and blessings, as she justly deserved. It was everywhere proclaimed, that Corinth had delivered Syracuse from the tyrants, had preserved it from falling into the hands of the barbarians, and restored it to its citizens. It is not necessary to insist here upon the grandeur of so noble and generous an action; the mere relation of it must make the impression that always results from great and noble deeds, and everybody owned, that no conquest or triumph ever equalled the glory which the Corinthians then acquired by so perfect and magnanimous a disinterestedness.

Those who came to Corinth, not being sufficiently numerous, demanded an addition of inhabitants from that city and from all Greece, to augment this kind of colony. Having obtained their request, and finding themselves increased to ten thousand, they embarked for Syracuse, where a multitude of people from all parts of Italy and Sicily had joined Timoleon. It was said their number amounted to more than sixty thousand. Timoleon distributed the lands among them gratis; but sold them the houses, with which he raised a very great sum; leaving it to the discretion of the old inhabitants to redeem their own: and by this means he collected a considerable fund for such of the people as were poor, and unable to support either their own necessities or the charge of the war.

The statues of the tyrants, and of all the princes who

had governed Sicily, were put up to sale ; but first they were cited and sentenced in the forms of law. One only escaped the rigor of this inquiry, and was preserved ; which was that of Gelon, who had gained a celebrated victory over the Carthaginians at Himera, and governed the people with lenity and justice ; for which his memory was still cherished and honored. If the same scrutiny were made into all statues, I do not know whether many would continue in being.

History has preserved another sentence passed also in regard to a statue, but of a very different kind. The fact is curious, and will excuse a digression. Nicon, a champion of Thasos,* had been crowned fourteen hundred times victor in the solemn games of Greece. A man of that merit could not fail of being envied. After his death one of his competitors insulted his statue, and gave it several blows to revenge perhaps those he had formerly received from him whom it represented. But the statue, as if sensible of that outrage, fell from its heights upon the person that insulted it, and killed him. The son of him who had been crushed to death, proceeded juridically against the statute, as guilty of homicide, and punishable by law of Draco. The famous legislator of Athens, to inspire a greater horror for the guilt of murder, had ordained that even inanimate things which should occasion the death of a man by their fall, should be destroyed. The Thasians, conformable to this law, decreed that the statue should be thrown into the sea. But some years after being afflicted with a great famine, and having consulted the oracle of Delphos, they caused it to be taken out of the sea, and rendered new honors to it.†

Syracuse being raised in a manner from the grave, and people flocking from all parts to inhabit it, Timoleon, desirous of freeing the other cities of Sicily, and finally to extirpate tyranny and tyrants out of it, began his march with his army. He compelled Ictas to renounce his alliance with the Carthaginians, obliged him to demolish his forts, and to live as a private person in the city of the Leontines. Lep- tinus, tyrant of Apollonia, and of several other cities and fortresses, seeing himself in danger of being taken by force, surrendered. Timoleon spared his life, and sent him to Corinth : for he thought nothing more great and honorable than to let Greece see the tyrants of Sicily in a state of humiliation, and living like exiles.

He returned afterwards to Syracuse, to regulate the

* An island in the Ægean sea. † Suidas in Νίκων.—Pausan. l. vi. p. 364

government, and to institute such laws as should be most important and necessary, in conjunction with Cephalus and Dionysius, two legislators sent to him by the Corinthians: for he had not the weakness to desire unlimited power, and sole administration. But on his departure, that the troops in his pay might get something for themselves, and to keep them in exercise at the same time, he sent them under the command of Dinarchus and Damaratus, into all the places subject to the Carthaginians. These troops brought over several cities from the barbarians, lived always in abundance, made much booty, and returned with considerable sums of money, which were of great service in the support of the war.

About this time, the Carthaginians arrived at Lilybæum, under Asdrubal and Amilcar, with an army of seventy thousand men, two hundred ships of war, a thousand transports laden with machines, armed chariots, horses, ammunition, and provisions. They proposed no less than the entire expulsion of the Greeks out of Sicily. Timoleon did not think fit to wait their advancing; and though he could raise only six or seven thousand men, so great was the people's terror, he marched with that small body of troops against the formidable army of the enemy, and obtained a celebrated victory near the river Crimesus; an account of which may be found in the history of the Carthaginians.* Timoleon returned to Syracuse amidst shouts of joy and universal applauses.†

He had before effected the conquest and reduction of the Sicilian tyrants, but had not changed them, nor taken from them their tyrannical disposition. They united together, and formed a powerful league against him. Timoleon immediately took the field and soon put a final end to their hopes. He made them all suffer the just punishment which revolt deserved. Icetas, and his son, among others, were put to death as tyrants and traitors. His wife and daughters having been sent to Syracuse, and brought before the assembly of the people, were also sentenced to die, and were executed accordingly. The people, without doubt, designed to avenge Dion their first deliverer by that decree. For it was the same Icetas who caused Aete, Dion's wife, his sister Aristomache, and his son, an infant, to be thrown into the sea.

Virtue is seldom or never without envy. Two accusers summoned Timoleon to answer for his conduct before the judges: and having assigned him a certain day for his

* Vol. I.

† Plut. in Timol. p. 248, et 255.

appearance, demanded sureties of him. The people expressed great indignation against such a proceeding, and would have dispensed with so great a man's observing the usual formalities, which he strongly opposed, giving for his reason, that all he had undertaken had no other principle, than that the laws might have their due course. He was accused of malversation during his command of the army. Timoleon, without giving himself the trouble to refute these calumnies, only replied, "That he thanked the gods, who had heard his prayers, and that he at length saw the Syracusans enjoy an entire liberty of saying every thing; a liberty absolutely unknown to them, under the tyrants, but which it was just to confine within due bounds."

That great man had given Syracuse wise laws, had liberated all Sicily from the tyrants who had so long infested it, had re-established peace and security universally, and supplied the cities ruined by the war with the means of reinstating themselves. After such glorious actions, which had acquired him an unbounded reputation, he quitted his authority to live in retirement. The Syracusans had given him the best house in the city in gratitude for his great services, and another very fine and agreeable one in the country, where he generally resided with his wife and children, whom he had sent for from Corinth; for he did not return thither, and Syracuse was become his country. He had the wisdom, in resigning every thing, to abstract himself entirely also from envy, which never fails to attend exalted stations, and pays no respect to merit, however great and substantial. He shunned the rock on which the greatest men, through an insatiate desire of honors and power, are often shipwrecked, that is, by engaging to the end of their lives in new cares and troubles, of which age renders them incapable, and by choosing rather to sink under, than to lay down the weight of them.*

Timoleon, who knew the full value of a noble and glorious leisure,† acted in a different manner. He passed the rest of his life as a private person, enjoying the grateful satisfaction of seeing so many cities, and such a numerous people, indebted to him for their happiness and tranquillity. But he was always respected and consulted as the common oracle of Sicily. Neither treaty of peace, institution of law, division of land, nor regulation of government, seemed well done, if Timoleon had not been consulted, and put the last hand to it.

His age was tried with a very severe affliction, which he

Malum deficere quam desinere.—Quintil.

† Otium cum dignitate.—Cic.

bore with astonishing patience; it was the loss of sight. That misfortune, far from lessening him in the consideration and regard of the people, served only to increase their respect for him. The Syracusans did not content themselves with paying him frequent visits; they conducted all strangers, both in town and country, to see their benefactor and deliverer. When they had any important affair to deliberate upon in the assembly of the people, they called him to their assistance. He was conducted thither in a chariot drawn by two horses, which crossed the public place to the theatre, and in that manner he was introduced into the assembly, amid the shouts and acclamations of joy of the whole people. After he had given his opinion, which was always religiously observed, his domestics re-conducted him across the theatre, followed by all the citizens, beyond the gates, with continual shouts of joy and clapping of hands.

He had still greater honors paid to him after his death. Nothing was wanting that could add to the magnificence of the procession which followed his bier, in which the tears that were shed, and the blessings uttered by everybody in honor of his memory, were the noblest ornaments. These tears were neither the effect of custom and the formality of mourning, nor exacted by a public decree; but flowed from a genuine source, sincere affection, lively gratitude, and inconsolable sorrow. A law was also made, that annually, for the future, upon the day of his death, the music and gymnastic games should be celebrated with horse-races in honor of him. But what was still more honorable to the memory of that great man, was the decree of the Syracusan people, that whenever Sicily should be engaged in a war with foreigners, they should send to Corinth for a general.

History does not perhaps contain any thing greater or more worthy of admiration than the acts of Timoleon. I speak not only of his military exploits, but the happy success of all his undertakings. Plutarch observes a characteristic in them, which distinguishes Timoleon from all the great men of his times, and makes use upon that occasion of a very remarkable comparison. "There is," says he, "in painting and poetry, pieces which are excellent in themselves, and which at first view may be known to be the works of a master, but some of them denote their having cost great pains and application; whereas in others an easy and native grace is seen, which adds exceedingly to their value;" and among the latter he places the poems of Homer. "Something of this sort occurs," says he, "when we com-

pare the great actions of Epaminondas and Agesilaus with that of Timoleon. In the former we find them executed with force and innumerable difficulties, but in the latter, there is an easiness and facility, which distinguish them as the work, not of fortune, but of virtue, which fortune seems to have taken pleasure in seconding."

"But not to mention his military actions," continues Plutarch, "what I admire most in Timoleon, is his warm and disinterested passion for the public good, and his reserving for himself only the pleasure of seeing others happy by his services; his extreme remoteness from ambition and haughtiness; his honorable retirement into the country; his modesty, moderation, and indifference for all honors paid him; and what is still more uncommon, his aversion for all flattery, and even just praises; for, when a person extolled in his presence his wisdom, valor, and glory, in having expelled the tyrants, he made no answer, but "that he thought himself obliged to express his gratitude to the gods, who having decreed to restore peace and liberty to Sicily, had vouchsafed to make choice of him in preference to all others for so honorable a ministration: for he was fully persuaded, that all human events are guided and disposed by the secret decrees of Divine Providence." * What a treasure, what a happiness for a state, is such a minister!

For the better understanding of his value, we have only to compare the condition of Syracuse under Timoleon, with its state under the two Dionysiiuses. It is the same city, inhabitants, and people; but how different is it under the different governments we speak of? The two governments had no thoughts but of making themselves feared, and of depressing their subjects to render them more passive. They were terrible in effect, as they desired to be, but at the same time detested and abhorred, and had more to fear from their subjects, than their subjects from them. Timoleon, on the contrary, who looked upon himself as the father of the Syracusan people, and who had no thoughts but of making them happy, enjoyed the refined pleasure of being beloved and revered as a parent by his children; and he was remembered among them with blessings, because they could not reflect upon the peace and felicity they enjoyed, without calling to mind at the same time the wise legislator, to whom they were indebted for those inestimable blessings.

* Cum suas laudes audiret prædicari, nunquam aliud dixit, quam se in ea re maximas diis gratias agere et habere, quod, cum Siciliam recreare constituisent, tum se potissimum ducem esse voluissent. Nihil enim rerum humanarum sine deorum numine agi putabat.—Cor. Nep. in Timol. c. 4.

BOOK TWELFTH.

THE HISTORY OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CHAPTER I.

THIS book contains principally the history of two very illustrious generals of the Thebans, Epaminondas and Pelopidas; the deaths of Agesilaus king of Sparta, and of Artaxerxes Mnemon king of Persia.

SECTION I.—STATE OF GREECE FROM THE TREATY OF ANTALCIDES.

The peace of Antalcides, which has been mentioned in the third chapter of the ninth book, had given the Grecian states great cause of discontent and division. In consequence of that treaty, the Thebans had been obliged to abandon the cities of Bœotia, and suffer them to enjoy their liberty; and the Corinthians, to withdraw their garrison from Argos, which by that means became free and independent. The Lacedæmonians, who were the authors and executors of this treaty, saw their power extremely augmented by it, and were industrious to make farther additions to it. They compelled the Mantinæans, against whom they pretended to have many causes of complaint in the last war, to demolish the walls of their city, and to inhabit four different places, as they had done before.*

The two kings of Sparta, Agesipolis and Agesilaus, were of quite different characters, and as opposite in their opinions upon the present state of affairs. The first, who was naturally inclined to peace, and a strict observer of justice, desired

* A. M. 3617. Ant. J. C. 387.

Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. v. pp. 550, 553.

that Sparta, already much exclaimed against for the treaty of Antalcides, would suffer the Grecian cities to enjoy their liberties, according to the tenor of that treaty, and not disturb their tranquillity, through an unjust desire of extending their dominions. The other, on the contrary, restless, active, and full of great views of ambition and conquest, breathed nothing but war.*

At the same time deputies arrived at Sparta from Acanthus and Apollonia, two very considerable cities of Macedonia, in respect to Olynthus, a city of Thrace, inhabited by Greeks, originally of Chalcis in Eubœa.† Athens, after the victories of Salamin and Marathon, had conquered many places on the side of Thrace, and even in Thrace itself. Those cities threw off the yoke, as soon as Sparta, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, had ruined the power of Athens. Olynthus was of this number. The deputies of Acanthus and Apollonia represented, in the general assembly of the allies, that Olynthus, situated in the neighborhood, daily improved in strength in an extraordinary manner: that she continually extended her dominions by new conquests; that she obliged all the cities round about to submit to her, and to enter into her measures, and was on the point of concluding an alliance with the Athenians and the Thebans. The affair being taken into consideration, it was unanimously resolved, that it was necessary to declare war against the Olynthians. It was agreed, that the allied cities should furnish ten thousand troops, with liberty, to such as desired it, to substitute money, at the rate of three oboli a day for each foot-soldier, and four times as much for the horse. The Lacedæmonians, to lose no time, made their troops march directly, under the command of Eudamidas, who prevailed with the ephori, that Phæbidas, his brother, might have the command of those which were to follow, and to join him soon after. When he arrived in that part of Macedonia, which is also called Thrace, he garrisoned such places as applied to him for that purpose, seized upon Potidæa, a city in alliance with the Olynthians, which surrendered without making any defence, and began the war against Olynthus, though slowly, as it was necessary for a general to act before his troops were all assembled.

Phæbidas began his march soon after, and having arrived near Thebes, encamped without the walls, near the Gymna-

* Diod. l. xv. p. 341.

† A. M. 3621. Ant. J. C. 383. Diod. l. xv. pp. 554, 556.

sium or public place of exercise. Ismenius and Leontides, both polemarchs, that is, generals of the army, and supreme magistrates of Thebes, were at the head of two different factions. The first, who had engaged Pelopidas in his party, was no friend to the Lacedæmonians, nor they to him; because he publicly declared for popular government and liberty. The other, on the contrary, favored an oligarchy, and was supported by the Lacedæmonians, with their whole interest. I am obliged to enter into this detail, because the event I am about to relate, and which was a consequence of it, occasioned the important war against the Thebans and Spartans.*

This being the state of affairs at Thebes, Leontides applied to Phæbidas, and proposed to him to seize the citadel, called Cadmæa, to expel the adherents of Ismenius, and to give the Lacedæmonians possession of it. He represented to him, that nothing could be more glorious for him than to make himself master of Thebes, while his brother was endeavoring to reduce Olynthus; that he would thereby facilitate the success of his brother's enterprise; and that the Thebans, who had prohibited their citizens by decree to bear arms against the Olynthians, would not fail, upon his making himself master of the citadel, to supply him with whatever number of horse and foot he should think proper, for the reinforcement of Eudamidas.

Phæbidas, who had much ambition and little conduct, and who had no other view than to signalize himself by some extraordinary action, without examining the consequences, suffered himself to be easily persuaded; while the Thebans, perfectly secure under the treaty of peace lately concluded by the Grecian states, celebrated the feasts of Ceres, and by no means expected such an act of hostility. Phæbidas, conducted by Leontides, took possession of the citadel. The senate was then sitting. Leontides went to them, and declared that there was nothing to be feared from the Lacedæmonians, who had entered the citadel; that they were only the enemies of those who were for disturbing the public tranquillity; that as for himself, by the power which his office of polemarch gave him of confining whoever caballed against the state, he should put Ismenius into a place of security, who factiously endeavored to break the peace. He was seized accordingly, and carried to the citadel. The

* A. M. 3622. Ant. J. C. 382. Xenoph. pp. 556-558. Plut. in Agesil. pp. 606, 609. Id. in Pelop. p. 289. Diod. l. xv. pp. 341, 342.

party of Ismenius, seeing their chief a prisoner, and apprehending the utmost violence for themselves, quitted the city with precipitation, and retired to Athens, to the number of four hundred and upwards. They were soon after banished by a public decree. Pelopidas was of the number; but Epaminondas remained at Thebes unmolested, being disregarded, as a man entirely devoted to the study of philosophy, who did not intermeddle in affairs of state; and also from his poverty, which left no room to fear any thing from him. A new polemarch was nominated in the room of Ismenius, and Leontides went to Lacedæmon.

The news of the enterprise of Phæbidas, who at the time of general peace had taken possession of the citadel by force, upon which he had no claim or right, had occasioned great murmurings and complaints. Such especially as opposed Agesilaus, who was suspected of having shared in the scheme, demanded by whose orders Phæbidas had committed so strange a breach of public faith. Agesilaus, who well knew that those warm reproaches were aimed at him, made no difficulty of justifying Phæbidas, and declared openly and before all the world, "That the action ought to be considered in itself, in order to understand whether it was useful or not; that whatever was expedient for Sparta, he was not only permitted, but commanded to do upon his own authority, and without waiting the orders of anybody:"—Strange principles to be advanced by a person who, upon other occasions, had maintained, "That justice was the supreme virtue, and that without it, valor itself, and every other great quality, were useless and unavailing." It is the same man that made answer, when somebody in his presence magnified the king of Persia's grandeur: "He whom you call the great king, in what is he greater than me, unless he be more just?" A truly noble and admirable maxim, THAT JUSTICE MUST BE THE RULE OF WHATEVER EXCELS AND IS GREAT! but a maxim that he had only in his mouth, and which all his actions contradicted, conformable to the principle of the generality of politicians, who imagine, that a statesman ought always to have justice in his mouth, but never lose an occasion of violating it for the advantage of his country.

But let us now hear the sentence which the august assembly of Sparta, so renowned for the wisdom of its councils and the equity of its decrees, is about to pronounce. The affair being maturely considered, the whole discussed at

large, and the manner of it set in its full light, the assembly resolved, that Phæbidas should be deprived of his command, and fined one hundred thousand drachmas; but that they should continue to hold the citadel, and keep a good garrison in it. What a strange contradiction was this! says Polybius;* what a disregard of all justice and reason, to punish the criminal, and approve the crime! and not only to approve the crime tacitly, and without having any share in it, but to ratify it by the public authority, and continue it in the name of the state for the advantages arising from it! But this was not all: commissioners, appointed by all the cities in alliance with Sparta, were despatched to the citadel of Thebes to try Ismenius, upon whom they passed sentence of death, which was immediately executed. Such flagrant injustice seldom remains unpunished. To act in such a manner, says Polybius again, is neither for one's country's nor one's own interest.

Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, had been substituted in the place of Phæbidas, to command the rest of the troops of the allies designed against Olynthus, whither he marched with all expedition. The city was strong, and furnished with every thing necessary to a good defence. Several sallies were made with great success; in one of which Teleutias was killed.† The next year, king Agesipolis had the command of the army. The campaign passed in skirmishing, without any thing decisive. Agesipolis died soon after, and was succeeded by his brother Cleombrotus, who reigned nine years. About that time began the hundredth Olympiad. Sparta had made fresh efforts to terminate the war with the Olynthians. Polybidas, their general, pressed the siege with vigor. The place being in want of provisions was at last obliged to surrender, and was received by the Spartans into the number of their allies.‡

SECTION II.—SPARTA'S PROSPERITY, CHARACTER OF TWO ILLUSTRIOUS THEBANS, EPAMINONDAS AND PELOPIDAS.

The fortune of the Lacedæmonians never appeared with greater splendor, nor their power more strongly established. All Greece was subjected to them either by force or alliance. They were in possession of Thebes, a most powerful city, and with that, of all Bœotia. They had found means to humble Argos, and to hold it in dependence. Corinth was

* Lib. iv. p. 196. † Xenoph. l. v. pp. 559-565. Diod. l. xv. pp. 342, 343.

‡ A. M. 3624. Ant. J. C. 380.

entirely at their devotion, and obeyed their orders in every thing. The Athenians, abandoned by their allies, and reduced almost to their own strength, were in no condition to resist them. If any city or people, in their alliance, attempted to withdraw themselves from their power, an immediate punishment reduced them to their former obedience, and terrified all others from following their example. Thus, masters by sea and land, all trembled before them; and the most formidable princes, as the king of Persia and the tyrant of Sicily, seemed to emulate each other in courting their friendship and alliance.*

A prosperity founded in injustice, cannot be of long duration. The greatest blows that were given the Spartan power, came from the quarter where they had done the greatest injuries, and from whence they did not seem to have any thing to fear; that is to say, from Thebes. Two illustrious citizens of that state will make a glorious appearance upon the theatre of Greece, and for that reason deserve our notice in this place.

These are Pelopidas and Epaminondas, both descended from the noblest families of Thebes. Pelopidas, nurtured in the greatest affluence, and while young, sole heir of a very rich and flourishing family, employed his wealth from the first possession of it, in the relief of such as had occasion for it, and merited his favor; showing in that wise use of his riches, that he was really their master, and not their slave.† For, according to Aristotle's remarks, repeated by Plutarch, most men either make no use at all of their fortunes, out of avarice, or abuse them in bad and trifling expenses. As for Epaminondas, poverty was all his inheritance, in which his honor, and one might almost say his joy and delight, consisted. He was born of poor parents, and consequently familiarized from his infancy with poverty, which he made more grateful and easy to him by his taste for philosophy. Pelopidas, who supported a great number of citizens, never being able to prevail on him to accept his offers, and to make use of his fortune, resolved to share in the poverty of his friend, by making him his example, and became the model as well as admiration of the whole city, from the modesty of his dress, and the frugality of his table.

If Epaminondas was poor as to the goods of fortune, those of the head and heart made him most ample amends. Modest, prudent, grave; happy in improving occasions; pos-

* Xenoph. l. v. p. 565. Diod. l. xv. p. 334.

† Plut. in Pelop. p. 279.

sessing in a supreme degree the science of war; equally valiant and wise; easy and complaisant in the commerce of the world; suffering with incredible patience the people's, and even his friends' ill-treatment, uniting with the ardor for military exercises, a wonderful taste for study and the sciences, priding himself especially so much upon truth and sincerity, that he made scruple of telling a lie even in jest, or for diversion. "*Adeo veritatis diligens, ut ne joco quidem mentiretur.*" *

They were both equally inclined to virtue. But Pelopidas was best pleased with the exercises of the body, and Epaminondas with the cultivation of the mind. For which reason, they employed their leisure, the one in the palæstra and the chase, and the other in conversation and the study of philosophy.†

But what persons of sense and judgment must principally admire in them and which is rarely found in their high rank, is the perfect union and friendship that always subsisted between them during the whole time they were employed together in the administration of the public affairs, whether in war or peace. If we examine the government of Aristides and Themistocles, that, of Cimon and Pericles, of Nicias and Alcibiades, we shall find them full of trouble, dissension, and debate. The two friends we speak of, held the first offices in the state; all great affairs passed through their hands, and every thing was confided to their care and authority. In such delicate conjunctures, what occasions of envy and jealousy generally arise! But neither difference of sentiment, diversity of interest, nor the least emotion of envy, ever altered their union and good understanding. The reason of which was, their being founded upon an unalterable principle, that is, upon virtue, which in all their actions, says Plutarch, occasioned their having neither glory nor riches, fatal sources of strife and division, in view, but solely the public good, and made them desire not the advancement or honor of their own families, but to render their country more powerful and flourishing. Such are the two illustrious men who are about to make their appearance and to give a new face to the affairs of Greece, by the great events in which they have a principal share.

Leontides, being apprised that the exiles had retired to Athens, where they had been well received by the people, and were in great esteem with all people of worth and

* Corn. Nep. in Epam. c. iii.

† Plut. in Pelop. p. 279.

honor, sent thither certain unknown persons to assassinate the most considerable of them. Only Androclides was killed; all the rest escaping the contrivances of Leontides.*

At the same time the Athenians received letters from Sparta, to prohibit their receiving or assisting the exiles, and with orders to expel them their city, as they were declared common enemies by all the allies. The humanity and virtue peculiar and natural to the Athenians, made them reject so infamous a proposal with horror. They were transported with the occasion of expressing their gratitude to the Thebans for a previous obligation of the same nature: for the Thebans had contributed most to the re-establishment of the popular government of Athens, having declared in their favor by a public decree, contrary to the prohibition of Sparta; and it was from Thebes that Thrasybulus set out to deliver Athens from the tyranny of the Thirty.

Pelopidas, though at that time very young, went to all the exiles one after another, of whom Melon was the most considerable. He represented to them, "that it was unworthy of honest men, to content themselves with having saved their own lives, and to look with indifference upon their country, enslaved and miserable; that whatever goodwill the people of Athens might express for them, it was not fit that they should suffer their fate to depend upon the decrees of a people, which their natural inconstancy, and the malignity of orators that turned them any way at will, might soon alter; that it was necessary to hazard every thing, after the example of Thrasybulus, and to set before them his intrepid valor and generous fortitude as a model; that as he set out from Thebes to suppress and destroy the tyrants of Athens, so they might go from Athens to restore Thebes its ancient liberty."

This discourse made all the impression upon the exiles that could be expected. They sent privately to inform their friends at Thebes of their resolution, who extremely approved their design. Charon, one of the principal persons of the city, offered to receive the conspirators into his house. Philidas found means to get himself made secretary to Archias and Philip, who were then polemarchs or supreme magistrates of the city. As for Epaminondas, he had for some time diligently endeavored to inspire the younger Thebans, by his discourse, with a passionate desire

* A. M. 3626. Ant. J. C. 378. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. v. p. 566-568. Plut. in Pelop. pp. 280-284. In de Socrat. Gen. pp. 586-588, et 595-598. Diod. l. xv. pp. 444-446. Corn. Nep. in Pelop. c. i. iv.

to throw off the Spartan yoke. He was ignorant of nothing that had been projected ; but he believed that he ought not to have any share in it, because, as he said, he could not resolve to imbrue his hands in the blood of his country ; foreseeing that his friends would not keep within the due bounds of the enterprise, however lawful in itself, and that the tyrants would not perish alone ; and convinced besides, that a citizen, who should appear not to have taken either side, would have it in his power to influence the people with the better effect.*

The day for the execution of the project being fixed, the exiles thought proper, that Pherenicus, with all the conspirators, should stop at Thriasium, a little town not far from Thebes, and that a small number of the youngest of them should venture into the city. Twelve persons of the best families of Thebes, all united by a strict and faithful friendship with each other, though competitors for glory and honor, offered themselves for this bold enterprise, Pelopidas was of this number. After having embraced their companions, and despatched a messenger to Charon, to give him notice of their coming, they set out, dressed in mean habits, carrying hounds with them, and poles in their hands for pitching nets ; that such as they met on the way might have no suspicion of them, and take them only for hunters that had wandered after their game.

Their messenger having arrived at Thebes, and having informed Charon that they were set out, the approach of danger did not alter his sentiments : and as he wanted neither courage nor honor, he prepared his house for their reception.

One of the conspirators, who was not a bad man, but loved his country, and would have served the exiles with all his power, but had neither the resolution nor constancy necessary for such an enterprise, and could think of nothing but difficulties and obstacles, that presented themselves in crowds to his imagination, much disordered with the prospect of danger, retired into his house without saying any thing, and despatched one of his friends to Melon and Pelopidas, to desire them to defer their enterprise, and return to Athens till a more favorable opportunity. Happily that friend, not finding his horse's bridle, and losing a great deal of time in quarrelling with his wife, was prevented from going.

* Plut. de Gen. Socrat. p. 594.

Pelopidas and his companions, disguised like peasants, and having separated from each other, entered the city at different gates towards the close of the day. It was then early in the winter, the north wind blew and the snow fell, which contributed to conceal them, everybody keeping within doors upon account of the cold weather; besides which, it gave them an opportunity of covering their faces. Some, who were in the secret, received and conducted them to Charon's house; where, of exiles and others, their whole number amounted to forty-eight.

Philidas, secretary to the bæotarchs,* who was in the plot, had some time before invited Archias and his companions to supper, promising them an exquisite repast, and the company of some of the finest women in the city. The guests being met at the appointed time, they sat down to table. They had made free with the glass, and were almost drunk, when it was whispered about, but not known where the report began, that the exiles were in the city. Philidas, without showing any concern, did his utmost to change the discourse. Archias, however, sent one of his officers to Charon, with orders to come to him immediately. It was now late, and Pelopidas and the conspirators were preparing to set out, and had put on their armor and swords, when, on a sudden, they heard a knocking at the door. Some person went to it; and being told by the officer, that he was come from the magistrates with orders for Charon to attend them immediately, he ran to him half out of his wits to acquaint him with that terrible message. They all concluded that the conspiracy was discovered, and believed themselves lost, before it would be possible to execute any thing worthy of their cause and valor. However, they were all of opinion that Charon should obey the order, and present himself with an air of assurance to the magistrates, as void of fear and unconscious of offence.

Charon was a man of intrepid courage in danger which threatened only himself, but at that time, terrified for his friends, and apprehending also that he should be suspected of some treachery, if so many brave citizens, whom he had received into his house, should be destroyed, he went to his wife's apartment, and brought his only son, of fifteen years old at most, who in beauty and strength, excelled all the youths of his age, and put him into the hands of Pelopidas,

* The magistrates and generals who were charged with the government of Thebes, were called bæotarchs, that is to say, commanders or governors of Bœotia.

saying at the same time, "If you discover that I have betrayed you, and have been guilty of treachery upon this occasion, revenge yourselves on me in this my only son, whom, dear as he is to me, I abandon to you, and let him fall a victim without mercy, to his father's perfidy."

These expressions wounded them to the heart; but what gave them the most sensible pain, was his imagining there was any one among them so mean and ungrateful, as to form to himself the least suspicion in regard to him. They conjured him unanimously, not to leave his son with them, but to put him into some place of safety; that his friends and country might not want an avenger if he should be so fortunate as to escape the tyrants. "No," replied the father, "he shall stay with you, and share your fate. If he must perish, what nobler end can he make, than with his father and best friends. For you, my son, exert yourself beyond your years, and show a courage worthy of you and me. You see here the most excellent of the Thebans. Make under such masters a noble essay of glory, and learn to fight; or, if it must be so, to die, like them, for liberty. For the rest, I am not without hopes, for I believe that the justice of our cause will draw down the favor and protection of the gods upon us." He concluded with a prayer for them; and after embracing the conspirators, went out.

He took pains on his way to recover himself, and to compose his looks and voice, that he might not appear under any concern. When he came to the door of the house where the feast was kept, Archias and Philidas came out to him, and asked the meaning of a report, that disaffected people were arrived in the city, and were concealed in some house. He seemed astonished; and finding by their answers to his questions, that they had no precise information of any thing, he assumed a bolder tone, and said, "it is very likely that the report you speak of is only a false alarm, intended to interrupt your mirth: however, as it ought not to be neglected, I will go immediately and make the strictest inquiry possible into it." Philidas praised his prudence and zeal, and carrying Archias back into the company, he plunged him again in the debauch, and continued the entertainment by keeping the guests in perpetual expectation of the women he had promised them.

Charon, on his return home, found his friends all prepared, not to conquer or to save their lives, but to die gloriously, and to sell themselves as dear as they could. The

serenity and joy of his looks explained beforehand, that they had nothing to fear. He repeated all that had passed; after which, they had no thoughts but of the instant execution of a design, to which the least delay might occasion a thousand obstacles.

At that very moment a second storm arose, far more violent than the first, and which seemed as if it could not possibly fail of making the enterprise miscarry. A courier from Athens arrived in great haste with a packet, which contained a circumstantial account of the whole conspiracy, as was afterwards discovered. The courier was brought first to Archias, who was far gone in wine, and breathed nothing but pleasure and the bottle. In giving him his despatches, he said, "My lord, the person who writes you these letters, conjures you to read them immediately, being serious affairs." Archias replied, laughing, "serious affairs to-morrow,"* which words were afterwards used by the Greeks as a proverb; and taking the letters, he put them under his pillow,† and continued the conversation and debauch.

The conspirators were at that time in the streets, divided into two parties: the one, with Pelopidas at their head, marched against Leontides, who was not at the feast; the other against Archias, under the command of Charon. These had put on women's habits over their armor, and crowned themselves with pine and poplar wreaths, which entirely covered their faces. When they came to the door of the apartment where the feast was kept, the guests made a great noise, and set up loud shouts of joy. But they were told, that the women would not come in till the servants were all dismissed, which was done immediately. They were sent to neighboring houses, where there was no want of wine for their entertainment. The conspirators, by this stratagem, having made themselves masters of the field of battle, entered sword in hand, and showing themselves in their true colors, put all the guests to the sword, and with them the magistrates, who were full of wine, and in no condition to defend themselves. Pelopidas met with more resistance. Leontides, who was asleep in bed, awaked with the noise that was made, and rising immediately armed himself with his sword, and laid some of the conspirators at his feet; but was at last killed himself.

This grand affair being executed in this manner with

* 'Ουκοῦν ἐς αὔριον, ἔφη, τὰ σπονδαῖα.

† The Greeks eat lying on beds.

so much despatch and success, couriers were immediately despatched to Thriasium. The doors of the prisons were broken open, and five hundred prisoners let out. The Thebans were called upon to resume their liberty, and arms were given to all they met. The spoils affixed to the porticoes were taken down, and the armorers and cutlers' shops broken open for that purpose. Epaminondas and Gorgidas came in arms to join them, with some old persons of great estimation, whom they had got together.

The whole city was in great terror and confusion; the houses all illuminated with torches, and the streets thronged with the multitude passing to and fro. The people, in consternation at what had happened, and for want of sufficient information, waited impatiently for the day to know their destiny. The Lacedæmonian captains were therefore considered guilty of a very great error in not falling upon them during their disorder; for the garrison consisted of fifteen hundred men, besides three thousand who had taken refuge in the citadel. Alarmed by the cries they heard, the illuminations they saw in the houses, and the tumult of the multitude running backwards and forwards, they lay still, and contented themselves with guarding the citadel, after having sent couriers to Sparta with the news of what had happened, and to demand an immediate reinforcement.

The next day at sunrise the exiles arrived with their arms, and the people were summoned to assemble. Epaminondas and Gorgidas conducted Pelopidas thither, surrounded with all the sacrifices, carrying in their hands the sacred bandages and fillets, and exhorting the citizens to assist their country, and to join with the gods. At this sight, the whole assembly rose up with loud acclamations and clapping of hands, and received the conspirators as their benefactors and deliverers. The same day, Pelopidas, Melon, and Charon, were elected *bœotarchs*.

Soon after the exiles, arrived five thousand foot, and five hundred horse, sent by the Athenians to Pelopidas, under the command of Demophoon. Those troops, with others which joined them from all the cities of Bœotia, composed an army of twelve thousand foot, and as many horse, without loss of time besieged the citadel, that it might be taken before relief could come from Sparta.

The besieged made a vigorous defence in hopes of a speedy succor, and seemed resolved rather to die than surrender the place: at least, the Lacedæmonians were of that

opinion, but they were not the greatest number of the garrison. When provisions began to fall short, and famine to press them, the rest of the troops obliged the Spartans to surrender. The garrison had their lives granted them, and were permitted to retire whither they thought fit. They were scarcely marched out, when the aid arrived. The Lacedæmonians found Cleombrotus, at Megara, at the head of a powerful army, which, with a little more expedition, might have saved the citadel. But this was not the first time the natural slowness of the Lacedæmonians had occasioned the miscarriage of their enterprises. The three commanders who had capitulated were tried. Two of them were punished with death, and the third had so great a fine laid upon him, that not being able to pay it, he banished himself from Peloponnesus.

Pelopidas had all the hono^r of this great exploit, the most memorable that ever was executed by surprise and stratagem. Plutarch, with reason, compares it to that of Thrasybulus. Both exiles, destitute in themselves of all resource, and reduced to implore a foreign support, formed the bold design of attacking a formidable power with a handful of men, and overcoming all obstacles to their enterprise solely by their valor, had each of them the good fortune to deliver their country, and to change the face of its affairs entirely. For the Athenians were indebted to Thrasybulus for that sudden and happy change, which, freeing them from the oppression they groaned under, not only restored their liberty, but with it their ancient splendor, and put them into a condition to humble and make Sparta tremble in her turn. We shall see in like manner, that the war which reduced the pride of Sparta, and deprived it of the empire both by sea and land, was the work of this single night, in which Pelopidas, without taking either citadel or fortress, and entering only one of twelve into a private house, threw off and broke the chains imposed by the Lacedæmonians on all the other states of Greece, though it appeared impracticable ever to produce such an effect.

SECTION III.—SPHODRIAS FORMS A DESIGN AGAINST THE PIRÆUS.

The Lacedæmonians, after the injury they pretended to have received by the enterprise of Pelopidas, did not remain quiet, but applied themselves in earnest to their re-

venge. Agesilaus, rightly judging that an expedition of that kind, the end of which was to support tyrants, would not reflect much honor upon him, left it to Cleombrotus, who had lately succeeded king Agesipolis, under pretence that this great age dispensed with his undertaking it. Cleombrotus entered Bæotia with his army. The first campaign was not vigorous, and terminated in committing some ravages in the country; after which the king retired, and detaching part of his troops to Sphodrias, who commanded at Thespiæ, returned to Sparta.*

The Athenians, who did not think themselves in a condition to make head against the Lacedæmonians, and were afraid of the consequences in which their league with the Thebans was likely to engage them, repented their having entered into it, and renounced it. Of those who persisted to adhere to the Theban party, were some imprisoned, and some put to death, others banished, and the rich heavily fined. The Theban affairs seemed almost desperate, not having any alliance to support them. Pelopidas and Gorgidas were then at the head of them, and were studious of finding means to embroil the Athenians with the Lacedæmonians, which they effected by the following stratagem.

Sphodrias the Spartan had been left at Thespiæ with a body of troops, to receive and protect such of the Bæotians as should revolt against Thebes. He had acquired some reputation among the soldiery, and wanted neither courage nor ambition; but he was rash, superficial, full of himself, and consequently apt to entertain vain hopes. Pelopidas and Gorgidas sent privately a merchant of his own acquaintance to him with the offer, as from himself, of a considerable sum of money, and with insinuations more agreeable to him than money, as they flattered his vanity. "After having represented to him, that one of his merit and reputation ought to form some great enterprise to immortalize his name, he proposed to him the seizing of the Piræus by surprise, when the Athenians had no expectation of such an attempt; he added, that nothing could be more grateful to the Lacedæmonians, than to see themselves masters of Athens; and that the Thebans, enraged at the Athenians, whom they considered as traitors and deserters, would lend them no assistance."

Sphodrias, fond of acquiring a great name, and envying

* A. M. 3627. Ant. J. C. 377. Xenoph. l. v. pp. 568-572. Plut. in Ages. pp. 609, 610. Id. in Pelop. pp. 284, 285.

the glory of Phæbidas, who, in this sense, had rendered himself renowned and illustrious by his unjust attempt upon Thebes, conceived it would be a much more brilliant and glorious exploit to seize the Piræus of his own accord, and deprive the Athenians of their great power at sea, by an unforeseen attack by land. He undertook the enterprise therefore with great joy ; which was neither less unjust nor less horrid than that of the Cadmæa, but not executed with the same boldness and success. For having set out in the night from Thespiæ with the view of surprising the Piræus before light, the daybreak overtook him in the plain of Thriasium, near Eleusis ; and finding himself discovered, he returned shamefully to Thespiæ with some booty which he had taken.

The Athenians immediately sent ambassadors with their complaints to Sparta. Those ambassadors found, that the Lacedæmonians had not waited their arrival to accuse Sphodrias, but had already cited him before the council to answer for his conduct. He was afraid to obey that summons, having just reason to apprehend the issue of a trial, and the resentment of his country. He had a son who had contracted a strict and tender friendship with the son of Agesilaus. The latter solicited his father so earnestly, or rather tormented him with such extreme importunity and perseverance, that he could not refuse Sphodrias his protection, and got him fully absolved. Agesilaus was not scrupulous, as we have seen already, in point of justice, when the service of his friends was in question. He was besides, of all mankind, the most tender and indulgent father to his children. It is reported of him, that when they were infants, he would play with them, and divert himself with riding upon a stick among them ; and that having been surprised by a friend in that action, he desired him not to tell anybody of it till himself was a father.

The unjust sentence passed in favor of Sphodrias by the Spartans, exceedingly incensed the Athenians, and determined them to renew their alliance with Thebes immediately, and to assist them with all their power. They fitted out a fleet and gave the command of it to Timotheus, son of the illustrious Conon, whose reputation he well sustained by his own valor and exploits.* It was he whom his enemies, in envy of the glory he had acquired

* Xenoph. 1. v. pp. 584-589. Plut. in Agesil. pp. 610, 611. Id. in Pelop. pp. 285-288.

by his great actions, painted sleeping, with the goddess Fortune at his feet, taking towns in nets for him: * but upon this occasion he proved that he was not asleep. After having ravaged the coast of Laconia, he attacked the isle of Coreyra (Corfu), which he took. He treated the inhabitants with great humanity, and made no alteration in their liberty or laws, which very much inclined the neighboring cities in favor of Athens. The Spartans on their side made powerful preparations for the war, and were principally intent upon retaking Coreyra. Its happy situation between Sicily and Greece rendered the island very important. They therefore engaged Dionysius the tyrant in the expedition, and demanded aid of him. In the mean time they despatched their fleet under Mnasippus. The Athenians sent sixty sail against them to the relief of Coreyra, under Timotheus at first; but soon after upon his seeming to act too slowly, Iphicrates was substituted in his place. Mnasippus having made himself odious to his troops by his haughtiness, rigor, and avarice, was very ill obeyed by them, and lost his life in an engagement. Iphicrates did not arrive till after his death, when he received advice that the Syracusan squadron of ten galleys approached, which he attacked so successfully, that not one of them escaped. He demanded, that the orator Callistratus, and Chabrias, one of the most renowned captains of his time, should be joined in commission with him. Xenophon admires his wisdom and greatness of soul upon that account, in being satisfied with appearing to have occasion for council, and not apprehending to share the glory of his victories with others.

Agesilaus had been prevailed upon to take upon him the command of the troops against Thebes. He entered Bæotia, where he did great damage to the Thebans, not without considerable loss on his own side. The two armies came every day to blows, and were continually engaged, though not in formal battle, yet in skirmishes, which served to instruct the Thebans in the art of war, and to inspire them with valor, boldness, and experience. It is reported that the Spartan Antalcides told Agesilaus very justly upon this head, when he was brought back from Bæotia much wounded: "My lord Agesilaus, you have a fine reward for the lessons you have given the Thebans in the art of war, which before you taught it them, they neither would nor could learn." It was to prevent this inconvenience, that Lycu-

* Plut. in Syl. p. 454.

gus, in one of the three laws which he calls Rhretræ, forbade the Lacedæmonians to make war often upon the same enemy, lest they should make them too good soldiers, by obliging them to the frequent defence of themselves.

Several campaigns passed in this manner, without any thing decisive on either side. It was prudent in the Theban generals not to hazard a battle hitherto, and to give their soldiers time to inure and embolden themselves. When the occasion was favorable, they let themselves loose like generous hounds; and after having given them a taste of victory by way of reward, they called them off, contented with their courage and alacrity. The principal glory of their success and this wise conduct was due to Pelopidas.

The engagement at Tegyra, which was a kind of prelude to the battle of Leuctra, added much to his reputation. Having failed in his enterprise against Orchomenos, which had joined the Lacedæmonians, at his return he found the enemy posted to intercept him near Tegyra. As soon as the Thebans perceived them from the defiles, some person ran in all haste to Pelopidas, and told him, "We have fallen into the enemy's hands." "Ah!" replied he, "why should we not rather say that they are fallen into ours?" At the same time he ordered his cavalry, which were his rear-guard, to advance to the front, that they might begin the fight. He was assured that his foot, which were only three hundred, and were called the Sacred Battalion, would break through the enemy, wherever they charged, though superior in number, as they were by at least two-thirds. The assault began where the generals of each party were posted, and was very violent. The two generals of the Lacedæmonians, who had charged Pelopidas, were immediately killed; all that were with them being either slain or dispersed. The rest of the Lacedæmonian troops were so daunted, that they opened a passage for the Thebans, who might have marched on to save themselves if they had thought fit: but Pelopidas, disdaining to make use of that opening for his retreat, advanced against those who were still drawn up in battle, and made so great a slaughter of them, that they were all dismayed, and fled in disorder. The Thebans did not pursue them far, lest they should be surprised. They contented themselves with having broken them, and with making a glorious retreat, not inferior to a victory, because it was made through an enemy dispersed and defeated.

This little encounter, for it can be called no more, was

in a manner the source of the great actions and events we are about to treat of. It had never happened till then in any war, either against the barbarians or Greeks, that the Lacedæmonians had been defeated with the superiority of numbers on their side, nor even with equal forces in regular battle: for which reason they were insupportably proud, and their reputation alone kept their enemies in awe, who never durst show themselves in the field before them, unless superior in number. They now lost that glory, and the Thebans in their turn became the terror and dread even of those who had rendered themselves so universally formidable.

The enterprise of Artaxerxes Mnemon against Egypt, and the death of Evagoras, king of Cyprus, should naturally come in here.* But I shall defer these articles, to avoid breaking in upon the Theban affairs.

SECTION IV.—NEW TROUBLES IN GREECE. THE LACEDÆMONIANS DECLARE WAR AGAINST THEBES.

While the Persians were engaged in the Egyptian war, great troubles arose in Greece. † In that interval the Thebans, having taken Plataæ, a city of Bœotia, and afterwards Thespiæ, a city of Achaia, entirely demolished those cities, and expelled the inhabitants. The Plataeans retired to Athens with their wives and children, where they were received with the utmost favor, and adopted into the number of the citizens.

Artaxerxes, being informed of the state of the Grecian affairs, sent a new embassy thither to persuade the several cities and republics at war to lay down their arms, and accommodate their differences upon the plan of the treaty of Antalcides. By that peace, as has been observed in its place, it was concluded, that all the cities of Greece should enjoy their liberty, and be governed by their own laws. In virtue of this article, the Lacedæmonians pressed the Thebans to restore their liberty to all the cities of Bœotia, to rebuild the Plataæ and Thespiæ, which they had demolished, and to restore them with their dependencies to their ancient inhabitants. The Thebans on their side insisted also that the Lacedæmonians should give liberty to all those of Laconia, and that the city of Messene should be restored to its ancient possessors. This was what equity required; but

* A. M. 3627. Ant. J. C. 377.

† A. M. 3633. Ant. J. C. 371. Diod. l. xv. pp.

361, 362.

the Lacedæmonians, believing themselves much superior to the Thebans, were for imposing a law upon them, which they would not submit to themselves.*

All Greece, being weary of a war which had already lasted several campaigns, and had no other end than the aggrandizing of that state, was seriously intent upon a general peace, and with that view had sent deputies to Lacedæmon, to concert together the means of attaining so desirable an object. Among these deputies, Epaminondas was of the first rank. He was at that time celebrated for his great erudition and profound knowledge of philosophy; but he had not yet given any very distinguished proofs of his great capacity for the command of armies, and the administration of public affairs. Seeing that all the deputies, out of respect for Agesilaus, who declared openly for the war, were afraid to contradict him, or to differ from his opinion in any thing; a very common effect of too imperious a power on one side, and too servile a submission on the other; he was the only one that spoke with a wise and noble boldness, as became a statesman who had no other view than the public good. He made a speech, not for the Thebans alone, but for Greece in general, in which he proved that the war augmented only the power of Sparta, while the rest of Greece was reduced and ruined by it. He insisted principally upon the necessity of establishing the peace in equality and justice, because no peace could be solid and of long duration but that wherein all parties find an equal advantage. †

A discourse like this, founded evidently upon reason and justice, and pronounced with a grave and serious tone, never fails of making an impression. Agesilaus plainly distinguished, from the attention and silence with which it was heard, that the deputies were extremely affected with it, and would not fail to act conformably to his opinion. To prevent that effect, he demanded of Epaminondas, whether he thought it just and reasonable, that Bœotia should be free and independent? that is to say, whether he agreed that the cities of Bœotia should depend no longer upon Thebes. Epaminondas immediately asked in his turn, with great vivacity, whether he thought it just and reasonable, that Laconia should enjoy the same independence and liberty? Upon which Agesilaus, rising from his seat in great

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. vi. pp. 590-593. Dion. pp. 365, 366.

† Plut. in Agesil. p. 612.

rage, insisted upon his declaring plainly, whether he would consent that Bœotia should be free? Epaminondas retorted his question again, and asked whether, on his side, he would consent that Laconia should be free? Agesilaus, who wanted only a pretext for breaking with the Thebans, struck them directly out of the treaty of alliance, which they were about to conclude. The rest of the allies signed it, not out of inclination, but from a fear of offending the Lacedæmonians, whose power they dreaded.

In consequence of this treaty, all the troops in the field were to be disbanded. Cleombrotus, one of the kings of Sparta, was then at Phocis, at the head of the army. He wrote to the ephori to know the republic's resolutions. Prothous, one of the principal senators, represented that there was no room for deliberations; for that Sparta, by the late agreement, had made the recall of the troops indispensable. Agesilaus was of a different opinion. Angry with the Thebans, and particularly with Epaminondas, he was absolutely bent on the war for an opportunity of revenge; and the present seemed most favorable, when all Greece was free and united, and only the Thebans excluded from the treaty of peace. The advice of Prothous was therefore rejected by the whole council, who treated him as an honest, well-meaning dotard, who knew nothing of the matter; the divinity from thenceforth, as Xenophon observes, promoting their downfall.* The ephori wrote immediately to Cleombrotus to march against the Thebans with his troops; and, at the same time, sent orders for assembling the forces of their allies who were averse to this war, and did not join in it but with great reluctance, and out of fear of contradicting the Lacedæmonians, whom they did not yet dare to disobey. Though no happy consequences could be expected from a war, visibly undertaken contrary to all reason and justice, and from the sole motive of resentment and revenge, the Lacedæmonians, however, from the superiority of their numbers, assured themselves of success, and imagined that the Thebans, abandoned by their allies, were in no condition to oppose them. †

The Thebans were much alarmed at first. They saw themselves alone, without allies or support, while all Greece looked upon them as utterly lost, not knowing that in a single man they had more than armies. This was Epami-

* 'Εκείνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, ἥδη γὰρ ὡς εἶκε τὸ δαίμονιον ἦγεν.

† Xenoph. vi. pp. 593-597. Diod. l. xv. pp. 365-371. Plut. in Agesil. pp. 611, 612. Id. in Pelop. pp. 288, 289.

nondas. He was appointed general, and had several colleagues joined in commission with him. He immediately raised all the troops he could, and began his march. His army did not amount to six thousand men, and the enemy had above four times that number. As several bad omens were told him to prevent his setting out, he replied only by a verse of Homer's, the sense of which is, "there is but one good omen, to fight for one's country." * However, to reassure the soldiers, by nature superstitious, and whom he observed to be discouraged, he instructed several persons to come from different places, and report auguries and omens in his favor, which revived the spirit and hopes of the troops.†

Pelopidas was not then in office, but commanded the Sacred Battalion. When he left his house to go to the army, his wife, in taking her last adieu, conjured him with a flood of tears to take care of himself: "That," said he, "should be recommended to young people; but for generals, they have no occasion for such advice; the care of others should be recommended to them."

Epaminondas had wisely taken care to secure a pass, by which Cleombrotus might have shortened his march considerably. The latter, after having taken a large compass, arrived at Leuctra, a small town of Bœotia, between Platææ and Thespiæ. Both parties consulted whether they should give battle, which Cleombrotus resolved to do by the advice of all his officers, who represented to him, that if he declined fighting with such a superiority of troops, it would confirm the current report, that he secretly favored the Thebans. The latter had an essential reason for hastening a battle before the arrival of his troops, which the enemy daily expected. However, the six generals who formed the council of war differed in their sentiments. The seventh, who was Epaminondas, came in very good time to join the three that were for fighting; and his opinion carrying the question, the battle was resolved upon. This was the second year of the 102d Olympiad.

The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Lacedæmonians, as has been said, consisted of twenty-four thousand foot, and sixteen hundred horse. The Thebans had only six thousand foot and four hundred horse; but all of them choice troops, animated by their experience

* Εἰς ὁὖτως ἀριστος, ἀμυνεσθαι περὶ πατρὸς. Iliad, xi. v. 423.

† A. M. 3634. Ant. J. C. 370.

in war, and determined to conquer or die. The Lacedæmonian cavalry, composed of men picked up by chance, without valor and ill-disciplined, was as much inferior to their enemies in courage, as superior in number. The infantry could not be depended on, except the Lacedæmonians; the allies, as has been said, having engaged in the war with reluctance, because they did not approve the motive of it, and were besides dissatisfied with the Lacedæmonians.

The ability of the generals on either side supplied the place of numerous armies, especially of the Theban, who was the most accomplished captain of his time. He was supported by Pelopidas at the head of the Sacred Battalion, composed of three hundred Thebans, united in a strict friendship and affection, and engaged under a particular oath never to fly, but to defend each other to the last drop of their blood.

Upon the day of battle the two armies drew up on a plain. Cleombrotus was upon the right, consisting of Lacedæmonians, on which he confided most, and whose files were twelve deep. To take the advantage which his superiority of horse gave him in an open country, he posted them in the front of the Lacedæmonians. Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, was at the head of the allies, who formed the left wing.

Epaminondas, who resolved to charge with his left, which he commanded in person, strengthened it, with the choice of his heavy-armed troops, whom he drew up fifty deep. The Sacred Battalion was upon his left, and closed the wing. The rest of his infantry were posted upon his right in an oblique line, which, the farther it extended, the more distant it was from the enemy. By this uncommon disposition, his design was to cover his flank on the right, to keep off his right wing as a kind of reserve, that he might not hazard the event of the battle upon the weakest part of his army; and to begin the action with his left wing, where his best troops were posted, to turn the whole weight of the battle upon king Cleombrotus and the Spartans. He was assured, that if he could penetrate the Lacedæmonian phalanx, the rest of the army would soon be put to the rout. As for his horse, he disposed them, after the enemy's example, in the front of his left.

The action began by the cavalry. As that of the Thebans were better mounted and braver troops than the Lacedæmonian horse, the latter were not long before they were broken and driven upon the infantry, which they threw into

some confusion. Epaminondas, following the horse closely, marched swiftly up to Cleombrotus, and fell upon the phalanx with all the weight of his heavy battalion. The latter, to make a diversion, detached a body of troops with orders to take Epaminondas in flank, and to surround him. Pelopidas, upon the sight of that movement, advanced with incredible speed and boldness at the head of the Sacred Battalion, to prevent the enemy's design, and flanked Cleombrotus himself, who, by that sudden and unexpected attack, was thrown into disorder. The battle was very obstinate, and while Cleombrotus could act, the victory continued in suspense, and declared for neither party. When he fell dead with his wounds, the Thebans, to complete the victory, and the Lacedæmonians, to avoid the shame of abandoning the body of their king, redoubled their efforts, and a great slaughter ensued on both sides. The Spartans fought with so much fury about the body, that at length they gained their point, and carried it off. Animated by so glorious an advantage, they prepared to return to the charge, which would perhaps have proved successful, had the allies seconded their ardor. But the left wing, seeing the Lacedæmonian phalanx broken, and believing all lost, especially when they heard that the king was dead, took to flight, and drew off the rest of the army along with them. Epaminondas followed them vigorously, and killed a great number in the pursuit. The Thebans remained masters of the field of battle, erected a trophy, and permitted the enemy to bury their dead.

The Lacedæmonians had never received such a blow. The most bloody defeats till then had scarcely ever cost them more than four or five hundred of their citizens. They had been seen, however, animated, or rather violently incensed, against Athens, to ransom, by a truce of fifty years, about three hundred of their citizens, who had suffered themselves to be shut up in the little island of Sphacteria. Here they lost four thousand men, one thousand of whom were Lacedæmonians, and four hundred Spartans,* out of seven hundred who were in the battle. The Thebans had only three hundred men killed, among whom were few of their citizens.

The city of Sparta at that time celebrated the gymnastic games, and was full of strangers, whom curiosity had

* Those were properly called Spartans who inhabited Sparta, the Lacedæmonians were settled in the country.

brought thither. When the couriers arrived from Leuctra with the terrible news of their defeat, the ephori, though perfectly sensible of all the consequences, and that the Spartan empire had received a mortal wound, would not permit the representations of the theatre to be suspended, nor any changes in the celebration of the festival. They sent to every family the names of their relations who were killed, and remained in the theatre, to see that the dances and games were continued without interruption to the end.

The next day, the loss of each family being known, the fathers and relatives of those who had died in the battle, met in the public place, and saluted and embraced each other with great joy and serenity in their looks; while the others kept themselves close in their houses; or if necessity obliged them to go abroad, it was with a sadness and dejection of aspect, which sensibly expressed their profound anguish and affliction. That difference was still more remarkable in the women. Grief, silence, and tears, distinguished those who expected the return of their sons; but such as had lost their sons, were seen hurrying to the temples to thank the gods, and congratulating each other upon their glory and good fortune. It cannot be denied, that such sentiments argue great courage and resolution: but I would not have them entirely extinguish natural tenderness, and should have been better pleased had there been less of ferocity in them.*

Sparta was under no small difficulty to know how to act in regard to those who had fled from the battle. As they were numerous, and of the most powerful families in the city, it was not safe to inflict upon them the punishments assigned by the laws, lest their despair should induce them to take some violent resolution fatal to the state. For such as fled were not only excluded from all offices and employments, but it was a disgrace to contract any alliance with them by marriage. Any person who met them in the streets might buffet them, which they were obliged to suffer. They were besides to wear dirty and ragged habits, full of patches of different colors. And lastly, they were to shave half their beards, and to let the other half grow. It was a great loss to the Spartans to be deprived of so many of their soldiery, at the time they had such pressing occasion for them. To remove

* Mr. Rollin seems to speak here *en Francois*. The sentiments of the Spartans have no exception, and are strictly consistent with true greatness of soul. None but slaves will deny, that the next glory and good fortune to defending their country against its enemies, when its ruin is at stake, is to die in its defence. Slaves have no country. Both belong to the tyrant.

this difficulty, they chose Agesilaus legislator, with absolute power to make such alterations in the laws as he should think fit. Agesilaus, without adding, retrenching, or changing any thing, found means to save fugitives without prejudice to the state. In a full assembly of the Lacedæmonians, he decreed, "That for the present day, the laws should be suspended, and of no effect; but ever after to remain in full force and authority." By these few words he preserved the Spartan laws entire, and at the same time restored to the state a great number of its members, in preventing their being for ever degraded, and consequently useless to the republic.

After the battle of Leuctra, the two parties were industriously employed, the one in retrieving, and the other in improving their victory.*

Agesilaus, to revive the courage of his troops, marched them into Arcadia; but with a full resolution carefully to avoid a battle. He confined himself to attacking some small towns of the Mantinæans, which he took, and laid the country waste. This gave the Spartans some joy; and they began to take courage, from believing their condition not entirely desperate.†

The Thebans, soon after their victory, sent an account of it to Athens, and to demand aid at the same time against the common enemy. The senate was then sitting, which received the courier with great coldness, did not make him the usual presents, and dismissed him without taking any notice of aid. The Athenians, alarmed at the considerable advantage which the Thebans had gained over the Lacedæmonians, could not dissemble the umbrage and dissatisfaction which so sudden and unexpected an increase of a neighboring power gave them, which might soon render itself formidable to all Greece.

At Thebes, Epaminondas and Pelopidas had been elected joint governors of Bœotia. Having assembled all the troops of the Bœotians and their allies, whose number daily increased, they entered Peloponnesus, and caused many places and people to revolt from the Lacedæmonians, Elis, Argos, Arcadia, and the greatest part of Laconia itself. It was then about the winter-solstice, and towards the end of the last month of the year; so that in a few days they were to quit their offices; the first day of the next month being

* Xenoph. l. vi. p. 598. Dion. l. xv. pp. 375-378.

† Plut. in. Agesil. pp. 613-615. Id. in Pelop. p. 290.

assigned by law for their resigning them to the persons appointed to succeed them, upon pain of death, if they held them beyond that term. Their colleagues, apprehending the badness of the season, and more the dreadful consequences, of infringing that law, were for marching back the army immediately to Thebes. Pelopidas was the first who, entering into the opinion of Epaminondas, animated the citizens, and engaged them to take the advantage of the enemy's alarm, and to pursue their enterprise in neglect of a formality, from the observance of which they might justly believe themselves dispensed by the state itself, as the service of the state, when founded in justice, is the sovereign law and rule of the people's obedience.

They entered Laconia, therefore, at the head of an army of seventy thousand good soldiers, the twelfth part of whom were not Thebans. The great reputation of the two generals was the cause that all the allies, even without order or public decree, obeyed them with respectful silence, and marched with entire confidence and courage under their command. It was six hundred years since the Dorians had established themselves at Lacedæmon; and in all that time they had never seen an enemy upon their lands; not daring till then to set foot in them, and much less to attack their city, though without walls. The Thebans and their allies, finding a country hitherto untouched by an enemy, ran through it with fire and sword, destroying and plundering as far as the river Eurotas, without any opposition whatever.

Parties had been posted to defend some important passes. Ischolas the Spartan, who commanded one of these detachments, distinguished himself in a peculiar manner. Finding it impossible with his small body of troops to support the enemy's attack, and thinking it below a Spartan to abandon his post, he sent back the young men, who were of age and condition to serve their country effectually, and kept none with him but such as were advanced in years. Devoting himself with these, after the example of Leonidas, to the public good, they sold their lives dear; and after having defended themselves a long time, and made great slaughter of their enemies, they all perished to a man.

Agesilaus acted upon this occasion with great address and wisdom. He looked upon this irruption of the enemy as an impetuous torrent, which it was not only vain, but dangerous to oppose; whose rapid course would be but of

short duration, and after some ravages, subside of itself. He contended himself with distributing his best troops into the middle, and all the most important parts of the city, strongly securing all the posts. He was determined not to quit the town, nor to hazard a battle, and persisted in that resolution, without regard to all the raillery, insults, and menaces of the Thebans, who defied him by name and called upon him to come out and defend his country, who had alone been the cause of all its sufferings, in kindling the war.

But far greater afflictions to Agesilaus were the commotions and disorders excited within the city, the murmurs and complaints of the old men in the highest affliction and despair, from being witnesses of what they saw, as well as of the women, who seemed quite distracted with hearing the threatening cries of the enemy, and seeing the neighboring country all on fire; while the flames and smoke, which drove almost upon them, seemed to denounce a like misfortune to themselves. Whatever courage Agesilaus might express in his outward behavior, he could not fail of being sensibly afflicted with so mournful an object; to which was added the grief of losing his reputation; who, having found the city in a most flourishing and potent condition when he came to the government, now saw it fallen to such a degree, and all its ancient glory lost under him! He was, besides, secretly mortified at so mournful a contradiction of a boast he had often made, "that no woman of Sparta had ever seen the smoke of an enemy's camp."

While he was giving different orders in the city, he was informed, that a certain number of mutineers had seized an important post, with a resolution to defend themselves in it. Agesilaus ran immediately thither; and as if he had been entirely unacquainted with their bad design, he said to them, "Comrades, it is not there I sent you." At the same time he pointed to different posts to divide them; to which they went, believing their enterprise had not been discovered. This order, which he gave without emotion, argues a great presence of mind in Agesilaus, and shows that in times of trouble it is not proper to see too much, that the culpable may not want time to reflect and repent. He thought it more-advisable to suppose that small troop innocent, than to urge them to a declared revolt by a too rigorous inquiry.

The Eurotas was at that time very much swollen by the melting of the snows, and the Thebans found more difficulty

in passing it than they had expected, as well from the extreme coldness of the water as its rapidity. As Epaminondas passed at the head of his infantry, some of the Spartans showed him to Agesilaus; who, after having attentively considered and followed him with his eyes a long time, said only, "Wonderful man!" * in admiration of the valor that could undertake such great things. Epaminondas would have been glad to have given battle in Sparta, and to have erected a trophy in the midst of it. He did not, however, think proper to attempt the forcing of the city; and not being able to induce Agesilaus to quit it, chose to retire. It would have been difficult for Sparta, without aid, and unfortified, to have defended itself long against a victorious army. But the wise captain who commanded it, apprehended that he should draw upon himself the whole force of Peloponnesus, and still more, that he should excite the jealousy of the Greeks, who would never have pardoned his destroying so potent a republic, and "pulling out," as Leptinus says, "one of the eyes of Greece," as a proof of his skill.† He confined himself, therefore, to the glory of having humbled the proud, whose laconic language added new haughtiness to their commands, and of having reduced them to the necessity, as he boasted himself, of enlarging their style, and lengthening their monosyllables.‡ At his return he again wasted the country.

In this expedition the Thebans reinstated Arcadia into one body, and took Messenia from the Spartans, who had long been in possession of it,§ after having expelled all its inhabitants. It was a country equal in extent to Laconia, and as fertile as the best of Greece. Its ancient inhabitants who were dispersed in different regions of Greece, Italy, and Sicily, on the first notice given them, returned with incredible joy; animated by the love of their country, natural to all men, and almost as much by their hatred to the Spartans, which the length of time had only increased. They built themselves a city, which, from the ancient name, was called Messene. Among the bad events of this war, none gave the Lacedæmonians more sensible displeasure, or rather

* "Ὁ τοῦ μεγαλοποιέμενος ἀνθρώπων. The Greek expression is not easily to be translated; it signifies, "Oh, the actor of great deeds!"

† Arist. Rhet. l. iii. c. 10.

‡ The Lacedæmonians sometimes answered the most important despatches by a single monosyllable. Philip having written to them, "If I enter your country, I shall put all to fire and sword," they replied: "If," to signify they should take all possible care to put it out of his power.

§ The Messenians had been driven out of their country two hundred and eighty-seven years.

more lively grief; because from time immemorial an irreconcilable enmity had subsisted between Sparta and Messene, which seemed incapable of being extinguished but by the final ruin of the one or the other.*

Polybius reflects upon an ancient error in the conduct of the Messenians with regard to Sparta, which was the cause of all their misfortunes. This was their too great solicitude for the present tranquillity, and through an excessive love of peace, their neglecting the means of making it sure and lasting. Two of the most powerful states of Greece were their neighbors, the Arcadians and Lacedæmonians. The latter, from their first settlement in the country, had declared open war against them: the others, on the contrary, always joined with them, and entered into all their interests. But the Messenians had neither the courage to oppose their violent and irreconcilable enemies with valor and constancy, nor the prudence to treat with due regard their faithful and affectionate allies. When the two states were either at war with each other, or carried their arms else where, the Messenians, little provident for the future, and regarding only their present repose, made it a rule never to engage in the quarrel on either side, and to observe an exact neutrality. In such conjunctures they congratulated themselves upon their wisdom and success in preserving their tranquillity, while their neighbors around them were involved in trouble and confusion. But this tranquillity was of no long duration. The Lacedæmonians, having subdued their enemies, fell upon them with all their forces; and finding them unsupported by allies, and incapable of defending themselves, they reduced them to submit, either to the yoke of a rigid slavery, or to banish themselves from their country. And this was several times their case. They ought to have reflected, says Polybius,† that as there is nothing more desirable or advantageous than peace, when founded in justice and honor, so there is nothing more shameful, and at the same time more pernicious, when attained by bad measures, and purchased at the price of liberty.‡

* Paus. l. iv. pp. 267, 268.

† Εἰρήνη γὰρ, μετὰ τὸν δίκαιον καὶ πρέποντος, κάλλιστόν ἐστι κτῆμα καὶ λυσίτε-
λέστατον; μετὰ δέκακίας ἢ δουλείας ἐπονείδιστον, πάντων αἰσχιστον καὶ βλαβερώτατον.

‡ Polyb. l. iv. pp. 299, 300.

SECTION V.—THE TWO THEBAN GENERALS, AT THEIR RETURN, ARE ACCUSED AND ABSOLVED. SPARTA IMPLORES AID OF ATHENS.

It might be expected, that the two Theban captains, on their return to their country after such memorable actions, should have been received with general applause, and all the honors that could be conferred upon them. Instead of which they were both summoned to answer as criminals against the state, for having, contrary to the law, whereby they were obliged to resign their command to new officers, retained it four months beyond the appointed term; during which they had performed in Messenia, Arcadia, and Laconia, all those great things we have related.

A behavior of this kind is surprising; and the relation of it cannot be read without a secret indignation: but such a conduct had a very plausible foundation. The zealous assertors of a liberty lately regained, were apprehensive that the example might prove very pernicious, in authorizing some future magistrate to maintain himself in command beyond the established term, and in consequence to turn his arms against his country. It is not to be doubted but the Romans would have acted in the same manner; and if they were so severe as to put an officer to death, though victorious, for giving battle without his general's orders, how would they have behaved to a general, who should have continued four months in the supreme command, contrary to the laws, and upon his own authority?

Pelopidas was the first cited before the tribunal. He defended himself with less force and greatness of mind than was expected from a man of his character, by nature warm and fiery. That valor, haughty and intrepid in fight, forsook him before the judges. His air and discourse, which had something timid and cringing in it, denoted a man who was afraid of death, and did not in the least incline the judges in his favor, who acquitted him, not without difficulty. Epaminondas appeared, and spoke with a quite different air and tone. He seemed, if I may be allowed the expression, to charge danger in front without emotion. Instead of justifying himself, he made a panegyric on his actions, and repeated, in a lofty style, in what manner he had ravaged Laconia, re-established Messenia, and reunited Arcadia in one body. He concluded with saying, that he should die with pleasure, if the Thebans would renounce

the sole glory of those actions to him, and declare that he had done them by his own authority, and without their participation. All the voices were in his favor, and he returned from his trial, as he used to return from battle, with glory and universal applause. Such dignity has true valor, that it in a manner seizes the admiration of mankind by force.*

He was by nature designed for great actions; and every thing he did, had an air of grandeur in it. His enemies, jealous of his glory, and with design to affront him, got him elected *telearch*; an office very unworthy of a person of his merit. He, however, thought it no dishonor to him, and said that he would demonstrate, that "the office did not only show the man, but the man the office."† He accordingly raised that employment to very great dignity, which before consisted in only taking care that the streets were kept clean, the dirt carried away, and the drains and common sewers in good order.‡

The Lacedæmonians, having every thing to fear from an enemy, whom the late successes had rendered still more haughty and enterprising than ever, and seeing themselves exposed every moment to a new irruption, had recourse to the Athenians, and sent deputies to them to implore their aid. The person who spoke began with describing, in the most pathetic terms, the deplorable condition and extreme danger to which Sparta was reduced. He enlarged upon the insolent haughtiness of the Thebans, and their ambitious views, which tended to nothing less than the empire of all Greece. He insinuated what Athens in particular had to fear, if they were suffered to extend their power by the increase of allies, who every day went over to their party, and augmented their forces. He called to mind the happy times, in which the strict union between Athens and Sparta had preserved Greece, to the equal glory of both states; and concluded with saying, how great an addition it would be to the Athenian name, to aid a city, its ancient friend and ally, which more than once had generously sacrificed itself for the common interest and safety.§

The Athenians could not deny all that the deputy advanced in his discourse; but at the same time they had not forgot the bad treatment which they had suffered from the Spartans on more than one occasion, and especially after the defeat of Sicily. However, their compassion for the present

* Plut. de sui laude, p. 540.

† Οὐ μόνον ἀρχὴ ἀνδρᾶ δείκνυσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀρχὴν ἄνθρωπου.

‡ Plut. de Præcept. Reip. Ger. p. 811.

§ Xenoph. l. vi. pp. 609-613.

misfortunes of Sparta prevailed over the sense of former injuries, and determined them to assist the Lacedæmonians with all their forces. Some time after,* the deputies of several states being assembled at Athens, a league and confederacy was concluded against the Thebans, conformably to the late treaty of Antalcides, and the intention of the king of Persia, who continually urged its execution.†

A slight advantage gained by the Spartans over their enemies, raised them from the dejection of spirits in which they had hitherto remained, as it generally happens, when in a mortal distemper the least glimpse of a recovery enlivens hope and recalls joy. Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, having received aid from Dionysius the Younger, tyrant of Sicily, put himself at the head of the troops, and defeated the Arcadians in a battle, called by Diodorus Siculus, "The Battle without Tears," because he did not lose a man, and killed a great number of the enemy. The Spartans before had been so much accustomed to conquer, that they became insensible to the pleasure of victory: but when the news of this battle arrived, and they saw Archidamus return victorious, they could not contain their joy, nor keep within the city. His father was the first who went out to meet him, weeping with joy and tenderness. He was followed by the great officers and magistrates. The crowd of old men and women came down as far as the river, lifting up their hands to heaven, and returning thanks to the gods, as if this action had obliterated the shame of Sparta, and they began to see those happy days again, in which the Spartan glory and reputation had risen so high.‡

Philiscus, who had been sent by the king of Persia to reconcile the Grecian states, was arrived at Delphos, to which place he summoned their deputies to repair. The god was not at all consulted in the affair discussed in that assembly. The Spartans demanded, that Messene and its inhabitants should return to their obedience to them. Upon the refusal of the Thebans to comply with that demand, the assembly broke up, and Philiscus retired, after having left considerable sums of money with the Lacedæmonians, for levying troops and carrying on the war. Sparta, reduced and humbled by its losses, was no longer the object of the fear or jealousy of the Persians, but Thebes, victorious and triumphant, gave them just cause of inquietude. §

* Xenoph. l. vi. pp. 609-613.

† Xenoph. l. vii. pp. 613-616.

‡ Plut. in Agesil. pp. 614, 615. Xenoph. l. vii. pp. 619, 620.

§ Xenoph. l. vii. p. 619. Diod. l. xv. p. 381.

To form a league against Thebes with greater certainty, the allies had sent deputies to the great king. The Thebans on their side deputed Pelopidas; an extremely wise choice, from the great reputation of the ambassador, which is no indifferent circumstance in respect to the success of a negotiation. The battle of Leuctra had spread his fame into the remotest provinces of Asia. When he arrived at the court, and appeared among the princes and nobility, they cried out, in admiration of him, "this is he who deprived the Lacedæmonians of their empire by sea and land, and reduced Sparta to confine itself between the Eurotas and Taygetus, that not long since, under its king Agesilaus, threatened no less than to invade us in Susa and Ecbatana."*

Artaxerxes, extremely pleased with his arrival, paid him extraordinary honors, and took pleasure in extolling him highly before the lords of his court; partly out of esteem for his great merit, but much more out of vanity and self-love, and to insinuate to his subjects, that the greatest and most illustrious persons made their court to him, and paid homage to his power and good fortune. But after having admitted him to audience, and heard his discourse, in his opinion more nervous than that of the Athenian ambassadors, and more simple than that of the Lacedæmonians, which was saying a great deal, he esteemed him more than ever; and as is common with kings,† who are but little accustomed to constraint, he did not dissemble his extreme regard for him, and his preference of him to all the rest of the Grecian deputies.

Pelopidas, as an able politician, had apprised the king, how important it was to the interest of his crown, to protect an infant power which had never borne arms against the Persians, and which, in forming a kind of balance between Sparta and Athens, might be able to make a useful diversion against those republics, the perpetual and irreconcilable enemies of Persia that had lately cost it so many losses and inquietudes. Timagoras, the Athenian, was the best received after him; because, being passionately desirous of humbling Sparta, and at the same time of pleasing the king, he did not appear averse to the views of Pelopidas.

The king having pressed Pelopidas to explain what favors he had to ask of him, he demanded that Messene should continue free and exempt from the yoke of Sparta;

* Xenoph. l. vii. pp. 620-622. Plut. in Pelop. p. 294.

† Πάθος βασιλικόν παθίον.

that the Athenian galleys, which had sailed to harass the coast of Bœotia, should be recalled, or that war should be declared against Athens; and that those who would not come into the league, or march against such as should oppose it, should be attacked first. All which was decreed, and the Thebans declared friends and allies of the king. Leon, the colleague of Timagoras, said loud enough to be heard by Artaxerxes, "Athens has nothing now to do but to find some other ally."

Pelopidas, having obtained all he desired, left the court, without accepting any more of the king's many presents, than what was necessary to carry home as a token of his favor and good-will; and this aggravated the complaints which were made against the other Grecian ambassadors, who were not so reserved and delicate in point of interest. One of those from the Arcadians said on his return home, that he had seen many slaves at the king's court, but no men. He added, that all his magnificence was no more than vain ostentation; and that the so-much-boasted plantain of gold,* which was valued at so high a price, had not shade enough under it for a grasshopper.

Of all the deputies, Timagoras had received the most presents. He did not only accept of gold and silver, but of a magnificent bed, and slaves to make it, the Greeks not seeming to him expert enough in that office; which shows that sloth and luxury were little in fashion at Athens. He received also twenty-four cows, with slaves to take care of them; as having occasion to drink milk for some indisposition. Lastly, at his departure, he was carried in a chair to the sea-side at the king's expense, who gave four talents for that service. His colleague Leon, on their arrival at Athens, accused him of not having communicated any thing to him, and of having joined with Pelopidas in every thing. He was brought to a trial in consequence, and condemned to suffer death.

It does not appear that the acceptance of presents incensed the Athenians most against Timagoras. For Iphicrates, a simple porter, who had been at the Persian court, and had also received presents, having said in a full assembly, that he was of opinion a decree ought to pass, by which, instead of the nine archons annually elected, nine ambassadors should be chosen out of the poorest of the people to be sent

* It was a tree of gold, of exquisite workmanship and great value, which people went to see out of curiosity.

to the king, in order to their being enriched by the voyage, the assembly only laughed, and made a jest of it. But what offended the more was, the Thebans obtained all they demanded. In which, says Plutarch, they did not duly consider the great reputation of Pelopidas, nor comprehend how much stronger and more efficacious that was in persuading, than all the harangues and rhetorical flourishes of the other ambassadors: especially with a prince accustomed to caress and comply with the strongest, as the Thebans undoubtedly were at that time, and who besides was not sorry to humble Sparta and Athens, the ancient and mortal enemies of his throne.

The esteem and regard of the Thebans for Pelopidas were not a little augmented by the good success of this embassy, which had procured the freedom of Greece, and the re-establishment of Messene: and he was extremely applauded for his conduct at his return.

But Thessalia was the theatre, where the valor of Pelopidas made the greatest figure, in the expedition of the Thebans against Alexander, tyrant of Pheræ. I shall relate it entire, and unite in one point of view all which relates to that great event, without any other interruption than the journey of Pelopidas into Macedonia, to appease the troubles of that court.

SECTION VI.—PELOPIDAS MARCHES AGAINST ALEXANDER,
TYRANT OF PHERÆ, IS KILLED IN A BATTLE. TRAGICAL
END OF ALEXANDER.

The reduced condition of Sparta and Athens, which for many years had lorded it over all Greece, either in conjunction or separately, had inspired some of their neighbors with the desire of supplanting those cities, and giving birth to the hope of succeeding them in the pre-eminence. A power had risen up in Thessaly, which began to grow formidable. Jason, tyrant of Pheræ, had been declared generalissimo of the Thessalians by the consent of the people of that province; and it was to his merit, universally known, he owed that dignity. He was at the head of an army of about eight thousand horse, and twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, without reckoning the light-armed soldiers, and might have undertaken any thing with such a body of disciplined and intrepid troops, who had an entire confidence in the valor and conduct of their general. But death pre-

vented his designs. He was assassinated by persons who had conspired his destruction.*

His two brothers, Polydorus and Polyphron, were substituted in his place; the latter of whom killed the other for the sake of reigning alone, and was soon after killed himself by Alexander of Phæræ, who seized the tyranny, under the pretence of revenging the death of Polydorus his father, against whom Pelopidas was sent.†

As the tyrant made open war against several people of Thessaly, and was secretly intriguing to subject them all, the citizens sent ambassadors to Thebes to demand troops and a general. Epaminondas being employed in Peloponnesus, Pelopidas took upon himself the charge of this expedition. He set out for Thessaly with an army, made himself master of Larissa, and obliged Alexander to make his submission to him. He there endeavored by mild usage and friendship to change his disposition, and from a tyrant to make him become a just and humane prince; but finding him incorrigible, and of unexampled brutality, and hearing every day new complaints of his cruelty, debauched life, and insatiable avarice, he began to treat him with warm reproofs and menaces. The tyrant, alarmed at such usage, withdrew secretly with his guard; and Pelopidas, leaving the Thessalians in security from any attempts of his, and in good understanding with each other, set out for Macedonia, where his presence had been desired.

Amyntas II. had lately died, and left issue three legitimate children, Alexander, Perdicas, and Philip, and one natural son, called Ptolemy. Alexander reigned but one year, and was succeeded by Perdicas, with whom his brother Ptolemy disputed the crown.‡ The two brothers invited Pelopidas, either to be the arbitrator and judge of their quarrel, or to espouse the side on which he should see the most right.

Pelopidas had no sooner arrived, than he put an end to all disputes, and recalled those who had been banished by either party. Having taken Philip, the brother of Perdicas, and thirty other children of the noblest families of Macedonia for hostages, he carried them to Thebes; to show the Greeks

* A. M. 3634. Ant. J. C. 370. Xenoph. l. vi. pp. 579-583, et 598-601. Diod. l. xv. pp. 371-373.

† A. M. 3635. Ant. J. C. 369.

‡ Plutarch makes this quarrel between Alexander and Ptolemy, which cannot agree with the account by Æschines (de Fals. Legat. p. 400) of the affairs of Perdicas after Alexander's death, which I shall relate in the history of Philip. As Æschines was their cotemporary, I thought it proper to substitute Perdicas for Alexander.

how far the authority of the Thebans extended, from the reputation of their arms, and an entire confidence in their justice and fidelity. It was this Philip who was father of Alexander the Great, and afterwards made war against the Greeks, to subject them to his power.

The troubles and factions arose again in Macedonia some years after, occasioned by the death of Perdiceas, who was killed in battle. The friends of the deceased called in Pelopidas. Being desirous to arrive before Ptolemy had time to execute his projects, who made new efforts to establish himself upon the throne, and not having an army, he raised some mercenary troops in haste, with whom he marched against Ptolemy. When they were near each other, Ptolemy found means to corrupt those mercenary soldiers by presents of money, and to bring them over to his side. At the same time, awed by the reputation and name of Pelopidas, he went to meet him as his superior and master, had recourse to caresses and entreaties, and promised in the most solemn manner to hold the crown only as guardian to the son of the deceased, to acknowledge as friends and enemies all those who were so to the Thebans, and in security of his engagement he gave his son Philoxenus, and fifty other children who were educated with him, as hostages. These Pelopidas sent to Thebes.

The treachery of the mercenary soldiers greatly occupied his thoughts. He was informed that they had sent the greatest part of their effects, with their wives and children, into Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly, and conceived that a fair opportunity for being revenged on them for their perfidy. He therefore drew together some Thessalian troops, and marched into Pharsalus, where he was scarcely arrived before Alexander, the tyrant, came against him with a powerful army. Pelopidas, who had been appointed ambassador to him, believing that he came to justify himself, and to answer to the complaints of the Thebans, went to him with only Ismenias in his company, without any precaution. He was not ignorant of his being an impious wretch, as void of faith as of honor, but he imagined that respect for Thebes, and regard to his dignity and reputation, would prevent him from attempting any thing against his person. He was mistaken, for the tyrant, seeing them alone and unarmed, made them both prisoners, and seized Pharsalus.

Polybius highly censures the imprudence of Pelopidas upon this occasion. "There is in the commerce of society,"

says he, "certain assurances, and, as it were, ties of mutual faith, upon which one may reasonably rely: such are the sanctity of oaths, the pledge of wives and children delivered as hostages, and, above all, the consistency of the past conduct of those with whom one treats; when, notwithstanding those motives for our confidence, we are deceived, it is a misfortune, but not a fault; but, to trust one's self to a known traitor, a reputed villain, is certainly an unpardonable instance of error and temerity." *

So black a perfidy filled Alexander's subjects with terror and distrust, who very much suspected that after so flagrant an injustice, and so daring a crime, the tyrant would spare no one, and would look upon himself upon all occasions, and with all sorts of people, as a man in despair, that needed no farther regard to his conduct and actions. When the news was brought to Thebes, the Thebans, incensed at so vile an insult, immediately sent an army into Thessaly, and, as they were displeased with Epaminondas, upon the groundless suspicion of his having been too favorable to the Lacedæmonians upon a certain occasion, they nominated other generals; so that he served in this expedition only as a private man. The love of his country and of the public good extinguished all resentment in the heart of that great man, and would not permit him, as is too common, to abandon its service through any pique of honor or personal discontent.†

The tyrant, however, carried Pelopidas to Pheræ, and made a show of him to all the world at first, imagining that such a treatment would humble his pride and abate his courage. But Pelopidas, seeing the inhabitants of Pheræ in great consternation, perpetually consoled them, advising them not to despair, and assuring them that it would not be long before the tyrant would be punished. He caused him to be told that it was as imprudent as unjust to torture and put to death every day so many innocent citizens, who had never done him any wrong, and to spare his life, who, he knew, would no sooner be out of his hands than he would punish him as his crimes deserved. The tyrant, astonished at his greatness of soul, sent to ask him why he took so much pains for death? "It is," returned the illustrious prisoner, "that thou mayest perish the sooner, by being still more detestable to the gods and me."

From that time the tyrant gave orders that nobody should see or speak to him. But Thebe, his wife, the daugh-

* Lib. vii. p. 512.

† Plut. in Pelop. pp. 292, 293. Diod. l. xv. p. 382, 383.

ter of Jason, who had also been tyrant of Phæræ, having heard of the constancy and courage of Pelopidas from those who guarded him, had a curiosity to see and converse with him, and Alexander could not refuse her his permission.* He loved her tenderly, if a tyrant may be said to love anybody, but, notwithstanding that tenderness, he treated her very cruelly, and was in perpetual distrust even of her. He never went to her apartment without a slave before him with a naked sword in his hand, and sending some of his guard to search every coffer for concealed poniards. "Wretched prince," cries Cicero, "who could confide more in a slave and a barbarian than in his own wife!"

Thebe, therefore, desiring to see Pelopidas, found him in a melancholy condition, dressed in a poor habit, his hair and beard neglected, and void of every thing that might console him in his distress. Not being able to refrain from tears at such a sight, "Ah! unfortunate Pelopidas," said she, "how I lament your poor wife!" "No, Thebe," replied he, "it is yourself you should lament, who can suffer such a monster as Alexander without being his prisoner." Those words made a deep impression on Thebe, for it was with extreme reluctance she bore the tyrant's cruelty, violence, and infamous way of living. Hence, going often to see Pelopidas, and frequently bewailing before him the injuries she suffered, she daily conceived new abhorrence for her husband, while hatred and the desire for revenge grew stronger in her heart.

The Theban generals who had entered Thessaly did nothing there of any importance, and were obliged, by their incapacity and ill conduct, to abandon the country. The tyrant pursued them in their retreat, harassed them shamefully, and killed great numbers of their troops. The whole army would have been defeated if the soldiers had not obliged Epaminondas, who served as a private man among them, to take upon him the command. Epaminondas, at the head of the cavalry and light-armed foot, posted himself in the rear, where, sometimes sustaining the enemy's attacks, and sometimes charging them in his turn, he conducted the retreat with success, and preserved the Bœotians. The generals, upon their return, were each of them fined ten thousand drachmas, and Epaminondas substituted in their place. As the public good was his sole view, he overlooked the injurious treatment and kind of affront which he had received,

* Cic. de Offic. l. ii. n. 23.

and had full amend in the glory that attended such generous and disinterested conduct.

Some days after he marched at the head of the army into Thessaly, whither his reputation had preceded him. It had spread already both terror and joy through the whole country—terror among the tyrant's friends, whom the very name of Epaminondas dismayed, and joy among the people, from the assurance of being speedily delivered from the yoke of the tyranny, and the tyrant punished for all his crimes. But Epaminondas, preferring the safety of Pelopidas to his own glory, instead of carrying on the war with vigor, as he might have done, chose rather to protract it, from the apprehension that the tyrant, if reduced to despair, would, like a wild beast, turn his whole rage upon his prisoner, for he knew the violence and brutality of his nature, which would hearken neither to reason nor justice, and that he took delight in burying men alive; that some he covered with skins of bears and wild boars, that his dogs might tear them to pieces, or he shot them to death with arrows. These were his frequent sports and diversions. In the cities of Melibœa and Scotusa, cities of Magnesia, which were in alliance with him, he called an assembly of the citizens, and causing them to be surrounded by his guards, he ordered the throats of all their youth to be cut in his presence.

Hearing one day a famous actor perform a part in the Troades of Euripides, he suddenly went out of the theatre, and sent to the actor to tell him not to be under any apprehension upon that account, for that his leaving the place was not from any discontent in regard to him, but because he was ashamed to let the citizens see him, who had cut so many of their throats without any compassion, weep over the misfortunes of Hercules and Andromache.

Though he was little susceptible of pity, he was much so of fear at this time. Amazed at the sudden arrival of Epaminondas, and dazzled with the majesty that surrounded him, he made haste to despatch persons to him with apologies for his conduct. Epaminondas could not suffer that the Thebans should either make peace or alliance with so wicked a man. He only granted him a truce for thirty days; and after having got Pelopidas and Ismenias out of his hands, he retired with his troops.

Fear is not a master whose lessons make any deep and lasting impression upon the mind of man. The tyrant of Phæræ soon returned to his natural disposition. He ruined

several cities of Thessaly, and put garrisons into these of Phthia, Achæa, and Magnesia. Those cities sent deputies to Thebes to demand a succor of troops, praying that the command of them might be given to Pelopidas, which was granted. He was upon the point of setting out, when there happened a sudden eclipse of the sun, by which the city of Thebes was darkened at noon-day. The dread and consternation was general. Pelopidas knew very well that this accident had nothing unnatural in it; but he did not think it proper for him to expose seven thousand Thebans against their will, nor to compel them to march in the terror and apprehension with which he perceived they were seized. He therefore gave himself to the Thessalians alone, and, taking with him three hundred horse of such Thebans and strangers as would follow him, he departed, contrary to the prohibition of the soothsayers, and the opinion of the most wise and judicious.*

He was personally incensed against Alexander, in resentment of the injuries he had received from him. What Thebe his wife had said, and he himself knew of the general discontent in regard to the tyrant, gave him hopes of finding great divisions in his court, and a universal disposition to revolt. But his strongest motive was the beauty and grandeur of the action in itself: for his sole desire and ambition was, to show all Greece, that at the same time the Lacedæmonians sent generals and officers to Dionysius the tyrant, and the Athenians on their part were in a manner in the pay of Alexander, to whom they had erected a statue of brass, as to their benefactor, the Thebans were the only people who declared war against tyranny, and endeavored to exterminate from among the Greeks all unjust and violent government.

After having assembled his army at Pharsalus, he marched against the tyrant; who, being apprised that Pelopidas had but few Thebans, and knowing that his own infantry was twice as strong as that of the Thessalians, advanced to meet him. Pelopidas being told by some one, that Alexander approached with a great army, "So much the better," replied he, "we shall beat the greater number."

Near a place called Cynoccephalus, there were very high and steep hills, which lay in the middle of the plain. Both armies were in motion to seize that post with their infantry, when Pelopidas ordered his cavalry to charge that of the

* Plut. in Pelop. pp. 295-298. Xenoph. l. v. p. 601.

enemy. The horse of Pelopidas broke Alexander's; and while they pursued them upon the plain, Alexander appeared suddenly upon the top of the hills, having outstripped the Thessalians, and charging violently such as endeavored to force those heights and entrenchments, he killed the foremost, and repulsed the others, whom their wounds obliged to give way. Pelopidas seeing this, recalled his horse, and giving them orders to attack the enemy's foot, he took his buckler, and ran to those who fought upon the hills.

He presently made way through his infantry, and passed in a moment from the rear to the front, revived the vigor and courage of his soldiers in such a manner, as made the enemies believe themselves attacked by fresh troops. They supported two or three charges with great resolution; but finding the infantry of Pelopidas continually gaining ground, and that his cavalry were returned from the pursuit to support them, they began to give way, and retired slowly, still making head in their retreat. Pelopidas, seeing the whole army of the enemy from the top of the hills, which, though it was not yet actually put to flight, began to break, and was in great disorder, he stopped for some time, looking about everywhere for Alexander.

As soon as he perceived him upon his right wing, rallying and encouraging his mercenary soldiers, he could contain himself no longer: but fired with that view, and abandoning to his sole resentment the care of his life, and the conduct of the battle, he got a great way before his battalions, and ran forward with all his force, calling upon and defying Alexander. The tyrant made no answer to his defiance, and not daring to wait his coming up, withdrew to hide himself among his guards. The battalion standing firm for some time, Pelopidas broke the first ranks, and killed the greatest part of the guards upon the spot. The rest continuing the fight at a distance, pierced his arms and breast at length with their javelins. The Thessalians, alarmed at the danger in which they saw him, made all the haste they could from the tops of the hills to his assistance: but he was fallen dead when they arrived. The infantry and the Theban horse, returning to the fight against the enemy's main body, put them to flight, and pursued them a great way. The plain was covered with dead; for more than three thousand of the tyrant's troops were killed.

This action of Pelopidas, though it appears the effect of a consummate valor, is inexcusable, and has been generally

condemned, because there is no true valor without wisdom and prudence. The greatest courage is cool and sedate. It spares itself where it ought, and exposes itself when occasion makes it necessary. A general ought to see every thing, and to have every thing in his thoughts. To be in a condition to apply the proper remedy on all occasions, he must not precipitate himself to the danger of being cut off, and of causing the loss of his army by his death.

Euripides, after having said in one of his pieces, that it is highly glorious for the general of an army to obtain the victory by taking care of his own life, adds, "that if it be necessary for him to die, it must be when he resigns his life into the hands of virtue;" to signify, that only virtue, not passion, anger, or revenge, has a right over the life of a general, and that the first duty of valor is to preserve him who preserves others.*

It is in this sense the saying of Timotheus is so just and amiable. When Chares showed the Athenians the wounds he had received while he was their general, and his shield pierced through with a pike, "and for me," said Timotheus, "when I besieged Samos, I was much ashamed to see a dart fall very near me, as having exposed myself like a young man, without necessity, and more than was consistent for the general of so great an army." Hannibal certainly cannot be suspected of fear; and yet it has been observed, that in the great number of battles which he fought, he never received any wound, except only at the siege of Saguntum.†

It is therefore not without reason, that Pelopidas is reproached with having sacrificed all his other virtues to his valor, by such a prodigality of his life, and with having died rather for himself than his country.

Never was a captain more lamented than him. His death changed the victory so lately gained, into mourning. A profound silence and universal affliction reigned throughout the whole army, as if it had been entirely defeated. When his body was carried to Thebes, the people of all ages and sexes, the magistrates and priests, from every city by which it passed, came out to meet the bier, and to march in procession before it, carrying crowns, trophies, and armor of gold. The Thessalians, who were at the same time highly afflicted for his death, and equally sensible of their obligation to him, made it their request, that they might be permitted to celebrate, at their sole expense, the obsequies of a

* Plut. in Pelop. p. 317.

† Idem. p. 27

general who had devoted himself for their preservation; and that honorable privilege could not be refused to their grateful zeal.

His funeral was magnificent, especially in the sincere affliction of the Thebans and Thessalians; for, says Plutarch, the external pomp of mourning, and those marks of sorrow which may be imposed by the public authority upon the people, are not always certain proofs of their real sentiments. The tears which flow in private as well as public, the regret expressed equally by great and small, the praises given by the general and unanimous voice to a person who is no more, and from whom nothing farther is expected, are an evidence not to be questioned, and a homage never paid but to virtue. Such were the obsequies of Pelopidas, and, in my opinion, nothing more great and magnificent could be imagined.

Thebes was not contented with lamenting Pelopidas, but resolved to avenge him. A small army of seven thousand foot and seven hundred horse were immediately sent against Alexander. The tyrant, who had not yet recovered the terror of his defeat, was in no condition to defend himself. He was obliged to restore to the Thessalians the cities he had taken from them, and to give the Magnesians, Pythians, and Achæans, their liberty, to withdraw his garrisons from their country, and to swear that he would always obey the Thebans, and march at their orders against all their enemies.

Such a punishment was very gentle. Nor, says Plutarch, did it appear sufficient to the gods, or proportioned to his crimes: they had reserved one for him worthy of a tyrant. Thebe, his wife, who saw with horror and detestation the cruelty and perfidy of her husband, and had not forgotten the lessons and advice which Pelopidas had given her, while in prison, entered into a conspiracy with her three brothers to kill him. The tyrant's palace was full of guards, who kept watch in the night; but he placed little confidence in them: as his life was in some sort in their hands, he feared them the most of all men. He lay in a high chamber, to which he ascended by a ladder that was drawn up after his entrance. Near this chamber, a great dog was chained to guard it. He was exceeding fierce, and knew nobody but his master, Thebe, and the slave who fed him.

The time pitched upon for the execution of the plot being arrived, Thebe shut up her brothers during the daytime,

in an apartment near the tyrant's. When he entered it at night, as he was full of meat and wine, he fell into a deep sleep immediately. Thebe went out presently after, and ordered the slave to take away the dog, that he might not disturb her husband's repose; and lest the ladder should make a noise when her brothers came up by it, she covered the steps of it with wool. All things being thus prepared, she made her brothers ascend, armed with daggers; who, when they came to the door, were seized with terror, and would go no farther. Thebe, in the greatest consternation, threatened to awake the tyrant and discover the plot to him if they did not proceed immediately. Their shame and fear reanimated them; she made them enter, led them to the bed, and held the lamp herself, while they killed him with repeated wounds. The news of his death was immediately spread through the city. His dead body was exposed to all sorts of outrages, trampled under foot by the people, and given for a prey to the dogs and vultures; a just reward for his violent oppressions and detestable cruelties.

SECTION VII.—EPAMINONDAS CHOSEN GENERAL OF THE THEBANS. HIS DEATH AND CHARACTER.

The extraordinary prosperity of Thebes was no small subject of alarm to the neighboring states. Every thing was at that time in motion in Greece. A new war had broken out between the Arcadians themselves. The people of Tegea had called in the Thebans to their aid; and those of Mantinea, the Spartans and Athenians. There were besides several other allies on each side. The former gave Epaminondas the command of their troops, who immediately entered Arcadia, and encamped at Tegea, with design to attack the Mantineans, who had quitted their alliance with Thebes to attach themselves to Sparta.*

Being informed that Agesilaus had begun his march with his army, and advanced towards Mantinea, he formed the enterprise, which he believed would immortalize his name, and entirely reduce the power of the enemy. He left Tegea in the night with his army, unknown to the Mantineans, and marched directly to Sparta by a different route from that of Agesilaus. He would undoubtedly have taken the city by surprise, as it had neither walls, defence, nor troops; but happily for Sparta, a Cretan having made all possible haste

* A. M. 3641. Ant. J. C. 363. Xenoph. l. vii. pp. 642-644. Plut. in Agesil. p. 615. Dioid. l. xv. pp. 391, 392.

to apprise Agesilaus of his design, he immediately despatched one of his horse to advise the city of the danger that threatened it, and arrived there soon after in person.

He had scarcely entered the town, when the Thebans were seen passing the Eurotas, and coming on against the city. Epaminondas, who perceived that his design was discovered, thought it incumbent on him not to retire without some attempt.* He therefore made his troops advance, and making use of valor instead of stratagem, he attacked the city at several quarters, penetrated as far as the public place, and seized that part of Sparta which lay upon the side of the river. Agesilaus made head everywhere, and defended himself with much more valor than could be expected from his years. He saw well, that it was not now a time, as before, to spare himself, and to act only upon the defensive; but that he had need of all his courage and daring, and to fight with all the vigor of despair; means which he had never used, nor placed his confidence in before, but which he employed with great success in the present dangerous emergency. For by this happy despair and prudent audacity, he in a manner snatched the city out of the hands of Epaminondas. His son Archidamus, at the head of the Spartan youth, behaved with incredible valor wherever the danger was greatest, and with his small body of troops stopped the enemy, and made head against them on all sides.

A young Spartan named Isadas, distinguished himself particularly in this action. He was very handsome in the face, perfectly well shaped, of an advantageous stature, and in the flower of his youth. He had neither armor nor clothes upon his body, which shone with oil, and held a spear in one hand, and a sword in the other. In this condition he quitted his house with the utmost eagerness, and breaking through the press of the Spartans that fought, he threw himself upon the enemy, gave mortal wounds at every blow, and laid all at his feet who opposed him, without receiving any hurt himself; the enemy being dismayed at so astonishing a sight, "or," says Plutarch, "the gods taking pleasure in preserving him upon account of his extraordinary valor." It is said the ephori decreed him a crown, after the battle, in honor of his exploits, but afterwards fined him a thousand drachmas for having exposed himself to so great a danger without arms.

Epaminondas having failed of his aim, foreseeing that

* Polyb. 1. ix. p. 517.

the Arcadians would certainly hasten to the relief of Sparta, and not being willing to have them, with all the Lacedæmonian forces, upon his hands at the same time, he returned with expedition to Tegea. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians, with their allies, followed him close in the rear.

The general, considering that his command was upon the point of expiring, that if he did not fight, his reputation might suffer extremely, and that immediately after his retreat the enemy would fall upon the Theban allies, and entirely ruin them, gave orders to his troops to hold themselves in readiness for battle.

The Greeks had never fought among themselves with more numerous armies. The Lacedæmonians consisted of more than twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse; the Thebans of thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Upon the right wing of the former, the Mantineans, Arcadians, and Lacedæmonians, were posted in one line; the Eleans and Achæans, who were the weakest of their troops, had the centre, and the Athenians alone composed the left wing. In the other army, the Thebans and Arcadians were on the left, the Argives on the right, and the other allies in the centre. The cavalry on each side were disposed in the wings.*

The Theban general marched in the same order of battle in which he intended to fight, that he might not be obliged, when he came up with the enemy, to lose, in the disposition of his army, a time which cannot be too much saved in great enterprises.

He did not march directly, and with his front to the enemy, but in a column upon the hills, with his left wing foremost, as if he did not intend to fight that day. When he was directly opposite to them at a quarter of a league's distance, he made his troops halt and lay down their arms, as if he designed to encamp there. The enemy were in fact deceived by that stand, and reckoning no longer upon a battle, they quitted their arms, dispersed themselves about the camp, and suffered that ardor to be extinguished, which the near approach of a battle is wont to kindle in the hearts of soldiers.

Epiniondas, however, by suddenly wheeling his troops to the right, having changed his column into a line, and having drawn out the choicest troops, whom he had expressly posted in front upon his march, made them double

* Xenoph. l. vii. pp. 645-647.

their files upon the front of his left wing, to add to its strength, and to put it into a condition to attack, in a point, the Lacedæmonian phalanx, which, by the movement he had made, faced it directly. He ordered the centre and right wing of his army to move very slowly, and to halt before they came up with the enemy, that he might not hazard the event of the battle upon troops of which he had no great opinion.

He expected to decide the victory by that body of chosen troops which he commanded in person, and which he had formed in a column to attack the enemy, in a point, like a galley. He assured himself, that if he could penetrate the Lacedæmonian phalanx, in which the enemy's principal force consisted, he should not find it difficult to put the rest to flight by charging the right and left with his victorious army.

But that he might prevent the Athenians in the left wing from coming to the support of their right against his intended attack, he made a detachment of his horse and foot advance out of their line, and posted them upon the rising ground, in readiness to flank the Athenians; as well to cover his right as to alarm them, and give them reason to apprehend being taken in flank and rear themselves, if they advanced to sustain their right.

After having disposed his whole army in this manner, he moved on to charge the enemy with the whole weight of his column. They were strangely surprised when they saw Epaminondas advance towards them in this order, and resumed their arms, bridled their horses, and made all the haste they could to their ranks.

While Epaminondas marched against the enemy, the cavalry that covered his flank on the left, the best at that time in Greece, entirely composed of Thebans and Thessalians, had orders to attack the enemy's horse. The Theban general, whom nothing escaped, had artfully bestowed bowmen, slingers and dartmen, in the intervals of his horse, in order to begin the disorder of the enemy's cavalry, by a previous discharge upon them, of a shower of arrows, stones, and javelins. The other army had neglected to take the same precaution, and had made another fault, not less considerable, in giving as much depth to the squadrons as if they had been a phalanx. By this means, their horse were incapable of supporting long the charge of the Thebans. After having made several ineffectual attacks with great loss, they were obliged to retire behind their infantry.

In the mean time, Epaminondas, with his body of foot, had charged the Lacedæmonian phalanx. The troops fought on both sides with incredible ardor; both the Thebans and Lacedæmonians being resolved to perish rather than yield the glory of arms to their rivals. They began by fighting with the spear; and their first arms being broken in the fury of the combat, they charged each other with the sword. The resistance was equally obstinate, and the slaughter very great on both sides. The troops, despising danger, and desiring only to distinguish themselves by the greatness of their actions, chose rather to die in their ranks than to lose a step of their ground.

The furious slaughter on both sides having continued a great while without the victory inclining to either, Epaminondas, to force it to declare for him, thought it his duty to make an extraordinary effort in person, without regard to the danger of his own life. He formed, therefore, a troop of the bravest and most determined about him, and putting himself at the head of them, he made a vigorous charge upon the enemy, where the battle was most warm, and wounded the general of the Lacedæmonians with the first javelin he threw. His troop, by his example, having wounded or killed all that stood in their way, broke and penetrated the phalanx. The Lacedæmonians, dismayed by the presence of Epaminondas, and overpowered by the weight of that intrepid party, were forced to give ground. The Theban troops, animated by their general's example and success, drove back the enemy upon his right and left, and made a great slaughter of them. But some troops of the Spartans, perceiving that the Epaminondas abandoned himself too much to his ardor, suddenly rallied, and returning to the fight, charged him with a shower of javelins. While he kept off part of these darts, shunned some of them, fenced off others, and was fighting with the most heroic valor, to assure the victory to his army, a Spartan, named Callierates, gave him a mortal wound with a javelin, in the breast, through the cuirass. The wood of the javelin being broken off, and the iron head continuing in the wound, the torment was insupportable, and he fell immediately. The battle began around him with new fury; the one side using their utmost endeavor to take him alive, and the other to save him. The Thebans gained their point at last, and carried him off, after having put the enemy to flight. They did not pursue them far, but returning immediately, contented them-

selves with remaining masters of the field and of the dead, without making any advantage of their victory, or undertaking any thing farther, as if they waited for the orders of their general.

The cavalry, dismayed by the accident of Epaminondas, whom they believed to be dead, and seeming rather vanquished than victorious, neglected to pursue their success in the same manner, and returned to their former post.

While this passed on the left wing of the Thebans, the Athenian horse attacked their cavalry on the right. But as the latter, besides the superiority of number, had the advantage of being seconded by the light infantry posted in their intervals, they charged the Athenians rudely, and having galled them extremely with their darts, they were broken and obliged to fly. After having dispersed and repulsed them in this manner, instead of pursuing them, they thought proper to turn their arms against the Athenian foot, which they took in flank, threw into disorder, and pushed with great vigor. Just as they were ready to retreat, the general of the Elean cavalry, who commanded a body of reserve, seeing the danger of that phalanx, came upon the spur to its relief, charged the Theban horse, who little expected it, forced them to retreat, and regained from them their advantage. At the same time, the Athenian cavalry, which had been routed at first, finding they were not pursued, rallied, and instead of going to the assistance of their foot, which was severely handled, attacked the detachment posted by the Thebans upon the heights within the line, and put it to the sword.

After these different movements, and this alternation of losses and advantages, the troops on both sides stood still, and rested upon their arms, and the trumpets of the two armies, as if by consent, sounded the retreat at the same time. Each party pretended to the victory, and erected a trophy; the Thebans, because they had defeated the right wing, and remained masters of the field of battle; the Athenians, because they had cut the detachment in pieces. And from this point of honor, both sides refused at first to ask leave to bury their dead, which, with the ancients, was confessing their defeat. The Lacedæmonians, however, sent first to demand that permission; after which, the rest had no thoughts but of paying the last duties to the slain.

Such was the event of the famous battle of Mantinea. Xenophon, in his relation of it, recommends the disposition

of the Theban troops and the order of battle to the reader's attention, which he describes as a man of knowledge and experience in the art of war. And Monsieur Follard, who justly looks upon Epaminondas as one of the greatest generals Greece ever produced, in his description of the same battle, ventures to call it the masterpiece of that great captain.

Epaminondas had been carried into the camp. The surgeons, after having examined the wound, declared that he would expire as soon as the head of the dart was drawn out of it. These words gave all that were present the utmost sorrow and affliction, who were inconsolable on seeing so great a man about to die, and to die without issue. For him, the only concern he expressed, was about his arms, and the success of the battle. When they showed him his shield, and assured him that the Thebans had gained the victory, turning towards his friends with a calm and serene air, "Do not regard," said he, "this day as the end of my life, but as the beginning of my happiness, and the completion of my glory. I leave Thebes triumphant, proud Sparta humbled, and Greece delivered from the yoke of servitude. For the rest, I do not reckon that I die without issue; Leuctra and Mantinea are two illustrious daughters, that will not fail to keep my name alive, and transmit it to posterity." Having spoken to this effect, he drew the head of the javelin out of his wound, and expired.

It may truly be said that the Theban power expired with this great man, whom Cicero seems to rank above all the illustrious men Greece ever produced.* Justin is of the same opinion, when he says, "that as a dart is no longer in a condition to wound when the point of it is blunted, so Thebes, after having lost its general, was no longer formidable to its enemies; and its power seemed to have lost its edge, and to be annihilated by the death of Epaminondas. Before him, that city was not distinguished by any memorable action, and afterwards it was not famous for its virtues, but misfortunes, till it sunk into its original obscurity; so that it saw its glory take birth and expire with this great man." †

* Epaminondas, princeps, meo iudicio, Græciæ.—Acad. Quæst. l. i. n. 4.

† Nam sicuti telo, primam acrem præfregeris, reliquo ferro vim nocendi sustuleris: sic illo velut mucrone teli ablato duce Thebanorum, rei quoque publicæ vires hebetatæ sunt: ut non tam illum amisisse, quam cum illo omnes interire viderentur. Nam neque hunc ante ducem ullum memorabile bellum gesserò, nec postea virtutibus, sed cladibus, insignes, fuere: ut manifestum sit, patriæ gloriam et natam et extinctam cum eo fuisse.—Justin. l. vi. c. 8.

It has been doubted whether he was a more excellent captain or good man. He sought not power for himself, but for his country; and was so perfectly void of self-interest, that at his death he did not possess what would pay the expenses of his funeral. Truly a philosopher, and poor out of taste, he despised riches, without affecting any reputation for that contempt; and if Justin may be believed, he coveted glory as little as he did money. It was always against his will that commands were conferred upon him; and he behaved himself in them in such a manner, as did more honor to dignities, than he derived from them.*

Though poor himself, and without any estate, his very poverty, by drawing upon him the esteem and confidence of the rich, gave him the opportunity of doing good to others. One of his friends being in great necessity, Epaminondas sent him to a very rich citizen, with orders to ask him for a talent in his name. That rich man coming to his house, to know his motives for directing his friend to him upon such an errand; "Why," replied Epaminondas, "it is because this honest man is in want, and you are rich."†

He had cultivated those generous and noble sentiments in himself by the study of polite learning and philosophy, which he had made his usual employment and sole delight from his earliest infancy, so that it was surprising, and a question frequently asked, how, and at what time it was possible for a man, always busy among books, to attain, or rather seize, the knowledge of the military art in so great a degree of perfection.‡ Fond of leisure, which he devoted to the study of philosophy, his darling passion, he shunned public employments, and made no interest but to exclude himself from them. His moderation concealed him so well, that he lived obscure and almost unknown. His merit, however, discovered him. He was taken from his solitude by force, to be placed at the head of armies; and he demonstrated, that philosophy, though generally in contempt with those who aspire to the glory of arms, is wonderfully useful in forming heroes. For, besides the knowledge of conquering one's self, which is a great advance towards conquering

* Fuit incertum, vir melior an dux esset. Nam imperium non sibi semper, sed patriæ quæsit; et pecuniæ adeo parvus fuit, ut sumptus funeri defuerit. Gloriæ quoque non cupidior, quam pecuniæ; quippe recusanti omnia imperia ingesta sunt, honoresque ita gessit, ut ornamentum non accipere, sed dari ipsi dignitati videretur.—Justin.

† Ὅτι χρηστὸς, ἔλεπεν, οὗτος ὧν πένης ἐστὶ σὺ δὲ πλουτὺς.—Plut. de Præcept. Reipub. Ger. p. 809.

‡ Jam literarum studium, jam philosophiæ doctrinā tanta, ut mirabile videretur, unde tem insignis militiæ scientiæ homini inter literas nato.—Justin.

the enemy, in this school were anciently taught the great maxims of true policy, the rules of every kind of duty, the motives for a true discharge of them: what we owe our country, the right use of authority, wherein true courage consists, in a word, the qualities that form the good citizen, statesman, and great captain.*

He possessed all the ornaments of the mind; he had the talent of speaking in perfection, and was well versed in the most sublime sciences. But a modest reserve threw a veil over all those excellent qualities, which still augmented their value, and of which he knew not what it was to be ostentatious. Spintharus, in giving his character, said, "That he never had met with a man who knew more and spoke less." †

It may be said therefore of Epaminondas, that he falsified the proverb, which treated the Bæotians as gross and stupid. This was their common characteristic, and was imputed to the gross air of the country, as the Athenian delicacy of taste was attributed to the subtlety of the air they breathed.‡ Horace says, "that to judge of Alexander from his bad taste for poetry, one would swear him a true Bæotian."

"Bæotum in crasso jurares ære natum."

—Epist. 1. l. 2.

In thick Bæotian air you'd swear him born.

When Alcibiades was reproached with having little inclination to music, he thought fit to make this excuse; "It is for the Thebans § to sing as they do, who know not how to speak." Pindar and Plutarch, who had very little of the soil in them, and who are proofs that genius is of all nations, do themselves condemn the stupidity of their countrymen. Epaminondas did honor to his country, not only by the greatness of his military exploits, but by that sort of merit which results from elevation of genius, and the study of science.

I shall conclude his portrait and character with a circumstance that gives place in nothing to all his other excellencies, and which may in some sense be preferred to them, as it expresses a good heart, and a tender and sensible spirit, qualities very rare among the great, but infinitely more estimable than all those splendid attributes, which the

* The works of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, are proofs of this.

† Plut. de. Audit. p. 36.

‡ Inter locorum naturas quantum intersit, videmus—Athenis tenuis cælum, ex quo acutiores etiam putantur Attici; crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani.
—Cic. de Fato, n. 7.

§ They were great musicians.

vulgar of mankind commonly gaze at with admiration, and seem almost the only objects worthy either of being imitated or envied. The victory at Leuctra had drawn the eyes and admiration of all the neighboring people upon Epaminondas, who looked upon him as the support and restorer of Thebes, as the triumphant conqueror of Sparta, as the deliverer of all Greece; in a word, as the greatest man, and the most excellent captain, that ever was in the world. In the midst of this universal applause, so capable of making the general of an army forget the man for the victor, Epaminondas, little sensible to so affecting and so deserved a glory, modestly said, "My joy arises from my sense of *that* which the news of my victory will give to my father and mother." *

Nothing in history seems so valuable to me as such sentiments, which is honor to human nature, and proceed from a heart which neither false glory nor false greatness have corrupted. I confess it is with grief I see those noble sentiments daily expire among us, especially in persons whose birth and rank raise them above others, who, too frequently, are neither good fathers, good sons, good husbands, nor good friends; and who would think it a disgrace to them to express for a father and mother the tender regard, of which we have here so fine an example from a pagan.

Until the time of Epaminondas, two cities had exercised alternately a kind of empire over all Greece. The justice and moderation of Sparta had at first acquired it a distinguished pre-eminence, which the pride and haughtiness of its generals, and especially of Pausanias, soon lost to it. The Athenians, until the Peloponnesian war, held the first rank, but in a manner scarcely discernible in any other respect, than their care in acquitting themselves worthily, and in giving their inferiors just reason to believe themselves their equals. They judged at that time, and very justly, that the true method of commanding, and of continuing their power, was to evidence their superiority only by services and benefactions. Those times, so glorious for Athens, were of about forty-five years' continuance, and they retained a part of that pre-eminence during the twenty-seven years of the Peloponnesian war, which make in all the seventy-two or seventy-three years which Demosthenes gives to the duration of their empire: but for this latter space of time,

* Plut. in Coriol. p. 215.

the Greeks, disgusted by the haughtiness of Athens, received no laws from that city but with reluctance.* Hence the Lacedæmonians became again the arbiters of Greece, and continued so from the time Lysander made himself master of Athens, until the first war undertaken by the Athenians, after their re-establishment by Conon, to withdraw themselves and the rest of the Greeks from the tyranny of Sparta, which was now grown more insolent than ever. At length, Thebes disputed the supremacy, and, by the exalted merit of a single man, saw itself at the head of all Greece. But that glorious condition was of no long continuance, and the death of Epaminondas, as we have already observed, plunged it again into the obscurity in which he found it.

Demosthenes remarks, in the passage above cited, that the pre-eminence granted voluntarily either to Sparta or Athens, was a pre-eminence of honor, not of dominion, and that the intent of Greece was to preserve a kind of equality and independence in the other cities. Hence, says he, when the governing city attempted to ascribe to itself what did not belong to it, and aimed at any innovations contrary to the rules of justice and established customs, all the Greeks thought themselves obliged to have recourse to arms, and without any motive of private discontent, to espouse with ardor the cause of the injured.

I shall add here another very judicious reflection from Polybius. He attributes the wise conduct of the Athenians, in the time I speak of, to the ability of the generals who were then at the head of their affairs; and he makes use of a comparison, which explains, not unhappily, the character of that people. "A vessel without a master," says he, "is exposed to great dangers, when every one insists upon its being steered according to his opinion, and will comply with no other measures. If then a rude storm attacks it, the common danger conciliates and unites them; they submit themselves to the pilot's skill; and all the rowers doing their duty, the ship is saved, and in a state of security. But when the tempest ceases, and the weather grows calm again, if the discord of the mariners revive; if they will hearken no longer to the pilot, and some are for continuing the voyage, while others resolve to stop in the midst of the course; if on one side they loose their sails, and furl them on the other; it often happens that, after having escaped the most violent storms, they are shipwrecked even in the port. This is a

* Demost. Philip. iii. p. 39.

natural image of the Athenian republic. As long as it suffered itself to be guided by the wise counsels of an Aristides, a Themistocles, and a Pericles, it came off victorious from the greatest dangers. But prosperity blinded and ruined it; following no longer any thing but caprice, and having become too insolent to be advised or governed, it plunged itself into the greatest misfortunes." *

SECTION VIII.—DEATH OF EVAGORAS, KING OF SALAMIN.
ADMIRABLE CHARACTER OF THAT PRINCE.

The third year of the 101st Olympiad, soon after the Thebans had destroyed Plataeæ and Thespiæ, as has been observed before, Evagoras, king of Salamin, in the isle of Cyprus, of whom much has been already said, was assassinated by one of the eunuchs.† His son, Nicocles, succeeded him. He had a fine model before him in the person of his father; and he seemed to make it his duty to be entirely intent upon treading in his steps.‡ When he took possession of the throne, he found the public treasures entirely exhausted, by the great expenses his father had been obliged to be at in the long war between him and the king of Persia. He knew that the generality of princes, upon like occasions, thought every means just for the re-establishment of their affairs; but for him, he acted upon different principles. In his reign, there was no talk of banishment, taxes, and confiscation of estates. The public felicity was his sole object, and justice his favorite virtue. He discharged the debts of the state gradually, not by crushing the people with excessive imposts, but by retrenching all unnecessary expenses, and by using a wise economy in the administration of his revenue. "I am assured," said he, "that no citizen can complain that I do him the least wrong; and I have the satisfaction to know, that I have enriched many with an unsparing hand." § He believed this kind of vanity, if it be vanity, might be permitted in a prince, and that it was glorious for him to have it in his power to make his subjects such a defiance.

He glorified also in particular upon another virtue, which is the most admirable in princes, as very uncommon in their fortunes; I mean temperance. || It is most amiable, but very difficult, in an age and fortune to which every thing is lawful, and wherein pleasure, armed with all her arts and

* Polyb. l. vii. p. 488.

† Isocrat. in Nicoc. p. 64.

‡ A. M. 3630. Ant. J. C. 374. Diod. l. xv. p. 388.

§ Idem. pp. 65-66. || Isocrat. in Nicoc. p. 64.

attractions, is continually lying in ambush for a young prince, and preventing his desires, to make a long resistance against the violence and insinuation of her soft assaults. Nicocles gloried in having never known any woman besides his wife during his reign, and was amazed that all other contracts of civil society should be treated with due regard, while that of marriage, the most sacred and inviolable of obligations, was broken through with impunity ; and that men should not blush to commit an infidelity in respect to their wives, of which, should their wives be guilty, it would throw them into the utmost anguish and despair.

What I have said of the justice and temperance of Nicocles, Isocrates puts into that prince's own mouth ; and it is not probable that he should make him speak in such a manner, if his conduct had not agreed with such sentiments. It is in a discourse, supposed to be addressed by that king to his people, wherein he describes to them the duties of subjects to their princes ; love, respect, obedience, fidelity, and devotion to their service, and to engage them more effectually to the discharge of those duties, that he does not disdain to give them an account of his own conduct and sentiments.

In another discourse, which precedes this, Isocrates explains to Nicocles all the duties of the sovereignty, and makes excellent reflections upon that subject, of which I can repeat here only a very small part. He begins by telling him that the private virtue of persons is much better supported than his own, by the mediocrity of their condition ; by the employment and cares inseparable from it ; by the misfortunes to which they are frequently exposed ; by their distance from pleasures and luxuries ; and particularly, by the liberty which their friends and relations have of giving them advice ; whereas the generality of princes have none of these advantages. He adds, that a king, who would make himself capable of governing well, ought to avoid an idle and inactive life, should set apart a proper time for business and public affairs, should form his council of the most able and experienced persons in his kingdom, should endeavor to make himself as much superior to others by his merit and wisdom, as he is by his dignity, and especially to acquire the love of his subjects, and for that purpose love them sincerely, and look upon himself as their common father. "Persist," said he, "in the religion you have received from your forefathers ; but be assured, that the most grateful adora-

tion and sacrifice that you can offer to the Divinity, is that of the heart, in rendering yourself good and just. Show upon all occasions so high a regard for truth, that a single word from you may be more confided in than the oath of others. Be a warrior, by your ability in military affairs, and by such a warlike provision as may intimidate your enemies; but let your inclinations be pacific, and be rigidly exact in never pretending to, or undertaking any thing unjustly. The only certain proof that you have reigned well, will be the power of bearing this testimony to yourself, that your people are become both more happy and more wise under your government." *

What seems to me the most remarkable in this discourse is, that the advice which Isocrates gives the king is neither attended with praises, nor with those studied reservations and artificial turns, without which fearful and modest truth dares not venture to approach the throne. This is most worthy of applause, and more for the prince's than the writer's praise. Nicocles, far from being offended at these counsels, received them with joy; and to express his gratitude to Isocrates, made him a present of twenty talents.†

SECTION IX.—ARTAXERXES MNEMON UNDERTAKES THE REDUCTION OF EGYPT.

Artaxerxes, after having given his people a relaxation of several years, and formed the design of reducing Egypt, which had shaken off the Persian yoke long before, and made great preparations for war for that purpose. ‡ Achoris, who then reigned in Egypt, and had given Evagoras powerful aid against the Persians, foreseeing the storm, raised a great number of troops from among his own subjects, and took into his pay a great body of Greeks and other auxiliary soldiers, who were under the command of Chabrias. § He had accepted that office without the authority of the republic.

Pharnabazus, having been charged with this war, sent to Athens to complain that Chabrias had engaged himself to serve against his master, and threatened the republic with the king's resentment if he was not immediately recalled. He demanded at the same time Iphicrates, another Athenian, who was looked upon as one of the most excel-

* Isocrat. in Nicoc. p. 64. † Plut. in Vit. Isoc. p. 838.

‡ A. M. 3627. Ant. J. C. 377. Diod. l. xv. p. 328, et 347.

§ Corn. Nep. in Chab. et in Iphic.

lent captains of his time, to give him command of the body of Greek troops in the service of his master. The Athenians, who had a great interest in the continuance of the king's friendship, recalled Chabrias, and ordered him, upon pain of death, to repair to Athens by a certain day. Iphicrates was sent to the Persian army.

The preparations of the Persians went on so slowly, that two whole years elapsed before they entered upon action. Achoris, king of Egypt died in that time, and was succeeded by Psammuthis, who reigned but one year. Nephrethitis ascended the throne next, and four months after him, Nectanebis, who reigned ten or twelve years.*

Artaxerxes, to draw more troops out of Greece, sent ambassadors thither to declare to the several states, that the king's intention was, that they should all live in peace with each other, conformably to the treaty of Antalcides; that all garrisons should be withdrawn, and all the cities suffered to enjoy their liberty under their respective laws. All Greece received this declaration with pleasure, except the Thebans, who refused to conform to it.†

At length every thing being in readiness for the invasion of Egypt, a camp was formed at Acæ, since called Ptolemais, in Palestine, the place appointed for the general rendezvous. In review there, the army was found to consist of two hundred thousand Persians, under the command of Pharnabazus, and twenty thousand Greeks, under Iphicrates. The forces at sea were in proportion to those on land; their fleet consisting of three hundred galleys, besides two hundred vessels of thirty oars, and a prodigious number of barks to transport the necessary provisions for the fleet and army.‡

The army and fleet began to move at the same time, and that they might act in concert, they separated from each other as little as possible. This war was to open with the siege of Pelusium; but so much time had been given the Egyptians, that Nectanebis had rendered the approach to it impracticable both by sea and land. The fleet, therefore, instead of making a descent, as had been projected, sailed forward, and entered the mouth of the Nile called Mendesium. The Nile at that time emptied itself into the sea by seven different channels, only two § of which remain at this day; and at each of those mouths there was a fort with a

* Euseb. in Chron.

† A. M. 3630. Ant. J. C. 374. Diod. l. xv. p. 355.

‡ Dioid. l. xv. pp. 358, 359.

§ Damietta and Rosetta.

good garrison to defend the entrance. The Mendesium not being so well fortified as that of Pelusium, where the enemy was expected to land, the descent was made with no great difficulty. The fort was carried sword in hand, and no quarter given to those who were found in it.

After this signal action, Iphicrates thought it advisable to reembark upon the Nile without loss of time, and to attack Memphis, the capital of Egypt. If that opinion had been followed before the Egyptians had recovered from the panic into which so formidable an invasion, and the blow already received, had thrown them, they would have found the capital undefended, and it would have inevitably fallen into their hands, and all Egypt been reconquered. But the main body of the army not being arrived, Pharnabazus believed it necessary to wait its coming up, and would undertake nothing, till he had re-assembled all his troops; under pretence that he would then be invincible, and that there would be no obstacle capable of withstanding them.

Iphicrates, who knew that, in affairs of war especially, there are certain favorable and decisive moments, which it is absolutely proper to seize, judged quite differently, and in despair to see an opportunity suffered to escape, that might never be retrieved, made pressing instances for permission to go at least with the twenty thousand men under his command. Pharnabazus refused to comply with the command out of abject jealousy; apprehending, that if the enterprise succeeded, the whole glory of the war would redound to Iphicrates. This delay gave the Egyptians time to look around them. They drew all their troops together into a body, put a good garrison into Memphis, and with the rest of their army kept the field, and harassed the Persians in such a manner, that they prevented their advancing further into the country. After which came on the inundation of the Nile, which laying all Egypt under water, the Persians were obliged to return into Phœnicia, after having first lost the best part of their troops.

Thus the expedition, which had cost immense sums, and for which the preparations alone had given so much difficulty for upwards of two years, entirely miscarried, and produced no other effect, than an irreconcilable enmity between the two generals who had the command of it. Pharnabazus, to excuse himself, accused Iphicrates of having prevented its success; and Iphicrates, with much more reason, laid all the fault upon Pharnabazus. But well assured

that the Persian lord would be believed at his court in preference to him, and remembering what had happened to Canon, to avoid the fate of that illustrious Athenian, he chose to retire secretly to Athens in a small vessel which he had hired. Pharnabazus caused him to be accused there of having rendered the expedition against Egypt abortive. The people of Athens made answer, that if he could be convicted of that crime, he should be punished as he deserved. But his innocence was too well known at Athens to give him any disquiet upon that account. It does not appear that he was ever called in question about it; and some time after the Athenians declared him sole admiral of their fleet.

Most of the projects of the Persian court miscarried by their slowness in putting them in execution.* Their general's hands were tied up, and nothing was left to their discretion. They had a plan of conduct in their instructions, from which they did not dare to depart. If any accident happened that had not been foreseen and provided for, they must wait for new orders from court; and before they arrived, the opportunity was entirely lost. Iphicrates, having observed that Pharnabazus took the resolution with all the presence of mind and penetration that could be desired in an accomplished general, asked him one day how it happened that he was so quick in his views, and so slow in his actions. "It is," replied Pharnabazus, "because my views depend only upon me, but their execution upon my master."†

SECTION X.—THE LACEDÆMONIANS SEND AGESILAUS TO THE AID OF TACHOS. HIS DEATH.

After the battle of Mantinea, both parties, equally weary of the war, had entered into a general peace with all the other states of Greece, upon the king of Persia's plan, by which the enjoyment of its laws and liabilities were secured to each city, and the Messenians included in it, notwithstanding all the oppositions and intrigues of the Lacedæmonians to prevent it. Their rage upon this occasion separated them from the other Greeks. They were the only people who resolved to continue the war, from the hope of recovering the whole country of Messenia in a short time. That resolution, of which Agesilaus was the author, occasioned him to be justly regarded as a violent and obstinate man, insatiable of glory and command, who was not afraid

* Diod. l. xv. p. 358.

† Idem. p. 375.

of involving the republic again in inevitable misfortunes, from the necessity, to which the want of money exposed them, of borrowing great sums, and of levying great imposts, instead of taking the favorable opportunity of concluding a peace, and of putting an end to all their evils.*

While this passed in Greece, Tachos, who had ascended the throne of Egypt, drew together as many troops as he could, to defend himself against the king of Persia, who meditated a new invasion of Egypt, notwithstanding the ill success of his past endeavors to reduce that kingdom.†

For this purpose, Tachos sent into Greece, and obtained a body of troops from the Lacedæmonians, with Agesilaus to command them, whom he promised to make generalissimo of his army. The Lacedæmonians were exasperated against Artaxerxes, from his having forced them to include the Messenians in the late peace, and were fond of taking this occasion to express their resentment. Chabrias went also into the service of Tachos, but of his own accord, and without the republic's approbation. This commission did Agesilaus no honor. It was thought below the dignity of a king of Sparta, and a great captain, who had made his name glorious throughout the world, and was then more than eighty years old, to receive the pay of an Egyptian, and to serve a barbarian, who had revolted against his master.

When he landed in Egypt, the king's principal generals, and the great officers of his house, came to his ship to receive and make their court with him. The rest of the Egyptians were solicitous to see him, from the great expectation which the name and renown of Agesilaus had excited in them, and came in great multitudes to the shore for that purpose. But when, instead of a great and magnificent prince, according to the idea his exploits had given them of him, they saw nothing splendid or majestic either in his person or equipage, and saw only an old man of a mean aspect and small body, and dressed in a bad robe of a very coarse stuff, they were seized with an immoderate disposition to laugh, and applied to him the fable of the mountain in labor.

When he met king Tachos, and had joined his troops with those of Egypt, he was very much surprised at not being appointed general of the whole army, as he expected, but only of the foreign troops, that Chabrias was made general

* Plut. in Agesil. pp. 616-618. Diod. l. xv. pp. 397-401.

† A. M. 3643. Ant. J. C. 363. Xenoph. de Reg. Agesil. p. 663. Corn. Nep. in Agesil. c. viii.

of the sea forces, and that Tachos retained the command in chief to himself, which was not the only mortification he had experienced.

Tachos came to a resolution to march into Phœnicia, thinking it more advisable to make that country the seat of war, than to expect the enemy in Egypt. Agesilaus, who knew better, represented to him in vain, that his affairs were not sufficiently established to admit his removing out of his dominions; that he would do much better to remain in them, and content himself with acting by his generals in the enemy's country. Tachos despised this wise counsel, and expressed no less disregard for him on all other occasions. Agesilaus was so much incensed at such conduct that he joined the Egyptians, who had taken arms against him during his absence, and had placed Nectanebis, his cousin,* upon the throne. Agesilaus, abandoning the king, to whose aid he had been sent, and joining the rebel who had dethroned him, alleged in justification of himself, that he was sent to the assistance of the Egyptians; and that they, having taken up arms against Tachos, he was not at liberty to serve against them without new orders from Sparta. He despatched expresses thither; and the instructions he received, were to act as he should judge most advantageous to his country. He immediately declared for Nectanebis. Tachos, obliged to quit Egypt, retired to Sidon, from whence he went to the court of Persia. Artaxerxes not only forgave him his fault, but added to his clemency the command of his troops against the rebels.

Agesilaus covered so criminal a conduct with the veil of public utility. But, says Plutarch, remove that delusive blind, the most just and only true name which can be given to the action, is that of perfidy and treason. It is true, the Lacedæmonians, making the *glorious* and the *good* consist principally in the service of that country which they idolized, knew no other justice than what tended to the augmentation of the grandeur of Sparta, and the extending of its dominions. I am surprised that so judicious an author as Xenophon should endeavor to palliate a conduct of this kind, by saying only, that Agesilaus attached himself to that of the two kings, who seemed the best affected to Greece.

At the same time a third prince of the city of Mendes set himself up to dispute the crown with Nectanebis. This new competitor had an army of one hundred thousand men

* Diodorus calls him his son; Plutarch his cousin.

to support his pretensions. Agesilaus gave his advice to attack them before they were exercised and disciplined. Had that counsel been followed, it had been easy to have defeated a body of people, raised in haste, and without any experience in war. But Nectanebis imagined that Agesilaus only gave him this advice to betray him afterwards, as he had done Tachos. He therefore gave his enemy time to discipline his troops, who soon after reduced him to retire into a city, fortified with good walls, and of very great extent. Agesilaus was obliged to follow him thither, where the Mendesian prince besieged them. Nectanebis would then have attacked the enemy before the works which he had begun were far advanced, and pressed Agesilaus to that purpose; but he refused his compliance at first, which extremely augmented the suspicions conceived of him. At length, when he saw the work in sufficient forwardness, and that there remained only as much ground between the two ends of the line as the troops within the city might occupy, drawn up in battle, he told Nectanebis that it was time to attack the enemy; that their own lines would prevent their surrounding him; and that the interval between them was exactly the space he wanted, for ranging his troops in such a manner that they might all act together effectively. The attack was executed according to the expectation of Agesilaus; the besieged were beaten; and from thenceforth Agesilaus conducted all the operations of the war with so much success that the enemy was always overcome, and the prince at last taken prisoner.

The following winter, after having well established Nectanebis, he embarked to return to Lacedæmon, and was driven by contrary winds upon the coast of Africa, into a place called the port of Menelaus, where he fell sick and died, at the age of eighty-four years. He had reigned forty-one of them at Sparta; and of those forty-one, he had passed thirty with the reputation of the greatest and most powerful of all the Greeks, and had been looked upon as the leader and king of almost all Greece, till the battle of Leuctra. His latter years did not entirely support the reputation he had acquired; and Xenophon, in his eulogy of this prince, wherein he gives him the preference to all other captains, had been found to exaggerate his virtues and extenuate his faults too much.*

The body of Agesilaus was carried to Sparta. Those

* A. M. 3543. Ant. J. C. 361.

who were about him not having honey, with which it was the Spartan custom to cover the bodies they would embalm, made use of wax in its stead. His son Archidamus succeeded to the throne, which continued in his house down to Agis, who was the fifth king of the line of Agesilaus.

Towards the end of the Egyptian war, the greatest part of the provinces in subjection to Persia revolted.

Artaxerxes Mnemon had been the involuntary occasion of this defection. That prince, of himself, was good, equitable, and benevolent. He loved his people, and was beloved by them. He had much mildness and sweetness of temper in his character; but that easiness degenerated into sloth and luxury, and particularly in the latter years of life, in which he discovered a dislike for all business and application; from whence the good qualities, which he otherwise possessed, as well as his beneficent intentions, became useless and without effect. The nobility and governors of provinces, abusing his favor and the infirmities of his great age, oppressed the people, treated them with insolence and cruelty, loaded them with taxes, and did every thing in their power to render the Persian yoke insupportable.

The discontent became general, and broke out, after long suffering, almost at the same time on all sides. Asia Minor, Syria, Phœnicia, and many other provinces, declared themselves openly, and took up arms. The principal leaders of the conspiracy were Ariobarzanes, prince of Phrygia, Mausolus, king of Caria, Orontes, governor of Mysia, and Autophradates, governor of Lydia. Datames, of whom mention has been made before, and who commanded in Cappadocia, was also engaged in it. By this means, half the revenues of the crown were on a sudden diverted into different channels, and the remainder did not suffice for the expenses of a war against the revoltors, had they acted in concert. But their union was of no long continuance; and those who had been the first and most zealous in shaking off the yoke, were also the foremost in resuming it, and in betraying the interests of the others, to make their peace with the king.

The provinces of Asia Minor, on withdrawing from their obedience, had entered into a confederacy for their mutual defence, and had chosen Orontes, governor of Mysia, for their general. They had also resolved to add twenty thousand foreign troops to those of the country, and had charged the same Orontes with the care of raising them. But when he had got the money for that service into his hands, with

the addition of a year's pay, he kept it for himself, and delivered to the king the persons who had brought it from the revolted provinces.

Reomithras, another of the chiefs of Asia Minor, having been sent into Egypt* to negotiate succors, committed a treachery of a like nature. Having brought from that country five hundred talents and fifty ships of war, he assembled the principal revolters at Leucas, a city of Asia Minor, under pretence of giving them an account of his negotiation, seized them all, delivered them to the king to make his peace, and kept the money he had received in Egypt for the confederacy. Thus this formidable revolt, which would have brought the Persian empire to the very brink of ruin, dissolved of itself, or, to speak more properly, was suspended for some time.

SECTION XI.—TROUBLE OF THE COURT OF ARTAXERXES CONCERNING HIS SUCCESSOR. DEATH OF THAT PRINCE.

The end of the reign of Artaxerxes abounded with cabals.† The whole court were divided into factions in favor of one or other of his sons, who pretended to the succession. He had one hundred and fifty by his concubines, who were in number three hundred and sixty, and three by his lawful wife Atossa; Darius, Ariaspes, and Ochus. To put a stop to these practices, he declared Darius, the eldest, his successor. And to remove all cause of disputing that prince's right after his death, he permitted him to assume from thenceforth the title of king, and to wear the royal tiara.‡ But the young prince was for having something more real. Besides which, the refusal of Artaxerxes to give him one of his concubines, whom he had demanded, had extremely incensed him, and he formed a conspiracy against his father's life, wherein he engaged fifty of his brothers.

It was Tirabazus, of whom mention has been made already, who contributed the most to his taking so unnatural a resolution from a like subject of discontent against the king; who, having promised to give him first one of his daughters in marriage, and then another, broke his word both times, and married them himself; such abominable in-

* Diodorus says he was sent to Tachos, but it is more likely that it was to Nectanebus.

† Plut. in Artax. pp. 1024-1027. Diod. l. xv. p. 400. Justin. l. x. c. 1, 2.

‡ This tiara was a turban, or kind of head-dress, with the plume of feathers standing upright upon it. The seven counsellors had also plumes of feathers, which they wore aslant, and before. All others wore them aslant, and behind.

cests being permitted at that time in Persia, the religion of the nation not prohibiting them.

The number of the conspirators was already very great, and the day fixed for the execution, when a eunuch, well informed of the whole plot, discovered it to the king. Upon that information, Artaxerxes thought it would be highly imprudent to despise so great a danger by neglecting a strict inquiry into it, but that it would be much more so, to give credit to it without certain and unquestionable proof. He assured himself of it with his own eyes. The conspirators were suffered to enter the king's apartment, and then seized. Darius and all his accomplices were punished as they deserved.

After the death of Darius, the cabals began again. Three of his brothers were competitors, Ariaspes, Ochus, and Arsames. The two first pretended to the throne in right of birth, being the sons of the queen. The third had the king's favor, who tenderly loved him, though only the son of a concubine. Ochus, prompted by his restless ambition, studied perpetually the means to rid himself of both his rivals. As he was equally cunning and cruel, he employed his cunning and artifice against Ariaspes, and his cruelty against Arsames. Knowing the former to be extremely simple and credulous, he made the eunuchs of the palace, whom he had found means to corrupt, threaten him so terribly in the name of the king his father, that expecting every moment to be treated as Darius had been, he poisoned himself to avoid it. After this there remained only Arsames to give him umbrage; because his father, and all the world, considered that prince as most worthy of the throne, from his ability and other excellent qualities. He caused him to be assassinated by Harpates, son of Tiribazus.

This loss, which followed close upon the other, and the exceeding wickedness with which both were attended, gave the old king a grief that proved mortal: nor is it surprising, that at his age he should not have strength enough to support so great an affliction. He sunk under it into his tomb, after a reign of forty-three years, which might have been called happy, if not interrupted by many revolts. That of his successor will be no less disturbed with them.*

* A. M. 3643. Ant. J. C. 361.

SECTION XII.—CAUSES OF THE FREQUENT INSURRECTIONS
AND REVOLTS IN THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.

I have taken care, in relating the seditions that happened in the Persian empire, to observe from time to time the abuses which occasioned them. But as these revolts were more frequent than ever in the latter years, and will be more so, especially in the succeeding reign, I thought it would be proper to unite here, under the same point of view, the different causes of such insurrections, which foretell the approaching decline of the Persian empire.

I. After the reign of Artaxerxes Longimanus, the kings of Persia abandoned themselves more and more to the charms of voluptuousness and luxury, and the delights of an indolent and inactive life. Shut up generally in their palaces among women, and a crowd of flatterers, they contented themselves with enjoying, in soft effeminate ease and idleness, the pleasure of universal command, and made their grandeur consist in the splendid glare of riches, and an expensive magnificence.

II. They were, besides, princes of no great talents for the conduct of affairs, of little capacity to govern, and void of taste for glory. Not having a sufficient extent of mind to animate all parts of so vast an empire, nor ability to support the weight of it, they transferred to their officers the care of public business, the fatigues of commanding armies, and the dangers which attend the execution of great enterprises; confining their ambition to bearing alone the lofty title of the Great King, and the King of Kings.

III. The great offices of the crown, the government of the provinces, the command of armies, were generally bestowed upon people without either service or merit. It was the influence of the favorites, the secret intrigues of the court, the solicitations of the women of the palace, which determined the choice of the persons who were to fill the most important posts of the empire, and appropriated the rewards due to the officers who had done the state real service to their own creatures.

IV. These courtiers, often out of a base, mean jealousy of the merit that gave them umbrage, and reproached their mean abilities, removed their rivals from public employments, and rendered their talents useless to the state. Sometimes they would even cause their fidelity to be suspected by false informations, bring them to trial as criminals

against the state, and force the king's most faithful servants, for their defence against their calumniators, to seek their safety in revolting, and in turning those arms against their prince, which they had so often made to triumph for his glory, and the service of the empire.*

V. The ministers, to hold the generals in dependence, restrained them under such limited orders, as obliged them to let slip the occasions of conquering, and prevented them, by waiting for new orders, from pushing their advantages. They also often made them responsible for their bad success, after having let them want every thing necessary to the service.

VI. The kings of Persia had extremely degenerated from the frugality of Cyrus, and the ancient Persians, who contented themselves with cresses and salads for their food, and water for their drink. The whole nobility had been infected with the contagion of this example. In retaining the single meal of their ancestors, they made it last during the greatest part of the day, and prolonged it far into the night by drinking to excess; and far from being ashamed of drunkenness, they made it their glory, as we have seen in the example of young Cyrus.

VII. The extreme remoteness of the provinces, which extended from the Caspian and Euxine to the Red Sea and Ethiopia, from the rivers Ganges and Indus to the *Ægean* sea, was a great obstacle to the fidelity and affection of the people, who never had the satisfaction to enjoy the presence of their masters, who knew them only by the weight of their taxations, and by the pride and avarice of their satraps or governors; and who, in transporting themselves to the court, to make their demands and complaints there, could not hope to find access to princes, who believed it contributed to the majesty of their persons to make themselves inaccessible and invisible.

VIII. The multitude of provinces in subjection to Persia, did not compose a uniform empire, nor the regular body of a state, whose members were united by the common ties of interests, manners, language, and religion, and animated with the same spirit of government, under the guidance of the same laws. It was rather a confused, disjointed, tumultuous, and even forced assemblage of different nations, formerly free and independent, some of whom, who were torn from their native countries and the sepulchres of their

* Pharnabazus, Tiribazus, Datames, &c.

forefathers, saw themselves with pain transported into unknown regions, or among enemies, where they persevered to retain their own laws and customs, and a form of government peculiar to themselves. These different nations, who not only lived without any common tie or relation among them, but with a diversity of manners and worship, and often with antipathy of characters and inclinations, desired nothing so ardently as their liberty, and re-establishment in their own countries. All these people, therefore, were unconcerned for the preservation of an empire, which was the sole obstacle to their so ardent and just desires, and could affect a government that treated them always as strangers and subjected nations, and never gave them any share in its authority or privileges.

IX. The extent of the empire, and its remoteness from the court, made it necessary to give the viceroys of the frontier provinces a very great authority in every branch of government; to raise and pay armies; to impose tribute; to adjudge the differences of cities, provinces, and vassal kings, and to make treaties with the neighboring states. A power so extensive, and almost independent, in which they continued many years without being changed, and without colleagues or council to deliberate upon the affairs of their provinces, accustomed them to the pleasure of commanding absolutely, and of reigning. In consequence of which, it was with great reluctance they submitted to be removed from their governments, and they often endeavored to support themselves in them by force of arms.

X. The governors of provinces, the generals of armies, and all the other officers and ministers, thought it for their honor to imitate, in their equipages, tables, movables, and habits, the pomp and splendor of the court in which they had been educated. To support so destructive a pride, and to furnish expenses so much above the fortunes of private persons, they were reduced to oppress the subjects under their jurisdiction with exorbitant taxes, flagrant extortions, and the shameful traffic of a public venality, that set those offices to sale for money, which ought to have been granted only to merit. All that vanity lavished, or luxury exhausted, was made good by mean arts, and the violent rapaciousness of an insatiable avarice.

These gross irregularities, and many others, which remained without remedy, and which were daily augmented by impunity, tired the people's patience, and occasioned a gene-

ral discontent among them, the usual forerunner of the ruin of states. Their just complaints, long despised, were followed by the open rebellion of several nations, who endeavored to do themselves that justice by force, which was refused to their remonstrances. In such a conduct, they failed in the submission and fidelity which subjects owe to their sovereigns; but paganism did not carry its lights so far, and was not capable of so sublime a perfection, which was reserved for a religion that teaches, that no pretext, no injustice, nor vexation, can ever authorize the rebellion of a people against their prince.

END OF VOL. II.





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